34th Annual Meeting of the

International Association for the Philosophy of Sport

hosted by

The Faculty of Applied Health Sciences
Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada

in

Niagara Falls, Ontario, Canada

September 14 – 17, 2006
Welcome!

On behalf of the Program Committee, it gives me great pleasure to welcome colleagues and students, old and new, to the 34th Annual Conference of the International Association for the Philosophy of Sport hosted by the Faculty of Applied Health Sciences, Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada in Niagara Falls, Ontario, Canada. A generation ago the Association held its conference in nearby Buffalo, just a short drive to one of the world’s most breathtaking landmarks. This year’s venue will allow delegates and guests to look out their hotel window to see the falls and actually walk up to the falls in just a matter of minutes. In addition to Niagara’s famous natural wonder, participants at this year’s conference have access to two world-class casinos, excellent restaurants, bars and entertainment destinations, and many sites in the region, including some of the best wineries in Canada. I do hope you take advantage of the many activities available in the area during your visit.

I want to extend my appreciation to Andy Miah, Heather Reid and Heather Sheridan for their invaluable assistance in helping me and the other members of the Program Committee, Dennis Hemphill and Mike McNamee, prepare for the conference. Drawing from their wealth of experience made our job much easier. I am extremely grateful to Dennis and Mike for their conscientious efforts in reviewing the abstracts and making sound recommendations relative to the program. I would also like to thank members of the Site Organizing Committee for their dedicated work. We hope we have lived up to the high standards of excellent conferences in years past.

This year’s conference is one of the largest on record. The annual conference continues to attract new scholars and I hope their experience, and that of all participants, is a stimulating and rewarding one. I would encourage those who are not members of the Association to please consider joining our international family of sport philosophers. As you will find out, we are a dynamic and collegial group with a common interest - our love of sport and philosophy - and that makes us a rather unique academic community.

Once again, we hope you enjoy this year’s conference. The venue is highly attractive, and with our scholarly exchanges, meeting new colleagues and catching up with old ones, you leave energized and satisfied. Should you have any questions or require assistance, please contact a member of the Site Organizing Committee or me.

Danny Rosenberg
Conference Chair and Site Convener

Site Organizing Committee Members: Emily Allan, John Corlett, Tim Elcombe, Peter Hager, Milaina Lagzdins, Ian Ritchie, Leslie Stefanyk, Phil Sullivan, Cesar Torres

Thursday, 14th September

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<td>3 – 3:30pm</td>
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<td>Dr. Terry Boak, Provost &amp; Vice-President, Academic Brock University</td>
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<td>Faculty of Applied Health Sciences, Brock University</td>
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<td>Heather Reid, IAPS President</td>
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<td>3:30 – 4:15pm</td>
<td>Warren P. Fraleigh Distinguished Scholar Lecture (Great Room)</td>
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<td>R. Scott Kretchmar, Penn State University, USA*</td>
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<td>The Normative Heights and Depths of Play</td>
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<td>*Dedicated to the memory of Mark Kodya</td>
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<td>Peter Hopsicker</td>
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<td>Nick Dixon</td>
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<td>Is Intercollegiate Sport Consistent with Universities’ Academic Mission</td>
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<td>Tim Elcombe</td>
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<td>Thinking ‘Small’: Ethical Leadership in Sport and Leisure</td>
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<td>Jeff Fry</td>
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<td>Coaching and the Consolations of Philosophy</td>
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<td>Leslie Howe</td>
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<td>Peter F. Hager</td>
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<td>Reverence: An Ancient Virtue for Modern Sport</td>
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<td>Praying for Assistance: Considerations for Kreider</td>
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<td>Ben Letson</td>
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<td>Games, Sports, and the Problem of Evil</td>
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<td>Cesar Torres</td>
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<td>Sport and Friendship: Embracing the Other</td>
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<td>Self-Promotion and Other-Concern: Aretism as a Guide to an Integrative Model of Sport Today</td>
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<td>William J. Morgan</td>
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<td>Sport and the Moral Importance of What We Care About</td>
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<td>6 – 8pm</td>
<td>Welcome Reception (Great Room)</td>
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| 8:30 – 10am | Freedom and Necessity in the World of Extreme Sports  
              | Pam R. Sailors
              | More than Meets the ‘I’: Values of Dangerous Sport |  
              | Artyom Ivanenko
              | John Michael Atherton
              | Canoes in the Office
              | Kevin Krein
              | Sport, Nature, and the Metaphysics of Worldmaking |  
              | Naofumi Masumoto
              | Grassroots Olympic Peace Activities: The Winter Olympic Message Relay for Peace and the Environment |  
| 10 – 10:30am | Refreshment Break (Atrium)  
              | 3A, Grand Hall I
              | Paul Gaffney
              | Gunnar Breivik
              | Skillful Coping in Everyday Life and in Sport: A Critical Examination of the Views of Heidegger and Dreyfus |  
              | Peter M. Hopsicker
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              | Claudio Tamburrini
              | Should Elite Sport Serve Social Utility?: Transforming Sports Medicine Ethics to Shape Democratic Society |  
| 3B, Grand Hall II | Sarah Teetzl
              | Michael S. Capobianco
              | Discovering the Self Through Play |  
              | Leslie A. Howe
              | Play, Pretence and Intersubjectivity |  
              | Simon Shih
              | A Critique of Johan Huizinga’s Play Theory from the Perspective of the ‘Sacred’ |  
| 3C, Grand Hall III | Dennis Hemphill
              | Michael W. Austin
              | The Magnanimous Athlete |  
              | Christos Evangelou
              | Socrates on Erotic/Aretic Athletics: An Analysis of Xenophon’s Symposium |  
              | Heather L. Reid
              | Philosopher-Athletes in Plato’s Republic |  
| 10:30am – 12pm | PANEL SESSION  
              | Sport as Fertile Ground for Deleuzian Deterritorialization |  
              | Panel Members:
              | Maureen Ford
              | Jamie Magnusson
              | David Phillips
              | Mark Renneson (Organizer) |
### Friday, 15th September

**12 – 1:30pm**

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<td>Bogdan Ciomaga</td>
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<td><strong>Face-Painters and Fascism: Reading Sports Fans From a Schmittian Perspective</strong></td>
<td><strong>No Line to Draw? Performance-Enhancement and Moral Particularism</strong></td>
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<td>Sheryle Dixon</td>
<td>Carwyn Jones &amp; Scott Fleming</td>
<td>Yoshitaka Kondo</td>
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<td><strong>Including Children with Disabilities in Sports Activities: A Moral Imperative</strong></td>
<td>‘I’d Rather Wear a Turban than a Rose’: The (In)appropriateness of Terrace Chanting Amongst Sport Spectators</td>
<td><strong>Why Japanese Athletes Do Not Indulge in Doping</strong></td>
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<td>J. S. Russell</td>
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<td><strong>Children and Dangerous Sports</strong></td>
<td><strong>The Fan’s Power to Corrupt Sports Play</strong></td>
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<td>Alun R. Hardman</td>
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<td><strong>The Inadequacy of ‘Gender’ as an Emancipatory Concept</strong></td>
<td><strong>Change of Citizenship in International Sport: Considerations of Moderate Patriotism and Morality</strong></td>
<td><strong>Samurai Wielding Tennis Rackets: On Zen, Swordsmanship, and Sport</strong></td>
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<td>Joan Grassbaugh Forry</td>
<td>Douglas W. McLaughlin &amp; Cesar Torres</td>
<td>Sharon Kay Stoll &amp; Jennifer M. Beller</td>
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<td><strong>Female Bodybuilding and the Problem of Gender Performativity in Sport</strong></td>
<td><strong>Olympism and Intersubjectivity</strong></td>
<td><strong>Reductivist or Pedagogist?</strong></td>
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<td>Mark Renneson &amp; Maureen Ford</td>
<td>Masami Sekine</td>
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<td><strong>Playing with Deterritorialization and Deterritorializing Play: A Deleuzian Approach to</strong></td>
<td><strong>From Record to Narrative: Social Philosophy of Narrative</strong></td>
<td><strong>The Value of Sport in the 21st Century</strong></td>
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<td>6B, Grand Hall II&lt;br&gt;Sharon Kay Stoll&lt;br&gt;Dennis Hemphill&lt;br&gt;A Phenomenology of Digital Sport&lt;br&gt;Sigmund Loland&lt;br&gt;Technological Challenges to Sport&lt;br&gt;Sean Smith&lt;br&gt;The Networked Meta-Game as Cyber(Enabled) Sport: A Response to Hemphill</td>
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<td>12 – 1:30pm</td>
<td>Lunch on Your Own</td>
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<td>1:30 – 3pm</td>
<td><strong>Sessions</strong>&lt;br&gt;7A, Grand Hall I&lt;br&gt;Gregg Twietmeyer&lt;br&gt;Alison Lord&lt;br&gt;Aesthetics in Sport: Unhooking Aesthetics From Art&lt;br&gt;Stephen Mumford&lt;br&gt;Aesthetics and Art in Sport&lt;br&gt;Charlene Weaving&lt;br&gt;Strippersize Me!: An Analysis of the Fitness Craze of Aerobic Striptease</td>
<td>7B, Grand Hall II&lt;br&gt;Bob Simon&lt;br&gt;Mike McNamee&lt;br&gt;What’s Wrong with Prudent Athletic Planners and Prudent Athletic Lifestyles&lt;br&gt;Heather Sheridan&lt;br&gt;How Do We Decide What’s Good for Sport?&lt;br&gt;Sarah Teetzel&lt;br&gt;Autonomy and Sport: Determining an Account</td>
<td>7C, Grand Hall III&lt;br&gt;Alun Hardman&lt;br&gt;PANEL SESSION&lt;br&gt;‘Doing’ Philosophy: Teaching and Learning in Exercise Science, Sport Studies, Human Movement, Physical Education and Sport Management</td>
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<td>6:30 – 10:30 pm</td>
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<td><strong>Warren P. Fraleigh Distinguished Scholar Lecture</strong></td>
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<td>Robert L. Simon, Hamilton College, USA</td>
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<td><em>Deserving to be Lucky: Some Reflections on the Role of Luck in Sport</em></td>
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<td><em>Heather Reid, Moderator</em></td>
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<td>Gregg Twietmeyer&lt;br&gt;Aristotle, Polanyi and the Redefinition of Kinesiology&lt;br&gt;Andrew D. Valentine&lt;br&gt;Dynamical Systems Theory and the Philosophical Implications for Understanding Sport&lt;br&gt;Samuel Morris&lt;br&gt;Genetically Engineering Our Way to Sexual Equality in Sport&lt;br&gt;Junko Yamaguchi&lt;br&gt;An Alternative Virtual Reality as Related to the Nature of the Sporting Body&lt;br&gt;<strong>PANEL SESSION</strong>&lt;br&gt;Institutions and Ethics: A Critique of the NCAA as Protector or Promoter of the Welfare of Student-Athletes&lt;br&gt;Panel Members: Mark Hamilton (Organizer)&lt;br&gt;Scott Kretchmar (Organizer)&lt;br&gt;Jan Rintala&lt;br&gt;Robert Simon</td>
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<td><strong>Sessions</strong>&lt;br&gt;Moderators: 9A, Grand Hall I <em>Jeff Fry</em>&lt;br&gt;9B, Grand Hall II <em>Joan Grassbaugh Forry</em>&lt;br&gt;9C, Grand Hall III <em>Kevin Krein</em>&lt;br&gt;10:30am – 12pm</td>
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<td>Kenneth Kirkwood&lt;br&gt;Reconsidering Internal Goods as the Philosophical ‘Way Ahead’ in the War on Doping in Sport&lt;br&gt;Jim Nendel&lt;br&gt;Big Game Hunt or Staged Massacre: The United States Congress and the Hunt for an Ethical Approach to the Steroid Issue in Baseball&lt;br&gt;Jerzy Kosiewicz&lt;br&gt;Boxing as a Manifestation of Movement Toward Absolute Abstraction: An Analysis from Hegelian Phenomenology of Spirit&lt;br&gt;Alex Krasnick&lt;br&gt;For All the Right Reasons: Morally Justifying the Hockey Fight&lt;br&gt;Danny Rosenberg&lt;br&gt;The Vulnerability Principle and Violence in Hockey</td>
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<td>12pm</td>
<td>Conference Close</td>
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Canoes in the Office
John Michael Atherton, Seton Hill University, USA
Friday, September 15, 8:30-10:00am, Grand Hall II
(Session 2B with Kevin Krein and Naofumi Masumoto)

What does canoeing have to do with the office, except as a respite? I argue that we can use canoeing to enhance office life and it does so beyond its obvious escapism. “Canoeing” represents Outdoor Kinesthetic Experiences (OKEs) such as mountain biking, kayaking, and rock climbing. “Office” represents indoor, structured, and primarily cognitive activities found in the classroom, home, and business.

The real consequences and unpredictability of OKEs intensify our sensory perceptions, require physical reactions, and entail patterns of thought called “Adaptive Thinking”. Adaptive Thinking selects heuristics that help us make decisions in limited time with incomplete information in order to survive and flourish. Borrowing from (and freely modifying) David Tracy’s work “Analogue Imagery,” I claim an OKE is an intensive journey into an outdoor setting that is accompanied by a willing self-exposure to a concrete whole where the participant has a particular vision of the whole and must engage in specific responses using Adaptive Thinking. The intensity of OKEs frees us from the tyranny of the familiar where the physically safe office routines dull our perceptions and limit our physical activity. People nap in the office, not in white water.

To transfer Adaptive Thinking from an outdoor to an indoor venue requires Analogue Imagery (AI), wherein we identify similarities while remaining aware of differences. Analogue Imagery can be as simple as comparing a sunrise to a sunset or as complex as comparing love to the sound of laughter. Analogue Imagery discloses the extraordinary in the ordinary, and reveals multiple connections, meanings, and enriching extensions beyond the initiating event. We use AI to generalize as a normal part of life because one experience is never identical to another. If such generalization did not occur, we would live a compartmentalized existence with no two events informing one another.

OKE insight helps us understand office experiences. Drawing on AI that is informed by a “Canoe Culture,” with its special praxis, texts, events, language, rituals, images, material, and personal expressions, we can apply river success to office success. In white-water canoeing we navigate the flow of water, negotiate obstacles, and handle gear. In an office we navigate the flow of psycho-social energy, negotiate personality conflicts, and manage office equipment. Both on the river and in the office we have relevant goals, cultures, and abilities that guide decisions and actions.

If OKEs provide insight into the office, properly tempered by an awareness of differences, then we increase the value of kinesthetic wisdom because we integrate it with other areas of life. If we leave outdoor insight on the river and path, we compartmentalize knowledge and demote kinesthetic wisdom as unworthy of serious attention. Such epistemic isolationism seems unacceptable because we are adaptive creatures who use any information we can to survive and flourish. If OKEs offer insight, we would be wise to take it.


The Magnanimous Athlete
Michael W. Austin, Eastern Kentucky University, USA
Friday, September 15, 8:30-10:00am, Grand Hall III
(Session 2C with Christos Evangelioi and Heather Reid)
During the past fifty years, there has been a revival of virtue ethics in moral philosophy, inspired in large part by the writings of Aristotle. While much attention has been paid to the theoretical merits of virtue ethics compared to other theoretical perspectives in ethics, very little attention has been given to the application of virtue ethics to contemporary moral issues.

In this paper, I will focus on the Aristotelian virtue of magnanimity.\(^1\) The literal rendering of this term is “great-souledness.” Interpreters of Aristotle have also translated this term as “pride,” “high-mindedness,” “superiority,” and “dignity.” The issues raised by Aristotle’s treatment of the virtue of magnanimity are important, and are especially relevant in the realm of athletics. A philosophical analysis of magnanimity leads us to consider “the character traits and type of psychological stance exemplified in those who aspire to acts of extraordinary excellence.”\(^2\) These character traits are particularly salient to the morality, motivations, and actions of athletes.

Interpreted one way, magnanimity calls to mind the recent actions of someone like Terrell Owens, both on and off the football field. However, under other interpretations, the magnanimous athlete is a very different type of person. The magnanimous person thinks that she is worthy of great things, and in fact is worthy of great things. The magnanimous person is able to properly handle honor, acclaim, and wealth. If one possesses the virtue of magnanimity, one must possess the many other virtues that Aristotle thinks are required for human flourishing, such as courage, generosity, and temperance. Those individuals who possess a mere semblance of magnanimity become arrogant and aggressive.

After offering a more complete analysis of the virtue of magnanimity, I intend to explore the implications of this virtue for the character and actions of athletes. How does the magnanimous athlete behave on the playing field? What does the magnanimous athlete value as an athlete? What motivates her to pursue excellence in her sport? Finally, I will explore whether or not the magnanimous athlete will seek to enhance her performance through the use of drugs or genetic modifications that are intended to enhance athletic performance. My thesis is that given Aristotle’s requirement that the magnanimous person will also possess all of the other moral virtues, the magnanimous athlete will not use drugs or undergo genetic modifications in order to enhance athletic performance.

Skilful Coping in Everyday Life and in Sport: A Critical Examination of the Views of Heidegger and Dreyfus

Gunnar Breivik, Norwegian University of Physical Education and Sport, Norway

Friday, September 15, 10:30 am – 12:00 pm, Grand Hall I
(Session 3A with Peter Hopsicker and Claudio Tamburrini)

In this paper I will try to make a contribution to the discussion of skilful motor behaviour in sport philosophy. My focus will be on the concept of ‘absorbed coping’, its presuppositions and its consequences. Hubert Dreyfus has coined the concept referring to Heidegger’s analysis in Being and Time of our everyday dealing with our environing world. In our daily life entities are discovered not as objects but as items of equipment to be used non-thematically in our circumspective dealing with our environment. Dreyfus has extended this analysis to sport. He maintains that skilled motor behaviour at expert level is to be characterized as non-thematic and absorbed coping. What I specifically intends to examine critically in this paper is the following:

1. How does Heidegger’s analysis of our everyday dealing with equipmental totalities throw light on our dealing with the environment in sport?
2. Is Dreyfus’ theory of absorbed coping a reasonable interpretation of Heidegger’s views on our everyday dealing with our equipmental environments?
3. Is Dreyfus’ use of absorbed coping to characterize our skilful dealings in everyday life and in sports, especially at expert level, suitable and valid?

I will start the paper with a presentation of some of the main ideas of Heidegger’s Being and Time, especially of the overcoming of the subject-object dichotomy in the idea of Being-in-the-

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\(^1\) This brief overview of the virtue of magnanimity is drawn from Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, and from David Horner’s “What it Takes to be Great: Aristotle and Aquinas on Magnanimity,” *Faith and Philosophy* 15 (1998): 415-444.

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 415.
World. I will then present and discuss his analysis of equipmental contexts (availableness). I will then discuss Dreyfus’ interpretation of equipmentality as a background for his idea of absorbed coping. Specifically I will show how he uses a breakdown in equipmental contexts to introduce representational thinking. The next main part will then more specifically relate Heidegger’s and Dreyfus’ view on coping to sport situations and contexts. I will here more explicitly present my disagreement with Heidegger and Dreyfus on some important points. I will end by stating systematically my conclusions and what I have found.

References

Discovering the Self Through Play
Michael S. Capobianco, The University of Western Ontario, Canada
Friday, September 15, 10:30 am – 12:00 pm, Grand Hall II
(Session 3B with Leslie Howe and Simon Shih)

In North America, play is predominantly viewed as an activity that should not be a priority in one’s life. Although some scholars have rightly displayed how play activity can be valuable, play is still labelled as immature and not worthy of one’s time, primarily being associated with children. These associations can be attributed to the misunderstanding of what the potential influence play activity can have on one’s life. Play can be helpful in developing one’s true Self, which most people struggle to discover over an entire lifetime.

Highly influenced by the existential frameworks of Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre, this study attempts to legitimize and elevate the value of play activity. To justify the value of play, this study is separated into five sections. Part One will summarize the existing, common opinions against play. The negative aspects attributed to play activity revolve around three topics: (i) its supposed unreality; (ii) its unserious nature; and, (iii) its childish orientation. Part Two will concentrate on the academic literature that discusses some ideas justifying play. This section focuses on existential thought and how play activity can contribute to the development of the Self. Part Three will include a few personal suggestions for play, incorporating old and new concepts of play to further the cause for the importance of play in life. Topics include the idea of mind-play, a re-evaluation of the three negative attributes associated with play in Part One, the work-play dichotomy, and play from a spectator’s view. Part Four will highlight a possible consequence of accepting play as a legitimate life activity, using the example of violence in sport. Lastly, Part Five will provide some concluding remarks on play.

Ultimately, it will be displayed that play activity can expose one to a fruitful source of possibility, which will assist in the discovery of the authentic Self.

Is Sports Bluffing Ethical?
Tal Caspi, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel
Saturday, September 16, 8:30 – 10:00 am, Grand Hall I
(Session 6A with Paul Gaffney and Sharon Kaye)

It is very difficult to find someone who hasn't heard about "The Hand of God goal" scored by Diego Maradona in the quarter-final match of the 1986 Mondial between England and Argentina,. Maradona scored the goal with his hand but the referee allowed the goal. By the end of the match, Maradona was asked about the goal and he said: “A little bit by the Hand of God, another bit by the head of Maradona". It is very clear that this answer was not a sincere expression of truth. This was proved, sixteen years after the fact when Maradona himself admitted to this during the time when his autobiography was publicized. It is a coincidence that he won by the "Hand of God” as he put it. In fact, this was just one example of the many cases where sports-players bluff in order to win a game.
This study focuses on the ethical issues derived from bluffing in sports match. The first part will present the criteria that will help distinguish between cases, in the Sports Sphere, that are "just" bluffs and cases which are full blown lies. It will ask when bluffing is an instance of cheating and when it fails to be an example of fair-play. The second part deals with the approaches that may accept certain instances of bluffing as legitimate active methods for sport-players. One way of supporting legitimacy of sports bluffing, may arrive from Business Ethics arena. Albert Car (1968), in his famous article "Is Business Bluffing Ethical?" supports the idea that bluffing is a part of the ethical business sphere. His argument is based on the analogy between the world of games and the business-world. He says that business bluffing is simply part of a game strategy in the business world, just as it is legitimate in other games. This view is often interpreted as a false analogy, especially based on the fact that it ignores important differences between the business world and the games world. Even though both of these worlds are based on competition, games much more exemplify this competition hypothetically, as if it were real. Where as, in the business world the competition is in a reality, a part of life.

Competitions in the sports sphere are games, therefore the analogy between a sports match and poker, doesn’t suffer from the same weakness that the analogy of the business world and the game of poker does. Nonetheless, along with this, a basic intuition tells us that bluffing can't live together with values of a fair and honest sports competition. This intuition based on the understanding that one of the foundational values of every sports competition is fairness.

Poker is a fair game where everyone can, or more correctly, has to bluff, if he wants to win. Is this also the meaning of a fair game of competition in sports? Obviously not! However, to show this, one has to analyze the analogy between the game of poker and the game of sports, and to show that these are the imaginary points and they are the important differences between the two games.

In the third part, the fans will be added to the discussion. There is a significant difference between the player's obligations of a fair game, and the fan's obligations of this. The obligations of the former are much stronger than the latter.

Broad Internalism and Adjudication: A Reply to Russell
Bogdan Ciomaga, The Ohio State University, USA
Friday, September 15, 1:30 – 3:00 pm, Grand Hall I
(Session 4A with Sheryle Dixon and J. S. Russell)

Broad internalism has become, thanks to a series of seminal papers written by John Russell, Nicholas Dixon and Robert Simon, central to the way the application of sport rules is generally understood. In this paper, I am going to address one of these articles, more exactly the argument made by John Russell in "Are Umpires All an Umpire Has to Work With?". I will first put the paper in the context of the Hart/Dworkin debate and I am going to show that a rejection of formalism in adjudication does not result in an automatic rejection of Hart’s legal positivist account of adjudication, and that Dworkin’s criticism of Hart as formalistic is unjustified in this respect. This means that a legal positivist account of decisions in sport is at least possible and that ignoring it is unjustified. In the second part, I am going to argue that applying an account like Dworkin’s to sport will give umpires a kind of freedom that will allow them to make major modifications of the rules of a sport, which is unacceptable. This freedom is put in check in Dworkin’s account by the requirement of fit and the idea of precedent, which are not really established in sport as formal requirements and there is no basis for establishing it. At the same time, an account like that of Russell misses the fact that sports are not means of achieving certain states of affairs like those described in the principles he presents, but rather sports are essentially collections of rules and breaking those rules in a significant number, even with the goal of satisfying the principles of adjudication described by Russell, results in not playing the game in the first place. In the third part of the paper, I am going to argue that the adjudication model proposed by Russell fails to take into consideration the fact that umpires are subject to obligations generated by expectations of the community, which, in many cases, are not rational developments along an ideal, but rather random traditionally accepted conventions. For this reason, I will argue that a conventionalist approach that follows the positivist account of Jules Coleman is preferable.
Face-Painters and Fascism: Reading Sports Fans from a Schmittian Perspective
Dan Collins-Cavanaugh, University of Maryland, USA
Friday, September 15, 1:30 – 3:00 pm, Grand Hall II
(Session 4B with Carwyn Jones & Scott Fleming and Stephen Schmid)

This paper concerns what seems to me to be a fairly recent phenomenon: the politicizing of professional team sports. This politicizing is not in the ordinary sense of nationalism per se. Certainly, nationalism still emerges from time to time in the context of professional team sports, but only in a secondary way (when professional athletes represent their countries in world competitions like the World Cup in soccer or the recently orchestrated World Baseball Classic). But the days where the Soviets and the Americans squared off and counted medals in the Olympics are over, since there is no more Soviet Union, nor any other comparable power with which America can have a Cold War. Instead, globalization means that the best athletes from around the world (with a few exceptions) play in the most lucrative sports leagues, wherever those leagues may be. The best basketball players in Europe play in America’s National Basketball Association. The best soccer players from America play in Europe’s top soccer leagues. Instead, what I have in mind here is something between the fans of the teams. This politicizing between the fans takes the form of Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction, with the teams becoming virtual nations. This has the effect of intensifying the experience of the fans in a way that may not be at all seemly, since the friend-enemy distinction is, philosophically speaking, a fascist distinction.

I develop this reading in the following manner. First, I offer a brief explanation of what Schmitt means by the friend-enemy distinction, how it works, and how it is determined. Then I discuss the transition among fans of professional sports teams from entertained spectators to engaged political actors. In particular, I will look at fans of three professional sports: football and baseball in America and soccer in Britain (I will use “soccer” instead of “football” so as not to confuse it with American football). Among the most important items to be discussed are the increasing attitude of “winning is everything,” or “Lombardianism” among the fans of these teams, the increasing tendency to wear the team’s “colors” or “merchandise” (jerseys, etc), paint faces, and so on, and the increasing violence, both verbal and physical, directed towards fans of the opposing teams – and sometimes towards the opposing teams themselves (particularly among European soccer fans of a certain kind, known as hooligans, ultras, etc).

I will conclude with some speculation as to why these Schmittian tones have been emerging among and between fans of professional sports over the last 15 or so years. I believe that the analysis will point to something many will find disturbing about the direction of sports fandom, namely, that it might be trying to fulfill a real or perceived need among people to have themselves arrayed in a friend-enemy configuration.*

*Tamburrini’s, article, “Is Our Admiration for Sport Heroes Fascistoid?” (Journal of the Philosophy of Sport. XXV, 1998, 23-34), was helpful in a number of ways in formulating this idea. I believe my analysis goes a bit further, however, since it leads from admiration to (more and more often) a kind of arrangement and action with decidedly fascist aspects.

No Line to Draw? Performance-Enhancement and Moral Particularism
Leon Culbertson, Edge Hill College of Higher Education, UK
Friday, September 15, 1:30 – 3:00 pm, Grand Hall III
(Session 4C with Yoshitaka Kondo and Jan Todd)

The notion of drawing a line is a prominent feature of literature on the moral evaluation of performance-enhancement practices. This paper draws on the later work of G. P. Baker, exploring his interpretation of Wittgenstein’s use of the terms ‘picture’ and ‘conception’ to argue that the notion of drawing a line is a picture with which we often operate when engaged in moral evaluation. This is a central feature of both ‘everyday’ moral evaluation and much literature in ethics and ethics of sport (not only deontology). The paper argues that the notion of drawing a line creates a false and misleading picture, which leads us to want to say ‘everything on this side of the line is okay, and everything on the other side is objectionable.’ By drawing a line, or simply
by thinking that that is what we need to do, we require a generalization. It is this generalization that is the mistake – it leads us irrecoverably astray. We need to abandon the picture of drawing a line in our moral evaluation of action and belief.

If the notion of drawing a line has no place in moral evaluation of action or belief, then this raises issues around the relationship between ethics and practices where a line must be drawn. For example in medicine it is continually necessary to draw and re-drawn the line in relation to moral matters. The same is true of research ethics, law and policies on performance-enhancement in sport. It is therefore not possible to argue that along with a rejection of the notion of drawing a line as a basis for moral evaluation of action and belief, we must reject the practice of drawing a line as a guide to moral action in some situations. It is quite clear that from a practical point of view it is still necessary to draw a line in such situations. However, this brings into question the idea that concrete moral reasoning is purely the domain of philosophy (cf. Williams’ *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*). The moral evaluation of an action or belief is one thing, but the formulation of policy in relation to moral matters is another thing altogether. The notion that policy on moral matters can be formulated on the basis of the best way to morally evaluate actions and beliefs is mistaken. The two are separate spheres, one practical (policy) and the other philosophical/ethical (the moral evaluation of action and belief). This calls into question the idea that policy should be formulated on ethical grounds in such a way that those grounds would stand philosophical scrutiny. In reality, policy is necessarily formulated on practical grounds, which entail a ‘best fit’ approach. This matches policy to general moral principles in the best way generality allows. Perhaps the answer is to take the policy (and therefore its underlying principles) as a weak guide, but require consideration of the specifics of the case at hand. A key point of the paper, however, is to argue that while such an approach may be necessary in relation to policy, we should not make the mistake of concluding that such an approach should be applied to the moral evaluation of action and belief. The paper applies this position to clarify what I take to be confusions in the literature on performance-enhancement policies in sport.

Is Intercollegiate Sport Consistent with Universities’ Academic Mission?
Nick Dixon, Alma College, USA
*Thursday, September 14, 4:30 – 6:00 pm, Grand Hall I*
(Session 1A with Tim Elcombe and Jeff Fry)

Debate over intercollegiate athletics in the United States tends to focus on well known charges of corruption. A more fundamental and philosophically interesting question is whether intercollegiate athletics belongs on university campuses at all. What connection does it have with universities’ academic mission? These questions are pertinent to all countries, not just the US. This paper is devoted to analyzing sophisticated attempts to reconcile sport with the academic enterprise by Robert Simon (*Fair Play: Sports, Values, and Society*, Westview Press 2003) and Myles Brand (“The Role and Value of Intercollegiate Athletics in Universities,” *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport* 33:1, 2006).

Simon argues that participation in sport is inherently educational, in that it requires self-knowledge in order to identify our strengths and weaknesses, and critical thinking skills in order to improve our performance and overcome the challenge posed by opponents. These critical thinking skills are continuous with the analytic problem-solving abilities that are central to conventional academic disciplines.

Simon’s argument that intercollegiate athletes need to use intellectual skills is very persuasive. Nonetheless, it may prove too much, in that the vast majority of conscious activities also require the use of analytic and critical thinking abilities. For instance, operating a casino or a strip joint also requires considerable acumen and the ability to adapt to changing circumstances, but it’s doubtful that a university would want to put its name to such an enterprise. Moreover, a multitude of everyday activities like romantic relationships and raising children require extraordinary amounts of ongoing reflection and adaptive decision making. However, the idea that a university would make not the study but the actual performance of dating, marriage, and child-raising a university-sponsored program sounds absurd.

Whereas Simon is eager to highlight sport’s affinities with academic disciplines that require cognitive skills, Brand criticizes universities for inappropriately regarding intellectual
"knowledge that" as more important than physical "knowledge how." He presents an intriguing analogy between intercollegiate athletics and performing arts groups at universities, like theater companies and orchestras. Brand proposes that extend to sport the same respect that we currently accord to theater and music performances, which we unhesitatingly regard as contributing to a university's academic life.

Despite the ingenuity of Brand's analogy, crucial disanalogies exist. Granted, theater, dance, and music all involve primarily physical skills, but the performances in which these skills are displayed have the goal of expressing or conveying emotions or messages. This is what makes them art forms. Sport, in contrast, does not aim at expressing or conveying anything. The decision to treat music, dance and theater as courses of academic study, while sport is treated as an extracurricular activity, is based on the crucial distinction between entertainment and, in contrast, art as representation. It is not, pace Brand, mere prejudice against the body that leads critics to question the place of intercollegiate athletics in academia. Since both Simon's and Brand's arguments are problematic, we will need to look elsewhere for a compelling justification of intercollegiate athletics.

Including Children with Disabilities in Sports Activities: A Moral Imperative
Sheryle Dixon
Friday, September 15, 1:30 – 3:00 pm, Grand Hall I
(Session 4A with Bogdan Ciomaga and J. S. Russell)

In a JPS article entitled "Integrating Children with Physical Impairments Into Sport Activities: A 'Golden Sun' for All Children?", Pinter, Filipcic, Solar and Smrdu argue for the integration of children with physical impairments into sports activities because "recognition that physically disabled children can actively participate in sports programs with their healthy peers and that they can be equally successful provides a 'sun' for such children and those close to them" (JPS, 32:2, p. 47). I agree with some of Pinter, et al.'s reasons for advocating for children's participation in sport, e.g. social, recreational, health, etc. I have argued elsewhere that the benefits of participation in sport should be available to all children and thus organized sport should focus on modifying the internal aspects of sport, e.g., rules, player responsibilities, playing areas, etc. rather than on the external aspects, e.g., tournaments, spectators, prizes, etc.

However, the reason that children with disabilities should be included in sports activities is more fundamental than the possibility of children with disabilities experiencing social, recreational, health benefits, etc. It has to do with what it means to be human, to be part of the human community. In their conclusion, Pinter, et al. allude to "respecting human dignity" but do not go into much detail as to why this respect is critical regarding people with disabilities. Koppelman, in a chapter entitled "Respect and the Retarded," gives a number of reasons why people with severe cognitive disabilities are owed respect as fellow-beings. The reason that is particularly relevant to the discussion of the inclusion of children with disabilities in sports activities concerns the reason that "we share our communities and homes with them [people with disabilities]; we respect the commitment, benevolent concern or affection that holds families and communities together" (in Ethics and Mental Retardation, p. 77). In the proposed paper, I will examine in more detail a justification for the inclusion of children with disabilities in sports activities based on the moral imperative that we should respect children with disabilities since they are part of the human community.

The Inadequacy of ‘Gender’ as an Emancipatory Concept
Lisa Edwards, University of Wales Institute Cardiff, UK
Friday, September 15, 3:30 – 5:00 pm, Grand Hall I
(Session 5A with Joan Grassbaugh Forry and Mark Renneson & Maureen Ford)

The sex/gender bifurcation has served a number of functions, the most immediate was to provide means to challenge the hierarchical relationships that subordinate women to men (Hird 2000). However the work of recent feminists such as Butler, Grosz and Gatens, casts uncertainty on the validity of the sex/gender distinction. Feminists have embraced the sex/gender distinction as a way of providing women with liberation through gender role choice. The concept of ‘gender’
was originally embraced by feminists as a critical tool to challenge female oppression. Gender is predominantly used to refer to social behaviours and characteristics associated with biological sex. Yet as Howard and Hollander (1997: 10) note, “there is substantially less agreement on exactly what this statement means”. Alongside questions concerning the meaning of the concept ‘gender’, which it can be argued is based on a number of spurious dichotomies, Prokhovnik (1999: 108) crucially notes that the promise of a multiplicity of gender — roles made by the sex/gender distinction is illusory and remains fallacious. Despite the ever growing body of work aimed at problematising the sex/gender dichotomy and the critical analysis of gender as an emancipatory term, a large body of feminist research in sport is nevertheless determined by a gender-blind model of equality. The sporting movement for women has centred on equal opportunity and whilst this is a “lofty and reasonable goal” (Messner 1994: 201), it fails to challenge the structures and discourses that work to maintain male superiority in sport. Indeed, I will argue that investment in the term ‘gender’ has led to the neutralisation of sexual difference and the desire for sex blind equality. I will examine the suggestion that this desired neutrality is not neutrality at all but what Gatens (1996: 17) refers to as “a ‘masculinization’ or ‘normalization’ (in a society where men are seen as the norm, the standard) of women — a making of ‘woman’ into ‘man’”.

This paper will outline and critically assess some of the conceptual problems and limitations of investing in ‘gender’ as an emancipatory concept. I will argue that feminist theory has falsely relied upon the sex/gender distinction as an analytical tool used to examine the relationship between gender and subjectivity. It is my intention to problematise the dichotomous nature of the sex/gender distinction which fails to capture the diversity of subjectivity or recognise the interrelations between body, mind and emotion (Prokhovnik 1999). Furthermore, I will argue that mainstream sports feminists continue to work within the sex/gender dichotomy and resultanty feminisms only solutions for female athletes have been “to become honorary men or to retreat into the motherhood of ‘natural’ sexual difference” (Prokhovnik 1999: 158). Finally, this paper will suggest that the gender equality approach espoused by sports feminists has been reduced in effectiveness because of an acceptance of the sex / gender framework. The dismantling of this conceptual fallacy will be suggested as an important prerequisite to challenging female oppression in sport.

Thinking ‘Small’: Ethical Leadership in Sport and Leisure
Tim Elcombe, Brock University, Canada
Thursday, September 14, 4:30 – 6:00 pm, Grand Hall I
(Session 1A with Nick Dixon and Jeff Fry)

Better it is for philosophy to err in active participation in the living struggles and issues of its own age and times than to maintain an immune monastic impeccability, without relevance or bearing in the generating ideas of its contemporary present.
- John Dewey “Intelligence and Morals” (MW 4.44)

Shortly following the release of a book entitled Game of Shadows, Major League Baseball Commissioner Bud Selig appointed former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell to lead an investigation into allegations of rampant steroid use in baseball. Around the same time, National Football League Commissioner Paul Tagliabue announced his intention to step down from the position during the summer. Both highly public decisions inevitably led to comparisons between Selig and Tagliabue’s leadership styles and effectiveness—Tagliabue widely lauded as a tremendously successful leader of North America’s most successful league; Selig as a reactionary, out-of-touch chief executive officer of America’s pastime. In a larger sense, the discussions, evaluations, and debates brought to bear larger questions of leadership. What makes an effective leader? How does one become an effective leader? How do ethical leaders act?

When it comes to the topic of “leadership”, various forms of management studies, including sport and leisure management programs, tend to dominate inquiry. Research in these academic disciplines and sub-disciplines examine what a leader is in a “metaphysical” sense in
order to better understand what an “effective” leader does in a practical sense. Even inquiry into “leadership ethics” seems to mostly reside in the field of management “science”. But considered more generally, leadership emerges as an important idea infused with values and norms that greatly impact all forms of culture—including sport and leisure. Consequently, the moral forces that shape our ideas about leadership and what ethical leadership means need to be subject-matters for philosophers.

In this paper, I will examine “leadership” from a pragmatic perspective. In particular, the moral responsibility of leaders in sport and leisure contexts to contribute to the community members’ “good life” will be considered. I will begin with a critique of the current ideas informing “leadership”, including the limits of the “corporatist” approach and negative implications associated with disconnected and reactionary notions of ethics. General conclusions will suggest “grand” proposals, emphasis on special interests, and “managerial” models of leadership stunt meaningful progress in cultures including sport and leisure.

Following this critique, I will offer suggestions of how we can reconstruct our understanding of what moral leadership is and how it can meaningfully transform human practices. In particular, I will argue that pragmatic notions of ends-in-view, imagination and creativity, care and community, and the moral responsibility of citizens to engage in sociopolitical dialogue can greatly impact our ideas about leadership.

Socrates on Erotic/Aretic Athletics: An Analysis of Xenophon’s Symposium
Christos Evangeliou, Towson University, USA
Friday, September 15, 8:30 – 10:00 am, Grand Hall III
(Session 2C with Michael Austin and Heather Reid)

Unlike Plato’s Symposium, the Symposium described by Xenophon centers on Autolycos, a handsome Athenian young man and celebrated athlete. In fact, an admiring Athenian, the wealthy Callias, gave the party to honor him for a recent victory. Besides the many jokes and funny contests, which take place during the night, there is also a sober effort by Socrates to educate Autolycus and Callias in proper erotics, the difference between bodily beauty and beauty of the soul, and the two different types of eros that follow each. Socrates believes, and suggests to Callias and the other symposiasts, that the admirable Autolycus will approach the Helicnic ideal of kalos kai agathos, only if he succeeds in adding to his athletic prowess and the fitness of his body, the beauty of his soul and the excellence of his character. In the end of the evening, Socrates makes the distinction between the two Aphrodites, Pandemos and Ourania, deploiring the baseness and faults of the former, while extolling the beauty and the advantages of the latter in the long run.

It is my purpose in this study to take a closer look at Socrates’ erotic athletics as it is presented in the Symposium of Xenophon, and compare it with that which we find in such Platonic Dialogues as Lysis, Phaedrus and Symposium. From such a comparison it will become clear that Xenophon and Plato, in spite of their differences in style and emphasis, agree in portraying Socrates as an erotic philosopher. By both authors, Socrates is presented as a lover of wisdom, who is more attentive to the beauty of the human soul and its potential for ethical and intellectual excellence, than to the body and its potential for excelling in athletic contests. As an integral part of the human being, the body must be trained well in gymnastics and dance. It must be strong and healthy, fit and disciplined to obey reason and to serve the human soul in its quest of eudaimonia through the activity of arete, in its multiple forms, both ethical and intellectual. This Socratic and classical Hellenic ideal of kalokagathia, of a good human character in an athletic body, has not lost its appeal even in our times, when the commercialization of the athletics is intensified. However, there is good hope that the return of the Olympic Games to their birthplace in 2004 will revive the Classical Hellenic ideal of philosophical athletics, as was envisioned by the Platonic and the Xenophonian Socrates.

Female Bodybuilding and the Problem of Gender Performativity in Sport
Joan Grassbaugh Forry, Temple University, USA
Friday, September 15, 3:30 – 5:00 pm, Grand Hall I
(Session 5A with Lisa Edwards and Mark Renneson & Maureen Ford)
In this paper, I examine cultural tensions and anxieties regarding masculinized female bodies, most notably exemplified by the female bodybuilder. A body that appears strong and powerful signifies an ability to change, manipulate, and perhaps even dominate one’s environment. This body, and what it signifies, is a mainstay of hegemonic masculinity. Though male bodybuilders perform this masculinity to the extent that it becomes a parody, when female bodybuilders perform this masculinity, there is a disruption of both feminine and masculine norms.

I use the female bodybuilder to examine the significance of disruptions in gender performance in sport. In doing so, I make two philosophical moves. First, I claim that the masculinized body exemplified by the female bodybuilder challenges philosophical conceptions of gender. Using Judith Butler’s account of gender as performance, I provide an account of how gender operates in relation to the female bodybuilder. The notion of gender as performance subverts the idea that gender, as a signifier of sex, is rooted in static biological features. Instead, gender is created and maintained through imitative, repetitive acts. When a female body performs masculinity, as is the case of the female bodybuilder, a tension is created that works to disrupt cultural constructions of gendered bodies. I illustrate this tension in a Powerpoint presentation, exhibiting images of female bodybuilders and providing some basic insights into the rules and history of the sport.

For my second philosophical move, I posit that this tension is part and parcel of a cultural anxiety about female athletes in general. The fear of female athletes becoming masculinized, thought to be a by-product of participation in sport, is a recurring theme in sport history. While women’s sport participation has increased dramatically in recent past, cultural fear and anxiety over gender transgressions by women’s bodies is still evident today. This fear is exemplified today in the hyperfeminization and sexualization of female athletes. For example, in the case of the female bodybuilder, breast implants have become a compulsory feminine marker. Female athletes in general are sexualized in an attempt to interpret their muscular bodies as non-threatening. Yet, do the bodies of female athletes in general work to negotiate with cultural norms, using sport as a kind of feminist activism to create new expressions of femininity? Or ought we read the performance of muscular masculinity by female athletes as a reinscription of body hegemony?

I answer in the affirmative to both questions, contextualizing my response in third-wave feminism and its emphasis on body image as a feminist issue. Mixed messages about women in sport, rooted in the cultural anxiety about the masculinization of female bodies and exemplified par excellence by the female bodybuilder, work to limit the benefits to female athletes. While the female bodybuilder is a site of cultural tension and anxiety, the same body simultaneously signifies ideological resistance of cultural norms and an expansion of possibilities for female athletes.

**Coaching and the Consolations of Philosophy**
Jeff Fry, Ball State University, USA

*Thursday, September 14, 4:30 – 6:00 pm, Grand Hall I*
(Session 1A with Nick Dixon and Tim Elcombe)

While the vocation of coaching may be deeply rewarding for many of its practitioners, it also holds the potential for deep frustration. This is linked to the fact that coaching is a vocation saturated with contingency. The coach remains on the sidelines, while the athletes on the playing fields are the main actors, who execute or fail to execute the game plan. In addition, Nicholas Dixon has argued that contingencies such as poor refereeing, bad luck, and cheating may lead to “failed athletic contests” in which the most deserving athlete or team does not win (“On Winning and Athletic Superiority,” in M. Andrew Holowchak [ed.], *Philosophy of Sport: Critical Readings, Crucial Issues*, Prentice Hall/2002). In spite of these factors, a coach is held responsible for losses. Since winning is reckoned by many as success, coaches are often under intense pressure to win. In the world of contemporary sport, not only job security and prestige, but also large salaries are sometimes at stake. Temptations to follow paths of expediency lurk at the door.
What does philosophy have to offer to the many coaches who work and live in this pressure-packed environment? Can philosophy help coaches maintain robust physical and psychological health, and a deep commitment to moral integrity? What consolations can philosophy offer individuals who wish to realize the good life through the vocation of coaching? Can philosophy provide a vision of success which is not wholly contingent?

While examining these issues I will explore different schools of thought about the good life. One school counsels detachment and a goal of tranquility. Is this, practically speaking, a viable path for coaches? Is it consistent with caring? If coaches care about their craft, and about the athletes under their supervision, do they not want to share the pain of loss? A second school of thought embraces the passionate life. But does this path lead to instability, excess, and needless suffering? I will attempt to discern the pros and cons of each view for the vocation of coaching. Should coaches embrace either path? Is there a middle way? Can coaches embrace contentment without succumbing to complacency? Can coaches exhibit passion without loss of perspective?

In attempting to chart a path for coaches who wish to realize the good life through their profession, I will argue that coaches who flourish in a robust sense are sustained by certain virtues, including resilience and exuberance.

**Perspectives on Competition**

Paul Gaffney, St. John’s University, USA

*Saturday, September 16, 8:30 – 10:00 am, Grand Hall I*

(Session 6A with Tal Caspi and Sharon Kaye)

Pythagoras of Samos (c560-480 BCE) belongs on any short list of seminal thinkers in the Western intellectual tradition, and he even had something to say that pertains to the philosophy of sport. Pythagoras argued that there are three classes of men, which mirror the three types of men who go to the Olympic games. The least worthy go to buy and sell their wares; second are those who go to compete for honor; best of all are those who come simply to watch.

Pythagoras’ tripartite division is both characteristic and useful for some contemporary discussions; however, his preference for the observers is also characteristic and, in my view, dead wrong. Such an estimation overextends the view that *theoria* enjoys a natural superiority vis-à-vis *praxis*, which results in a point of view that unfairly denigrates the nobility of the competitive engagement. Pythagoras, of course, comes at this question with a deep-seated preference for the timeless, the pure, and the perfect (he is, through Plato, the chief originator of this Western intellectual tradition). But this epistemological premise causes him (and many others of a contemplative nature) to miss the special goodness that characterizes athletics.

To correct this view, we must start with an analysis of athletic competition: it is, first and foremost, a positive and irreducible relationship between the adversaries. By ‘irreducible’ I mean that it provides the occasion for a type of pleasure and excellence that cannot be simulated otherwise—specifically because of the competitive challenge that situates the athletic achievement. Although often thought of a *making* (a means-to-an-end) because the participants seek the spoils of victory, it is primarily a *doing* (an end-in-itself) because it represents a certain kind of authentic, intimate engagement.

By appreciating the nobility and the intimacy of the athletic engagement, we can better assess the different perspectives on competition and the various roles at the Games. Those who actually compete, because they put themselves on the line and strive for excellence against a resistant other, have by far the superior role. All others should approach the event with a respectful appreciation for the inherent value of the contest.

In contemporary sport culture there is lamentable tendency to regard the athletic event as merely an occasion for the simultaneous engagement of the various perspectives. Games become spectacles; even the athletes themselves often think of their activity as mere entertainment. Worst of all is the ever-growing presence of the “expert” analysts who dissect, criticize and, often, even ridicule what they observe from their safe positions. They implicitly set themselves up as the ultimate bar in their area of interest, as they consider the place of the particular contest and the particular athletes in the history of their sport.
In my view, to be an athletic “expert” is to compete, and to compete well. Everything else—the selling of sport, the analysis of sport—is non-essential, and sometime intrusive. In fact, because athletic competition is a form of intimacy, the outside perspectives become, at their worst and most invasive, something like pornography.

Reverence: An Ancient Virtue for Modern Sport
Peter F. Hager, State University of New York College at Brockport, USA
Thursday, September 14, 4:30 – 6:00 pm, Grand Hall II
(Session 1B with Doug Hochstetler and Ben Letson)

In today’s sports world, many are seeking value reform. They are in lesser cases dissatisfied and in worse cases appalled by the manner in which many professional and elite athletes conduct themselves within and outside the sporting context. As the immorality, hubris and irreverence these athletes display has been more strongly publicized and, to varying degrees, has trickled down to younger levels of sport, a call for change has been issued by those who still believe that sport can teach positive moral values and lessons.

While most of these caretakers continually emphasize the importance of fair play and sportspersonship, they tend to ignore other virtues that might assist in improving the moral atmosphere of sporting communities. A question that arises, then, is whether there are virtues that such communities or the societies in which they are enmeshed have left behind, that might facilitate efforts to reform sport.

Enter reverence. In his 2001 book Reverence: Reviving a Forgotten Virtue, Paul Woodruff sets out to retrieve this ancient virtue and to help readers understand its essential value for today’s societies. As Woodruff defines it, reverence “is the well-developed capacity to have the feelings of awe, respect, and shame when these are the right feelings to have” (pp. 8-9). Reverent persons recognize the limitations of human beings, and find awe in what lies beyond their own control (e.g., God, nature, truth, death, etc.). Woodruff contends that as an individual’s ability to appropriately experience awe increases, it “brings with it the capacity for respecting fellow human beings, flaws and all,” which “in turn fosters the ability to be ashamed when we show moral flaws exceeding the normal human allotment” (p. 3).

Is reverence, as Woodruff has retrieved and presented it, a virtue that is important or even essential for modern sporting communities and their members? In this paper, I will thoroughly develop Woodruff’s conception of reverence, and preliminarily examine the value that this ancient virtue has for sport today. In clarifying what reverence is and revealing what it has to offer to athletes, coaches and administrators, I hope to determine whether it is a virtue that can help caretakers of sport in their attempts to improve sport’s moral atmosphere and its status as a vehicle for moral education.


Sport and Friendship: Embracing the Other
Mark Hamilton, Ashland University
Thursday, September 14, 4:30 – 6:00 pm, Grand Hall III
(Session 1C with Andrew Holowchak and Bill Morgan)

The most widely accepted and generally agreed upon understanding of friendship in much of Western Culture has been the three-fold description of friendship in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics. As we look at the historical idea of friendship as presented by Aristotle, it is generally viewed as a picture of friendship between equals or those who are similar with similar values and interests, or like cultural backgrounds. Emphasis on friends and fellow citizens as part of a brotherhood implies this equality. Friends are a type of second self. But in more recent years some very controversial and different views of friendship have arisen. Derrida (in his work The Politics of Friendship) and other Continentalists have critiqued Aristotle by looking at friendship that occurs with the “other”. Derrida says of Aristotle that his model ignores the reality of difference. This sense of difference allows Derrida to ask whether these traditional idealized
conceptions of friendship are actually another form of self-belief. As sport has become more and more globalized it has provided a context to expose people to others who are quite different from the self and has even created many friendships with "the other", someone quite strikingly different from the self. Just look at the recent Dodgers starting pitching staff as an example of the globalization of baseball, the Europeanizing of the NBA, or the legacy of the friendship between opposites like Brian Piccolo and Gayle Sayers. This presents an alternative model of friendship in sports. It is through sports that many of us have found ourselves being stretched out of our cultural boundaries. It is even argued that one of the values of college sports is that it educates and exposes student athletes to people quite diverse from the self. Sport, as a metanarrative, has been much more successful in creating true friendships and unity than other metanarrative attempts. Therefore it will be argued that sports rather than politics provides a better metanarrative for Derrida’s understanding of friendship.

**Change of Citizenship in International Sport: Considerations of Moderate Patriotism and Morality**

Alun R. Hardman, University of Wales Institute Cardiff, UK  
*Friday, September 15, 3:30 – 5:00 pm, Grand Hall II*  
(Session 5B with Douglas McLaughlin & Cesar Torres and Masami Sekine)

In addition to being world-class performers in their respective sports, Kenyan born Stephen Cherono, Serbian born Jelena Dokic, and British born Fiona May all changed nationality before achieving success as citizens of Qatar, Australia and Italy respectively. All three, though their motives were very different, observed appropriately the formal regulations that allow persons changing citizenship to represent an adopted country. The regulations vary from sport to sport, but the International Olympic Committee’s current requirement of a three year international hiatus following the acquisition of new citizenship, (or 12 months where both originating and adoptive countries agree) provide the benchmark for regulating this increasingly common, but historically enduring procedure.

In this paper, I will argue that a litigious approach to changes in citizenship in international sport obfuscate a number of important issues that suggest different cases, from a moral point of view, are more or less deserving. Those in favour of greater control on nation-swapping in sport argue that adopting countries mistake nationalistic jingoism for patriotic pride, that sporting mercenaries stunt the development of home-grown talent, and akin to the ‘brain-drain’ in business and academia – represents a putative form of neo-colonialism that strips economically developing nations of some of its most talented human resources. Those in favour of a *laissez faire* approach argue that it allows individuals, who, through no fault of their own, do not have the opportunity to maximise their potential talent nor achieve the rewards that come with elite performance. More draconian measures would not only be a restraint of trade but also in some cases lead to sporting refugees who, after being forced to leave their country of origin, are subsequently denied the opportunity to present to the world, their sporting talent in their adopted country.

Drawing on Stephen Nathanson’s underlying normative principle of *moderate patriotism* (elsewhere presented and defended in the context of sport by Nick Dixon), my analysis will attempt to articulate the philosophical implications of what it means, in the context of changing citizenship, to further the interests of one’s own country whilst at the same time refusing to act immorally against the interests of others.

As with the defence of moderate patriotism itself, such an account will attempt to balance the demands of philosophical contingency with philosophical universalism.

The paper will then present a more detailed account of the relevant and respective duties and obligations of athletes and nations that need to be articulated to evaluate the merits of different citizenship cases. Central to this account will be how redistributive justice and the virtue of citizenship help ensure the duties and obligations of nations and athletes respectively are met.

**References**

A Phenomenology of Digital Sport
Dennis Hemphill, Victory University of Technology, Australia
Saturday, September 16, 8:30 – 10:00 am, Grand Hall II
(Session 6B with Sigmund Loland and Sean Smith)

This paper explores the possibilities offered up by digital sport for understanding embodiment. More and more sports are being digitalized, that is, converted into computer-generated replicas, not just for training purposes, but also as sports in their own right. Moving beyond simply a keyboard or joystick interface, other ‘cybersport’ environments and actions are made possible through the use of three-dimensional acoustics and stereoscopic optical displays, data gloves, as well as head tracking and full body tracking devices to facilitate immersion and expand movement control options for participants.

The notion of an electronically reproduced and extended athletic body throws up for grabs the status of the body and athletic movement. On the traditional dualistic account, athletic action is seen as a two-part process: the tactical, strategically active mind directing a machine-like athletic body. Adding digital technology as a mediating factor may act to reinforce and extend this dualistic vision. The electronic extension of athletic action into a computer generated spatial and temporal environment is, according to some critics, dualism writ large. It is a disembodied experience, the very antithesis of sport.

Phenomenology is usually offered up as a holistic alternative to the conventional dualistic vision of athletic action. That is, it addresses ‘lived experience.’ Using largely a Merleau-Pontian version of phenomenology, the paper will explore the personal, subjective experience of the body, space, time and others in digital or virtual reality sport activities. Moreover, this paper will adopt an approach that sees notions such as ‘mind-body dualism’ and ‘lived body’ as more or less useful metaphors, which will hopefully shed some light on the experience and meaning of the human-computer interface in digital sport.

Praying for Assistance: Considerations for Kreider
Doug Hochstetler, Penn State University - Lehigh Valley, USA
Friday, September 15, 4:30 – 6:00 pm, Grand Hall II
(Session 1B with Peter Hager and Ben Letson)

One need not look far to find evidence of religion in contemporary sport. Football players kneel in prayer after scoring a touchdown. Athletes begin post-game interviews by “giving glory” to a higher power. Coaches intertwine motivational speeches with principles ranging from Zen Buddhism to Native American spirituality.

In his recent JPS article – “Prayers for Assistance as Unsporting Behavior” – Anthony Kreider examined the relationship between sport and the supernatural. Kreider addressed praying for assistance in sport, specifically requesting assistance from a higher power (i.e., God) to succeed. He argued that it is both unsporting and unethical for participants to ask for outside help. To this end, he recommended that such prayers (in similar fashion as other unsporting and unethical acts) should be discouraged.

My purpose is to extend Kreider’s discussion by examining both the nature of prayer as well as its relation to sport. I begin by providing a brief overview of Kreider’s article. This includes the problem of praying for assistance and the extent to which these acts are unsporting and forms of cheating. Next, I discuss the nature of prayer, including the various forms of prayer throughout theistic traditions. I then offer several additional reasons why theists might believe it is acceptable to pray for victory, or at least outside assistance. These concerns highlight the inherent tensions between sport and religion. Finally, I recommend several guidelines for the use of prayer in sport, understood as prayer within a larger theological purpose. Ultimately, I agree
with Kreider that praying for victory should be discouraged. While I also agree, to some extent, that this form of prayer is both unsporting and unethical, I place more emphasis than Kreider on the broader theological implications of such prayers.

**Self-Promotion and Other-Concern: Aretism as a Guide to an Integrative Model of Sport**

*Today*

M. Andrew Holowchak, Kutztown University, USA

*Thursday, September 14, 4:30 – 6:00 pm, Grand Hall III*

(Session 1C with Mark Hamilton and Bill Morgan)

Ever since Muhammed Ali, shouting “I am the greatest” and besting boxing’s best in an effort to prove it, exploded onto the boxing scene in the 1960s, showboating, gloating, taunting, and the other deeds of self-promotion have been an inescapable part of sport. Today, many players, through showing up or belittling teammates or opponents, become “standouts” in their sport. There seems to be an ever-increasing tendency toward athletic self-promotion—one fueled by obsession with (oftentimes ridiculously irrelevant) statistical data.

Often self-promotion manifests itself innocuously. Consider San Francisco wide receiver Terrell Owens, who pulled out a pen from his sock and autographed the football after scoring a touchdown against the Seattle Seahawks in 2002. At other times, self-promotion divides players on a team, even their fans. Consider the feuding between manager Billy Martin and Reggie Jackson of the New York Yankees in the 1970s. The issue that I address in this undertaking is not the morality or immorality of deeds of self-promotion in sport, but instead what such deeds represent—a preoccupation with self in sport, which many athletes today embrace as an ideal.

To this end, I focus on answers to three questions throughout. First, why is it that so many athletes, self-preoccupied, have so little regard for others in their sport? Second, to what extent is this fixation a detriment to sport? Last, are modern accounts of morality part of the problem?

**It’s Just Like Riding a Bike: Overcoming the Paradoxes of Cycling**

Peter M. Hopsicker, Penn State University – Altoona, USA

*Friday, September 15, 10:30 am – 12:00 pm, Grand Hall I*

(Session 3A with Gunnar Breivik and Claudio Tamburrini)

“It’s just like riding a bike.” How often have we used this adage to describe a specific learning phenomenon? We struggle to learn a specific skill. After persistent attempts, we suddenly “get it” and the skill seems wonderfully easy to perform – so easy that we never forget how to perform the skill for the rest of our lives. Riding a bike, a skill learned by millions upon millions of people around the world since the machine’s invention, is the beloved example of this learning experience. Yet a closer examination of how we learn to ride a bike reveals a hazy understanding of how one actually acquires this skill characterized by balance, an elevated center of gravity, and a constant forward motion.

How do we learn to ride a bike? What kinds of knowing are involved and how does our intellect operate at the tacit level? Is the evolution from beginning skill to more advanced ability smooth and even or is it typically chaotic and dynamic? For a skill that is almost universally known – a venerable rite of passage when growing up – there seems to be a very limited understanding of the lived experience associated with learning to ride a bike and the phenomenological benchmarks encountered along the way.

Utilizing distinctions highlighted by Merleau-Ponty, Polanyi, and Sudnow, I will show how learning to ride a bike begins with persistent attempts to explicitly know specific and necessary skills. I will then show how this group of skills is transformed through the overcoming of certain paradoxes. It is the overcoming of these paradoxes that result in the tacit knowing of these necessary skills. Knowing how to ride a bike, in turn, becomes embodied and is rarely forgotten.

I will examine the nature of how we learn to ride bikes in three steps. First, I will review the first person accounts of beginners learning to ride a bike. From these experiences, I will identify eight skills explicitly identified as foundational in riding a bike: balance, visual focus, pedaling, steering, starting, mounting, stopping, and dismounting.
Second, I will then show how each of these skills is transformed through the overcoming of a paradox (a statement that is contradictory to belief but may in fact be true) into the riders' tacit awareness. For example, when most beginner riders lose their balance on the bike, their intuition will often guide them to steer away from the fall. However, the proper correction to this loss of balance is to steer into the fall. This places the bike back under the riders’ center of gravity.

Third, I will identify the “Ah-ha” moment. It is at this moment that riders suddenly “get it” and the ability to maintain balance and negotiate the machine over the landscape becomes an embodied skill. From this point on, riders find themselves with a tacit understanding and ability to ride a bike, implicitly paying attention to all eight skills simultaneously, rather than focusing on them from an explicit and fragmented perspective.

**Play, Pretence, and Intersubjectivity**

Leslie A. Howe, University of Saskatchewan, Canada  
*Friday, September 15, 10:30 am – 12:00 pm, Grand Hall II*  
(Session 3B with Michael Capobianco and Simon Shih)

It is often remarked that sports give permission to their participants to behave in ways not otherwise tolerated. They do this by marking out the boundaries and conditionality of this behaviour, regulating it in more or less detailed ways. What takes place within these boundaries is a form of play. In this paper I want to explore certain aspects of play, especially its status as a privileged zone of expression, a deliberate lifting of social norms that is itself ruled by social norms, those governing when it is appropriate and those that belong to play itself. I take these latter in particular to be intersubjective rules for determining meaning: normative constraints on the interpretation of play and player. Insofar as these also govern behaviour (deportment) and inclusion, they function as rules of legitimation.

Play as a space apart presents the possibility of self-revelation and self-creation through the exploration of one’s limitations and potentials. As one plays, one hazards a trial of oneself—each play-attempt is a hypothetical self-construction. The fundamentally conditional quality of play is crucial; because play is “just play,” rather than “serious,” the player has licence to behave in ways and explore hypothetical identities not otherwise open. And yet, play must be taken seriously for this benefit to accrue; to only “play at” a game or practice, rather than “like you mean it” is to forego the revelatory and creative possibilities. In effect, the sport situation is a pretence of reality that generates the reality of the player, provided that pretence is seriously adopted. Play, and especially sport as a form of play, subsists in a tension between its conditional status and the seriousness with which it must be pursued in order to function as authentic self-expression. This tension can be disrupted by certain kinds of transgression of the intersubjective norms governing play and its interpretation, ones that make this conditionality transparent. Where this conditionality is not fully acknowledged the transgression may be interpreted as travesty (as in “making a travesty of the game”), that is, presenting an affront to the assumption of the sport’s givenness. Playing-at is a variety of travesty, but these norms can be challenged through serious play as well. Thus, both ironical play and certain modes of serious play, especially those that jar naturalising assumptions, can constitute a subversion of the play context, pressuring a critique or re-visioning of whether the game should be played in the accepted way, who should play it, and what it accomplishes for the player.

**Samurai Wielding Tennis Rackets: On Zen, Swordsmanship, and Sport**

Jesús Ilundain-Agurrzuza, University of New Mexico-Los Alamos, USA  
*Friday, September 15, 3:30 – 5:00 pm, Grand Hall III*  
(Session 5C with Sharon Kay Stoll & Jennifer Beller and Karin Volkwein-Caplan)

In the direct, no nonsense manner of a Zen master, I immediately state my purpose: to apply specific aspects of Eastern philosophy and culture to the realm of sports. Methods and concepts from Zen Buddhism and Taoism brandished by samurai swordsmanship are presented, analyzed, and drawn on to glean insights from and for sport and its philosophical analysis. Swordsmanship, commanding exceptional physical skills, connects naturally with sports. Key
The concepts are the Zen notion of *mushin*, “no mind”, the Taoist conception of *wu-wei*, “no action,” and the samurai ideal of *muktekatsu*, “no sword,” each served by a body of conceptual retainers, their eidetic samurai (originally and fittingly it means ‘attendant’). Since the English “negative” rendition of these notions belies the affirmative fertility of the original languages and context, my aspiration is to meaningfully evoke this inherent fecundity within a western philosophical framework. Being neither samurai nor Zen master nor Taoist sage, and considering the venue for the paper, I keep Eastern terminology to a minimum. This is a friendly sparring bout where both sides engage in cross-cultural dialogue, not a deadly duel between traditions.

The paper favors metaphysical themes and what can loosely be categorized as existential issues. Out of the pertinent Eastern ideas I forge a blade that incorporates the requisite broader cultural background. Notable moves that shine in the skirmish are excellence as it aims for perfection, self-knowledge, a Socratic pursuit that Japanese swordsmanship so deftly incorporates, and the theme of life and death in “limit situations” (related to an existential analysis of dangerous sports). The theoretical sparks from the contact between Eastern and Western intellectual steels result in a series of antagonistic dichotomies that frame the discussion as applied to sports, primarily: immanence versus transcendence, the opposition between flowing “no mind” and intensely focused attention, the antagonism between the extrinsic and the intrinsic, the everyday mind and ordinary life against the extraordinary experience, and non-attachment in its face-off with the quest for victory. In distinctive Zen fashion these are solved as a “higher affirmation.”

The Eastern side wields as its weapons of choice canonic writings on swordsmanship, *bushido*, and Zen. Unlike the historic European martial art manuals they parry, these are deeply spiritual. Zen masters, especially Daisetz Suzuki, and Taoist sages, mainly Chuang-Tzu, brandish the philosophical blade for the East. The West wields the able foil of William James, William Morgan’s work, and a cohort of other contemporary philosophers. Confessional glimpses from athletes, swordsmen, Asian and Western philosophers, and my experiences—recorded in a journal that documents the incorporation of Zen and Taoism to my Western sports and swordsmanship training—illustrate specific ideas.

Our philosophic inquiry on sports rarely engages the Orient. Looking towards the lands of the rising sun in matters philosophical should not be motivated by condescending indulgence or a resigned “we have nothing to lose” attitude, instead genuine interest and a deferential realization of its relevance should spearhead things. The reward: a Zen revelation that we have *everything* to gain. Sports and its theory can be profoundly enriched by an Eastern philosophical ethos. This paper cuts a purposeful, if exploratory, path in this direction.

**Freedom and Necessity in the World of Extreme Sports**

Artyom Ivanenko, Magnitogorsk State University, Russia

*Friday, September 15, 8:30 – 10:00 am, Grand Hall I*

(Session 2A with Pam Sailors)

It is believed that the essence of extreme sports is the attempt to reach inner freedom. The term “freedom” is widely used when speaking about extreme sports, for example in advertisements, in the interviews with extreme sports athletes, in sports magazines and so on. But several questions remain opened:

1. To which extent can the actions and movements of extreme sports athletes be considered as free?
2. What is the place of necessity in the extreme sports?
3. How are freedom and necessity interconnected in extreme sports?

So I would like to try to answer these questions in my paper. For this purpose I would like to consider the following: it seems that in extreme sports beautiful movement of an athlete can be regarded as a free movement. But at the same time, the beautiful, spectacular movement is connected with risk. For example, in order to make a high, stylish jump on a snowboard an athlete should gain much speed before the jump. That means if something goes wrong, if an athlete loses control before the jump, or during it he/she will most probably be injured. So an athlete doesn’t have quite enough options for choice: either he/she puts his/her health, and
sometimes even life, at risk and produces perfect, beautiful jump, or he/she cares about self-preservation and the athletes’ movements become too careful and loose their beauty.

To the large extent person’s desire to risk his/ her life depends on the responsibilities that he/she has. If an athlete is a father or a mother of several children (or at least one child), if the living of an athletes’ family largely depends on his/her work, on his/her ability to earn money, the athlete will think several times before risking his/her health in the chase for some “illusive” dream of reaching freedom through perfect, beautiful but dangerous movements.

According to Erich Fromm: “Positive freedom...is identical with the full realization of the individual's potentialities, together with his ability to live actively and spontaneously”. The practice of extreme sports carries in itself the possibilities for an athlete to act spontaneously, to lead active life, to realize his/her potentialities. Therefore, such kinds of sports are very fruitful for achievement of inner freedom. At the same time an athlete can not be absolutely free from physical, psychological, social boundaries. Therefore, necessity is the other side of the coin in the world of extreme sports.

Epistemology of Movement Culture: The Truth of the Body
Ivo Jirásek, Palacky University, Czech Republic
Saturday, September 16, 8:30 – 10:00 am, Grand Hall III
(Session 6C with Fumio Takizawa and Ai Tanaka)

Epistemology, as philosophical teaching concerned with knowledge, profiles itself in many various directions and discourses. Different epistemological attitudes could be a source of discrepancies and contradictions. I would like to however point out the truth of the body as a possible epistemological scheme of movement culture (sport in the English habit of speaking). It is not the right understanding of corporeality (which is anthropological access), but it is the truth of the body as the specific epistemological approach uncovering it by physical questioning. From various theories of truth (corresponding, semantic, coherent, pragmatic) I choose Heidegger's dynamic structure of transmigration from implicitness to openness as a suitable access and I define the truth of body as its naturalness. Nature in the old Greek meaning of the word fysis, nature as “life in truth” in the philosophy of Jan Patočka. Nature bears great courage, because the naked (unprotected) body is the most vulnerable shape of corporeality. The nakedness of the old Greek athlete obtains however different interpretative meanings at the present time. It transformed itself from old Greek naturalness into postmodern hyperreality of pornoculture (Baudrillard). Such a process of the disembodiment or alienation of my own body is some way of the dissembling of naturalness by the same way as other forms of artificiality (cosmetic, chirurgical and other issues). The agencies dissembling nature’s shade, that the part of naturalness is not only genesis, but also expiry. They camouflage the truth of the body. The truth of the body as its nature in the movement culture area is not only an accent on the step-by-step increase of performance without technical and technological agents. The endeavor for the maximization of achievement without any interferences combating nature. The damnation of doping practice came to have not only an ethical appeal, but also an epistemological attitude with consideration to the truth of the body.

'I'd Rather Wear a Turban than a Rose': The (In)appropriateness of Terrace Chanting Amongst Sport Spectators
Carwyn Jones and Scott Fleming, University of Wales Institute Cardiff, UK
Friday, September 15, 1:30 – 3:00 pm, Grand Hall II
(Session 4B with Dan Collins-Cavanaugh and Stephen Schmid)

Racist abuse of black footballers in Britain and elsewhere in Europe is not new. There have, however, been some recent high profile examples that have brought it back into sharp focus. The most visible and distasteful examples involve the chanting of monkey noises when certain black players are in possession of the ball. Indeed, FIFA have recently begun to explore sanctions for clubs whose fans demonstrate this kind of behaviour.

In this paper, however, we deal with crowd racism of a different kind and in a different sport, Rugby Union. During matches between Wales and England a significant number of Welsh
supporters have been heard to chant “I’d rather wear a turban than a Rose”. The purpose of the chant is to upset the English supporters by claiming that “being” English is worse than “being” South Asian. The chant fits a well established tradition, more associated with football, of barracking opposition fans with tasteless and insulting chants that draw upon an acceptance of a shared value system. That is to say, the chant will only offend if the targets of the chant share the notion that “being” South Asian is a bad thing.

First, we first explore the moral status of the chant and argue that it is racist and therefore inherently offensive. Morally mature witnesses to the chant ought therefore to be offended by it. Second, we argue that although the chant is racist, morally evaluating the characters of the chanters should be differentiated. Some may be ignorant, some may be bigots, and some may just join in with what they see as “harmless banter”. Finally, we argue that appropriate reaction to the chant may be particular in nature. Immediate indignation and an attempt to stop the chant may not necessarily be the best course of action. Different people may exercise different qualities of character or demonstrate their condemnation in different ways: stadium managers might call for the chanters to desist; police officers might warn chanters that they are behaving unlawfully (and perhaps prosecute them); parents might tell their children that the chant is offensive; teachers might teach children in school that the chant bad and/or wrong; and philosophers of sport might write papers and teach classes about the issue.

Our conclusions are not particular to rugby union and this specific chant. They inform more generally issues of racism in sport. Commitment to moral education (of whatever kind) might be more productive than outright indignation lest we be accused of intolerance, hypersensitivity or political correctness.

**Lust, Sport, and the Will to Win**
Sharon Kaye, John Carroll University, USA
*Saturday, September 16, 8:30 – 10:00 am, Grand Hall I (Session 6A with Tal Caspi and Paul Gaffney)*

The medieval period was not a golden age for sport. It was an age of tribulation and faith, when philosophers struggled to define the values that would guide Western civilization into more prosperous times. The notion of the seven deadly sins, formulated by Gregory the Great in the sixth century and developed by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, captured the popular imagination and became a paradigm for navigating the murky landscape of right and wrong.

In Gregory’s view, the seven deadly sins can be ranked in order with lust being the least serious and pride being the most serious. Aquinas, however, denies the possibility of such a simple ranking. In one sense, all mortal sins are equal in so far as they each function to sever the link between man and God. In another sense, however, lust can actually be considered the worst. Aquinas asserts that the more necessary a thing is, the more sinful it is to act against the dictate of reason with respect to it. Venereal acts are most necessary because reproduction is required for the survival of the human community and lust acts against the dictate of reason with respect to venereal acts. Although Aquinas declines to take a clear stand on this ranking, one might easily conclude from his reasoning that lust is the most sinful.

I think Aquinas is exactly right to point out that lust is important due to its direct connection with human reproduction. I do not agree, however, that lust is a bad thing. In fact, I think that it is the repression and sublimation of lust that ultimately causes the vast majority of pain and suffering in our world. I maintain that lust is a good thing, worth cultivating in a healthy way. I further maintain that sport is a healthy way of cultivating lust and that the cultivation of lust is one of the main reasons sport is a valuable facet of society.

In this paper I would like to examine the connection between lust and sport. I will begin by defining lust, following Simon Blackburn, as the desire for sexual activity and its pleasures for their own sake. According to medieval philosophers, loving things of this world for their own sake is sinful. In terms of modern evolutionary theory, however, such love is the survival instinct. While lust is a private experience of this instinct, sport is a public display of it. After establishing this relationship, I will show that sport serves to cultivate lust in three important ways: (1) physical activity increases libido; (2) watching sports is sexually stimulating; and (3) regarding sex as sport
improves sexual performance. Finally, I will explore the will to win, arguing that it is the essential defining characteristic of sport, and that it cannot be understood independently of the human sex drive. I conclude that sport and sex are mutually supportive and that lust is the key to success in both.

Reconsidering Internal Goods as the Philosophical ‘Way Ahead’ in the War on Doping in Sport
Kenneth Kirkwood, The University of Western Ontario, Canada
Sunday, September 17, 10:30 am – 12:00 pm, Grand Hall I
(Session 9A with Jim Nendel)

Schneider and Butcher have claimed that the intrinsic goods of sport are the answer to an otherwise futile ethical argument against doping. My claim is that many banned drugs would actually allow athletes to achieve those intrinsic goods, and as such, anabolic steroids (for one example) should be encouraged as a means to access ‘the good.’

Secondly, I’ll examine how intrinsic good is not relevant to the high-performance sport model to which it is often applied. High-level sport (such as NCAA, and professional sports – including the Olympics), are already inhospitable environments for such an experience of the ‘good,’ and therefore these organizations should not exist, if the true aim of sport is to achieve an intrinsic good.

Lastly, I question the validity of how people understand the intrinsic good. How can we parse self-interest into these categories, and how can we determine where the goodness comes? Am I motivated selfishly to non-material things, or material things? And does that make the former always good?

The Nature of Rock-Lifting as Games
Mark Kodya*, Penn State University, USA

Play and games are nearly as old as civilization itself. Likewise strength-based physical activities have long been a rite of passage in many cultures. Americans virtually worship the physical prowess of professional football players. Strongman contests are often seen on ESPN. Steve Jeck and Peter Martin in Of Stones and Strength clearly demonstrate that many primitive and modern cultures have had a connection to such strength-based activities. For example, the Scottish culture has a rich history of the “manhood stones” – feats that are highly dependent on one’s physical strength. Such physical challenges arguably fall under the twin umbrellas of games and play. These unique feats of strength should be of interest to those involved in the philosophic study of sport but - until now – the literature has been largely devoid of such discussions. We know very little of various forms of strength-based sports and their credentials as forms of play and games.

The manhood stones of Scotland are an example of a traditional, ancient, and culturally significant physical activity that has received little philosophic attention. This rite of passage to male maturity involves the lifting of rocks to certain heights. In this paper I will examine the ancient practice of lifting rocks to determine whether or not it meets certain characteristics of games (vis a vis Suits and others). I will also discuss its potential for both diversion or shallow play and something called “deep play” (Kretchmar, Ackerman).

In this paper the analysis proceeds in four steps. First I will distinguish games from play. I will rely on the work of Suits and other analysts who describe games as artificial problems and play as an intrinsically satisfying way in which such problems can be addressed. Second, I will tease out those factors that are critical for normative evaluations of good or genuine games and good or deep play. These factors will provide a foundation on which I will discuss the credential of manhood stones. Third, I will discuss the human fascination with strength—from an anthropological, philosophical perspective. This will include examinations of both the human fascination with strength and of other strength challenges which have been a part of our gaming heritage. Fourth, and finally, I will show how and why “manhood stones” is a game with rich potential for deep play.
It is with deep sadness I inform you that Mark passed away shortly after his abstract was accepted. Mark was a graduate student and although his full-length paper was not completed, his abstract is being printed to pay tribute to his memory and acknowledge his interest in sport philosophy. Scott Kretchmar’s distinguished scholar lecture is dedicated to Mark.

**Why Japanese Athletes Do Not Indulge in Doping**

Yoshitaka Kondo, University of Tsukuba, Japan

*Friday, September 15, 1:30 – 3:00 pm, Grand Hall III*

(Session 4C with Leon Culbertson and Jan Todd)

The past history of doping violations in Japan indicates that there have been no cases at all of intentional doping violations and there are only 10 incidents due to carelessness during the past 20 years. The question then arises as to why Japanese athletes do not become involved in deliberate doping violations. Is there perhaps some sort of overwhelming force at work that leads to or impedes doping? The purpose of this study is to discuss the forces that act to impede doping and why Japanese do not become involved in doping in an intentional or deliberate manner. The possible reasons are as follows.

1) As a result of the formal establishment of the Japan Anti-Doping Agency (JADA), it can probably be said that even from the perspective of the Japanese submission to authority, there is virtually no doping that can be described as intentional or deliberate. Beyond the deterrent force of this public organization, though, the force of social surveillance, that is, “surveillance by the public eye” (“seken”), renders involvement in doping essentially impossible.

2) Since the external norms of the public eye that have served as the basis for Japan's unique spiritual culture have functioned with unerring force thus far, there have likely been no athletes or other parties who became involved in doping in an intentional or deliberate manner even if there was the possibility of violations due to ignorance. With the weakening of external norms in modern-day Japan, however, the anti-doping spirit is also likely to be gradually exposed to risk.

3) The third reason why Japanese do not become involved in doping in an intentional or deliberate manner is the system of collective responsibility under the name of educational sports. This system functions as a powerful force deterring doping. It is probably impossible, however, to prevent involvement in doping without the ability to imagine what sort of judgment, both formally and in the public eye, would be forthcoming as the result of one's own involvement in doping.

In short, since there have only been occasional cases of doping in Japan due to intentional use or carelessness, Japanese athletes are evaluated as relatively clean. Possible reasons include external pressure in the form of the anti-dumping structure of the JADA and surveillance by the public eye and the collective responsibility system, which function as norms for deterrence. Therefore, even if there are or may be doping violations due to carelessness or ignorance, it is thought that there are no athletes or other parties who become involved in doping in an intentional or deliberate manner. The norms of the public eye and collective responsibility, in particular, reflect the unique Japanese spiritual culture. The concepts of the public eye, which exists between the individual and society, and collective responsibility for the purpose of protecting sports culture, as H. Lenk has indicated formerly, also suggest the potential for measures for the deterrence of doping centered on public-minded norms or ideals.

**Boxing as a Manifestation of Movement Toward Absolute Abstraction: An Analysis from Hegelian Phenomenology of Spirit**

Jerzy Kosiewicz, Academy of Physical Education, Poland

*Sunday, September 17, 10:30 am – 12:00 pm, Grand Hall II*

(Session 9B with Alex Krasnick and Danny Rosenberg)

* Work prepared within the framework of one's own researches BW- I.13 “Social and Cultural Values of Sport”, financed by the Ministry of Science and Introduction of Information Technology
In the presented text I point out to anthropological as well as axiological foundations of the boxing fight from the viewpoint of Hegel’s philosophy. In the genial idealist’s views it is possible to perceive the appreciation of the body, which constitutes a necessary basis for the man’s physical activity, for his work oriented towards the self-transformation and the transformation of the external world, as well as for rivalry and the hand-to-hand fight. While focusing our attention on the issue of rivalry and on the situation of the fight – and regarding it from the viewpoint of the master-slave theory (included in the phenomenology of spirit), it is possible to proclaim that even a conventionalised boxing fight – that is, restricted by cultural and sports rules of the game – has features of the fight to the death between two Hegelian forms of self-knowledge striving for self-affirmation and self-realisation. In the boxing fight, similarly as in the above mentioned Hegelian theory, a problem of work and of the development of the human individual (that is, of the subject, self-knowledge, the participant of the fight) appears. There appears also a prospect of death as a possible end of merciless rivalry. The fight revalues the human way in an important way, whereas the prospect for death, the awareness of its proximity, the feeling that its close and possible, saturates the life with additional values. It places the boxer, just like every subject fighting in a similar or a different way, on the path towards absolute abstraction – that is, it brings him closer to his self-fulfilment in the Absolute, to the absolute synthesis.

The Hegelian viewpoint enables also to appreciate the boxing fight as a manifestation of low culture (being in contrast with high culture), to turn attention to the relations which – according to Hegel - take place between the Absolute and the man, as well as to show which place is occupied by the subject both in the process of the Absolute’s self-realisation and in the German thinker’s philosophical system. Independently of the dialectical, simultaneously pessimistic and optimistic overtone of considerations connected with the very boxing fight (regarding destruction and spiritualisation on a higher level), it is possible to perceive far-reaching appreciation of the human individual in Hegel’s philosophy since the Absolute cannot make its own self-affirmation without the individual, without the human body, without the fight aimed at the destruction of the enemy and without the subjective consciousness and the collective consciousness which appear thanks to this fight. Thus, it is justified to suppose that the foundation of the whole Hegel’s philosophy is constituted by anthropology and that in the framework of this anthropology a special role is played by the fight and by work, which changes the subject and his(her) environment. Admittedly Hegel does not emphasise it explicitly, nevertheless his views (with their centre, which, according to Hegel himself and his interpreters, is constituted by the Absolute) have, as a matter of fact, an anthropocentric character and the main source of the subject’s development is the struggle which, irrespectively of its result

For All The Right Reasons: Morally Justifying the Hockey Fight
Alex Krasnick, Pennsylvania State University, USA
Sunday, September 17, 10:30 am – 12:00 pm, Grand Hall II
(Session 9B with Jerzy Kosiewicz and Danny Rosenberg)

There is an old joke that says, “I went to a fight and a hockey game broke out.” While this may appear comical to those who don’t understand the nuances of the game, those who have a passion for hockey may take offense. Fighting is a part of professional hockey, but the game itself will always be bigger and more important than the fight. Ice hockey is one of the last true gentlemen’s games left in sport today. It is a rarity because players are more accountable and responsible to and for one another than they are to an official. Officials are there to draw the line when the players go too far, but they are not the primary source of enforcing accountability. This is a rare and wonderful thing in this era where a lack of personal responsibility seems to permeate both the sporting world and society as a whole. I will argue that although many in the public may see fighting in hockey as immoral, unnecessary violence which would carry stiff penalties if it happened away from the game, it is moral within the confines of the unwritten rules of the game. In making the case, I will identify the primary reasons for the existence of fighting, the roles of players on the team, and will use as examples from the history of the game to justify this premise. Lastly, I will stress that these are adults and there is no place for fighting in youth hockey as like all other youth sport, the emphasis should be on personal and skill development.

The primary reason for fighting in hockey is to keep the game safe by enforcing the unwritten rules. This is probably the most unique and controversial role in any team sport today.
The enforcer’s job is to keep the game fair and safe for all as they force anyone who violates the unwritten players’ code of conduct to face their decisions head-on in a one-on-one confrontation in front of teammates and fans. Without this, certain players would likely feel it okay to use their sticks in a dangerous manner, a potentially ugly situation as a carbon-fiber or wood stick is a potentially deadly weapon.

Enforcers also keep the star players safe. With the assigned and understood roles of players within the game, the star athletes and scorers of the league should not have to fight. While there are exceptions to the rule such as Eric Lindros and Maurice Richard who chose to defend themselves and their teammates when appropriate, this duty should not fall on the shoulders of players whose primary responsibility is to help their team win through stellar offense, defense, or goaltending. It does the league and the game no good to have these players injure themselves in a fight or to have them spend a significant amount of time in the penalty box.

**Sport, Nature, and the Metaphysics of Worldmaking**
Kevin Krein, University of Alaska, USA
*Friday, September 15, 8:30 – 10:00 am, Grand Hall II*  
(Session 2B with John Michael Atherton and Naofumi Masumoto)

In his 1993 presidential address to the Philosophic Society for the Study of Sport, Gunter Gebauer¹ argues that, like theater and ritual, sport is a practice in which worlds are created. In entering the medium of sport, Gebhauer claims, one is entering into a mimetically created world. The worlds of sport, he argues, are interpretations of the worlds of the community in which they take place – the fundamental values of the communities are dramatically represented in sport. As Gebauer puts it, “...sport is the embodiment of interpretations, of what we know for sure, of our certainty. That makes sport both simple and deep. As a codification of what constitutes our world, it belongs to everyone”(106). In particular, according to Gebauer, the certainty that there are human individuals who stand in relationships of competition and cooperation is represented in the activity of sport.

The first part of this paper is an exposition and development of Gebauer’s claims concerning worldmaking. Gebauer relies on Nelson Goodman’s conceptions of world and worldmaking. I provide an overview of these aspects of Goodman’s work, and an explication of Gebauer’s claims concerning sport’s mimetic character and the worlds that sport creates.

I then argue that Gebauer’s work can be fruitfully extended to cover a broader range of sporting activities. His position is that sport dramatically represents the existence of human individuals and their competitive and cooperative relationships to each other. I argue that sports involving significant interaction with features of the natural world, such as climbing, skiing, and surfing, create worlds that reinforce not only the existence of human individuals and the relationships between them, but also of natural features and human relationships to those features. The recognition of this characteristic in adventure/extreme sports helps to explain the motivation of athletes to participate in such sports and provides an explanation of how athletes are influenced by their participation in them.


**KEYNOTE ADDRESS: The Normative Heights and Depths of Play**
Scott Kretchmar, Penn State University, USA  
*Thursday, September 14, 3:30 – 4:15 pm, Great Room*  
*Dedicated to the memory of Mark Kodya*

Scholars from a variety of disciplines have generally said nice things about play. Biologists, developmental psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, and theologians, among others, have been almost universally complimentary when talking about the functions and values of play. Idealists like Plato and Schiller, as we all know, made rather extreme claims about play reflecting “the best part of us” and humanity becoming truly human “only when it plays.” Huizinga, adopting a more empirical perspective, was no less effusive in his praise of play. He argued that civilization itself “arises and unfolds in and as play.” And reductive-tending scientists
have said that play performs any number of bio-psychological roles from providing outlets for excess energy and preparing children for adult life to modulating our arousal levels.

In my talk I will examine the roots of these wide-ranging claims. I will tether the early appearance of play to advancing animal sentience and thus, to basal levels of intelligence. Accordingly, I will describe play as a primordial distraction and show how this understanding fits with Suits’ well-known description of play as both autotelic and relational.

I will then speculate on sources of value for those far more intellectually impressive forms of “distracted behavior” characteristic of human play. This will raise interesting questions about the proper wellsprings for our positive normative judgments about play. Is it play, per se, that ennobles us and produces the life most worth living? Or is it a variety of activities that are conducive to play (but also exist apart from it) that more deserve our commendation and respect? Was Aristotle right, for instance, when he argued that the ideal of existence lies simply in activities and experiences for the sake of which we do other things? Or is the story more complicated than that? Answers to these questions should provide some provocative perspectives on what I am labeling "the normative heights and depths of play."

Games, Sports, and the Problem of Evil
Ben Letson, Emory and Henry College, USA

Thursday, September 14, 4:30 and 6:00 pm, Grand Hall II
(Session 1B with Peter Hager and Doug Hochstetler)

My thesis in this paper is that a close analysis of the meaning and dynamics of games and sports may help illuminate the longstanding philosophical problem of evil. Philosophers have argued for centuries about whether God would be logically constrained to create a world without evil. One tendency of these debates has been to focus on particularly egregious examples of evil and to question whether these examples, and others, could possibly be part of the best possible world—the world that God would logically have to create if He exists. But this paper will focus on a broader concept of evil: I will argue that it is a mistake to emphasize flagrantly horrific evil and that we might try instead to make sense of evil as including any painful or unpleasant state that we habitually avoid if possible. I will try to show that any painful event participates at least to some extent in evil, and then I will further attempt to show that at least such “minor” evil is in fact necessary in order for us to live a human life.

Games and sports are well suited as examples of why evil, or pain and suffering of some kind, is necessary if we are to live human lives. Even though we all characteristically shun pain and suffering and seek pleasure and enjoyment, I will show that there is a conceptual connection between games/sports and pain and suffering, risk and loss. I will argue that sports depend on the accomplishment or non-accomplishment of goals and that failure to accomplish these goals, failure to win, typically, must be understood as unpleasant and, in the sense explained above, evil. Moreover, the possibility of winning is conceptually parasitic on the possibility of losing, and losing must be understood as painful in some sense if it is to be losing at all. So if our desires in sports were only indifferently directed at winning or losing, then the very nature of these activities would be significantly different. And that isn’t all: imagine how our participation in sports we be changed if everyone were equal in terms of talent and skill, so that, for example, there would be no point in training longer and harder in order to have a better chance at winning. Put generally, in a world with no evil, then all outcomes are equivalent, at least as far as desirability is concerned. So, in such a world, there can be no risk, no reward, no drama, no excitement, and no virtue. In a real sense, there can be no goals and no victories, because in a world without evil, no outcome can be preferable to another. Each of these claims requires argument, of course, and the paper will supply these arguments.

Technological Challenges to Sport
Sigmund Loland, Norwegian University of Physical Education & Sport, Norway

Saturday, September 16, 8:30 – 10:00 am, Grand Hall II
(Session 6B with Dennis Hemphill and Sean Smith)
In the paper I propose a categorization of technology in sport and present what I find to be the most significant challenges to the values of sport posed by technology.

Technology is understood as human made means to reach human interests and goals. Technology in sport, then, is seen to be human made means to reach human interests and goals in sport or related to sport.

Such technologies may have constitutive functions (skis and rackets are necessary means for skiing and tennis); they may serve goals of health and non-harm (shock-absorbing soles in shoes, and helmets and protection gear in ice hockey); and/or they may be developed with performance-enhancing intentions (aerodynamic suits in speedskating, hypoxic chambers to enhance the number of red blood cells). I argue that technologies intended to enhance performance are those that pose the most significant challenges to sport values.

Performance-enhancing technologies can be distinguished in at least four categories. I distinguish between body techniques (such as the Fosbury flop); sport equipment used by athletes in the performance of their sport (skis, rackets); training technologies used by athletes to prepare for performance (thread mills and strength training machines); and technologies administered to athletes outside of competition and that do not require athletic effort (advanced diet regimes, hypoxic chambers, drugs). Provided that innovation meets requirements of non-harm, I argue that innovation in body techniques are generally to be admired and ethically unproblematic, that innovation in sport equipment and training technologies raises questions of fairness and equality, and that expert-administered technologies are the most problematic category as they raise radical challenges to conventional ideas of sport performance.

In the final section, I propose a casuistic methodology of how to deal with the ethical challenges of expert-administered technologies by examining a continuum ranging from apparently unproblematic diet regimes in the one end via hypoxic chambers to performance-enhancing drugs and genetic technologies in the other end.

**Aesthetics in Sport: Unhooking Aesthetics From Art**
Alison Lord, University of Southampton, UK
*Saturday, September 16, 1:30 – 3:00 pm, Grand Hall I*  
(Session 7A with Stephen Mumford and Charlene Weaving)

Discussions of aesthetics in sport are often centred on whether or not sport should be considered to be art. This is to approach the issue in the wrong way. It is not necessary to assess the aesthetic features of sport as art. That doing so is so prevalent suggests that there is some kind of unspoken assumption that if sport can successfully be shown to be an artwork that this adds something to, or enhances, the thing that sport is. The implication is that art is somehow a measure against which the aesthetics of sport or sporting events should be assessed.

My paper has two aims. The first is to show that sport is not art, not because it falls short in some way, but because to reduce sport to art is to misunderstand and misrepresent the full aesthetic experience of sport. Sport and art do have many aesthetic features in common, and it is useful to look at the debates concerning aesthetics in art in relation to aesthetics in sport. However the features that art and sport have in common are aesthetic features shared by art and sport, not artistic features. The aesthetics of sport cannot be reduced to art. Just as art has aesthetic features not shared with sport, sport has aesthetic features not shared by art. By paying particular (though not exclusive) attention to a comparison of sporting events with dramatic arts I will bring out these differences and show that sporting events offer a rich aesthetic experience without being art.

Second, via this analysis of the aesthetics of sport I will consider how the aesthetics of sport offers a way to facilitate an analysis of aesthetic experience that does not inevitably lead to an analysis of art. The collapsing of ‘aesthetic’ into ‘art’ in aesthetics is all too common. Discussions of art almost inevitably take over what started out as a promising discussion of aesthetics. As well as giving sport its rightful status in aesthetics by viewing its aesthetic features as meaningful without the necessity of fixing it to art, formulating a general picture of the aesthetic features of sport adds something to aesthetics. Sport is especially suited to do this because of its peculiar ontological status.
The Grass-roots Olympic Peace Activities: The Winter Olympic Message Relay for the Peace and Environment
Naofumi Masumoto, Tokyo Metropolitan University, Japan

Friday, September 15, 8:30 – 10:00 am, Grand Hall II
(Session 2B with John Michael Atherton and Kevin Krein)

On the occasion of the 2006 Torino Winter Olympic Games, it was said that many athletes signed the “Olympic truce book” at the medal plaza. Moreover, the IOC president, Jack Rogge, asked the athletes to sign for the Olympic truce on the wall of the three Olympic villages. It could be said that the 2006 Turin Games was for the Olympic Truce Games.

The other side, there were grass-roots Olympic peace activities. On the 28th July, 2005, the Mayor of Salt Lake City, Rocky Anderson passed the Olympic message to Torino Mayor Sergio Chiamparino using environmentally friendly transportation means that did not burn any fossil fuels. The message called for the international cities to take action "to achieve and sustain peace, to protect our world and future from climatic disaster, and to provide for the essential health care needs and the protection of our brothers and sisters around the world." It was said that the message was well received in Torino and the relay team was greeted by Torino citizens.

Although this relay message was not so popular in Olympic media worldwide, this type of peace appeal and environmental message should be taken more seriously.

This tradition began after the 1994 Lillehammer Winter Olympic Games, or as it known as “Green Olympics" in Norway, which sent a message to Nagano, Japan in 1998. The Nagano team, in turn delivered the same message to Salt Lake City in 2002. The Salt Lake message was carried by bike and hike to New York, where it was put on a sailing yacht for Brussels, Belgium, from where it was carried by the European cycling legs. Although at this time the Salt Lake City Government had a strong role to play in transporting the message, in the case of the relay from Nagano to Salt Lake, the grass-roots movement also played an important role. NASL International Environmental Mission, which is a small NPO whose name is taken from NA and Salt Lake, carried the Nagano Olympic message for more than two years. They started by hike and bike on 13th March, 1998 after the Nagano Paralympic Games, to Shimizu City, and then they sailed out with a tall ship, the Kaio-Maru, and arrived at Saint Francisco on 30th June, 1999. On 13th June 2000, they started there by bike and arrived at Salt Lake City on 24th July, 2000 on the occasion of the Pioneer Day.

These grass-roots Olympic movement, appealing on behalf of peace and the environment, does not usually have a significant impact on the Olympic media. This is due to the lack of big sponsorship and aid from the IOC and the OCOG, and especially because of absence of the Olympic heroes and heroines. As the advocate for the Olympism and Olympic Movement, we philosophical scholars have to take action to research the conduct of the grass-roots movement, their main concerns and purposes, in order to propagate this type of peaceful and environmental message on to next generation.

Olympism and Intersubjectivity
Douglas W. McLaughlin, California State University at Northridge and Cesar R. Torres, State University of New York College at Brockport, USA

Friday, September 15, 3:30 – 5:00 pm, Grand Hall II
(Session 5B with Alun Hardman and Masami Sekine)

One of the most important philosophical developments of the twentieth century was the elucidation of intersubjectivity by phenomenologists such as Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Emmanuel Levinas. Contemporary to this development was the establishment and expansion of the modern international Olympic games. Of particular significance in this process was Pierre de Coubertin’s elaboration of Olympism, a complex philosophical vision that suggests ethical principles at different levels. Olympism seems not only to influence the growth of the modern Olympic games but also to entail the notion of intersubjectivity. Indeed, a clear understanding of intersubjectivity appears to be beneficial to fully comprehend the notion of Olympism and fully understand why the Olympic games are so captivating. In turn, it seems that Olympism provides the conceptual framework in which the intersubjective nature of sport becomes important. The goal of this presentation is, precisely, to explore the relationship
between Olympism and intersubjectivity, and how this relationship could assist in addressing Olympism’s ambiguities.

Due to the complexity of its philosophical underpinnings, we will start by providing an account of Olympism. Then, although Olympism does much important work in framing the meaning and values embedded in the modern Olympic games, we will recognize its ambiguities. In order to clarify them, a brief account of the nature of intersubjectivity will be presented. By understanding what intersubjectivity is and how it reveals important aspects of our human condition, the writings of Coubertin will be understood in a new light. Apparently, intersubjectivity is not only implicit in his notion of Olympism, but is in important ways a fundamental element that shapes his vision of what the modern Olympic games should look like.

In this presentation, we will argue that beyond the modern Olympic games, our understanding and appreciation of sport itself can be enhanced by an Olympic philosophy informed by intersubjectivity. The goods and values that have come to be associated with sport are most fully intelligible through a notion of intersubjectivity and most readily realized through the philosophy of Olympism. This claim will be argued for by looking at how Olympism and intersubjectivity inform two very important philosophical inquiries of sport: how are ethical concerns in sport resolved and what is the nature of excellence in sport. Examples taken from recent Olympic games will be used to illustrate how intersubjectivity is woven into the very fabric of Olympism, the Olympic games, and sport itself.

**What’s Wrong with Prudent Athletic Planners and Prudent Athletic Lifestyles**
Mike McNamee, University of Wales Swansea, UK  
*Saturday, September 16, 1:30 – 3:00 pm, Grand Hall II*  
(Session 7B with Heather Sheridan and Sarah Teetzel)

Brown argues that prudence requires an individual to be ‘equally concerned about all the parts of his future’ (Brown 1990: 78) thus keeping our options open. Derived from Norman Daniels (1988) ‘prudential lifespan account’, itself derived from John Rawls’ account of a “life-plan” Brown’s argument concludes that the rational person will employ prudence in making decisions with regards to their life in time-neutral ways; avoiding the over-weighting of any given time slice. In the sports domain the consequent ‘prudential athletic lifestyle (PAL)’ (Brown 1990: 78) demands that a rational agent will engage in sport with a concern for their well-being over an entire life that ensuring that the goods inherent in sport can be pursued and secured over the course of a life time.

This paper will critically examine the concept of the PAL. It is argued that the proposal that rational agents must be thus prudent excludes their possibility of their attaining excellence in adolescence or the earlier years of adulthood in order not to limit the potential to secure these goods later in life. The achievement of one’s potential, particularly in elite sport may indeed require the abandonment of prudence in the proposed sense. Indeed, there is nothing necessarily irrational in athletes’ putting ‘all their eggs in one basket. Adopting a posture contrary to time-neutrality, I build on Slote’s (1983) proposal that goods and virtues are ‘time-relative’ (1983: 31) which is opposed to the basis of the prudential athletic lifestyle and its insistence upon the time neutrality (Brown 1990) of well-being. The tension between these contrasting perspectives, the inefficacy of the concept of “life-plans”, the problem of moral luck, and the idea of a naturalistic lifespan will be explored in the context of a number of sports.

**Sport and the Moral Importance of What We Care About**
William J. Morgan, The Ohio State University, USA  
*Thursday, September 14, 4:30 – 6:00 pm, Grand Hall III*  
(Session 1C with Mark Hamilton and Andrew Holowchak)

In an oft-cited argument, Bernard Williams poses the following example: a man is faced with a situation in which two people are in imminent physical danger and he is only in a position to save one of them. One of those whose life is imperiled is a perfect stranger while the other is his wife. He decides to save his wife. The question Williams wants to provoke is whether the man was morally justified in choosing his wife over the stranger. Now, Williams argues, many moral
philosophers think they can justify his choice by appeal to a moral principle that holds “in situations of this kind it is at least morally permissible to save one’s wife.” But Williams famously objects that the moral philosopher who so insists that it is his wife and that in situations like this it is morally right to save one’s wife is guilty of “one thought too many.” For the very fact that it is his wife is moral reason enough, Williams claims, to save her, and, therefore, to add impersonal considerations into the mix to justify his decision only shows that he lacks the appropriate love and feelings and moral regard for his wife that are or should be characteristic of such intimate personal relationships. Williams points out that our personal attachments and relationships should always take moral precedence over impersonal considerations, but rather that if our lives are to have meaning such that they are worth living our personal attachments and the things we care about cannot be made wholly hostage to abstract moral considerations.

I want to similarly argue that what goes for personal relationships goes for social practices like sport whose meaning similarly rests on the fact that we not only care about them, but care deeply about them. And it is our caring about them, rather than some Kantian rational formulation of a moral life or some utilitarian moral weighing of the consequences of our actions, that accounts for their moral importance in our lives. That is why, I claim, our personal attachment to sports, no less that our personal attachment to meaningful others, also speaks against holding them wholly hostage to impersonal moral reasons and principles.

Genetically Engineering Our Way to Sexual Equality in Sport
Samuel Morris, The Ohio State University, USA
Sunday, September 17, 8:30 – 10:00 am, Grand Hall II
(Session 8B with Junko Yamaguchi)

In Tamburrini and Tännsjö’s recent provocative essay “The Genetic Design of a New Amazon,” they argue that a traditional approach of allotting greater resources to the development of women’s sports (as advocated by Jane English) in order to achieve gender equity with regard to the basic benefits of sports only “perpetuates the division between male and female sport gender stereotypes”. They argue that instead of “a policy of assigning resources across gender barriers” we should rather use genetic technology to close the gender gap. In other words, they claim that affirmative action policies are ineffective at achieving gender equity with regard to the basic benefits of sports and that a gender-blind approach utilizing genetic technology to close the athletic gender gap is preferable.

I argue, contrarily, that affirmative action policies have produced significant, albeit slow progress and that these practices continue to be the best method of working towards gender equity with regard to the basic benefits of sports. I argue further that Tamburrini and Tännsjö’s dismissal of affirmative action is based upon the suspect biological assumption that the gender gap can only be closed by genetically engineering women to be stronger, an assumption that we have good reason to contest from a cultural perspective. Finally, I argue that the resort to genetic technology Tamburrini and Tännsjö urge here is itself morally problematic if not dangerous because the “enhanced society” it conjures up suggests that deep seated moral problems like sexual equality are amenable to technological fixes.

Aesthetics and Art in Sport
Stephen Mumford, University of Nottingham, UK
Saturday, September 16, 1:30 – 3:00 pm, Grand Hall I
(Session 7A with Alison Lord and Charlene Weaving)

Since David Best’s work in the 1970’s (cf. ‘The Aesthetic in Sport’) the orthodoxy has been that sport is not, and can never be, art. I intend to re-open this debate.

In the first place it is agreed that aesthetic value can be found in sport, both in terms of physical movement but also higher-order beauty in strategy and tactics. I agree with Best, however, that aesthetic value is not a sufficient condition for art. Best has a definition of art that he argues does not apply to sport. I say that this definition is either overly restrictive or can indeed apply to sport. A key battleground that remains is the number of disanalogies that Best claims there to be between sport and art.
Sport is likened by some observers to unscripted theatre. Best responds that defeat or injury only happens to the character on the stage, not to the actors, whereas in sport people do suffer real defeats and real injuries. I argue that there is a sense in which sport can involve adopting a role. Team-mates in national sides, for example, can become adversaries in club sides. These players may be perfectly good friends as people but have to adopt an adversarial role for the sport, even to the point where they are prepared to risk injuring their friend in order for the game to be won. After the game the adversarial role can be dropped and the friendship is unaltered. Analogously, a drama may require the actors to be adversaries, even to the point where a physical injury occurs: A may have to give B a real slap across the face for it to look convincing. The actors, like the sportspeople, accept that the injury is not administered to the adversary qua person but to the adversary qua opponent. In both cases, however, extreme acts of violence may be interpreted as acts against the person rather than acts against the role and therefore produce appropriate indignation.

In sport, the aesthetic values are also said to be incidental while they are essential in standard cases of art. This is contentious because it ignores the evident fact that many sports are spectator sports and dependent for their rules and evolution on the responses of the spectators. A sport may undergo rule changes specifically to make it a more pleasing spectacle rather than, for example, to make it more physically demanding. Some of the reasons why a sport is regarded as entertaining can be understood as aesthetic reasons. As there is a link between such aesthetic values and the existence and nature of the sport, sometimes sport can correctly be described as art.

**Big Game Hunt or Staged Massacre: The United States Congress and the Hunt for an Ethical Approach to the Steroid Issue in Baseball**

Jim Nendel, Eastern Washington University, USA  
*Sunday, September 17, 10:30 am – 12:00 pm, Grand Hall I*  
(Session 9A with Kenneth Kirkwood)

Former Major League baseball player Jose Canseco opened up a Pandora’s box of trouble for Major League baseball when he published a tell-all autobiography. Canseco became a whistleblower on the use and abuse of steroids in Major League baseball. Not only did Canseco admit his use of the illegal substances but he also named names of those he purportedly assisted in the endeavor to gain a performance advantage through chemical assistance.¹

The publication of the book and the attendant publicity attached to it including a “60 minutes” segment on the Columbia Broadcast System (CBS) brought the attention of the United States Congress. As a result, Members of Congress assembled a special committee to investigate the use of steroids in baseball and subpoenaed various players administrators and medical personnel to testify before them in March, 2005. The committee emphasized that the intent of the special investigation was to stem the use of steroids in order to protect American youth from emulating their professional heroes. Since that time more books alleging steroid use by Barry Bonds have been published and Rafael Palmeiro one of those testifying before Congress that he never used steroids has tested positive. Major League Baseball has now hired George Mitchell a former congressman and a part owner of the Boston Red Sox to head a committee to investigate the use of steroids in baseball.

This paper will investigate the Congressional hearings as well as the Major league baseball investigation from the perspective of the ethical intent of the political gathering. There are numerous ethical issues which can be addressed in this situation including whether or not these athletes should be utilized as role models for young people and the larger issue of whether or not the use of steroids are an ethical breach. However, I will focus on the issue of why Congress is attacking baseball on steroids and whether or not this is truly an ethical crusade for the good of the youth of America.

I will concede that whether or not athletes have an ethical responsibility to be perceived as role models, the reality is that they are viewed in those terms. Athletes live a life that is appealing to those who are impressionable. I also will not attempt to prove or disprove the ethical nature of the use of steroids. I will grant that they enhance performance in athletes who use them
and acknowledge that to date no conclusive medical research has been done in regards to the perceived health issues related to the use of steroids.

My inquiry addresses the nature of the investigation. Congressional leaders chose to bring out their big guns in confronting this supposed scandal. They are hunting down the elephant in the room, which no one wishes to address. It appears that this is a big game safari expedition in search of a vicious predator. Or is it? Could it be that Congress’ hunt is nothing more than a shooting gallery with a hampered injured animal, while in reality the true threat to the young people in the village is the tiger, which no one in Congress or baseball wants to confront, tobacco.

If the ethical nature of baseball’s substance abuse policy, or lack thereof, is of such interest to politicians, why have they not addressed the lack of a tobacco policy in Major League Baseball when that substance is a proven killer?  


**Philosopher-Athletes in Plato’s Republic**

Heather L. Reid, Morningside College, USA  
**Friday, September 15, 8:30 – 10:00 am, Grand Hall III**  
(Session 2C with Michael Austin and Christos Evangelion)

The idea of a “philosopher-athlete” may seem odd to Plato scholars and physical educators alike. Although physical training is included in *Republic* as part of the education of the guardians, their goal is to become philosopher-rulers, not philosopher-athletes. Furthermore, the goal of all Platonic education is virtue, excellence, or *aretē*—something he believes to be a quality of the mind/soul (*psychē*) and not the body. In *Republic*, *aretē* is explicitly associated with the proper organization and harmonious function of the tripartite soul. *Aretē* is the health of the soul, just as justice is the health of the city; it’s hard to see how athletics could contribute to it. For these reasons, scholars generally regard Plato’s endorsement of physical education as little more than a nod to contemporary tradition, which valued gymnastics for their cultivation of physical beauty and military preparedness. A closer look reveals a more interesting resolution to the paradox, however. It turns out that Plato exercises the bodies of his guardians specifically for benefit of their souls. Physical training helps to harmonize the soul, to prepare it for philosophy, and to cultivate the moral strength demanded of rulers. In short, the *Republic’s* philosopher rulers must start by becoming philosopher athletes.

Only a cursory reader would conclude that Plato includes physical training merely for the body. To begin the discussion of education for the guardians (an elite class of men and women from which the city’s rulers will be chosen), Socrates asks whether they could do any better than the traditional combination of “physical training for bodies and music and poetry for the soul” (376e). At first it is agreed that improvement on this system would be difficult, but later Socrates qualifies his characterization. At 410bc he states explicitly that, like music, physical education was established “chiefly for the sake of the soul,” and not just the body as many assume. After a brief discussion, he concludes: “It seems, then, that a god has given music and physical training to human beings not, except incidentally, for the body and the soul, but for the spirited and wisdom-loving parts of the soul itself, in order that these may be in harmony with one another, each being stretched and relaxed to an appropriate degree.” (411e)

Just what does Plato mean here? How does physical training “harmonize” these parts of the soul? Unfortunately, the text’s immediate explanation is brief and lacking detail. There is a brief analogy to the tuning of string instruments (412a) and a cursory listing of appropriate activities: dances, hunts, athletic games, and horse races (412b). But there is no clear answer to the question of how such activities cultivate *aretē*. What I propose here is to construct an answer to that question by explaining Plato’s general theory of education for virtue, showing how athletic activities would fit into that theory, and applying his comments about just and unjust souls to various kinds of athletes. Finally, I sketch a model of the Platonic philosopher-athlete as a socially-engaged citizen who puts athletics in the service of his or her soul.
Playing with Deterritorialization and Deterritorializing with Play: A Deleuzian Approach to Sport and Gender Performance
Mark Renneson and Maureen Ford, University of Toronto/OISE, Canada
Friday, September 15, 3:30 – 5:00 pm, Grand Hall I
(Session 5A with Lisa Edwards and Joan Grassbaugh Forry)

In this paper we explore how sport can be instrumental in reframing the ways in which one interprets the world, specifically, gender performances. Using Pirkko Markula’s article “Deleuze and the Body Without Organs: Disreading the Fit Feminine Identity” as a starting point, we suggest that play and playfulness can create opportunities to disrupt, challenge, and reconfigure one’s perspectives on normalized gender roles. It is our contention that sport and play can work to bring about the significant shift in perspective that Gilles Deleuze calls deterritorialization.

Through the combined use of theory and practice, a case is made for the inclusion of sport as a means for challenging gendered norms, especially for attracting those who resist such challenges through ‘conventional’ methods. By grounding the rethinking of gender performances in sport, one broadens the invitation to participate. Thus, while sport can be used to entrench certain performances, it can also be used as an invitation to challenge and renegotiate them.


The Vulnerability Principle and Violence in Hockey
Danny Rosenberg, Brock University, Canada
Sunday, September 17, 10:30 am – 12:00 pm, Grand Hall II
(Session 9B with Jerzy Kosiewicz and Alex Krasnick)

In his discussion of violence and contact sport, Simon (2004) introduces a normative concept called the Vulnerability Principle (VP) to determine whether or not the use of physical force is ethically defensible. His formal definition states, “According to the VP, for the use of force against an opponent in an athletic contest to be ethically defensible, the opponent must be in a position and condition such that a strategic response is possible and it is unlikely that injury will ensue” (p. 104). Acts that violate the VP include “undercutting” from behind a basketball player who is in the air, throwing a brushback pitch against batters playing in older adult leagues, and bodychecking in children’s ice hockey. In these instances, athletes on the receiving end of the force are unlikely to be in a position to respond effectively because they are either too vulnerable or lack the reflexes or requisite skills to execute protective countermoves. Simon also recognizes that some acts, like a blind side tackle against a receiver in football, are less clear as a VP violation. The VP may be useful to differentiate between many forms of physical force and acts of violence in various sports. In some contexts this principle may be less helpful.

Violence has been associated with hockey in three main areas: bodychecking, bareknuckle fighting, and use of one’s stick as a weapon. This proposed paper will consider each of these areas in light of the VP. Bodychecking is a learned skill, yet it is not a necessary skill even in elite circles, unlike tackling in football and rugby. For example, women’s international and Olympic hockey is a contact sport that bans bodychecking. There are clear strategic uses for bodychecking and most players, at a certain age, are able to protect themselves from this type of physical force as stipulated by the VP. However, in football, one can deliver a blind side bodycheck that is perfectly legal, though perhaps questionable from an ethical perspective.

Bareknuckle fighting in hockey is an institutionalized part of the sport. Whereas in most sports fighting results in being ejected from the game, hockey players who fight usually receive a penalty and may return to finish out the contest. I will show that certain elements of the VP occur in hockey fights, like its use for strategic purposes and the fact that when two players square off little real harm usually results and players can reasonably protect themselves. In this sense I will disagree with Simon (2004) who claims that “fighting [in hockey] involves the use of force with the intent to harm” (p. 108).

In contrast to fighting, clubbing a player with one’s stick, as Marty McSorley did against Donald Brashear in a professional hockey game a few years ago, is a clear transgression of the
This use of force is seen rarely in hockey, but when it occurs, it can be easily discerned and censured as an act of violence and it cannot be institutionalized like bodychecking and fighting.

This proposed paper then will examine the VP in relation to violence in hockey as evident in bodychecking, bareknuckle fighting, and use of one’s stick as a weapon.

**Children and Dangerous Sport**
J.S. Russell, Langara College, Canada

*Friday, September 15, 1:30 – 3:00 pm Grand Hall I*  
(Session 4A with Sheryle Dixon and Bogdan Ciomaga)

This paper examines the ethical dimensions of children’s participation in dangerous sport. This is a problematic and neglected issue in philosophy of sport and in applied moral philosophy generally. There is a common ethical presumption that parents and others in positions of responsibility should not permit children (or at least incompetent children) to engage in activities that pose significant risks of injury to them. A related duty concerns parents’ and guardians’ obligations to secure an “open future” for their children. These obligations are in apparent tension with permitting, encouraging, or requiring children’s participation in dangerous sport.

The paper presents a qualified defense of the participation of children in dangerous sport, drawing in part on ideas developed in the paper “The Value of Dangerous Sport” (*Journal of the Philosophy of Sport*, XXXII No.1 [2006]:1-19). That paper argued that the value of dangerous sport consists principally in affording opportunities to test and extend the limits of one’s being along certain physical, emotional, and intellectual aspects of the self. This was described as a process of self-affirmation. I argue that childhood development is fundamentally an experience of such self-affirmation, and that this affords a qualified justification for permitting children to engage in dangerous sport. The paper also considers the nature and limits of parental responsibilities for their children’s participation in dangerous sport. As well, it considers the applicability of standard ethical models of informed consent and informed assent. Related issues concern assessment and respect for children’s decision-making capacity, duties to disclose risks to children, and voluntariness of participation in dangerous sport.

**More than Meets the “I”: Values of Dangerous Sport**
Pam R. Sailors, Missouri State University, USA

*Friday, September 15, 8:30 – 10:00 am, Grand Hall I*  
(Session 2A with Artyom Ivanenko)

Some people go to great expense and effort to engage in sports that carry great risk to life and limb, eagerly climbing to such altitudes that the human body literally begins to die, running long distances across deserts in ferocious heat, or engaging in races that require them to exercise several skills on minimal sleep. What is it about these activities, i.e., dangerous sports, that draw people to them? J. S. Russell defines dangerous sport as “sport that involves activity that itself creates a significant risk of loss of, or serious impairment to, some basic capacity for human functioning” and has argued that its value lies in the opportunity it provides for enhanced self-knowledge and self-affirmation (2005). I don’t question this claim, but I do suggest that this is not the whole story. Utilizing a distinction suggested by Jonathan Simon, I argue that there are two kinds of value derived from dangerous sport; one is self-referential in the way that Russell has suggested while the other is better characterized as self-transcendent or self-negating. Simon distinguishes between “summiteers”—who focus on the individual quest to reach the summit by whatever means necessary—and “mountaineers”—who draw value from relationships with each other and with the environment (2002). I draw on narratives from mountain climbing, ultra-running and adventure racing to show examples of these two types. On the one hand are those individuals (Simon’s “summiteers”) who engage in dangerous sport with eyes locked on the goal, whether it be reaching a summit or a finishing line, focused on themselves as individuals locked into combat with their own limits. These are the people described most closely by Russell. On the other hand are those individuals (Simon’s “mountaineers”) who participate in dangerous
sport for the less tangible values found in encounters through the process of engaging in the sports themselves. An account of the value of dangerous sport is incomplete without acknowledging both of these types.

The Fans’ Power to Corrupt Sports Play
Stephen E. Schmid, University of Wisconsin–Rock County, USA
Friday, September 15, 1:30 – 3:00 pm, Grand Hall II
(Session 4B with Dan Collins-Cavanaugh and Carwyn Jones & Scott Fleming)

In this paper, I argue that fans corrupt pure play in the playing of sports. The concept of play I will adopt is Meier’s (1988), where play is “an autotelic activity...an activity voluntarily pursued for predominantly intrinsic reasons.” Autotelicity, the pursuing of an event or activity solely for its intrinsic value, is essential for play. Fundamental to this understanding of play is the idea that one who plays pursues that activity (sports or games) for its intrinsic and not its instrumental value. I will refer to autotelic play as pure play.

There are two ramifications of this conception of pure play within the context of sports. Given this definition of pure play, (i) one can play sports when one participates in that activity merely for the rewards of the activity itself, and (ii) one can participate in a sport and not play the sport when one participates in the sport only for the benefit or payoff that the sport is expected to provide. In (ii), the sport has instrumental value but no intrinsic value for the athlete. In these cases, the athlete “works” sports but doesn’t play sports. I will argue that “playing to win” in most, if not all, cases is not pure play and is working sports.

Under this conception of pure play, I think it is obvious that most professional athletes work their sport, but do not play it. But, why is this? While the pursuit of riches and fame is a plausible answer, I think the explanation goes deeper.

To highlight the corruption of pure play in sport activities, I will use Bode Miller’s participation in this year’s Winter Olympics to argue that sports fans are the factor that leads to the corruption of pure play. Spectators pay to watch their team compete. Fans expect a sport’s star to play to win. When an athlete expresses his or her desire to compete simply for the sake of playing and that player’s performance is considered substandard (even when it is not), then the fan is left with the feeling that the athlete has failed to live up to his or her duty. In other words, the fans’ disappointment in such cases highlights the assumption that the athlete ought to be playing to win and not playing purely for the sake of playing. It is the spectators’ expectation that an accomplished athlete ought to engage in a given activity to win or excel that fuels the corruption of pure play. In essence, what the spectator demands is that athletes not play their sport simply for the activity’s intrinsic value.

From Record to Narrative: Social Philosophy of Narrative in Modern Sport
Masami Sekine, Okayama University, Japan
Friday, September 15, 3:30 – 5:00 pm, Grand Hall II
(Session 5B with Alun Hardman and Douglas McClaughrine & Cesar Torres)

If we think sensibly, it will be thought that a record completely differs from a narrative. It is because that record symbolizes rationality and narrative symbolizes our imagination and feelings. The record is considered a symbol of modern age and the narrative is considered pre-modern symbol. However, is this right? Even if record is the feature of a modern sport, the role of the narrative produced by sport phenomenon has been pointed out until now. There are researches of Morgan(1998) and Eassom(1997) as precedence research that took up an athlete’s narrative in the field of sport philosophy. They discuss the narrative of Boulmerka who was the female runner of Algeria. She was the athlete of the Islamic cultural sphere and won in an Olympic Games. It is said that the function which the tale involving Boulmerka bring a sense of solidarity to a different community. Morgan and Eassom suggest the possibility of the dialog between foreign culture or different community by the narrative of Boulmerka. The narrative of Boulmerka
especially suggests a change of the sports culture in the Islamic cultural sphere, and a mutual understanding of different cultural spheres. This position is based on the geographical framework. In this research, I want to show the interpretation to solidarity by a sport not by the geographical framework but by a time framework. It is specifically solidarity between generations. In order to attain this subject, I consider the function which narrative has based on the argument of H. Arendt. According to Arendt (1958), narrative (story) shows who one is. It is not made by highest achievement. I develop an argument as follows on the basis of the character of such the narrative. The feature of modern sport is that record was made strict. The modern sport compares achievement by record, and the result has important value socially. Various unfair acts represented by doping also originate in the sense of values. So to speak, it is alienation. However, record is an existence different from the person who achieved. On the other hand, the sense of values of the achievement produced by the narrative is connected with the act of the person who achieved. The person who achieved is "hero" (Arendt) in the narrative. I think the function of narrative leads to create solidarity between different generations.

References

How Do We Decide What's Good for Sport?: Tradition-Practice Bound Reasoning
Heather Sheridan, University of Gloucestershire, UK
Saturday, September 16, 1:30 – 3:00 pm, Grand Hall II
(Session 7B with Mike McNamee and Sarah Teetzel)

All sports practices undergo challenges and revisions to their nature. Innovative rule changes such as the penalty shoot out and the golden goal in soccer, the tie-breaker in tennis, Fosbury’s ‘flop’ in the high jump, and Chris Boardman’s ‘Superman position’ in cycling, are evidence of the dynamic nature of sports. These innovations, when adopted, represented new instantiations of particular sports. Yet a sport that changes its rules too readily is in danger of sacrificing the traditional skills that contribute so much to the beauty and enjoyment of the sport, both for the athlete and the spectator. By contrast, a sport that resists innovations is in danger of obsolescence in a world that seems increasingly to demand the new and improved.

Is it possible to rationally decide between those ways of playing sports that are beautiful from those that are corrupt? We need to determine how we ought to select the criteria to justify changes that will benefit sports practices while simultaneously safeguarding their integrity. To this end I set out a tradition-practice bound decision-making model that can be used to evaluate sporting practices which is transparent, democratic, and respectful of the traditions and internal norms of particular practices.

A Critique of Johan Huizinga's Play Theory: From the Perspective of the ‘Sacred’
Simon Shih, Taiwan University, Taiwan
Friday, September 15, 10:30 am – 12:00 pm, Grand Hall II
(Session 3B with Michael Capobianco and Leslie Howe)

Obviously, play theory has influenced sport a great deal, especially because of the influence of Johan Huizinga’s famous book, Homo Ludens. According to Huizinga, play is not only recreational “play”, but also performs a very important role in human civilization, and elements such as “Law, War, Knowledge, Poetry, Mythology, Philosophy, and Art” are all forms of play. However, are there no exceptions to Huizinga’s theory? What are the shortcomings to his theory? The answer is undoubtedly that there are both exceptions and shortcomings. This paper uses the perspective of the “Sacred”, especially as defined by Roger Caillois in Man and the Sacred, to criticize Huizinga’s theory on the one hand, and to reveal new meanings for sport on the other.
There are two major critiques in Roger Caillois’ famous book Man and the Sacred. Firstly, Caillois asks: Is play truly singular? Can this single term cover the many activities that can be defined as play? Hence, Caillois created categories of play, which he defined as “Competition, Chance, Simulation and Vertigo”. Secondly, he emphasizes the important approach of the “Sacred” in play theory. From a “Sacred” perspective, not only can the “seriousness” of play be clearly explained, but the ontology of play can be clarified, as he wrote: “However, if one considers not merely its forms, but the intimate attitudes of the officiant and of the faithful, I also see that sacrifice and communion are involved, that one is then fully in the sacred, and as far removed from play as is conceivable.” Thus, many ordinary games have a sacred origin. Caillois even goes so far as to say, “It is evident that I am the first to recognize the relationship that it is possible to establish between play and the sacred.”

In my own opinion, there still one critique left. According to Huizinga, among the characteristics of play, one is: “A free activity standing quite consciously outside ‘ordinary’ life as being ‘not serious’”. He also writes, “It proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and space according to fixed rules and in an orderly manner.” It seems that he defines a “Play world” which is separate from the “Living world”, but if elements of civilization such as law, science, war and so on are forms of play, how could they be separate from the living world?

Thus, I contend that it is better to say that the “Play world” and “Living world” are the same, just as Mircea Eliade points out that a “Sacred tree” is the same tree in the living world. Furthermore, if we use the approach of the “Sacred” to explain the theory of play, we can clearly see the “seriousness” of play. These are the major critiques and shortcomings of Huizinga’s theory. Finally, all of these arguments can be evidenced and observed in the world of Sport, especially through the growing body of research into “Sport and Religion”.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS: Deserving to be Lucky: Some Reflections of the Role of Luck in Sport
Robert Simon, Hamilton College, USA
Saturday, September 16, 6:30 – 10:30pm, Conference Banquet, Great Room

Luck clearly plays a significant role in many sports contests, but is this a good or bad thing? To those who believe contests primarily are tests of the relative skills of the participants, the intrusion of luck, especially when it significantly affects the outcome of the contest, spoils it by interfering with the test of skill. Other philosophers worry that if our skills and abilities, and even the psychological traits that enable us to take the best advantage of our innate talents, come to us only fortuitously (perhaps through what Rawls calls “the natural lottery”), our athletic successes are undeserved. In great part, they are the result of the luck of the draw, for which we can take no credit.

In my paper, I argue against both these claims. First, I argue that sometimes skill and ability create opportunities for luck to strike, so to speak, and so in a way athletes can deserve to be lucky. Finally, I argue that the natural lottery or luck of the draw of talents and abilities does not always rule out desert or merit in athletic contests.

The Networked Meta-Game as Cyber(-Enabled) Sport: A Response to Hemphill
Sean Smith, European Graduate School/Brock University, Canada
Saturday, September 16, 8:30 – 10:00 am, Grand Hall II
(Session 6B with Dennis Hemphill and Sigmund Loland)

Since the 1960s, several communications technologies have, singly and in combination, emerged to impact our contemporary understanding of sporting practices. Of particular interest in this essay are the invention and commodification of the personal computer; the evolution of the U.S. military’s ARPAnet into today’s Internet; and the development of electronic and digital games. As these networked communications technologies become an ever-increasing part of the sporting landscape, most notably in professional and high-performance sport, they appear to open up new vectors for sporting production and consumption, both in terms of its corporeality and its mediation. Hemphill (2005) has posited the most radical interpretation of this new sporting
landscape by suggesting the emergence of what he refers to as “cybersport”, while asking, in effect, can this be considered sport?

In contrast to Hemphill’s cybersport concept, I intend to propose a sporting event that incorporates aspects of virtuality, but retains a fuller sense of embodiment and stops just short of the “dubious” nature of cybersport-as-sport: call it the networked meta-game. This new type of athletic event is posited as a sporting response to what Virilio (2002) has termed the “city of the instant” that is emerging as multiple geographies are being connected by ubiquitous electronic communications. What interests us is the score of this particular sporting contest, since it is the medium by which the networked meta-game connects athletes over a large distributed geography into one meta-game.

Imagine thousands and millions of pickup games simultaneously occurring around the world, each with a Blue and White team. The players do not know the score at their own particular location, though. Rather, it is being transmitted digitally to a central database server, from which an aggregated meta-score is sent back to each of the local sites of play around the world—all of the Blue scores against all of the White scores. That is, score as a medium of competition gets taken to its logical conclusion: a reversal into a medium of cooperation, in which the de facto goal becomes trying to get as many local game cells going around the world to push the meta-score ever higher.

In essence, the networked meta-game constitutes a radical decentralization of the space of sport (re)production, in which the bodies-athletic in motion are simultaneously participants and spectators of a global sports spectacle. With this different form of cyber-enabled sport, the question is clearly not that which challenges Hemphill, since each game cell around the world is engaged in what we would consider a “traditional” sporting practice. Instead, we may ask: in the city of the instant, are we all participating in the same sporting event?

References
The purpose of this research is to investigate the formation process about one's view of the human body by a comparison of English, German and Japanese people. First, an international comparison was made on the results of a questionnaire survey, and it was investigated what kinds of factors made these differences. Furthermore, the formation process about one's view of the human body is analyzed from a phenomenological viewpoint. This study is the fundamental research to clearly demonstrate the possible necessity of education in regards to developing one's view of the human body. Why is it necessary for students to educate one's view of the human body? It is because there are conditions that the physical culture, which makes the basis of daily life, is impoverished, and that a surface culture concerned with the human body is too excessive. In present Japan, we have to get over this situation.

With respect to this theme, "the paradigm change of one's view of the human body in Japan" (2003 IAPS) and "comparison of one's view of the human body between Germany and Japan" (2005 German-Japanese Symposium) were presented. This time, with results of an investigation in England, the formation process of one’s view of the human body is considered through examination of the differences among three countries. Content of this presentation is as follows. First, the formation factors about one's view of the human body are explained; feeling, behavior, scientific knowledge and influence from mass media. These factors composed the framework of the questionnaire. Next, the differences among three countries are interpreted, depending on the comparison of the results of the questionnaires. Moreover, it is my consideration that the validity of the formation process is revealed through this interpretation.

As for Japan, differences in age, lifestyle and region were seen. There were many items of big difference between men and women, in the standard deviation as well as these with a commonality. Hence, it is difficult to extract an own view of the body based solely on nationality. Also, big differences between Japan and the other two countries were not seen in items that were expected. Surprisingly, an interested result surfaced: a Japanese student was being westernized all the more. The strength of the influence from mass media to one's view of the human body was common in each country. Briefly, the people come to hold an individual view of the human body by four formation factors.

Should Elite Sports Serve Social Utility?: Transforming Sports Medicine Ethics to Shape a Democratic Society
Claudio Tamburrini, Stockholm University, Sweden
Friday, September 15, 10:30am – 12:00 pm, Grand Hall I
(Session 3A with Gunnar Breivik and Peter Hopsicker)

Regarding genetic engineering, it seems reasonable to distinguish between negative medical interventions (intended to cure disease), positive interventions (intended to improve functioning, within the normal range) and enhancement (where a person is pushed beyond normal functioning). In medical ethics, all these kinds of genetic modification seem to be accepted and are considered uncontroversial. However, in sports medicine ethics, while negative interventions are unproblematic, positive interventions are judged as problematic, and enhancement forbidden. In that sense, there seems to be a conflict between the (more conservative) ethos of sports and the (seemingly more liberal) stance adopted by the wider society regarding the application of the new genetic technologies. Which one should prevail?
In this paper, I will argue for the extension of the latter societal stance to the world of sports in terms of its potential beneficial effects for (1) gender equity, and (2) distributive justice. Thus, I will explicitly abstain from arguing for genetic engineering resorting to its expected positive effects for sports, or to the fact that the use of these new technologies seems to be required by the ethos of professional sports, properly understood. Beyond sporting considerations, social utility demands paving the way for genetics in competitive elite sports.

The Study of the ‘Considerate Body’ from a Phenomenological Viewpoint
Ai Tanaka, Tokyo Gakugei University, Japan
Saturday, September 16, 8:30 – 10:00 am, Grand Hall III
The purpose of this study is to clarify the concept of “considerate body” as the basis of interpersonal relationship based on phenomenological method. This concept has the following three dimensions of phenomenological concept of “I”: 1) to present “considerateness” 2) to receive “considerateness” 3) to observe “considerateness”. From these three viewpoints, the structure and function of “considerate body” is tried to be clear. This concept of “considerate body” is expected to provide a new viewpoint of the relationship between the ability to construct interpersonal relationship and sports practice in physical education.

While the term “considerate” is used to express one’s feeling or emotion of interpersonal relationship, and is also used as synonyms of “sympathetic”, “kind”, and “attentive”, it is used without a clear understanding and intention of how to “act”. Therefore, this term seems to be only concerned with emotional aspect of human being. Nevertheless, we usually interpret one’s act of behavior as “considerate”. This means the importance of body as phenomenon to interpret others. This is why this study focuses on body for the discussion of interpersonal relationship and presents the concept of “considerate body” based on phenomenology.

To bring the ability to construct interpersonal relationship is common goal in school education and physical education is the practical field to bring up body not only from scientific aspect but also from cultural aspect in education. Therefore, relationship between “considerateness” and body should be one of the important themes in physical education. In this study the possibility of sports practice for interpersonal relationship is tried to be deduced from the concept of “considerate body”.

Although this study focuses on theoretical discussion of body, some examples of “considerateness” in daily life and sport are given to discuss the concept concretely.

**Autonomy and Sport: Determining an Account**
Sarah Teetzel, The University of Western Ontario, Canada
*Saturday, September 16, 1:30 – 3:00 pm, Grand Hall II*
(Session 7B with Mike McNamee and Heather Sheridan)

When arguing in favour of eliminating the current doping bans in elite sport, some of the most convincing arguments used by Brown, Tamburrini, and other critics of the doping prohibitions appeal to an athlete’s autonomy and right to make independent decisions about matters pertaining to his or her own body. The notion of self rule, which has been debated for centuries, has been described in countless ways by a myriad of philosophers; hence, a repertoire of conceptions of autonomy has been built over the years. How, then, should autonomy be viewed in the context of sport?

In this paper, I will ask what conception of autonomy, if any, most accurately describes what philosophers of sport want to encompass in evaluating an athlete’s ability to make independent decisions within the arbitrarily created and constructed world of elite sport. To answer this question, I compare traditional accounts of autonomy with more contemporary conceptions to elucidate what self rule actually involves, particularly with respect to doping bans in sport. Drawing from works by Berlin, Rawls, Dworkin, Agich, Beauchamp and Childress, I examine the concept of autonomy in a variety of applied ethics settings, and from a number of perspectives, in order to determine the relevance of these definitions, explanations, and characterizations for sport. I will also discuss whether sport requires its own definition of autonomy or if a previously proposed model and conception will suffice. As critics of the current doping policies and rules often base their opposition on the argument that preventing an athlete from using a drug, substance, or method violates the athlete’s autonomy, the goal of this paper is to unpack what exactly is being violated when the governing bodies of sport prohibit athletes from participating in doping practices. In doing so, I argue that a conception of autonomy for sport blends together elements of liberty, independence, fair play, and power that can be found in a variety of philosophical works.

**Sport, Doping, and the Parallel Federation Solution: An Historio-Ethical Analysis**
Jan Todd, The University of Texas at Austin, USA
Dan Hamner, a former world-class track and field athlete, suggested to a Seattle Times reporter in October of 2005 that, since there appeared to him to be no way to stop the use of drugs and other forms of performance enhancement, sport should be divided into two leagues: “One clean. One dirty.” The creation of two leagues for the same sport, Hamner argued, was “the only way to level the playing field.” Otherwise, Hamner continued, “…you’re going to have cheating. You always will” (Bishop, 2005).

Hamner is not the first to suggest parallel federations as a solution to the problem of drug use in sport. A look at the history of powerlifting and bodybuilding reveals that both sports adopted this “solution” approximately 20 years ago by dividing themselves into so-called tested and non-tested federations. Rather than solving the drug problem in these sports, however, the adoption of the “Parallel Federation Solution” served to demonstrate the applicability of sociologist Robert Merton’s theory of unintended consequences (1936). This is because once the idea of parallel federations entered these sports, there was no stopping the proliferation of federations. Multiple “drug-free” federations developed in powerlifting, for example, each with a slightly different testing methodology. And, even more unexpectedly, multiple “drug-using” federations evolved, most formed by individuals with the desire to establish constitutive rules and doping policies that fit their own vision of what was best for the sport and, and particularly, for themselves. This has resulted in sports so fractionalized that, in 2006, there are 15 different world governing bodies for powerlifting (each keeping its own set of world records), and 14 “American” powerlifting organizations vying for competitors. Bodybuilding currently features 11 international federations and 11 national federations.

This essay uses the history of the Parallel Federation Solution in the sports of powerlifting and bodybuilding as the basis for an ethical discussion of the concept of tested and non-tested federations and their impact on the nature of sport. At this time, there is a growing sentiment within some quarters of sport philosophy that testing will not work and cannot be ethically defended. Albrecht, Anderson and McKeag, for example, claimed in 2001 that it was “impossible for drug testing to ensure fair and equal athletic competition; illogical and inconsistent with empirical evidence to test…; unethical to coerce athletes to consent to drug testing; unrealistic to believe the results of positive drug tests will remain confidential; and inefficient to spend millions of dollars each year to detect a handful of positive drug tests (185). Terry Black argued in 1996, that “Removal of the ban on drugs will result in fairer contests and greatly reduced health risks” (p. 377). Such remarks, the author contends, must be weighed against the rights of those athletes who wish not to use drugs and other forms of performance enhancement. They must also be weighed against the lessons learned from the history of powerlifting and bodybuilding, in which the creation of parallel federations has resulted in the breakdown of the very nature of the sport they were trying to preserve.

Aristotle, Polanyi and the Redefinition of Kinesiology
Gregg Twietmeyer, Penn State University, USA

Sunday, September 17, 8:30 – 10:00 am, Grand Hall I
(Session 8A with Andrew Valentine)

The current marriage of the sciences and the humanities within the discipline of Kinesiology is quite puzzling. Kinesiology is often described to curious onlookers as “The study of human movement;” and such abstract study is legitimizied by pointing out the field’s appropriately scientific sub-disciplines. (Biomechanics, Exercise Physiology, etc.) But what exactly does this kind of definition yield? Can we even begin to adequately explain such an abstraction as “The study of human movement?” If Kinesiologists can not give an adequate response to such an inquiry how can they possibly even begin to understand themselves?

Perhaps the problem is with the understanding of “motion” itself? Building on the work of both Aristotle and Polanyi I will argue that a fresh understanding of both motion and science must be constituted if Kinesiology is to become a coherent academic field. An Aristotelian understanding of what the word kinesis actually means reveals a more dynamic understanding of
motion. For Aristotle motion is much more than the mathematically describable change of place by inert matter. Motion is of four kinds rather than one; thinghood (being), quality, quantity, and place. Motion is fundamental to our human being. We come into being, we pass away, we grow, we tan, we freckle, we learn, we perceive, and we locomote. All of which are in themselves motions or fundamental outcomes of the motion(s) inherent in our being expressing itself (entelecheia). From an Aristotelian understanding of motion, a mechanical description of motion is hopelessly insufficient because it ignores the nature of the whole that is driving the mechanism. To be human is to move in every sense of the word. For Aristotle locomotion is incoherent when separated from either the perceptive capacity inherent in the being, or from the other motions that influence and make possible such perception. Locomotion is fundamentally grounded in perception, not measurement. Locomotion is and must be filled with and informed by human meanings, values, intentions, and potencies.

Using Polanyi’s critique of science found in Meaning, I will further argue that a reconception of Kinesiology must be one in which science serves rather than dominates the field. (The field being understood as an investigation of the meanings, values, intentions and potencies found in human locomotion.) As Polanyi argues, science’s latent meaning structure of experience, skill(s), and MacIntyrean practices must be recognized. “Scientific inquiry is accordingly a dynamic exercise of the imagination and is rooted in commitments and beliefs about the nature of things.” (Meaning, 1975, p. 63) Science and the humanities properly understood are after, and constituted on, the same paradigm; the discovery of coherent meaning.

My concern then is not unlike the concern Anderson expressed in “The Humanity of Movement” (Quest, (54)2, 2002). Kinesiology redefined is understood as the investigation of the meaning to be found in the fundamentally moving nature of humanity. Play, games and sport best fit this reconceived model and should therefore be the heart of the field. While Kinesiology must investigate scientific abstractions regarding the movement of human beings, such exploration should always serve the genuinely human experience from which it springs forth.

**Dynamical Systems Theory and the Philosophical Implications for Understanding Sport**

Andrew D. Valantine, Penn State University, USA

*Sunday, September 17, 8:30 – 10:00 am, Grand Hall I*

(Session 8A with Gregg Twietmeyer)

Dynamical Systems Theory (DST) and Complexity Theory (CT) have been pervasive forces in the scientific world as holistic models whereby complex systems can be better conceptualized. For example, a subset of these larger theories is the more popularly known, Chaos Theory. DST and CT posit that complex systems are best understood when viewed from both a “top-down” and “bottom-up” or reductionistic vantage. Ubiquitous properties of such systems exhibit novel and probabilistic behavior at various hierarchal levels of organization and are capable of maintaining stability without exclusive reliance upon exogenously imposed information normally thought necessary to control behavior. In contrast with deterministic (i.e. Newtonian) physical models solely exhibiting linear trends, these types of systems display unpredictable and non-linear behavior created by an indeterminate number and type of boundary conditions or constraints, both intrinsic and extrinsic.

In addition to offering a scientific paradigm that may be validated empirically across a multiplicity of disciplines such as meteorology, biochemistry, and motor behavior, the philosophical rationale behind DST/CT offers a much broader ontological framework that maps closely to our observations and experiences as intelligent and embodied persons engaged in sport, games, and play.

In consideration of the need to better understand the philosophical infrastructure capturing the essence of sport, games, and play it is proposed that the philosophical implications cast by DST/CT may help to solidify current foundations or perhaps assist in reconceptualizing and affirming these fundamental human experiences. Important concepts that lie at the root of DST/CT will be explicated and evaluated philosophically in an effort to provide an alternative perspective into the nature of sport. For example, DST terminology such as non-linearity, self-organization, emergent properties, reciprocated feedback, and historicity are reexamined.
philosophically to present explanatory parallels between physical systems normally explained by DST/CT and more complex and elusive sport systems.

Major theoretical and practical implications are made when team-sport dynamics, such as soccer play, are characterized as being open and nested systems, exhibiting emergent and global phenomenon not normally discernable when individual players are exclusively assessed at a local and reductionistic level. Not unlike physical systems exhibiting low-dimensional, although highly coordinated behavior, the success and/or failure of a team depends on its coordinative or cooperative abilities. Understanding how complex and non-linear systems maintain coordination becomes critical for understanding and implementing strategies for enhancing coordinated game play despite common systematic perturbations such as mental and physical fatigue, not to mention motivational adversity.

When viewed in this way the underlying philosophy of DST/CT offers a novel and holistic model for the understanding of sport philosophy, which is not only consistent with our experiences but is highly compatible with contemporary scientific findings. Furthermore, a basic grasp on the philosophical values of DST/CT may help to reframe and resolve pragmatic concerns such as coaching strategies, practice organization, and sport ethics. Ultimately, it is argued that viewing sport through a DST/CT-type philosophical lens will shed new light on the metaphysical foundations of sport.

The Value of Sport in the 21st Century
Karin Volkwein-Caplan, West Chester University of Pennsylvania, USA
Friday, September 15, 3:30 – 5:00 pm, Grand Hall III
(Session 5C with Jesús Ilundáin-Agurruza and Sharon Kay Stoll & Jennifer Beller)

Sport for development and peace is an often cited phrase. By declaring the year 2005 as the "International Year for Sport and Physical Education", a significant step has been made towards the recognition of sport as one of the most popular and powerful cultural phenomena. But more important than the recognition is the appropriate use of this potential towards achieving greater acceptance and understanding of differences among people, their values and cultures, and thus, a more peaceful global world.

The power of sport is used in numerous projects and initiatives around the globe for the acceleration of personal and social development. Examples of good practice include: peace-building and peace-keeping instruments from the Peres Center for Peace in Israel, the “football for peace” methods in Colombia, the social integration issues through “Soccer in the Streets” in the United States or the “Street League” in England, and more. Throughout the year 2005 we have witnessed many programs, projects and meetings, which discussed the cultural aspects of sports. This presentation will reflect on the importance of value changes in a global culture and the role of sport and physical activity in this process, with special focus on older adulthood.

Values are changing in society and subsequently in sport and physical activity as well and vice versa. The prevailing question relative to how people react to these changes, especially older adults, is of central interest. There is no doubt that participation in sport and exercise is greatly beneficial – especially for older adults. Factors influencing whether older adults participate in these activities include: health or physical impairment, culture and values, socio-economic status, gender, environment, and more. The positive effects of exercise and sport participation include physical processes, well-being, cognitive processes, body image, self-esteem, control, and self-efficacy – factors that are especially important in societies that will see an increasing number of older adults in the near future. As the population of the United States and various countries in Europe and Asia continues to age, the focus on how to increase the quality of life as well as the meaning and value of sport and physical activity will no doubt increase. Furthermore, the role that sport and physical activity play in the strengthening of mutual understanding between people – especially intergenerational understanding – needs to be studied further. It was the intention of this paper, to sensitize the listener to the importance of researching this topic by the social scientists of sport and exercise, especially the sport philosophers, as we are moving into the 21st century.

Strippersize Me!: An Analysis of the Fitness Craze of Aerobic Striptease
Within the past 5 years, a new fitness craze has dramatically increased in popularity for numerous North American women. This craze is the aerobic fitness activity--“strippersize”. The premise of such a workout is to mimic the dance movements of a typical stripper. Various dance studios and fitness facilities across Canada offer the aerobic class and Hollywood icons, such as Carmen Electra, have produced a series of DVDs that provide step-by-step instructions to a sequence of stripper routines.

In this paper, I will examine this new trend from a liberal feminist, phenomenological, North American perspective. I will argue that we should be concerned about the strippersize movement’s false empowerment of girls and women in physical activity in sport. The underlying theme of the strippersize workout is that women can “create” better bodies so that they can in turn become more “sexy” and consequently appear “sexier” for their men. I will maintain that this message is sexist and also heterosexist. In applying Paul Davis, Martha Nussbaum and Jean-Paul Sartre’s theories on objectification, various arguments will be presented to help support the claim that perhaps there is more to this craze than bouncing around a makeshift stripper pole. I will argue that this trend arose from an overtly hyper-sexualized culture and thus is an extension of the continuing theme of the sexualization of women, especially, female athletes. It is also important to examine the effect of such a popular and widely accepted trend on the actual profession of stripping.

It is important to note that placing a moral value on the trend of strippersize is not clear cut and thus it will be prudent to explore the positive aspects that surround this activity. For example, many participants claim that the activity is a lot of fun, and thus increases their adherence to an exercise plan. It is also important to refer to traditional female and male sexual roles and the impact of the rising popularity of strippersize. Overall, I will argue that the popularity of strippersize alludes to the close relationship between sport, physical activity and sex.

An Alternative Virtual Reality as Related to the Nature of the Sporting Body
Junko Yamaguchi, Tsuda College, Japan
Sunday, September 17, 8:30 – 10:00 am, Grand Hall II
(Session 8B with Samuel Morris)

The human conditions as related to the ambiguous body bring about the compound ontological questions. What is the reality? Is the world we look at the same as our existing world? For example, watching the games in the stadium, do we look at the player’s body before our eyes? Or do we see the existing world under arrest of multicultural contexts? When a tour conductor guide to, “Please look at my right (-hand),” do we watch the stretched right hand of the guide? To put it in another way, can I say that we have two views of the body as the hardware and the software? So, we live in this incompatible and therefore, imagined world called “virtual reality (VR)”.

More specifically, my central concern is how “virtual reality” would be explained and what insight we could get from the collective, illusory and symbolic world.

A historically rooted Native Americans’ narrative called “The Great BALL GAME” will be introduced to explain the structure of an incommensurable world with the different belief together with the ambiguous existence. As the operational definition, “VR” is not only the construction by the information technology, but also the experience of one’s body imagined from within. For example, the Chinese, Tibetan and Indian traditional ideas make the landscape inside the body as the map through the pictures in mind and reflect on the body, which becomes to be a path to circulate the energy into the whole body.

My suggestion is that the Asian theoretical ideas whose features are more analogous, holistic and cosmological would be helpful to interpret the experience of the “sporting body.” For, the ambiguous body cannot apart from the active, living condition and we are always exposed ourselves to the conflict. We could not live in the society without distinction about course to take such as the context-dependent and context-free situations. At school, we learned that the body is not only the object, but also the subject (I have a body and I am a body).
In Eastern idea there is a concept called “moderation.” People think that things have always two aspects from the beginning (brightness coexist darkness, etc). The moderation is a way of life in balance as the Native Americans believe. My conclusion is that the Asian traditional body system would be a model for the alternative virtual reality and it could be more fully probed into the nature of the SPORTING BODY.

PANEL SESSION (3C)
Friday, September 15, 10:30 am – 12:00 pm, Grand Hall III
Sport as Fertile Ground for Deleuzian Deterritorialization
Mark Renneson, Organizer
List of Panel Members: Maureen Ford, Jamie Lynn Magnusson, David Phillips, Mark Renneson

The aim of this panel session is to discuss the ways in which sport can be a fertile environment for challenging the ways one interprets the world and one’s place in it. Each of the panelists orients their project with some reference to Gilles Deleuze’s concept of deterritorialization. Each speaker plays with a sport context to explore the unique opportunities it offers to disrupt, challenge, and reconfigure one’s ways of seeing. Situated across a range of academic and athletic backgrounds, the panelists bring different voices, different experiences and different metaperspectives to the work. We believe this multiplicity enhances the boundary-crossing capacity of the discussions.

PANEL SESSION (7C)
Saturday, September 16, 1:30 – 3:00 pm, Grand Hall III
‘Doing’ Philosophy: Teaching and Learning in Exercise Science, Sport Studies, Human Movement, Physical Education and Sport Management
Dennis Hemphill, Organizer
List of Panel Members: Dennis Hemphill, Scott Kretchmar and Heather Reid

Many scholars in sport philosophy undertake teaching and research in departments or schools other than philosophy. It is also often the case that sport philosophers teach more than philosophy of sport, and are called upon to apply philosophy in multi-disciplinary undergraduate programs such as exercise science, human movement, physical education and sport management. When dealing not with philosophy majors, the challenge of introducing philosophy in these programs lies in engaging athletic, science, education and management type students who desire, even demand, to see the practical relevance of philosophy to their respective professional fields of study.

The aim of this panel discussion is to examine how philosophy can be creatively and effectively delivered in exercise science, sport studies, human movement, physical education and sport management related programs of study. Several international, university level teachers including Scott Kretchmar, Heather Reid and Dennis Hemphill have been brought together to discuss engaging ways of teaching philosophy in these applied programs of study. They will provide examples of lecture content, readings, writing assignments, seminar exercises or other pedagogical devices that are effective in promoting not the development of philosophers, per se, but rather philosophically sensitive and informed athletes, coaches, teachers, scientists, therapists, counsellors and managers.

PANEL SESSION (8C)
Sunday, September 17, 8:30 – 10:00 am, Grand Hall III
Institutions and Ethics: A Critique of the NCAA as Protector or Promoter of the Welfare Student-Athletes
Mark Hamilton and Scott Kretchmar, Organizers
List of Panel Members: Mark Hamilton, Scott Kretchmar, Jan Rintala, Robert Simon
The NCAA (National Collegiate Athletic Association), the governing body of the majority of American College sports, has recently celebrated its 100th anniversary. The NCAA has a rich and varied history. In the last few decades it has emerged as one of the most powerful and richest sports governing bodies in the world. This has caused it to be at the center of sport controversy, especially collegiate sport controversy. Numerous philosophical and ethical issues have emerged from its history. Though it has often been critiqued, IAPS has done little to directly speak to the issues of the NCAA. It is time to open up discussion in IAPS over NCAA related issues in the same manner that IAPS has approached the IOC and Olympic issues. In order to begin this, a proposal is being made for the 2006 IAPS Conference to have a panel presentation, discussion, and time of questions involving some of the members of IAPS who have been active in NCAA related practices and discussions, along with others who might provide a critical voice.

Some of the questions that could or should be addressed are the following:

1. What are the greatest ethical achievements and the greatest moral challenges before it?
2. Why does the NCAA have a negative perception among the general public?
3. What are the philosophical differences between DI, DII, and DIII?
4. How are student athletes treated and is it ethical? What policies would make the NCAA more moral?
5. How does it deal with issues of amateurism and professionalism?
6. Is the NCAA proactive or reactive? How is it dealing with the developments in technology and human engineering?
7. How has Title IX been an effective influence in the NCAA?
8. Is there a philosophical or hidden political agenda of the NCAA?
9. Has it become too big or too economically powerful to do the job that is necessary?

The panelists could come from those who are active in IAPS and who are serving as Faculty Athletic Representatives to the NCAA. These could include Mark Hamilton, Scott Kretchmar, Jan Rintala, and Robert Simon. We would also like at least one outside person looking at the NCAA from the outside in rather than from the inside out. Former NCAA athletes, IAPs people who have worked in coaching or athletic administration could also be included, such as Jan Boxill.