

Somaesthetics, education and the art of dance

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This paper is concerned with two things. The first is to explicate what dance as an art form should comprise if it is to be taught as a distinctive aspect of education in the school curriculum. The second is to argue that dance, if taught in accordance with what is outlined, is not only an efficacious means in the development, understanding and promotion of somaesthetics, a new term in aesthetic theory, but a paradigm case of what it is. Put differently it will be argued that the practice of dance is not only an excellent vehicle in the furtherance of somaesthetics, along with some forms of sport, but an instance of its very embodiment. As a necessary prelude to what is to follow the paper will consider briefly such topics as education in relation to the art of dance as a valued human practice before moving on to the substantive part which is concerned with three key aspects of an education 'in' dance - understanding and appraising; creating and composing; and performing and expressing. Particular attention will be given to the last of these which is centrally concerned with the notion of embodiment, before providing some general conclusions about this approach to dance in relation to a broader understanding of aesthetics.

Philosophy outdoors: first person physical

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The Peripatetic philosophers were onto something. Philosophy should be a moving experience because, quite literally, motion aids philosophy. A physical encounter with nature provides occasions to philosophize that expand desk bound ruminations. Careening down a

white water river offers philosophical insights about our ability to know the nature of the forces operating on us. The rush of exhilaration from mountain biking on a dangerous precipice can become an experience of the sublime. Orienteering through a forest allows us to live the virtues of courage, self-mastery, and endurance. First person physical experiences in the outdoors wake our senses, capture our attention, and allow us to think with clarity about things that matter.

Nature interacts with our physical presence in at least three ways: real consequences, unpredictability, and reciprocity. Real consequences in outdoor experiences help temper our philosophical pronouncements. We cannot, for example, define ourselves out of a storm and into a warm bed nor reframe poison ivy on our legs to make it go away. Nature's unpredictability can reveal beauty as when an unexpected storm evokes terror in us that some philosophers connect to the sublime. Rock climbing can unexpectedly reveal a source of the clay we use in art, which makes the connection between art and nature something we experience directly. Our physical presence in nature is reciprocal: we affect nature and nature affects us. Snorkeling in a lagoon we can see the impact of previous divers on a coral reef. A single brush of a swim fin can scar coral that takes years to repair. Too close an encounter of a leg or hand with coral can leave its scar on us. In a forest our scent can disturb creatures and their sudden flight, in turn, can startle us. Such experienced reciprocity can generate moral reflection on our relationship to nature. A first person physical experience with real consequences, unpredictability, and reciprocity offers occasions for reflection.

Outdoor experiences can generate epistemological, aesthetic and ethical questions and do so with an urgency spurred on by our physical efforts. Epistemologically we can ask whether the lake on which we are sailing offers insight or whether knowledge is independent of our physical environment and state of being. We can camp in an unkempt

wilderness and then stroll through a slightly disheveled city park and compare their aesthetics. Ethical sensitivity allows us to examine our reciprocal relation to the segment of nature we occupy. It also encourages us to address the virtues and vices that wilderness draws from us.

A physical encounter with nature offers much to those who open themselves to its meanings. If we make the experience our own by reflecting on its significant side, then the environment outside our window becomes an extension of our libraries. Philosophy outdoors may occur in unfamiliar venues, [but they offer the advantage of providing multiple occasions for insight. However, before we can bring philosophic rigor to the outdoors we must experience this physical interaction in the first person.

Experiences in sport and their relation to a horizon of time, sense and existentials

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This paper deals with a specific experiences in sport against the background of time and sense. We believe this analysis can extend our understanding both of existentials as categories of human existence (Heidegger, Fink, Jaspers) and value of sporting experiences or sport generally.

Let us consider two different type of sporting activities:

1. Sporting activities as a leading to a specific aim (peak performance, records, gaining money or reputation etc.);
2. Sporting activities for their own intrinsic value.

Both types have a different relation to TIME: the former uses the present only as a passable point to the future, which dictates the whole

timing of appropriate activity - the latter gives a present peculiarity and its own value.

Both types also have a different relation to Kant's CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE (the formula of the end itself). In the latter type I treat humanity in my own person as an end; in the former type I treat humanity in me only as a means (with some possible negative consequences – e.g. for my body), but in relation to other people I can treat humanity in them not only by this "bad" way, but also as an end (with some possible positive consequences – e.g. for spectators).

Furthermore we should like pay our attention to the specific EXPERIENCES in the field of sport, especially of our second type. We must judge a question of AUTHENTICITY. Are there some differences between sporting, artistic, sexual, religious, drug or other experiences? Has some importance an ascetic or hedonistic way to experience? What is a role of the physical or the bodily anchored type of experiencing in sport? What is more: peak, optimal or deep experience? Can we be enriched with repeated flow of common experiences (training!)? And what about temporal profile of these specific experiences?

Looking for SENSE / MEANING of sporting activities we should also think their relation to relevant EXISTENTIALS over. We must consider such as death, love, game (!), work, worldliness (Weltlichkeit), "leap into authenticity" etc. Can a sporting experience be entrance gate to deeper understanding of them? Can this new knowledge be integrated into a new (wider, richer) identity of (sports)men?

Can base jumping be morally defended?

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Some sports involve risk. They may lead to serious injury or even death. Most risk sports are accepted. They are morally defensible or at least not forbidden by law. However some sports cause debates. In this paper I will look at base jumping, one of the new sports that have caused a lot of debates both in the media, among the public, and among persons involved in the sport. It is time scholars take up the debate. Base jumping is defined as sky diving from material objects like bridges, antennas, rocks, mountains, buildings and the like. There are two questions that need to be faced. One is whether base jumping is morally acceptable, defensible or even good. The other question is whether it should be prohibited if it is found to be morally unacceptable, or leads to social costs above a certain limit. The first part of the paper lists the various arguments that are raised against base jumping. 1) Base jumping is too risky. It is unacceptable to risk ones life in an unnecessary manner or for no benefit. 2) Base jumping leads to harm for the families and friends of the jumpers. They are very often scared, concerned, afraid and may in case of death, experience deep sorrow. 3) Base jumping leads to unnecessary risks for the rescue people, the mountaineers and the helicopter pilots, that try to rescue the basejumpers when the jumps have failed. 4) base jumping leads to economic and social costs for the society at large.

To answer these objections one could introduce utilitarian counterarguments. From a cost-benefit perspective there are also various positive consequences 1) for the jumpers themselves, the joy and life quality they experience, 2) for the public through television, films, commercials, magazines 3) for the development of new technologies and new sport forms. In order to answer the objections to base jumping I will however in my paper rather argue along the lines of Joel Feinberg who defends the freedom to choose ones own life

goals. I maintain that base jumping should not be forbidden by law, as we have seen in some countries. I think that most of the problems can be solved by regulations of various kinds. However this does not mean that base jumping is morally defensible under all circumstances. There are various situations, circumstances, cases, that need to be discussed. I try to define under what conditions base jumping is acceptable. The right to jump does not mean that base jumping is a good activity. The last part of the paper discusses whether base jumping even can be seen as a valuable and good activity.

Daredevil': towards an (un)sporting ethic of the real

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Contemporary critical thought has diagnosed an ascendant culture of therapy within the institutional fabric of daily life. This culture has acquired an ethical dimension with its alleged humanitarian goal as the pursuit of 'spiritual' well-being. This paper examines this ethic as a function of sport and argues that as an hegemonic ideology it subjugates the sporting act(or) to the prurient discourse of temperance, restraint, and moderation. The contemporary lexicon of sport is characterised by its shift in emphasis from combatative struggle towards therapeutic compliance. Policy initiatives are shaped by the assumption that sport can arrest feelings of social exclusion and increase individual self-esteem. Ethics committees attempt to regulate sporting conduct and action. The growth of so called post-modern alternative sports, is an explicit manifestation of the therapeutic sensibility, shunning the 'traditionalist' ethos of competition in favour of the nurturing of individual spirituality and self-awareness under the guise of 'living life to the full'. Indeed 'traditional' sports are also framed within the therapeutic, no more so than in the so called hard masculinity of soccer. It is perhaps in soccer where the most dramatic

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manifestation of sports therapeutic drift can be found, as the 'will to win' is reconciled within the contemporary moment as a pathology. The Irish captain Roy Keanes unrepentant desire for sporting victory 'at all costs' - embodied in his personal mantra 'fail to prepare, prepare to fail', and subsequent expulsion from the 2002 World Cup - is universally diagnosed as the psychotic excesses of a 'troubled mind'. The spectacular 'arrival' of Wayne Rooney within English soccer, is a moment characterised not as a celebration of a copiously gifted player, but by the demand that his talent be restrained and suppressed, that it should be shielded, hidden and reined in. He should be protected, not only from the voyeuristic gaze of the media, but from his own desires, for it believed that in the act of his self realisation (to play soccer as a professional), that the seeds of his impending doom are irretrievably sewn.

Drawing upon the work of the Lacanian philosophers Slavoj Zizek, Mladen Dolar and Alenka Zupancic this paper is concerned with fleshing out an ethics and politics of the Real and the drive predicated upon Lacan's famous maxim for the ethics of psychoanalysis 'do not give way as to your desire'. We argue that sports demand for the therapeutic degrades both the sporting act and the actor. But we also contend that, by its very essence, the sporting subject violently ruptures the conservative ethical injunction 'yes, that's alright, you're allowed to do that, because it causes no harm.' It is, we argue that in the 'constant force' (drive) of sporting endeavour that desire becomes truly radical as the circuit beyond the satisfactions of the pleasure principle. It is our argument that the subject can only truly exist as a subject 'true to (it')self' at the limit points of experience and representation (for Zizek in the domain of the Real) . This domain - 'beyond the good' - is where the subject encounters the self-withdrawal of support within existing subject positions and occupies the place of subjective destitution and destruction. Albeit in different ways both

Keane and Rooney embody this radically traumatic counterpoint to sports therapeutic ethic.

The contention of this paper is that if sport has an essence it is one characterised by the selfless drive towards destruction, rather than the narcissisms of catharsis, preservation and self-enlightenment. Above all it incites us to dare. As Zizek (following Hegel), might characterise it, it involves a symbolic death, an exile which severs the subject from reality and forces it towards a traumatic encounter with the unspeakable! 'Thing' of subjectivity. It is our belief that such an ethics of the Real allows a radical re-figuring of the nature of ethical acts in sport. Its scope shatters our 'normal' understanding of the ethical and its tendency towards the therapeutic.

Do I still belong in my club? Reflections on the ontological status of a *fútbol club*

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I investigate the ontological status of a football club through C. S. Peirce's metaphysics. Though I focus on a case study, the inquiry may be generalized to other sport clubs.

The Club Deportivo Saprissa, founded (1935) in Costa Rica, by a group of young players, excelled for generations in the formation of footballers under the direction of Ricardo Saprissa. When he retired, the club lost its emphasis on forming and providing opportunities to young players. An institutional crisis ensued, including burdensome debt. To resolve the crisis, in 2002 the club changed its legal status from an *asociación deportiva*—the club has *asociados* with one vote and players are members of the *asociación*—into a *sociedad anónima deportiva*—*socios* have as many votes as the shares they own and players are not part of the *sociedad* unless they buy shares. In 2003, a

Mexican multinational company bought 51% of the shares. The corporate president promises to respect the identity of the club while turning it into a profitable enterprise, but journalists, players, and fans debate the club's new identity. A Mexican journalist puts the poignant question to all *saprististas*: are you fans of a *fútbol club* or of a brand?¹

This question is a lively issue in Costa Rican football. I approach it as a metaphysical question by asking whether in changing from an *asociación* into a *sociedad anónima*, with all the related social and sporting changes, the club has become a different entity. As a former minor league player and as a fan, I ask whether the club is the same entity to which I still belong or whether it is a different entity from which I am alienated.

Based on C. S. Peirce's metaphysics, I examine whether the *fútbol club* has a personality, that is, 'a coördination or connection of ideas' that are continuous with each other and that develop towards a *telos*.² For Peirce, a personality is a continuity of coördinated ideas that may extend beyond an individual into a 'corporation'.³ This personality evolves towards a *telos* that provides direction but that does not constrain growth; rather, the *telos* itself evolves as the personality develops. Accordingly, I inquire whether there is a 'corporate personality' of the Club Deportivo Saprissa that remains continuous even as it evolves. I examine whether the personality of the club consists in the unity of players, coaches, executives, and fans in endeavors at all levels, from minor to professional leagues, that aim towards social and sporting excellence, while the particular institutional form of this unified endeavor may evolve. If so, the new

organization as a *sociedad anónima* is then part of the continuous evolution of the club's personality. The club is then the same general entity with a new specific form, and as former player and as a fan I still belong in the club—my ideas about the aims of the club are continuous with its personality and my participation in the social and sporting activities of the club have an effect on its development.

Doping in sport: a Kantian perspective

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There are, broadly speaking, two questions concerning doping in sports: first, is it unethical? Are the athletes who engage in it doing something wrong? Second, should we ban doping? As a matter of policy, should we design and enforce certain restrictions? In this paper I focus on the first question. I begin by suggesting that previous efforts to show the immorality of doping—including arguments from fairness, harm, unnaturalness, and inhumanness—have been unsuccessful. I then provide a Kantian argument, focusing on the intentions of athletes who would use drugs, to suggest that doping is unethical. I show how the Kantian position can overcome the difficulties to which other views are subject. I also argue that the Kantian approach can provide a way of distinguishing activities that constitute doping from those that do not. I conclude by briefly considering some of policy implications of the Kantian view.

¹ Francisco San José, "Llegó el fútbol S.A.," *La Nación* (San José, Costa Rica), Saturday March 8, 2003.

² See C. S. Peirce, "The Law of Mind," in *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings*, Vol. 1 (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 312-333.

³ See C. S. Peirce, "Man's Glassy Essence," in *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings*, Vol. 1 (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 334-351.

Sartre contra Sartre: a rejection of the Sartrean ethics of authenticity as the moral ground for sporting conduct

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Although phenomenological analyses of lived sporting experience and embodiment and sport have a small but persistent tradition within the philosophy of sport, consideration of phenomenological and/or existentialist ethics in relation to sport is rare. A notable exception to the general lack of such work is Morgan's (1976) claim that a Sartrean ethics could provide the moral ground for sporting conduct. Morgan's positive treatment of Sartre's early ethical position is at odds with Sartre's own considered view of that work. This paper will consider the later work of Sartre, along with a number of posthumous publications, in offering a critique of Morgan's advocacy of Sartre's early ethical position as the foundation for an ethics of sport.

The paper will argue that there are four problems with Morgan's interpretation of the importance of Sartre's early ethical work in relation to sport. First, Morgan considers a very limited sample of relevant Sartrean texts. Second, he conflates inauthenticity and bad faith in a manner that is contrary to Sartre's use of the terms. Third, he fails to consistently draw a distinction between reflective and pre-reflective freedom, choice and responsibility throughout the construction of his case for a Sartrean moral ground for sporting conduct. Finally, Morgan offers an abstract and highly generalised view of sport. The result is an abstract and idealistic account of both ethics and sport.

This is exactly the problem which Sartre found in his own reflections on his first ethics. The paper, therefore, argues that any attempt to employ Sartre's first ethics as a moral ground for sporting conduct is destined to fail as a result of the abstract nature of that ethics. Sartre did, however, work on a second, more concrete and dialectical, ethics. The paper concludes by considering the implications of Sartre's dialectical work for the project of appropriating a Sartrean ethics as the ground for sporting conduct.

References: Morgan, W. J. (1976) 'An Analysis of The Sartrean Ethic of Ambiguity as The Moral Ground For The Conduct of Sport' *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport* 3 (September 1976) 82-96

Sport and religion: a pairing for new impulses to the discourse about ethical problems in sport?

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Even though it is not a traditional pairing, this paper suggests that sport and religion may be integrally intertwined. By broadening the research perspective and the approaches to the study of sport in this way, solutions may be found which may aid in the clarification of the ethical questions and problems which now confront international sports and physical education in multicultural societies; e.g. doping, commercialism, perverting the "Citius-altius-fortius" principle to inhumanity and conflicts in multicultural sport classes.

Researching sport and religion can be structured according to different perspectives.

Differing from former studies about sport and religion, which focused on western sport and Christianity and the comparison of both, here a more open perspective is preferred. This perspective includes a broader, more flexible comprehension of sports and religion. The main part of this investigation involves text analysis and qualitative-discursive interviews with academics from both religious studies and sport science. This paper is part of a larger project concerning the comprehension of movement, games and sports in Christianity, Islam and Buddhism and the consequences for ethical questions in the area of sport. Here it shall focus on the resemblances between religion and sport in order to lay a basis for the further studies.

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Sport and religion have some common grounds which warrant challenging this field of investigation. Both sport and religion are similar as core elements of most culture systems; they regard the human being in its entirety and create "time-outs" from everyday life stress. Both include rituals and ritual actions in a similar way. They are social institutions which can convey norms and meaning and both are engaged in general social life even that is not directly concerned with either sport or religion. Both have been considered and "used" as state religion/ folk religion or state sport/ folk sport and have been abused by political exploitation. These common points lead us to the conclusion that it could be worthwhile to do further enquiries on this field.

It is obvious that there is a need to have a closer look at this field of research in sport science and physical education. In addition, the progression of globalization in the world of sport and the increasing influence of both sport and religions (in their each own special way) should also provoke academic discussion. To be open to new perspectives can aid in the progress in considering and solving some of the ethical problems which sport now faces.

Rethinking the ethics of sport business practices

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Sport is now big business! I suggest that the influence of sports governing bodies is being diminished by business decisions that are changing the power base of sport.

Come prepared to participate in a wide-ranging discussion, which will lead to sorting out the myths from the realities of commercialised sport and share some recent Australian research into ethical business issues as they relate to sport. You may like to dwell on the following key

issues that will be addressed. Have money and TV royalties corrupted athletes and certain sports by offering excessive material rewards? Are some sports teams and athletes powerless pawns who are victims of management and team owners whose unethical behaviour in an undemocratic environment result in the removal of sport decisions from the traditional membership base?

Can sport learn from the demise of high profile business organisations such as HIH, One Tel and Ansett? There is an increasing emphasis on sport governance at all levels and there is a pressure to adopt ethical business practices. Above all sport needs to operate within an ethical framework and it is vital that acceptable business practices are established. In order to begin this process; *Ten Commandments For Responsible Sports Organisations* will be proposed and further developed in the following concurrent session on 'An Ethical Framework for Sport'.

I hope that if you are in any way involved with the future policy and direction of sport as a manager, sports administrator, coach, athlete, owner of a small or large sports complex or government official, you will come along to this presentation and help us think through the ethics of some sports business practices, which might apply to your situation.

Rethinking the Ethics of Sport Business Practices

Summary of Jim Daly's proposed presentation

Whether we like it or not, the sports industry is under increasing pressure to adopt business practices while at the same time continuing to represent the needs of their participants at all levels, and maintain the integrity and social relevance of their sport.

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Jim Daly's presentation will:

- Debate the myths and realities of commercialised sport
- Suggest ways in which sports governance at all levels can adopt ethical business practices
- Examine the need to ensure that sport continues to operate within an ethical framework.
- Suggest a way forward.

Jim will use examples of ethical issues from the business world and discuss results of recent Australian research into ethical issues in sport.

Critique of antirealism

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Recent decades have seen considerable popularity for ethical responses of a relativist flavour. Today's postmodern mind is defined by reluctance to cast moral judgement upon alien cultural practices, and weighty sponsorship is offered by Rorty and by the neo-communitarianism of MacIntyre. In this paper, I sketch a critique of this antirealism, applying it to the practices of boxing and fox hunting with hounds.

I first acknowledge some intellectually and morally healthy impulses behind the antirealism. These include:

- Rejection of the moral arrogance of the western, bourgeois male
- The imperative to listen as well as talk
- Openness to the moral limitations of one's own milieu
- The realisation that different cultures (and persons) are good in very different ways

- The distinction between actions and their agents

I then sketch some intellectually and morally questionable ramifications of this antirealism. They are subsumable under Eagleton's (2000) term 'universalised particularism' (2: p. 82) and include:

- A morally evasive mystification of the Other, esp. the demotic and vernacular
- Elevation of the experiential values, internal goods, and symbolic reconfigurations associated with the Other
- Enthusiasm for the notion that different cultures are morally incommensurable
- Feigned anaesthesia towards the truth-value of beliefs and their critical role in the reconfiguration of properties 'out there' in social reality
- Moral conservatism and sociocultural stasis

The approach I think correct is neither relativist, nor postmodern, nor the arrogance to which the "rampant relativism of today's postmodernism" (4: p. 49) is a reaction. It is the moral analogue of the Natural Method Flanagan (1992) applies to his study of consciousness. (3: pp. 11-13) The Natural Method requires that we listen to the phenomenological reports subjects give, but not that we give *carte blanche* to them, since they might have to be overridden by the findings of psychology and neuroscience. We attempt, as far as possible, to bring the 'voice from within' into harmony with more objective findings. But complete harmony might not always be possible. Similarly, the way that things appear normatively to situated subjects – even qua members of cultures and social practices – should be regarded as critical but not final.

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Michael Burke (1998) has counselled that we listen to the voices of boxers before morally evaluating the sport. (1) The Countryside Alliance asserts the equivalent about fox hunting. I agree in both cases. However, objective properties of the respective practices give reason to believe that these voices are ideologically inflected in questionable ways, and that the stories they tell should be respectfully rejected.

1. Burke, M. "Is Boxing Violent? Let's Ask Some Boxers." In *All Part of the Game: Violence and Australian Sport*, D. Hemphill (ed.), Sydney: Walla Walla Press, 1998, pp. 111-32.
2. Eagleton, T. *The Idea of Culture*. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2000.
3. Flanagan, O. *Consciousness Reconsidered*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992.
4. Holowchak, M.A. "'Aretism' and Pharmacological Ergogenic Aids in Sport: Taking a Shot at the Use of Steroids." *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport*, XXVII, pp. 35-50, 2000.

Aesthetic and ethical issues concerning sport in wild places

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During the second half of the Twentieth Century there was an exponential growth of participation in adventurous sports undertaken in relatively wild locations. This was especially true amongst the populations of economically favoured countries. The trend appears to continue unabated into the new millennium.

Following a brief explanation as to the reasons for the adoption of the concept of wildness and the avoidance of the term wilderness, an

analysis of some of the, often inter-twined, aesthetic and ethical issues raised by a variety of sports conducted in wild places is offered. Both issues integral to particular activities, and between sports and environment will be considered.

For example, contrast is made between bolt-protected and leader-placed protection in rock-climbing, driven grouse shooting and individual / small-group stalking of wild game, and skiing on piste and ski touring.

Developing Berleant's, multi-sensory, *Aesthetics of Engagement*ⁱ and inspired by some of Leopold's prophetic writingsⁱⁱ, the notion of *authentic engagement* with environment is proposed. That being engagement not overly mediated by technology and meeting nature more on its own terms. In analysis it is contrasted with the life experience of many in the Developed World: disengagement from environment; "Disneyfication" and its sanitised presentation of Nature; and the vicarious pleasures of virtual reality.

The notion of engagement *appropriate* to specific environments is proposed also, both as a proper basis for interaction with the rest of Nature (sentient and non-sentient) *and* as contributing to the quality of sporting experience. Contrasted to the, often, baseless rules of etiquette and "good form," a case is made for the role of appropriateness in behaviour generally, provided its underpinning concepts are sound and well thought through. The case is extended and an additional claim made for appropriateness of engagement as a key concept to be considered in the analysis of sport in wild places.

The possibility of enhanced aesthetic, especially kinaesthetic, experiences, derived from adventure in wild places, is discussed; as Mortlock puts it: "there is a distinction between *being* in a wild place and looking at a view."ⁱⁱⁱ[Emphasis mine]

A thorough analysis of sport in wild places not only contributes to our understanding of our species' relationship to the rest of Nature but can also illuminate the routes to enhanced experience within the activities themselves. For example, the concept of carrying capacity cannot only be used to question the ability of a specific ecosystem to survive particular numbers of people or certain activities but can also lead to an understanding as to diminished sporting quality when too many people or inappropriate activities are present.

ⁱ See for example: Berleant, A. (1997) *Living in the Landscape - Toward an Aesthetics of Environment*, Kansas, University of Kansas Press.

ⁱⁱ Leopold, A. (1968) *A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There*, Oxford, Oxford University Press [Especially Part III The Upshot]

ⁱⁱⁱ Mortlock, C. (2001) *Beyond Adventure - Reflections from the Wilderness: An Inner Journey*, Milnthorpe, Cicerone Press, P.88.

Perfection and progress: reflections on the meaningfulness of “the natural” in sport

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In this paper, it will be argued that sport is a highly appropriate context within which to explore ideas that have framed our conceptualisations of being human. On the one hand, sport can be conceived in terms of finitude, given-ness, end-states, perfection, actuality, and death, as the measure of humankind, the telos of human physical perfectibility. In this sense, sport is part of the discovery, or realisation, or description, of a fixed notion of human being. On the other hand, sport can be seen as the quest to escape limitations, to go beyond boundaries, break down barriers, and forge new descriptions of human possibility. In this

sense, sport has a part to play in the making of human being, the shaping of our future natures, the invention of new modes of being, the infinite ongoing progress of human evolution. These two characterisations of sport are necessarily at odds with each other: they require different ontological commitments to the notion of being human (if such a notion is indeed sensible). As a result, the future of sport is rendered problematic by the paradox of the evolution of the “human” out of one of our paradigmatic exemplars of *being-human*.

This paper will articulate the ways in which contemporary sport exists at a point of dispersion in human history where techno-ontological boundaries have begun to break down. That is, cultural evolution has reached a point where the fusion of technology and biology has blurred the distinctions between the animal-human nexus and the human-machine nexus. Moreover, it will be, and already is, in the world of highly commercialised elite sport that the transformation of the human will occur in a largely unproblematic way (as distinct from the current highly controversial and politically charged explorations of the potential use of “genetic engineering” in medicine and animal husbandry). In short, a discussion on the future of sport (and the future of the human *in* sport) is necessarily no less than a discussion of the future of the human, of utopia, and dystopia.

Dewey & democracy: building athletic communities

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Sport continues to mirror the conditions, as well as contribute to the evolution, of our society. Increasingly and peculiarly private and atomistic, athletic participants and spectators perceive sport as a world of individualism and annihilation. Unfortunately, this sport climate threatens the nature of many cherished athletic contests.

American philosopher John Dewey's (1859-1952) notion of democratic communities provides hope to save and enrich our sport endeavours. During his life, Dewey witnessed an increasing sense of isolation as the population sought individualism through within the emergence of America's Great Society. These observations led Dewey to posit an expanded view of democracy – and the need to transform Great Societies into Great Communities.

To accomplish this transformation, Dewey's notion of democracy moves beyond the institutional structures and political machinery most commonly associated with the term. Instead, Dewey conceives of democracy as a creative project that appropriates the ideal possibilities for human life – to make available a life enriched with meaning and value. To engage in this project, democracy requires communication amongst the vested individuals to shape and reveal shared ideals. This communication is vital in the development of communities. Within these communities, the individuals inquire into the ideals of the group, and thus the ideal of democracy can be constituted.

This paper looks to present Dewey's notion of democratic communities and its relevance and potential implications to sport. Previous Pragmatist theorists, including Charles Peirce, William James, Josiah Royce, and Charlotte Perkins Gilman, will be briefly reviewed and their contributions to Dewey's ideal of democracy presented. Following a review of the social conditions that led to Dewey's call to transform our Great Society to genuine communities, I will demonstrate how sport needs to, and is capable of undergoing, a similar transition. Finally, this paper looks to offer some practical implications emerging from Dewey's notion of democratic communities for our sporting practices.

Intentional rules violations – one more time

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The topic of intentional rules violations has a history of over twenty five years in the literature. It is a good topic to illustrate how various treatments over time by different contributors can refine the issues and provide the basis for better analysis. This paper will advance the treatment of the issue by, first, brief restatement of several treatments which appear in the literature. Such recounting will be used to identify the contested issues in the debate. Positions taken by Pearson, Fraleigh, D'Agostino, Lehman, Leaman, Tamburinni, Morgan, Loland, Simon and others will be reviewed.

Second, the problem of definitions of cheating and of the status of the “good” foul and the “professional” foul will be clarified. The ethos argument with regard to such “strategic” rules violations will be examined and the positions of Morgan, Loland, Simon, Butcher and Schneider, and Torres will be applied.

Finally, a category system of differing instances of “strategic” rules violations will be established and then analyzed by use of a practice internalism perspective.

Sports and “the fragility of goodness”

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Drawing on Martha Nussbaum's exploration in *The Fragility of Goodness* of ancient Greek reflections on contingency and the good life, this paper probes the following question: Within what conception of a flourishing life do sports represent an attractive component? This question is prompted by the fact that sports expose our physical, emotional, and moral vulnerabilities.

If the good life is one over which we exercise control, then participation in sports seems to represent its antithesis. Sports expose us to the realm of contingency. In the first place, not only are individual participants tested, but so too are the coaches and teammates on whom they depend. Subordination of self to a team thus entails a loss of control from the outset, and the possibility that individuals who are counted on may respond in a disappointing manner.

Sports also expose us to other contingencies. It is well-known that sports expose our physical vulnerabilities. The quest for athletic accomplishments may result in pain, suffering, debilitating injury, and even premature death. These risks are present as a result of the athlete's inherent physical constitution, the inherent stresses of sports, athletic ambition, and the comportment of other competitors. Will the athlete be treated as a mere means to an end, or will his or her bodily integrity be respected?

Sports and emotions typically go hand in hand. But emotional involvement in sports entails vulnerability. Juxtaposed to the "thrill of victory," is the "agony of defeat." Winners may be objects of adulation, but also of jealousy and envy, while losers may be held in contempt. Others may seek control over one's emotional life. Self-esteem may fluctuate.

Finally, sports expose us to a realm of moral luck, more narrowly considered. While some participants in sports may be fortunate enough to be surrounded by coaches, teammates, and supporters who encourage moral behavior, other participants may face

a moral climate that promotes cheating and other forms of dishonesty, alienated relationships, and loss of self-respect. The ethos of the competitive environment is a contingent matter, and thus another factor over which the athlete does not exercise complete control. Will the athlete survive the potentially morally disintegrative influences of the sports environment with his or her moral integrity intact?

Given the nature and extent of these contingencies, how is participation in sports connected to a good life? Presumably, some positive value must be assigned to risk in a conception of a good life that accommodates or even encourages participation in sports. Are sports in any way unique in this regard? Might attraction to or avoidance of sports point to a psychological deficit? Alternatively, might participation or nonparticipation in sports take as its starting-point a position of strength? Is it rational to participate in sports? This paper will explore these questions while keeping in mind Nussbaum's consideration of the possibility that vulnerability or fragility may be partly constitutive of the flourishing human life, and that, as a result, a life without vulnerability may be an impoverished one.

Creating sporting game: factors of organizing rules and its educational significance

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It is one of the pleasures that we create a new game with contriving rules by peer group, aside the joy of play by given game rules. To create something new could be counted as a desire of mankind. When I taught students in physical education (or exercise, sporting activities) class, however, students who were reluctant to exercise sat on my mind. They, called 'wall-side students', remain standing at the wall of the gym and make no attempt to treat sporting

goods had available before class. Their interpersonal communication appears to be poor and estranged from sport activities. We could give such reason as the image of sport that it has nothing to do with them and is the activity in which professionals engage exclusively, depending on their life history has little experience in physical activities.

In this paper, I focus attention on creating sporting game by participators as a way to feel an affinity with sport. The rules of game, fundamentally, are procedures to enjoy the game, not to compel someone to obedience. If the rules of game were organized accord to the participators' taste, skill level or ingenuity, they will be fascinated with the game. To create such game, however, is not facile. Herein lies the intent of my paper: on the occasion of creating new game, what ideas or thinking patterns are gotten and what factor does influence to it? From an educational point of view, moreover, what significance does the activity have?

The students who have broad experience of physical activities or sports seem to show a marked tendency to be long on ideas. This means that they invent games modeling after a number of given sport games. And how students transform the model is the key factor of creating game, the element of 'play' has significance for it. To keep a proper distance from an object, to switch the frame of reference, or to attempt to change the manner of play, these are nature of play. The aspect of given game could be changed through such arrangements as new treatment of sporting goods, making modification on acceptable physical movement, or combination of a few kind of game. As to game rules, in special, I will investigate what type of rule had better be arranged to make a game fascinating with H.L.A. Hart's concept of rule (primary rule and secondary rule) clue to go on. Then what suggestion has educative effect to those who try to create new game will be considered.

An application of Dreyfus' phenomenology in a critique of sport cognitivism

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How can we understand and explain skillful actions in sport? This is a basic question for sport research and to answer it, we need both a good model and a proper conceptual apparatus to work from. The information processing approach is one of the most popular approaches to conceptualize human performance in sport. At the core of this approach lies the computer model of the mind. In traditional cognitive science there is a strong analogy between how the computer and the human function. Since the computer is a device that carries out computations, the human has, in accordance with the computer, been thought of as a computing system. This is one of the basic assumptions behind cognitivism. In this paper I will take a closer look at Hubert L. Dreyfus' critical objections to cognitivism. Through his phenomenology, Dreyfus presents several arguments about what he thinks is the shortcomings and false assumptions of cognitivism. I will put focus on two of his arguments. First, I will elaborate what Dreyfus means when he argues that the information processing approach is without phenomenological support. Second, I will use Dreyfus' argument from skills to show how he may push the explanation of the traditional cognitivist into an infinite regress of rules, when the cognitivist tries to account for skilful behavior. The paper starts by defining sport cognitivism, and then it makes a general account of Dreyfus' two major anti-cognitivist arguments. At the end, several things have to be discussed. What may the implications of Dreyfus' arguments be for sport research? First, is Dreyfus' phenomenology convincing? Second, what do his arguments imply for an established conceptual apparatus in sport research? Third, does Dreyfus give us

any new concepts to work on, concepts that may account for skilful motor actions in a novel way? The main goal of the paper is to point at some of the implications I find important from the cognitivism-Dreyfus controversy for developing a proper conceptual apparatus in sport research.

A Hegelian understanding of athletic competition

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In this well-known discussion, Hegel studies the effects of struggle and domination as two consciousnesses encounter one another, each seeking its own self-consciousness through the recognition provided by the other.

Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.

Acknowledgement or recognition (Anerkennen) elevates, so to speak, what was formerly only a subjective self-certainty into an objective truth. The encounter appears to be a zero sum confrontation; only one of the antagonists can emerge with the sought-after recognition. The other consciousness relinquishes its own claims, and accepts the role of the dominated in order to avoid death. The resulting imbalance, however, proves to be doubly frustrating. The slave (the dominated, the participant who cannot confirm his self-consciousness in this encounter) is forced to take an inferior position; the master (the dominating, the participant who finds recognition from the other) cannot be satisfactorily reflected in the being of the other because the

slave is no longer a fully adequate other. What is recognition from a nobody?

This initial result is only temporary, however, as the “slave” is actually able to gain self-understanding and self-respect through the work imposed upon it by the “master.” Eventually, the very situation that subdues the slave allows him to gain superiority, which reverses the first frustration. Thus there arises a dialectical interplay between these two positions, which constantly shift and readapt themselves to their new statuses and roles. The result is an egalitarian dynamic that simultaneously constructs the being of the two participants.

I contrast a Hegelian with a Hobbesian understanding of competition; the difference can be suggested as follows. Although in both accounts there is a natural struggle that is decided by fear of death, only in the Hegelian account does defeat frustrate both participants. This reflects the fact that for Hobbes the touchstone value is survival, whereas for Hegel it is self-consciousness. In other words, Hegel—but not Hobbes—must value the interaction, because through it the distinctive selfhood emerges.

This dynamic, I shall argue, provides an excellent explanatory device for the relationship that constitutes athletic engagement (as well as other antagonistic encounters, such as adversarial law and market capitalism). Competitors provide one another something that a friend (who seeks my own as his/her own) cannot provide; paradoxically, while I do everything possible to make the other a loser I need him/her to respond adequately so that my achievement gains meaning. So long as the engagement operates within well-defined rules, there is a direct relationship between the intensity of the antagonism and the intimacy of the relationship. It is the loser, in principle, who terminates this engagement.

Disordering of affections: an Augustinian critique of our relationship to sport

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Much of the discussion in contemporary sports ethics involves the behavior of athletes and fans or the actions in sport (how the game is played). Another issue relevant to the discussion of sports ethics is our relationship to sport especially our current sporting events. It is our current approach that has made our athletic contests as much spectacle as sport. This paper will examine sport as spectacle while probing, critiquing, and calling into question our relationship to sport as spectacle. It will be argued that our primary ethical problems with sport are not how we play the games, nor our behavior in the games but rather how we relate to the games. It is this disproportionate relationship that has created the spectacle out of sport. The approach will be Augustinian in nature for I contend that his understanding of evil provides the best metaethical understanding of the ethical problems in sport today. Augustine writes, "But in certain of its parts (of Creation) there are some things which we call evil because they do not harmonize with other things." This disharmony results from making of the lower things higher.

Augustine specifically makes observations about the gladiatorial games of his day and though there is no precise parallel of violence in our current sports activities some of the observations Augustine makes regarding the games have usefulness in our current ethical assessment of sport. This paper will not deal with the actual intrinsic evil or violence in the gladiatorial games. Instead I will use some of the general observations that Augustine makes about the social relationship to these games by the fans and participants and apply them to the modern social phenomena of sport as spectacle and the way people relate to sport. This will be to clarify and identify the

primary foundation to the immoral practices in sport today. This will also provide an explanation for why sport has taken upon itself a type of religious zeal. It will also be my contention that this Augustinian approach is of greater explanatory value than other approaches one might take.

Competition and amateur sport

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Competition and Amateur Sport is a work of practical ethics. In it I challenge one fundamental belief about amateur sport. In common thought, competition and sport are intimately linked. This is true for both the professional and amateur levels. What is different though about amateur sport is that it has an implicit agreement, one that rules out certain behavior and intentions. An examination of competition shows that the sort of behavior competition requires are the same as those ruled out in the amateur agreement. For example, if one behaves as if the game's participants do not matter or that the losers are worth less, they are being 'poor sports'. However, those attitudes are typical of competitive behavior; indeed they are necessary to being competitive. Whether competition is viewed as a product i.e. winners and losers, or a process i.e. acting in order to win, its presence in amateur sport is unacceptable. I argue in this paper that the amateur agreement rules out the behavior made necessary by competition and therefore that competition in amateur sport is immoral. This criticism is not, like other criticisms of competition in sport, directed at, or motivated by, political agendas. Rather, I attempt to show that there are commonsense reasons to discourage competition. This conclusion has important practical implications which I explore very briefly. One implication is that the

relationship that currently exists between amateur and professional sport must be questioned.

Embodiment, meaning and sports education

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It is has become increasingly evident that changes to diet, transportation, working practices, leisure pursuits pose a significant threat to the health and well-being of a significant number of the world's population. Furthermore, future economic, social and political changes are likely to escalate this process rather than moderate it.

In this context, sports and physical education professionals face a daunting task as to how to inculcate the counter-cultural values and behaviours which their practices demand. Furthermore, sports and physical activity practitioners have often propounded self-defeating aims and objectives. Those who espouse the value of sports have tended to accentuate elitism and competition, while those more concerned with mass participation in physical activities of various kinds have tended to emphasise the functional benefits of movement on the human organism. What is common to both approaches, and a host of other pedagogical variations that consent to such ideological conceptions of sport, is that they have at their heart conceptions of human activity that tend to demarcate their sphere of interest above all else to the modification of bodily functioning.

The thesis of this paper is that while much philosophical discussion has attempted to demonstrate that human embodiment is the at conceptual heart of sport and physical activity, pedagogical models have paid insufficient attention to the way their investment in sport

and physical activity potentially reinforces philosophically discredited, yet residually powerful, Cartesian principles that view mind and body as separate entities.

The paper will examine the significance that a holistic and relational approach to understanding sport and physical activity has upon pedagogical aims and objectives in general. Finally it will assess the extent to which the Sports Education model is underpinned by philosophically robust holistic principles.

Good governance: an ethical approach to sport?

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The link between sport and ethics is long entrenched and is commonly manifest in questions of competition, fair play, cheating and the place of winning in sport. Ethics then, lies in the impartial, open application of well-established principles, concepts and methods of reasoning to emerging and evolving issues both within and outside of sport. The ways in which sport is governed and, in particular, failures of governance have brought the issue of ethics into critical focus. Such interest has been fostered by misgivings about strategic directions and manifold complications involved in the decision-making process. An example of this is the confusion surrounding the proposals for the redevelopment of Wembley Stadium, the lack of infrastructure investment for Picketts Lock, and England's failed bid to host the 2006 FIFA World Cup Finals.

In response to appeals for greater organisational effectiveness and for more controls on potential abuse of existing power, and by demands for more effective stakeholder representation, increasing attention is

being focused on different management models to develop a set of ethical principles for sport. The author will consider the notion of 'good governance', which refers to the ethical standards underpinning the relations, methods and instruments of relationships between organisations, and discuss whether potentially governance provides a useful framework for understanding relations between sports governing bodies and primary and secondary stakeholders.

The concept of good governance as a language for reform has gained currency among a range of sports associations that traditionally has been built on a base of amateurism and voluntary contributions, and have struggled to adapt to increasing commercial and government forces within sport. In drawing on doctoral research, the paper seeks to examine attempts to modernise a number of national governing bodies of sport, against a backdrop of fierce policy autonomy and resistance to change. Attention will also be given to the intricate relationships between stakeholders, in particular the ambiguous position of athletes as both employees and club members, and external influences on the internal machinery of sporting bodies.

Moral exemplars in sport: using narrative to enhance moral education

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R.W. Emerson wrote that "the world is upheld by the veracity of good men; they make the earth wholesome." Despite the evidence of unethical behavior in sport today, there are those athletes that demonstrate actions of trust, integrity, honesty, and the like. One such example is golfer Jeff Sluman. Halfway through the 1996 Bay Hill Invitational, two strokes behind the match leaders, Sluman disqualified

himself because he believed he had taken an improper drop. Unlike many athletes, Sluman did not leave the responsibility for following the rules to tournament officials. In respect for the game of golf, and his fellow competitors, Sluman removed himself from the tournament – a decision with great financial repercussions. The purpose of this paper is to examine the concept of moral exemplars in sport, and to use storytelling as a model for improving sport.

First, I examine the concept of a moral exemplar. This notion has to do with qualities and standards of behavior that merit following. Moral exemplars represent the best actions in sport in terms of proper behavior. What does it mean then to be a moral exemplar, especially in sport in our postmodern world? How do we identify potential moral exemplars in sport, both past and present? Further, it is important to acknowledge that exemplary behavior occurs both on and off the playing field. Next, I examine the problem of determining appropriate virtues meriting "moral exemplar" status. For what behaviors should some athletes or coaches be deemed exemplary? In other words, who decides which virtues count, and on what criteria are these decisions made?

Finally, how can moral exemplars be used to improve the moral climate of sport? Using the framework of Hare (1981), I suggest that stories of exemplars in sport provide a model for moral education. I describe Hare's three levels of moral thinking – the intuitive (where habits are established), the critical (where decisions are made regarding right courses of action), and the meta-ethical (where definitions and use of logic are examined). In addition, I illustrate Hare's three levels with narrative sport examples at each level. This process prods us to reflect about the role of moral exemplars in sport and their purpose in moral education.

Sport and the philosophy of behavioural genomics: issues for epistemological analysis

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The paper considers sport in the perspective of the philosophy of behavioural genomics. Sport is an area of human activity which provides an unusually rich context for the analysis of epistemological issues involved in the attempt to derive a genome-based account of behaviour.

The emergence of the science of genomics presents an opportunity to take a fresh look at the possible relationships between genes and behaviour, creating space as it does for considering the interactions of groups of genes as contributing factors. Genomics will give rise to claims to knowledge concerning the genetic causation of specific behaviours. These will need to be evaluated, which means that criteria will need to be devised for this purpose. The very idea that human behaviour may be controlled by the genes has long been controversial. However, it would be wrong at this stage to assume that progress in genomics will infallibly lead towards a genetic-determinist thesis. Alternatively, its outcome could be to clarify our picture of an interactionist thesis as between genome and environment that tilted the balance away from the determinist view.

What is needed is a ground-clearing exercise to clarify the epistemological problems that can sow confusion. One such issue is the description of behaviour. Modifying an example from the 2002 report by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics on 'Genetics and human behaviour - the ethical context' (p.35), we could point to the difficulties that arise when we offer such an apparently simple

description as 'The man kicked the ball'. In expressing the matter this way we have already de-selected a number of alternatives, such as 'The man's brain sent messages to his leg muscles', 'The man's leg muscles contracted and then relaxed', 'The man moved his leg', or even 'The man scored a goal'. Where behaviour is concerned, the selection of one description rather than another seems to influence our chances of being able to construct a genome-based account. The more strongly 'physiological' the description, the greater the plausibility. But the more we move towards the 'psychological' or even the 'sociological' end of the spectrum, so the plausibility seems to decline.

The paper argues the need for a critical re-examination of our assumptions about what constitutes 'behaviour'. In the context of sport, does 'behaviour' only refer to broad personality traits like competitiveness, leadership, goal-directedness or the capacity for teamwork? Or can it be used to refer to any type of bodily movement executed in the course of sporting performance, as well as to the processes that underlie such performance? How, for example, should we categorise research into the neurophysiology of motor control, and into its possible basis in molecular genetics? The paper concludes that there is a need for a two-way channel of communication between the philosophy of sport and the philosophy of behavioural genomics.

Self-promotion and other-concern; artism as a guide to an integrative model of sport today

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Ever since Muhammed Ali, shouting "I am the greatest" and besting boxing's best in an effort to prove it, exploded onto the boxing scene in the 1960s, showboating, gloating, taunting, and the other deeds of

self-promotion have been an inescapable part of sport. Today, many players, through showing up or belittling teammates or opponents, become “standouts” in their sport. There seems to be an ever-increasing tendency toward athletic self-promotion—one fueled by obsession with (oftentimes ridiculously irrelevant) statistical data.

Often self-promotion manifests itself innocuously. Consider San Francisco wide receiver Terrell Owens, who pulled out a pen from his sock and autographed the football after scoring a touchdown against the Seattle Seahawks in 2002. At other times, self-promotion divides players on a team, even their fans. Consider the feuding between manager Billy Martin and Reggie Jackson of the New York Yankees in the 1970s. The issue that I address in this undertaking is not the morality or immorality of deeds of self-promotion in sport, but instead what such deeds represent—a *preoccupation with self* in sport, which many athletes today embrace as an ideal.

To this end, I focus on answers to three questions throughout. First, why is it that so many athletes, self-preoccupied, have so little regard for others in their sport? Second, to what extent is this fixation a detriment to sport? Last, are modern accounts of morality part of the problem?

Through temperance to health

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The article deals with the concept of recreation, that is becoming widely recognized as a popular physical culture mostly institutionalized as *Sports for all*. With the distinction between elite sport and recreation we establish two different ethical positions. While for elite sport, we argue, the imperative of competitive efficiency is the core argument, we therefore use the ethics of maximum to

conceptualize our position. This serves as a starting point for applying Aristotle’s notion of temperance to recreation. The discussion is then continued on two levels. First, the temperance in larger scheme as harmonization of modern lifestyle, and second temperance in the very act of recreation. Then we tie the virtue of temperance with notion of health, which is understood as a dynamic system of human being in its totality.

Searching for the middle way we characterize the recreation in larger scheme as a non-pleasure in the sphere of modern everyday prosperity. As such, the recreation is a way of compensation which is placed secondary in satisfying basic needs. Prior to compensation comes the prevention which existence within the modern life-style is questionable. In fact, today the compensation becomes prevention.

In the very act of recreation we point to subjectivity of organism that refuses each in advance given norm, and is focused on simultaneous creation of its own norms.

Further on, we raise the understanding of subjectivity of temperance and health towards the popular practice of sport prescriptions. When, from one point of view, this is unethical intrusion of norms on individual, from other point of view this may serve as an ideology with positive effects called education.

The athletic self or gamesmanship

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In this paper I examine the relationship between sportsmanship and gamesmanship as moral responses to the competitive sporting environment. I will argue that these two attitudes are opposed to each other, but not in a straightforward way; rather, that while it may at first glance seem to be the case that gamesmanship harms the

sportsmanlike player, by placing him or her at a disadvantage with respect to the less scrupulous competitor, it is the perpetrator who is (both physically and morally) harmed by the practice of gamesmanship. Thus, gamesmanship is self-defeating in a deeper sense than it is defeating of sport as such.

I begin by exploring the purpose of sport and some limited aspects of its expression, specifically, the nature of sport as structured and artificially constrained play. I argue that all sports are defined as such by some set of rules, even where these are vague, flexible, or variable, and that these rules serve to restrict the allowable movements of the participants, as well as identifying each particular sport as its own. Given that a sport is only the sport it is by virtue of this prescription of allowable strategies, it follows that the purpose of a sport is the carrying out of that activity, in preference to the eventual scoreline: that sport as such is process rather than result. Or, at least, that the result only “counts” *if* the activity has been performed in the specified manner. Discussions of sportsmanship only make sense if this is assumed, since sportsmanship is precisely about how the activity of sport is carried out by the participants.

For the purposes of this discussion, I assume a competitive environment, and thus I discuss at some length the significance of competition for the development of the player/athlete, including the significance of winning and losing, and the response to failure, in the sport experience. I argue that competition is a good, both from a physical standpoint, for the development of certain skills (though with reservations), but more so from the psychological-moral standpoint. I argue that there are two main benefits of competition: the experience of ontological wholeness that is not generally available when concentrating on the rehearsal of physical technique (training) but that is released as a possibility under the pressure of joint competitors, and the psychological trial of the moral self: the response to the question “what are you prepared to do to win?” If the purpose of sport is to

develop the physical and personal skills (including self and moral development) of the participant, then certain attitudes on the part of the participant are necessary for this to be a success. I argue that the ideal of sportsmanship captures just this set of personal virtues, in particular that the competitor must practice an openness to the game and to learning about herself in the game, as well as a respect both for herself and her opponents, and that this then allows the competitor to improve athletically, competitively, and morally. Gamesmanship, on the other hand, where this is understood as the deliberate attempt to undermine one’s opponent psychologically, substantially interferes with this process. While the practice may well bring one profit in the short term, in terms of victories scored, it closes the practitioner off from the other benefits of sport. Simply, if you can get your opponent to cave mentally, you don’t get pushed as hard as you might, thereby lessening the competitive situation, and your own opportunities for improvement and achievement, whether on that day or in the future. In this respect, gamesmanship undercuts the benefit of sport to the player who employs it. However, I also argue that there is a sense in which gamesmanship is not necessarily a detriment to sport, in that it provides an additional test for the sportsmanlike participant to develop and demonstrate the appropriate virtues. In the course of this discussion I also devote some time to the distinction of gamesmanship from cheating and other forms of sporting malpractice.

Five arguments for the elimination of college football

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117 colleges and universities in the United States maintain football programs which compete at the division I-A level, as defined by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). These schools offer

athletic scholarships, participate in intercollegiate competition, and hope to win a bowl game or national championship. At many prominent schools (including Ohio State, Notre Dame and Michigan) football is central to the culture and image of the university. Huge amounts of attention are lavished on the teams.

College football has been scandal-ridden since its invention in the 1890s, yet has continued to expand its influence and prestige. Since every attempt at reform has failed, intercollegiate football in anything like its current form should be banned. I believe that American universities have a moral duty to disband their football programs, on the basis of five arguments: harm to the education mission of universities, corruption of their values, erosion of their standards, harm to their students and, finally, destroying the possibility for gender equity in sport.

Educational Mission: It is the central responsibility of a university to educate its students. Other activities which support this mission—introducing new intellectual and cultural experiences, encouraging clubs, and helping students be healthy—are accepted as part of the college’s responsibilities. Does sport fit this mission? Yes for participatory sports that provide exercise and fun to students (often called “intramural sports”); no for competitive inter-collegiate sports like football.

Corruption of Values: The highest paid employee at many prestigious American universities is not a famous professor, nor the President or Chancellor of the college. Rather it is usually the football or (men’s) basketball coach. In a society where personal and social worth is judged almost entirely by wealth, this sends an unmistakable message to the student body. Winning football games is more important that

teaching literature, curing disease, or even managing thousands of staff at a research university.

Erosion of Standards: Unlike racial, gender or “legacy” (children of Alumni) benefits, it is currently relatively uncontroversial that most college athletes are given places in colleges that are not justified by their academic performance. A student with much better grades and test scores has been rejected by Harvard or Michigan State for every weaker student with athletic skills who attends. Having accepted a student who is otherwise unqualified, the college then has a remarkable incentive not to let them fail. Such students are, almost by definition, those most likely to earn failing grades. This corrupts standards in two distinct ways: 1) classes and programs that fit the limited time and ability of such students, so called “jock” or “gut” courses, evolve to allow athletes to pass something; 2) faculty teaching mainstream classes are frequently subjected to pressure to let athletes pass their courses, or to ignore obvious cases of cheating or collusion when they occur.ⁱⁱⁱ

Harm to the participants: Unlike their peers who attend college full time, athletes work an unpaid job in exchange for their tuition. Sadly, much of their time on campus is wasted. Many are injured, and shockingly few receive the degree promised them in exchange for their labor.

Gender equity: Equitable treatment of men and women athletes, as mandated by fairness and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1973, is impossible as long as football programs are maintained.

Hedonism with a twist or the duplicitous face of fun: the perverse enjoyment of suffering in sport and its role in enhancing the sporting experience

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Sports, games, and play are as old as human civilization. In its long genesis the ludic realm has been conceived both positively as a generative and creative force, as well as negatively as an unproductive waste of our time and energies. *Homo Ludens* and *Homo Faber* seem to be two different and incompatible species. Presently I will not argue for either side. Regardless of which side one favors, the aspect both camps agree on is that sports, games, and play are enjoyable and fun. Indeed, as Hyland points out, while avowing to the difficulty of defining the concept, fun is a *telos* of sport. Rather, I will focus on the elusive concept of fun and related kin, such as enjoyment, elation, or pleasure, to uncover a “darker side” that enhances our challenging sporting experiences precisely by way of sacrifice and suffering. Thus, I propose to undertake a conceptual disquisition of what I call the “paradox of enjoyment in sports”, which counterintuitively suggests that the way to intensify our sporting experience is not *just* through fun *simpliciter*, but rather is contingent on and congruent with the level of suffering involved. To put it another way, the “fun” to be had in sports is a complex phenomenon that needs to be dissected into two opposing sets of values: enjoyment and suffering.

A coin has two sides that are an inherent part of each other, and without these the coin is not possible. On the one side there is “the fun,” loosely understood as having a good time or enjoying something. This enjoyment is associated with pleasure, joy, even ecstasy. Sports and games nowadays, perhaps solving the previous entente, are conceived of as activities that belong to the realm of leisure. As such,

they are supposed to promote healthy values, and their positive aspects are vigorously lauded. They increase our *joie de vivre*, as Meier points out with regard to play. The other side, not usually acknowledged but not any less part of it, involves a sacrifice, cashed out in terms of suffering (this includes satellite notions such as anxiety, fear, and discomfort). A big part of why we engage and invest so much time, energy, and resources in sports is because they offer us rewarding *challenges* that we enjoy, particularly if these challenges are to become *an* experience (in Dewey’s fertile sense). We are able to profoundly enjoy and appreciate these activities precisely because of this sacrifice and suffering. Otherwise mere daydreaming would suffice. Indeed without this suffering facet sports would be more banal, and our lives less meaningful. Whether it be the life threatening challenge of mountain climbing, the sheer physical agony of bicycle racing, or the more aristocratic exertions of golf, in all cases there is a physical and mental price to be paid that is predicated on this “twisted” aspect of fun that is crucial to our being able to enjoy said activities to their fullest expression. In short, the suffering undergone to overcome a challenge is an essential reason why we find sports and games fun and rewarding.

To sum up, I plan to legitimize this “darker side” to our ludic and fun challenges as a *de facto* source of value and enjoyment for sport and even for our life. The coin has been tossed. Which side is tails or heads, and which one comes on top is to be seen.

Ontology of experience and extreme sports

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The notion “experience” is one of the most frequent words in postmodern society. First of all psychology, experience education and leisure business use the word “experience” as a sign of attractiveness for everybody (authentic, original, extreme, intensive, deep etc. experience).

And what about philosophy? Unfortunately the reflexion of this term in the history of philosophy indicates that “experience” was not a topic of philosophy from the oldest times up to the 20th century. We can read some considerations about our theme only from the Romantic period as well as in treatises on the philosophy of life, hermeneutics or phenomenology. But the ontology of an experience means (from Heidegger’s point of view) the way of being of this beingness (existence or essence), which is still missing.

The study uses phenomenological findings about the “world” and analytical discoveries of “possible worlds” and speculates about the ontology of experience and its structure. In my opinion experience is an intersection of the individual and the world. (The world from the phenomenological point of view, that means the horizon of the senses and the framework of our understanding. The world is not the sum of all things and objects. Human beings are always embedded into the world and everybody understands the world somehow.) I see experience as a single event, not as a process (as Csikszentmihalyi’s flow is).

The structure of experience depends on the cultural environment and on the time of experiencing. The theme of time relativity in experiencing is very clear and obvious in the case of sport experience. These factors are visible in postmodern society. In postmodern experiencing we can see the process of our own bodily

experience as opposed to experience acquired vicariously by social contact and technical audiovisual media. This “alienation” is maybe more serious than human alienation from work (as Marx wrote).

The intensity and authenticity of experience is documented for extreme sports. The attractiveness of extreme sports springs from their possibility to transfer us to a different possible world. This possible world is different from the actual living world. It is not only a psychological difference (various meanings, sensations and feelings), but it is really an ontological difference: there are very different understandings of all senses and substances which create peculiar world from all possible worlds.

Disability sports: the ethics of classification

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The issue of classification is an integral and perennial subject for disability sport. Currently international disability-specific sports federations (e.g. Cerebral Palsy International Sport and Recreation Association) determine categories of competition that govern their members participation. Like other governing bodies these federations also exercise a crucial institutional role in the development, health and well being of the practice. The International Paralympic Committee, which is responsible for the Paralympic Games, arguably the showpiece of disabled sports, also exercises a legislative role by defining the categories for participation in the Paralympic Games. The number of categories for participation are fewer in number than those offered by the specific federations. As a consequence a number of athletes are unable to compete in the Paralympics because their category of competition simply does not exist. This paper examines the legitimacy of the Paralympic categories in particular and the

Institutional operation of the IPC in general. We argue that the classification systems are constructed primarily for the commercial aims of the Paralympic movement. The categories selected are those considered most attractive to a viewing audience and tend to be closely aligned with the dominant aesthetic associated with 'able' sport. Categories for more extreme impairments are excluded resulting in the marginalisation of those athletes and consequently the particular activity. Following MacIntyre (1986) we believe that decisions about sport ought to reflect the best interests of the practice community and not simply the commercial interest of the institution. Although the Paralympics has clearly increased awareness of, and benefited, disability sport the IPC's actions have negative consequences. On the one hand competitive events and competitors are excluded and marginalized and on the other an idealised conception of the disabled athlete is promoted and reinforced. The Paralympics therefore promotes a limited image of acceptable impairment in the world of sport. Given this difficulty in clearly identifying the geography of disability sport, making conclusive ethical judgments using the MacIntyrian model is by no means straightforward in this case. In drawing these conclusions the paper also provides a rigorous philosophical interrogation of the heuristic and critical merits of the dominant MacIntyrian social practice account of sports, practices, and institutions.

From opening of the bodyconsciousness to the "bodily ethics"

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There are two basic ways of controlling the human movement when a physical skill is being learned: from outside and from inside. You can look the movement of the body from outside through a mirror, fore

example, and try to correct it's movements as the dancers do. Or you can listen to the movement from inside of the body through your bodyconsciousness, through the proprioceptive awareness. Both of the methods (and others) are used in most movement learning processes. In this paper I want to do phenomenological analysis of proprioceptive awareness of the body that is skilled in an art that is practiced through the method of "inner listening" of the body. My question is, what are the essential features of the lived experience of this kind of body and what are their existential meaning. The basic experiential structures that are analysed are the structure of the "inner space" of the body, its two main experiential centers: the head and the abdomen; movement consciousness and structure consciousness that express the body's relation to the earth and environment; the *hyle* of the proprioceptive awareness: "the vibration of the cells" and the experience of vitality, the "stream of life" that is hereby produced. And finally the meaning of conscious breathing connected to moment in opening these experiences is analysed. The implications of the discoveries to sport and physical education are considered.

As far the systematic practise of the proprioceptive awareness in sport is almost non-existent. If there has been such a thing it has had three basic functions: 1. the prevention of sport injuries, 2. the rehabilitation from sport injuries and 3. increasing the performance ability or accuracy, the last item being the least explored. One of the basic point of my paper is that the emphasis of the internal or proprioceptive control of movement in all movement learning processes -including sport - could have many positive meanings to the person involved. Especially the experiences I have described in this paper all have a positive existential value, too. This could be one way to build a new "bodily ethics" to sport and other movement arts where the ethical ground is missing or beginning to crumble.

Study on the significance of Homer and Plato in modern sport - from the viewpoint of the relationship between immortal existence and human happiness

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The purpose of this study was to make significances of Homer and Plato in modern sport clear. Their works belonged to the classic culture and were important sources of ideas on the West Sport. Their thoughts on the sport in Ancient Greece were examined from the viewpoint of the relationship between immortal existence and human happiness. These perspectives on the study suggested to us significant ideas on sport culture over the age and the area.

The sport in this study was understood as a cultural term which satisfied the following three conditions; 1) being based on the safety of our life, 2) respecting rules on physical movement, 3) being able to transmit a movement style from generation to generation.

Homer told us that the gods influenced the games of sports in his time. The gods in his works were immortal and had eternal existence. They had the power to decide human destiny and happiness. Heroes were given some victories by the gods, too. An athlete tried to win them and considered honor as the best happiness in his life. Homer expressed the winner as an excellent person in movement skill, physical strength, will, endurance, intelligence and judgment.

Plato realized sport as the base of education. Education was the means to develop battle ability, because the wars between state-cities could not always be stopped in his time. But the purpose of education in his thought wasn't to win in the wars. Plato's true aim in education was for a person to live with 'Goodness' that was the eternal existence and led an individual and a community in a good direction and happiness. 'Goodness' in his works was the reason for all good things in the Ancient World. Plato recognized sport education as

the foundation of human development which was consciousness of 'Goodness'.

The results are summarized as follows:

1. Homer and Plato told about sport based on the relationship between immortal existence and human happiness in their works.
2. It is Homer's significance in modern sport where he is suggesting the human possibility of a chance to experience the influence of eternal existence. A person must make every effort to take this chance.
3. Plato's significance in modern sport is that he is telling that sport education has the possibility of contributing to the human development based on 'Goodness'. If 'Goodness' is the foundation of all life, we should always be conscious of it.

Aleatorism and sports spectacle

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A sports performance is an important cultural event, essentially influencing social and individual lives. Despite that, there has been no monograph, so far developed, as part of the theory of sports and physical education, which has analysed described and explained this phenomenon. There has been no monograph that has developed the issue in a multi aspectual, holistic, culturalological and philosophical way, dealing with its social and axiological values (esthetic, ethical and praxeological). This applies to particular elements of a performance, to relations between them and to mechanisms bringing about development and growth of interest in the social dimension.

Generally, the theory of performance comprising such forms as sports and theatrical, political or social performances does not have extensive coverage in polish literature. The relatively well developed one is the theory of a theatre performance and that is why, for formal and operational reasons (a developed conceptual and methodological framework) it can serve as the basis for structural and esthetic studies. The above does not mean that the author will aim at appreciating a sports performance due to its links with theatre. He points to one of many possible aspects of a sports performance, which are assumptions of aleathorical nature included into its structure into its plan and into the tactics of the game.

Martyrdom as extreme sport

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From modern differentiated point of view, Roman spectacles included sports, arts and recreational activities, like wrestling, theatre, baths, mime, races etc. A curious taste for obscenity, perversity and cruelty is detectable in all of them, together with a desire to overcome the limits of fiction, and to transgress from »just games« into »real reality«. The extreme case are amphiteater games of death (*munera*; all the other games were called *ludi*). Originally, games were of ritual character and organised in regular intervals. In times of empire, they spread all over the world, they were organised more and more often, and their ritual character was more or less forgotten. They represented imperial culture and power of the center, something recognised by all different cultures, religions, and ethnic groups. Repugnant to modern human scientists, these games are treated as something out of order,

and are not accepted as part of tradition of modern sports and spectacles.

If we take into account long fight of Church fathers, from Tertullian to Augustin, against their fascination with Roman spectacles, as spectators, early Christians were hardly different from all the others. But, on the other side, in times of persecution they were all potential victims of amphiteater executions, and had to prepare themselves, just in case, how to react and what to do in such circumstances. What really perplexed Romans was that many of them, even when they had a chance, did not avoid their punishment or escape, but accepted martyrdom as God's gift. Christian texts from those early centuries reveal that a special set of rules of martyrdom developed. Christians saw themselves as actors in the universal and ultimate arena, engaged with another kind of sport, and appearing in another kind of spectacles, where victorious participants, albeit dead for this world, went directly into heaven.

This opposition between Roman and Christian involvement and interpretation of spectacles testifies to the existence of two kinds of extreme competitiveness in Roman spectacles.

Getting high: relating to wilderness through the sport of climbing

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When climbing popular alpine, rock, and ice routes, one often uses sophisticated technological equipment, follows well-established paths, and encounters large numbers of people. Climbing in such places, then, would seem to have little in common with what North Americans have traditionally understood as the experience of wilderness. "Wilderness" is generally taken to refer to unknown and uninhabited places, or, at least, places in which the effects of human

activities are unnoticeable. Yet, climbers often speak and write of experiencing nature in the same terms as those who take themselves to be writing about empty and isolated places. I present a view of wilderness that focuses, not on the objective features of places, but on the relation between individuals and their environment. Doing so resolves the apparent tension that emerges when climbers speak of the places in which they climb, though inhabited and well known, as wilderness areas. As well as explaining this aspect of the experience of climbing, this approach to the understanding of wilderness has significant implications for environmental philosophy.

While playing an enormously important role in the history of environmental philosophy, the North American conception of wilderness has recently received severe criticism. J. Baird Callicott, for example, argues that the concept of wilderness serves to separate human beings from nature, is eurocentric, and misconceives the way natural systems function. I argue that, while criticisms along the lines of Callicott's are important, the concept of wilderness should not be discarded, but altered in a way that addresses the problems with it, while saving crucial aspects of it. In this paper, I put forth the position that the analysis of the relationship climbers have with the natural world suggests a way of understanding the concept of wilderness that provides a useful framework for conceptualizing the role of wilderness and wilderness experience in contemporary Western culture.

By focusing on the relationship between individuals and their environment, it is possible that an area might be considered worth preserving, because it provides a wilderness experience for a number of people, even if that area has supported a large population and shows the effects of use by people. Such a conception could serve to bring humans into relationships with nature that can be maintained, and provide a platform for further development in the understanding of the natural world.

Regulative rules: the cornerstone of effective gamewrighting

Scott Kretchmar

Far more attention has been paid in the literature to the so-called constitution of games than their regulation. Similarly, constitutive rules have been accorded more central lusory functions and far more gamewrighting value than regulative guidelines. Suits (1967), for instance, argued persuasively that the defining features of a game—its central problem, allowances and prohibitions, and its penalties—are set by its constitutive rules and their extensions.

In a previous article (XXX, 2001), I argued that the constitutive-regulative distinction, as described by Searle in Game Acts and later in Mind, Language and Society, has been typically misapplied to sport. I attempted to show that when regulative rules are conceptualized as Searle did, they take on a far more important function than previously thought. In that essay, I provided a couple of brief examples of regulative rules that set parameters for game inventions.

In this paper, I will attempt to spell out the utility of regulative rules for the generation of game problems. This will involve a brief journey into philosophical anthropology. The purpose is to discover fundamental movement challenges that serve as the raw material that gamewrights explicitly or tacitly use for their subsequent constitutive activity. Some of the work of Maxine Sheets-Johnstone will be used for these descriptions. I will describe how basic acts of every-day chasing/fleeing that can be described by a number of regulative rules become lusory chasing and fleeing as a product of sound constitutive rules. This transition shows the importance of both regulation and constitution as foundational game resources.

The outcome of the analysis will be, hopefully, a richer appreciation of the resources available to gamewrights. I will say that gamewrighting is not simply a logical process of inventing durable artificial problems. It is partly that. But it is also a human process that involves an appreciation of deeply satisfying pre-lusory movement problems. It involves tasteful judgments about which problems work well together and how those problems can be enhanced artificially in game contexts. Games are, in a sense, elevated problems, and they bear testimony to distinctly human needs, insight, and creativity. But games are also, in a sense, basic problems. They bear testimony to our evolutionary heritage and our very common condition as embodied creatures.

Conflict between the Olympic ideal and national interest: symbolic meaning of the cultural performance in the opening ceremony of the 2002 Salt Lake Winter Olympic Games

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It may be argued that there were three significant political moments in the Opening Ceremony of the 2002 Salt Lake Winter Games (SLWG). First, the entrance of the world trade center flag to memorialize the 9.11 terrorism, second, President Bush's opening declaration promoting national prestige (thereby violating Olympic Charter protocol), and third, the choice of the 1980 "Miracle on Ice" hockey team to light the Olympic flame (following the "U.S.A." chant). It is fresh in our memory of the Ceremony that the SLWG was colored with the nationalism and patriotism of the U.S.A.

Moreover, there were other political and philosophical issues related to the opening cultural shows that were presented by the host city. In particular, the cultural and symbolic meanings of the opening

performance, 'Light the Fire Within,' contain problematic and meaningful issues. For example, the symbolic meaning of the 'Fire' and 'Child of Light' and the situations surrounding their appearance, (a lack of reconciliation between native Americans and the white immigrants, and the nostalgic representation of the West by white immigrants) showed clearly a kind of conflict between localism and internationalism typical to the Olympic philosophy of Olympism.

In this study, the following issues are interpreted. What kind of messages did this cultural show try to transmit? What kind of symbols does the 'Child of Light' have? What is the meaning of the 'Fire Within'? What were the special positions of the fires? In order to interpret these issues, it is useful to refer to the broader context of the SLWG. First, because the SLWG was the first international mega-sport event after the 9.11 attack, the American government and USOC had to keep a strong anti-terrorism standpoint and maintain severe security control for the USA's national prestige. Second, it was natural for the USOC to try to heal victims of the 9.11 terrorism and to promote national dignity by using this global athletic event. Therefore, the USOC planned to separate the nationalistic pre-show programs from the official Opening Ceremony. Third, because there is strong patriotic education in U.S.A. (typified by the "Pledge of Allegiance," for example) the Opening ceremony show was a great chance for the patriotic education of American children.

Within the "Light the Fire Within" portion of the cultural performance of the SLWG opening ceremony, the producer Don Mischer used many children for a mass performance and many 'Child Lights,' who guided the athletes' entrance parade and led an audience performance in the stands. From these hermeneutical analyses of the cultural performances of the Opening Ceremony in the SLWG, it can be concluded that there was a double standard in the ceremony.

Moreover, this double standard includes many dimensions concerned with Olympism: was it festival or national celebrity, were these shows localism and nationalism or globalism and internationalism, and were these performances patriotism or a hope for a peaceful world? This double standard existed in the structure and script of the cultural program and the modification of the official rites in the Opening Ceremony. It is important for us to reconstruct the cultural performance of the SLWG opening ceremony in order to understand and critique the messages delivered.

Why sport is not a (MacIntyrean) practice

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A widespread idea is that it is philosophically revealing to regard sport as a *practice*. But evaluation of that idea requires understanding of what reference to *practice* imports. No doubt many answers are possible. But one favoured answer explains *practices* by reference to ideas from Alastair MacIntyre. Here too there is a variety of uses: the paper focuses on one from William Morgan, especially his *Leftist Theories of Sport*, and hence on the idea of a *practice* as explaining normativity. For, in contrasting his view with D'Agostino's, Morgan specifically urges that a 'descriptive' reading of *ethos* (which he associates with D'Agostino) cannot account for the requisite normativity. In part, the paper disputes this *use* of MacIntyre's account of *practices*: that account contains descriptive elements which render problematic its deployment in *contrast* to a descriptive account. Further, the 'community view' of the normativity of rules (which seems to develop) cannot be sustained, since normativity does not require extant practices. So, for these reasons, MacIntyre's ideas cannot answer the 'question' Morgan asked. Moreover, on such an

account, practices *assume*, rather than ground, normativity. Were this the structure of Morgan's argument, he would have no rational basis for preferring his account to D'Agostino's. Three points should be added: first, that normativity requires *teachability*, not an extant practice (as noted above); second, that this exhausts the issue — there is no remaining 'gap'; and, third, that the project concerning normativity may well not be MacIntyre's own — if not, any critique here passes him by.

Stakeholder analysis in sports ethics

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Sports ethics is a broad area and includes a variety of philosophical activities. One segment of sports ethics is ethical decision-making in sports and sports related situations. Several approaches to decision-making in ethics have been advanced at both the theoretical and practical levels. One approach to decision-making in management is "stakeholder analysis". While stakeholder analysis is common in business decision-making, it can be adapted to ethical decision-making with the inclusion of the "moral stakes" of stakeholders together with their economic and strategic stakes. We review several related approaches to ethical decision-making and evaluate and compare their theoretical and practical benefits and liabilities. In this essay we develop the concept of "moral stakes" and provide examples of moral stakes in sports contexts. We also demonstrate how moral stakeholder analysis can provide a practical meta-framework for decision-making in sports ethics situations.

Particular reference to the work of (1) Bernard Gert (2) the model suggested by the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics at Santa Clara

University and (3) the SAGE model used in teaching thousands of students at the University of South Florida will provide practical applications for moral stakeholder analysis in sports ethics.

Genetically modified athletes: an update

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This paper explores a number of arguments made within a number of organisations about the use of genetic technology in sport. It identifies 3 key organisations who have made attempts at addressing this problem, particularly the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA, 2002), the US President's Council on Bioethics (2002) and the Australian Law Reforms Commission (ALRC, 2001). For each of these organisations, it is explained how they reflect a different kind of appreciation for values about genetics and sport. Specifically, WADA frames its argument in what is medically ethical, the US President's Council considers a broad range of moral views concerning sport, and the ALRC captures legal and ethical issues related to the use of genetic information. Collectively, they provide a useful breadth of ideas to inform the discussion concerning the use of genetics and sport and can be helpful to begin theorising an approach to this performance issue in elite sport.

Sport, moral inquiry and historical narrative

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One question looms large in sport ethics and moral inquiry in general today. And that question is how far outside the self should ethical considerations range? What gives this question its present urgency is that one prominent answer given to it, that ethical considerations should range very far outside of the self indeed, the answer of moral universalism, has lost its critical luster. One important reason why is that its attempt to purge moral reflection of all particulars (specific beliefs, desires, interests, and concerns), or, to use Nagel's more well known language, to view the world from no particular point in it, is considered by many moral philosophers to be too abstract for its own good. That is because its very abstractness, they reason, makes it largely irrelevant to the actual course of our lives. For a form of moral reflection that willfully distances itself from the particular concerns and interests that impel people forward in their lives would be hard pressed to find anything about those concerns worth endorsing. What goes for our lives in general here, of course, goes for our sporting lives in particular.

If moral inquiry in sport is ill-served, as I have suggested, by a transcendental standpoint, a standpoint that enjoin us, as Jonathan Bennett colorfully puts it, "to take warm, familiar aspects of the human condition and look at them coldly and with the eye of the stranger," then the question arises as to just what starting point is it well-served by. My answer is historical narrative, that is, the moral stories we tell about our sporting lives and the moral self-images we craft in their telling. For it is these stories and self-images that convey our moral idealizations of sport, our best judgments about how they should be morally conducted, and drive our efforts to morally justify them, to find some place in the good life for them.

But, alas, there are many moral tales that could be told about sport, and, to make matters worse, some of them are distinctly unflattering ones, narratives of moral decline rather than uplift. So where do we begin?; what stories are so important that they can be ignored only at

our moral peril? Of course, the turn to history rules out any metaphysical answer to this question, since that turn amounts to a concession to contingency. That means that the reflective efficacy of any yarn we spin can only be gauged by the fruits it bears, by the moral insights it delivers, not by any a priori claim of moral superiority.

This brings me to the story I want to tell about sports, which takes us back to the turn of the twentieth century and to the progressive movement - - a program of major social and moral reform that swept America and dominated much of its moral and political life until the 1960s. What is of particular interest about this story is the prominent role sport played in it, in which it was viewed by progressive intellectuals like Herbert Croly and John Dewey and much of the public alike as a moral antidote to the moral failings of the times. What makes this story especially worth retelling is the similarity of those times to ours, for America was then suffering from a runaway individualism that continues to ravage it today, an inflated sense of self that produced and is still producing a socially and morally undesirable distribution of wealth and an equally socially and morally undesirable fractured sense of community. What I want to claim is that this progressive moral vision of sport is one worth updating because the arguments marshaled on its behalf are still cogent ones, and ones that are likely to find some moral resonance in our contemporary age.

Dying, death and immortality in sports – moments of enhanced existence

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Nowadays we can find many different forms of sport, sometimes they are just classic types of sport in a new covering, sometimes variations that mutated into independent kinds of sport. All in all a tendency to “the extreme“ is noticeable. This trend towards *extremes* seems to have an “unavoidable” connotation of risk – cultivated in so called *high risk sports*. Now, what do athletes really risk in those kinds of activities and what might the benefit be?

At first we have to differentiate between types of sport where athletes have to run an *extreme distance* – a 100 km run for example, where they (only) take the risk of “minor” injuries – and types of sport such as free-climbing or any other kind of death-centred sports, where people take an *extreme risk* into account – to risk their life. The question at stake is: do such *near death experiences* lead to an enhanced existence, respectively to an enhanced “Dasein” (Heidegger, 1993). High risk sports might not be the only way to attain an extended awareness of *being*, but sport might provide a more controlled way to experience such a challenge of life and death. In a second step an interpretation of this “flirting with death” follows (Slusher, 1967) with the help of concepts like: *luck, flow, eroticism* and *ecstasy*. These concepts can be seen as forms of expression of an enhanced existence and might be helpful to understand this “carrying-to-the-extreme” boom where people gamble with their physical existence. A further connotation of death in sports could be seen in the field of drug abuse (doping) in performance sports. For example, if athletes accept to take drugs to enhance their performance, knowing that these drugs might harm their body or might kill them, hence such a form of doping could be regarded as *suicide*. Besides the problem of death and dying, two significant aspects of immortality should be analysed. The first aspect focuses on the “as-if-immortality”, i.e. the promise of lifetime extension through sports, while the second one is a study of *heroes* and *legends* in the field of sport. “Real” heroes only seem to reach the *mystic hyperspace of immortality* when they are dead.

Talking about death and dying still seems to be a taboo in our society. Almost every scientific paper about death in the field of sport sciences is written from a medical point of view and only very few research concerning death *and* sports takes place in the humanities. Even in the ostensible domain – the philosophy of sports – only a small amount of publications on that topic can be quoted. On the contrary the philosophy itself regards the idea of “learning to die” as one of their ultimate goals.

The author’s aim is to lessen this deficit by a philosophical interpretation of such death-centred sports as well as stressing the positive consequences of sporting activities in the face of death. “Finitude as topic of self-awareness attains [...] a positive momentum, because in *Grenzsituationen* [extreme situations] (Jaspers) such as suffering and death-awareness the individual is radically reflected on itself and has to encounter the task of realisation of the essence within his limited lifetime” (Burkard, 1999).

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Allegiance and identity

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Sporting allegiance is a widespread phenomenon in spectator sports, especially team sports. Is there any rational basis for it? Some proposed reasons will be briefly explored, such as geographical

location, tradition or religious/political affiliation, but are found insufficiently rational.

However, a continued affiliation through time must depend essentially on there being conditions of diachronic, numerical identity of the team or club supported as the concept of an allegiance, I claim, is one that makes sense only if extended through time. Identity provides at least some rational structure to allegiance. What such identity conditions consist in seems far from clear, however (in the case of non-team sports, allegiances are to persons and fixed by personal identity, which is in practice seldom disputed). I will run through some candidate identity conditions: club name, club members or team, base or location, spatio-temporal continuity and franchise. Using examples of British Association Football clubs, I will show how identity is seemingly preserved through changes or breaks in all these categories. Clubs have been known to go out of and come back into existence, for example, but this is not an insurmountable obstacle to identity as the notion of a ‘gappy existence’ is well-established in metaphysics. There are also many cases of a club changing name, its membership or geographical location. But Aristotle noted that the very concept of a change (in these or any other attributes) requires an underlying identity that provides a subject of change so we must continue to look for it.

Cases of uncertain identity will be considered such as those in the histories of Bootle FC, Durham City FC and Bradford Park Avenue FC. These, it seems, fall on a continuum, which presents a problem as numerical identity appears to be an all-or-nothing matter. A case of disputed identity will be considered: whether the Wimbledon FC of 1990 is identical with the Wimbledon FC or the AFC Wimbledon of 2003.

I will argue that it cannot be solely metaphysical concerns that determine the identities of these clubs as they are essentially creations of convention. Being regarded as the same club over time is a mind-dependent and social phenomenon that involves a degree of ‘conspiracy’ among a community of supporters and onlookers that is able to overcome certain discontinuities. I conclude that being regarded as the same club is the most important feature of identity for clubs. This can supply a logical subject of Aristotelian change, if not a metaphysical one. However, for such a conspiracy to be successful there must be at least some metaphysical grounding to it that will persuade enough people that the conspiracy is sufficiently rational.

Stoicism, corporeality and sport in Adam Smith's philosophy

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Adam Smith is known popularly and mostly as the founder of modern political economy, who wrote *The Wealth of Nations*, thus becoming the patron-saint of economic liberalism. To some others who studied the tradition of eighteenth century Scottish philosophy he is also considered one of the philosophers of moral sense, especially due to his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. To careful readers of Adam Smith's works he is also a philosopher of language, who wrote treatises on this theme and gave a series of *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*. All this may be seen as very interesting for further studies, but in this paper I want to concentrate on Adam Smith as a philosopher of sport.

Adam Smith dealt with questions related to the body, corporeality and competition in sports, which led to his consideration of sport as a model for economic activity and behavior. Therefore, I propose a reading of his work according to the following steps: We shall first situate his philosophy in the context of eighteenth century Scotland

and track the influence of Stoicism on his thinking. Moreover, we will center our attention on Smith's appropriation of the Stoic concept of body and observe how he relates this concept of body and corporeality to sports. Finally, we will consider the systematic role of Smith's conception of sports as a controversial point of his philosophy, for this idea lays at the core of his ethical and economic thinking, which is evidenced by the concept of “fair play”. In my view, this discussion is not only historically relevant, but it is also important to contemporary philosophy, especially due to the contemporary emphasis on the body and its impact on the philosophy of sport.

The aesthetics of the interval: one approach to contemporary dance

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“The issue are not the postures, it is the energy and the connections”

Angelique Wilkie

In our occidental culture we are used to talk about well delimited objects, to establish well defined limits and divisions. Our language conditions this way of perception of the world and things. Language has the power to determinate which are the experiences that should be included in the category of objects and which are the ones that should be considered as successes, actions or processes. We are so used to this grammatical convention that we don't even realize that it exists. We can easily understand the convention that occurs at the signs level but we don't appreciate that easily the arbitrariness in which we live in at

the grammatical level. This arbitrariness is very important once it determines, in a decisive way, how we have access to reality.

Focus on the corporal language of dance, we can verify how occidental dance history seems to have evolutioned (when I say evolutioned I mean just in a chronological way) from an importance gave to the positions, to the established figures and to a vocabulary of movement well known by dancers as well as by the public (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th positions of the low part of the body, the plié, etc.) into another kind of vocabulary much more difficult to qualify. It is another way of looking into dance where we can hardly find names to call to an exact position, and where the speech is much more about the quality of movement, the way in which it is executed.

This study intends to show how the emphasis no longer belongs to the positions and starts to be acquired by the process the dancer goes through till he arrives, or more exactly, passes through a position. That position can be recognised because it belongs to the known vocabulary of movement, or because the self dynamics of the dance emphasises it in a way that the observer of the dance understand it as a position, even if he can't integrate it in a established vocabulary of movement.

This change of the emphasis also corresponds to a modification of the structure of the attention that is no longer concentrated in what can be seen from the exterior, what could be appreciated by looking to a mirror, or that could be corrected by copying another demonstrative body. The attention now turns to "the inside" of the body giving rise to a significative change in the way of perception of the space as well as of the other bodies with whom the space of dance is shared.

Olympism – universalism and humanism

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The ideology of Olympism sees itself as universalist and liberal-humanist. This paper will explore both aspects, assessing the tenability of a universalist ethic, and the viability of the liberal-humanist project.

Olympism Olympism is a social philosophy which emphasises the role of sport in world development, international understanding, peaceful co-existence, and social and moral education. De Coubertin, being a product of late nineteenth-century liberalism, emphasised the values of equality, fairness, justice, respect for persons, rationality and understanding, autonomy, and excellence. These are, basically, the main values of liberal humanism.

The Olympic Movement – global and local I shall draw attention to the emerging relationship between The Olympic Movement and the United Nations, two global organisations facing similar problems in regard to universality and particularity. The general problem is how we are to operate at a global (universal) level whilst there exist such apparently intractable differences at the particular level.

Some seek to resolve such difficulties by speaking of sport as a universal language; but this seems to me to under-represent the case. Not just sport, but Olympism itself seeks to be universal in its values: mutual recognition and respect, tolerance, solidarity, equity, anti-discrimination, peace, multiculturalism, etc. This is a quite specific set of values, which might be construed as a set of universal general principles; but which also require different interpretations in different cultures - *stated* in general terms; *interpreted* in the particular.

This search for a universal representation at the interpersonal and political level of our common humanity seems to me to be the essence of the optimism and hope of Olympism and other forms of humanism and internationalism. In the face of recent events in Europe and the Middle East it seems a fond hope and a naive optimism; but this paper will argue that the philosophy of Olympism has been the most coherent systematisation of the ethical and political values underlying the practice of sport so far to have emerged.

Olympism: Universal Values? Social ideas, or ideas inscribed in social practices, depend upon a specific social order or a particular set of social relationships for their full meaning to be exemplified. This seems to suggest that such meanings are culturally relative and that therefore there could be no such thing as a universal idea of Olympism. Are we doomed to relativism? The paper will explore and apply recent work in moral theory that addresses the issue of moral universalism.

A Philosophical Anthropology of Olympism I have elsewhere tried to present a philosophical anthropology of Olympism as part of an explication of its ideology, and as a contribution to a theory of sport and physical education. Part of the claim is that Olympism is well placed to provide the basis for the world-wide development of physical education as a valued element in everyone's general education. This section will explore the implications of the foregoing analysis for universalism and humanism in sport as an everyday practical reality.

„Two Concepts of Rules“: John Rawls' design of a particular rule utilitarianism

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The rule- and constitution theme is a significant one in sport philosophy. As games and their rules are conspicuous and transparent they are in vogue also in general philosophy to demonstrate and clarify philosophical issues.

But not seldom, whenever sportspecific characteristics of game rules are misunderstood, this leads to wrong conclusions.

So the paper is to show that in „Two Concepts of Rules“ Rawls' approach goes wrong when he tries to found a particular form of rule utilitarianism with reference to practices and when he supports the thesis that utilitarian arguments are appropriate for solely being applied to practices i.e. to issues of institutional ethics: The reason for him not to succeed originates from erroneously equating game rules with moral rules as well as with all rules constituting practices.

The Hellenic virtue of *sophrosyne* in ancient and modern Olympic sport

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If there is one thing that can bridge the gap between Olympia 776 and Athens 2004, it is the *experience* of the athletes. The athletes' experience remains unchanged for two reasons: the enduring nature of human beings, and the enduring nature of sport. Athletic contests, ancient and modern, are meant to cultivate and celebrate *aretai*, excellences of human nature that do not change as human

circumstances (or even particular sporting events) do. The traditional Hellenic *aretai* of reverence, courage, self-discipline, justice, and wisdom are still elicited by modern sport and still relevant in the modern world, even if their applications have changed. By becoming aware of the connections between traditional Hellenic *aretai* and the nature of athletic contests, I think we can meaningfully bridge the gap between Ancient and Modern Olympic sport.

In this paper, I will focus on the virtue of self-discipline or *Sophrosyne*. Usually translated 'temperance' or 'self-control', *sophrosyne* has an aesthetic dimension not easily communicated by those words. Nevertheless it is a concept easy for those who love and participate in sports to understand. *Sophrosyne* applies the aesthetic qualities of harmony and balance to the metaphysical understanding of man as a limited combination of mind, body and spirit. It connects beauty to a dynamic and harmonious tension between power and control, passion and reason. The goal of *sophrosyne* is spiritual freedom.

Power and control are just the qualities demanded by both the aesthetic and the objectives of most sports. What's fascinating about athletes is the dynamic human power they display within extreme limits—gymnasts do things on a 4-inch balance beam that defy imagination. An important metaphysical characteristic of sport is that it quite consciously imposes limitations and boundaries on space, time, and action. Ironically, these boundaries carve out a space apart from the "mundane world" where we can "go all-out" and express unprecedented freedoms. Athletes achieve freedom through control, by transforming passion into performance. In this way they embody *sophrosyne*.

Are sport philosophers merely playing games?

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The underlying question that has prompted this paper asks why are we doing philosophy? Is it to discover an ineffable truth? Is it for self-enlightenment? Or, is it to persuade others of our arguments? Do sport philosophers, in general, believe that their work will have any practical consequences for sport?

This paper adopts Wittgenstein's view that philosophy doesn't explain or deduce anything: it simply allows you to rearrange what you already have and ultimately leaves everything as it is. If this is the case, then does it follow that we should all go home and become police officers, social workers or accountants instead? Furthermore, if I accept Wittgenstein's pessimistic conclusion, then why am I still doing it (philosophy)? The simple answer is that, fundamentally, I/we enjoy it. We get our kicks from formulating arguments; criticising others; thinking of examples, anecdotes, and analogies as their justification; and using others' thoughts as a stimulus for our own. Moreover, if our primary motive is that of enjoyment then should philosophy be considered like many other leisure pursuits: as a game to be played? Does philosophy necessitate a luscious attitude? I do not intend simply to revisit Suits' proposal in *The Grasshopper: Games, Life & Utopia* (and in his earlier work, such as 'Is Life a Game We Are Playing?'), but to discuss the nature of philosophy and philosophical argument in relation to sport and games. I will explore the similarities between the way in which philosophy is undertaken and the ways in which we play or practice games and sports: considering examples such as, specific sporting and philosophical skills, the concepts of defence, attack, and counter-attack, organisation and rules, and point scoring and competition. I will argue that language is the primary tool that allows us to play the game of philosophy, in the same way that a football enables us to play football, chess pieces allow us to play chess, and

golf clubs enable us to play golf. In doing so I will be revealing the game that I am playing with my listeners and how they tacitly consent to their involvement in it.

Genetic transfer technology and sport: Is the sky falling?

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Sport everywhere in the service of humanity.

The IOC in its third Fundamental Principle, declares that:
The goal of Olympism is to place everywhere sport at the service of the harmonious development of man, with a view to encouraging the establishment of a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity.

Fundamental Principles #3 in Olympic Charter.

Elsewhere in the Charter the IOC speaks of putting “sport at the service of humanity” (Charter 2.2).

The tantalizing possibility is that if we took this idea seriously, and came to grips with what it actually could mean, we could use the concept to ground a principled objection to, for instance, some aspects of doping, and potentially, the use of genetic modification for the purposes of sport performance enhancement.

The first point to note is that there is a distinction to be made between the two ways in which “sport can be in the service of man [and woman].”

The *personal* sense of sport being in the service of man concerns the way in which sport can play a role in developing each individual athlete or practitioner. Sport can be used as a training ground for character, it can be used to teach values, and sport can also be a vehicle for promoting healthy activity.

The *social* sense concerns the way in which sport can be used to build civil society through creating communities that work, or the way in which sport competitions and events can promote national and international peace, or indeed the way in which sport can be used to promote population health.

However, the claim cannot be that sport, however, and wherever practiced, is *necessarily* of service to humanity in either the personal or the social sense.

Sport can assist in personal development, sport can promote health, and sport can help to build healthy and co-operative communities. But it need not. Sport can ruin lives through injuries, sport can teach abominable values by encouraging violence, cheating and contempt for opponents, and sport can set communities apart, again through violence and contempt.

What is required, therefore, is a double set of evaluative assessments, one for sport, and one for humanity and society. We need a conception of a “good” person, or “good” society before we can assess “good” sport, that is, sport that contributes to the development and maintenance of those good people and good communities.

Sport in the service of humanity.

There are at least two, competing, conceptions of the personal good for man. On one account my personal good is whatever I say it is. That is, “good” for me, is defined by me, for me and is not, in principle, corrigible. So, if I say that living healthily, pursuing education and so on serve my personal good, then they do. But, of course, if someone else says that smoking to excess and watching re-runs of game shows on the television define his or her good, then they do too. On this account sport serves me if it can be used to meet my purposes. So, if I practice sport for pleasure and that is what I want, it serves my good, but if I happen to pursue sport in order to demonstrate my superiority to others, or earn large amounts of money, if that is what I want, then sport serves my purposes too. Good sport, on this account would be whatever serves my purposes.

This view, of the personal definition of the good, is the default position of liberal individualism. To the extent that we decline to interfere with people’s liberty of action we decline to interfere with their personal conceptions of the good.

Misunderstanding the value and importance of sport.

On the liberal view of personal freedom people are free to choose their own values, life-projects and ways of life (providing, of course that they do not interfere with similar liberties for others.) If a person freely chose to devote his or her life to sport and was prepared to make enormous personal sacrifices or run terrible risks of injury, that would be up to the person concerned. If a person gave up family and health, or even life for sport, that would be up to him or her. The liberal view is that we cannot interfere with that person’s life and choices unless it harms others.

We cannot, and indeed, if we value liberal freedom, we should not, prevent people from misusing sport. However, what is possible is that

sport itself could be so designed as to make misuse more difficult or less likely. The misuse of sport that is of concern in the context of genetic manipulation is that sport is being given too great importance. Sport is not the sort of thing for which lives should be lost, or futures jeopardized. Sport should not define lives; sport should not dictate how human bodies and people are constructed. To do this is to get the relationship backwards. Sport needs to fit into lives, complete lives, and because those who have the guardianship of sport know how dangerous and seductive sport can be they have an obligation to seek to ensure that the practice they guard is not misused.

The crisis of modern sport and the dimension of achievement for its conquest

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The greatest danger to modern sport is doping. The term doping is applied to a specific phenomenon in sport. It refers to the illegal use of drugs in sport for the purpose of increased performance. Prohibition of doping was the result not only of its undesirable influence on the outcome of sports events but also and more importantly of its threat to the athlete’s health, potentially leading to acute fatalities. Not only does doping attack ethics and fair play, it puts at risk the health of athletes who will do anything to get a competitive edge. It also threatens the credibility and future of sport in the eyes of parents and children who may look down on a win-at-all-costs attitude.

Anti-doping programs seek to preserve what is intrinsically valuable about sport. This intrinsic value is often referred to as the spirit of sport. It is how we play honestly. The spirit of sport is the

celebration of the human spirit, body and mind. It is characterised by the following values: ethics, fair play and honesty; health; excellence in performance; character and education; fun and joy; teamwork; dedication and commitment; respect for rules and laws; respect for oneself and other participants; courage; and community and solidarity. Doping is fundamentally contrary to the spirit of sport.

The pursuit of sporting excellence can be represented by the motto “Citius, Altius, Fortius”. The motto highlights the principles, which uphold the true spirit of sport. Excellence in performance and wholesomeness are the two major principles of modern sport. It is becoming more difficult to adhere to such qualities as a result of doping. If doping progressively continues, how will the general population view sport and its participants? Athletes will no longer be supported and sport will lose its appeal and social value.

In this paper, on such recognition, the necessity of an ideological basis for overcoming the crisis of modern sport symbolised by doping will become apparent. The structure of the paper is as follows. The first part provides the consideration about the influence which doping brings to sport. The second section examines a means for conquering the crisis of sport. The third and final section considers the dimension of achievement, which is different from excellence, and the concept of health as a social value, and proposes the ideological basis for conquering the crisis of modern sport.

The issues of a person’s body concerning doping emerged as a problem of possession (to have) and existence (to be) because of the above consideration. The dimension of existence concerning a person’s body is important in this paper. We will propose an idea, which criticises the view of the body as a self-possession, as a means for conquering the crisis of the decreasing social value of modern sport by examining Eastern Zen philosophy.

To what extent can Rawls’s philosophical method of “reflective equilibrium” contribute to decision-making in elite tennis?

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Tennis like any other social practice undergoes challenges and revisions to its nature. A number of technical and technological innovations have recently been implemented including the introduction of shorter sets and tie-breaker sets, and a revised tennis seeding structure. These innovations, if adopted, will represent a new instantiation of the game. The aim of this paper is to determine *how* decision makers ought to select the criteria to justify technical and technological innovations that will benefit tennis while simultaneously safeguarding the integrity of the sport. I explore Rawls’s (1971) method of “reflective equilibrium” as a philosophically grounded decision-making method for the rational evaluation of technical and technological innovations in elite tennis.

I set Rawls’s (1974/75) method of “wide reflective equilibrium” in the context of the elite tennis seeding procedure introduced at the 2001 Wimbledon championships. Then I discuss critically the objection that “wide reflective equilibrium” disregards the diversity and the moral importance of the different cultures in which people live generally, and the different ways in which tennis can be played. I argue that the universal and cross-cultural nature of the method of “wide reflective equilibrium” disregards the way in which people are dependent on their culture for the way in which they think about themselves and how they ought to live their lives in and out of sports. The method promotes an understanding of (sports) cultures as cooperative projects for individual gain; as a fundamentally private association created by individuals whose interests are defined independently of the

community they are members of. Thus, the method of “wide reflective equilibrium” is too far removed from the practice of elite tennis, its ethos, histories and traditions, to have any normative force. I conclude that whilst “reflective equilibrium” is a praiseworthy procedure for evaluating technical and technological innovations in elite tennis it is too “thin” a method since it disregards the diversity and the moral importance of the different cultures in which people live in general and tennis more specifically.

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God among athletes: Daoism and an ontology of the invisible

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Since Frank Deford's famous article “Religion in Sport” was published in *Sports Illustrated* in 1976, there has been active discussion over the topic of “sports and religion”, especially in research fields related to sports studies (e.g., Frank Deford, 1976; Harry Edwards, 1973; Michael Novak, 1976; Shirl J. Hoffman, 1992; Robert J. Higgs, 1995; Tara Magdalinski and Timothy J.L. Chandler, 2002). Much of this existing work takes one of three thematic approaches: 1) sports as a form of religion; 2) essential differences between sport and religion; 3) religions and sports as cultural practices (Jay Coakley, 2001, pp. 459-462). Additionally, drawing from Caputo's question: “who comes after the God of metaphysics?” (John D. Caputo, 2002, p.2), some researchers indicate that “sport” seems to be an answer (e.g., Charles S. Prebish, 1993). My own work does not

enter the boundaries of the above views and arguments concerning sport. Instead, an approach building upon Merleau-Ponty and my knowledge of Daoism is used to explore a new possibility or way of understanding sport and religion. My specific concern is with individual athletes and the notion of God present in them.

I start from a bold assertion—that God already is present among athletes. Yet, how do researchers and athletes recognize God? I believe that to begin to answer this question, we need to know ourselves first. Since we recognize ourselves by either a subjective way or objective way --both applied to our sport world and selves-- two means of epistemology are provided here. In the subjective way (“know yourself”), the spiritual world of human being is indicated as a complexity, such as Gallway understands the athlete self (as thinker and doer in *The Inner Game of Tennis*, 1974). Yet, as the work of Merleau-Ponty suggests (*The Visible and The Invisible*, 1968), the existence of a house itself reveals furniture (visible) and emptiness (invisible), just as the existence of selves incorporate the visible as well as emptiness (invisible). I interpret the emptiness or Dao (Chinese term) as the ontology of the invisible. That is, in an objective way, most athletes recognize themselves through sports whereas people understand themselves through external titles and identities. Sports, as a metaphor, represents external titles, positions, and records. Yet, it is memories, expressions, interpretations and so on, that construct the real meaning of sports as a metaphor; in this understanding, interpreting sport as an objective inquiry reverses to a subjective understanding, an ontology of the invisible.

Overall, using these concepts of the ontology of the invisible, along with interpretations of “emptiness” as illuminated in Daoism, in my work I attempt to explore notions of “God” in the athlete and in the realm of athletics. I argue that we need to go back to the traditional --perhaps universal—wisdom of know yourself, an ontology of the invisible. This old proverb has new meaning in

contemporary transnational society and especially in studies of sport and religion. Using such a framework that illuminates the importance of “know yourself,” we can philosophically articulate an answer as to why God shows up among athletes.

Key word: sports/athletics, religion, Dao, God, ontology of the invisible.

“If my life is finite, why am I watching this damned game?”

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The philosophy of sport often attends to “issues” in sports—for instance, ethical issues involving cheating, competition, and fairness, to name just a few. But in an arguably more important context, one finds many of these same concerns rearing their heads in business ethics. What is peculiar to sports is the play element: sports are essentially invented competitions whose outcome has little bearing on the rest of our lives. Sure, fans can be either happy or crestfallen depending on the fortunes of the teams they root for. But these emotions are ephemeral. By noontime on the day after the Super Bowl, who—besides gamblers and team owners—is even affected by who won or lost?

The question the philosopher of sport must answer is, “Does sport have some ultimate meaning that makes watching it worthwhile?”

With so much else to do in life—and with each of our personal clocks ticking a finite number of ticks—why should anyone spend hours on a sporting event which is ultimately trivial? For those seeking perennial distractions, sport offers up a smorgasbord of distractions *de jour*. To compete in any of these games professionally, you may need to give your sport half your life.

To be a spectator, you may need to sacrifice more time than that. How can the expenditure of time be justified?

Unlike other diversions—visual arts, drama, and opera, to mention just a few representations that draw interest from aesthetics—sport has received short shrift in 2,600 years of Western philosophy, excepting the very recent past. One of Paul Weiss’ explanations in *Sport: A Philosophic Inquiry* (1969) is that sport has, since the time of Aristotle, been deemed common and hence regarded as vulgar. Perhaps this goes a long way toward explaining philosophy’s relative neglect of sport, even in aesthetics.

On one level, of course, this academic neglect hardly matters to the fan. The attraction of it all is clear: it’s unbridled fun. When the fan is “in the rooting moment,” the expenditure of time is the last thing on his mind. Issues of meaning are not paramount. Fandom, after all, is not intrinsically rational or self-examining.

Notice how the question about the depth of spectator’s devotion doesn’t arise in the same way with the arts. Do people press the devotee of opera or classical music why he spends so much time with his love? Does the visitor to the Metropolitan Museum of Art incur criticism for repeatedly returning to view the permanent Egyptian collection? Probably not. So there may be a kind of “high-culture”—“low-culture” distinction that fuels the indifference to—and, yes, for many citizens—disdain for and loathing of sports. But if this common-uncommon distinction is all that lies behind it, then the reason for philosophy’s neglect of sport (until the last half-century) is largely subjective, even arbitrary. For is there anything common about Barry Bonds’ 480-foot bomb—which caromed off a seat, past the runway in the third tier of Yankee Stadium last summer—that makes it inferior to an aria being sung at Lincoln Center, five miles to the south? The aesthetics of Bonds’ achievement—the very precision of

his swing and his singular power—seem every bit as spectacular, and certainly more rare, than the beautiful intonations of the aria.

One needn't be a professional philosopher to raise the question of what counts as meaningful or worthwhile. Most people who raise questions of what is meaningful in a life are not professional philosophers. But being philosophically inclined may help to set the parameters for the discussion, define the terms, and probe whether it is meaningful or useful in some way to spend one's time being "devoted" to a team.

I maintain that unless we can successfully argue that spending so much time following a sports team is time meaningfully spent, then we will have to admit that the time spent is not meaningful.

Hard relaxationism: conceptions of sport

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European Sports Charter (1992) : 'Sport' means all forms of physical activity which, through casual or organised participation, aim at expressing or improving physical fitness and mental well-being, forming social relationships or obtaining results in competitions at all levels.'

Dictionary of Concepts in Recreation and Sports Studies (1990): 'Sport': a type of game, characterised by competition based on physical skill, subject to established rules of play, and governed through some form of institutionalisation.'

We could argue about the correctness and formulaic felicity of these definitions. We could treat them as arbitrary stipulations. Or we could

see them as attempts to draw lines corresponding to resemblances and differences thought worthy of linguistic signaling.

The use of the term 'sport' shifted in the late Nineteenth Century as leisure activities became formalised and timetabled. Perhaps the European Sports Charter is an attempt to reverse or modify that shift. I hope they succeed and was delighted to see rambling this spring described as one of our favourite sports on the BBC news.

To promote this reorganization of the filing cabinet, I want to look at some 'prehistory': Dr Johnson's entries for the 'tricky' triad: sport, game, play in his great Dictionary. I will conclude with reflections on my own work at the Prince of Wales Youth Club in Canterbury, Kent.

I will be arguing, in an uptight way, for a 'relaxed' conception of sport in the sense of a broad idea of the field that is our subject. I am not relaxed about this as it seems to me humanly urgent to hang seriously looser.

A paradigm change of one's view of the human body in Japan

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The purpose of this presentation is to show clearly how one's view of the human body in Japan has changed and why the present view of the body has been formed. It is considered as a paradigm change from a phenomenological standpoint.

I have searched for logic of the human body by way of phenomenological consideration, and so far my latest theme is the "wise body" which can solve problems practically by "bodily thinking". Now I think that surface-culture in connection with the

body becomes too superfluous, and that body culture, which serves as a base of daily life, has become poor in present-day Japan. This situation results in isolation and problems of social actions. This presentation also examines whether the present condition is sufficient, in addition to the view of the human body in present-day Japanese holds. After that, the relationship between "the human body as a life base", "the ideal body view" and "the present body view" is discussed.

The outline of this presentation is as follows. First, it surveys the history of the original view of the body in Japan, e.g. Buddhism, Bushido, Koshi-hara culture and Hara-kiri. By doing so, some views of the human body involved in the theory of mind-and-body are examined in terms of a history, e.g. a view as a tool, as a container and as an expression of self. Next, the background of the paradigm change is analyzed in connection with the present living environment, e.g. change of labor form, and shift to information society. There is now an original view of the human body in Japan caused by the difference between Christianity and the original Japanese religion, beyond the process of the loss of the original view that has accompanied globalization. Furthermore, the paradigm change of the view of the human body is stated as a dangerous sign. Finally, it is stated how people's view of the body is generated in Japan. I also point out the problem of the present view of the human body.

Though the human body is not only the base of cultural exchange, but also the base of real life, it is hard to promote the view that consists of the human body as it is. The view of the human body in Japan will be examined by means of inquiring into the views of many foreign countries. We will then be able to more clearly understand the general process in which the view of the human body is produced.

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Educational and genetic blueprints, what's the difference?

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Unlike most technical improvements, the prospect of applying genetic technology to enhance elite sport performances meets massive opposition. Even if gene technology can be expected to become relatively safe from a medical point of view in the future, the eventual irruption of this new technique is considered a fundamental threat to the notion of sports and to the ideal of fair competition. Traditionally, pedagogues have often been concerned with the kind of values instilled in young athletes through sports. Their present silent on this incipient sport technology is therefore amazing. Gene technology, probably already in train of being used in sport contexts, has not been scrutinised from a pedagogical point of view yet.

This paper tries to remedy this situation by bringing attention to some critical arguments that might be directed against gene technology, both in sports and society at large. An aspect to be discussed is autonomy. Does "athletic design" of a child mean a fundamental threat to, or even a denial of, the child's personal autonomy? Does genetic pre-programming essentially differ from the stimulation and specialisation considered to be legitimate aims of good education and upbringing?

In this paper, I will answer both these questions in the negative. Further, I will also try to substantiate the claim that genetic design might contribute to enrich the world of sports by diminishing the role played in it by non-sportive factors.

Sport and utopia

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In an ideal world there would be no pain, suffering or disappointment. Sport, at a high level, necessarily involves pain, suffering and disappointment. Therefore, there can be no place for such sport in an ideal world.

This is a valid syllogism with, to lovers of sport, an unacceptable conclusion. Something *must* therefore be wrong with one or other of the premises, or with both, or with lovers of sport.

I shall examine the aforementioned argument, considering first Bernard Suits' view in the Grasshopper that sports and games are defining characteristics of Utopia.

I shall demonstrate that Suits' argument is inconsistent and cannot sustain its conclusion. It can be amended, but only at the price of removing the uniqueness which Suits claims for play and sport, and of allowing negative elements into the concepts of Utopia which would generally be perceived as undermining it.

I shall note that as a matter of fact it appears that most literary utopias appear to have little, if any, place for sport and suggest that this is because they seek to eliminate conflict.

I shall then consider the consequences for the concept of Utopia of Isaiah Berlin's value pluralism. I shall argue that Berlin's position on values shows an appropriate way of avoiding relativism on the one hand and dogmatism on the other and that he is correct in

concluding that it renders the conventional concept of Utopia logically contradictory.

I shall conclude, therefore, that for that concept, which has become otiose, should be substituted another which permits conflict but locates it within a broad view of that which is intrinsically worthwhile. Suits' view on the place of sports is thus reinstated, though his view on their unique place is denied.

So far as the initial syllogism is concerned it is the major premise which is at fault. There can be no such thing as an ideal world. Rather than seek 'utopia' we should pursue a world in which sport is pursued as one among other intrinsically valuable activities.

Ties as meaningful resolutions: applications for sporting contests

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In a recent conference presentation,ⁱⁱⁱ we argued that a tie is a meaningful contest resolution. Despite a widespread distaste for ties, a careful analysis of the structure and purpose of sporting contests suggests that a tie may very well be the most appropriate and meaningful resolution to a certain contest. Although there is little favorable mention of ties in the sport philosophy literature, an analysis of the work of prominent philosophers suggests that they must look favorably upon the possibility of sporting contests ending in a tie.

If our reasoning has force, there are several consequences an appreciation of ties has, particularly for the way in which competitive

sport is organized, valued, and experienced. This presentation will discuss two relevant implementations by which our findings can help achieve and foster the central purpose of competitive sport—the attempt to create and demonstrate skillful excellence at overcoming the artificial hurdles established by the rules of the sport and made possible by the effort of the contestants. The first is an attitudinal application while the second is eminently practical.

The implementation of an attitudinal adjustment is compelled by the prevalent cultural attitude towards ties. The distaste for ties can be attributed in large part to the desire for contests to distinguish a winner and a loser. Such an outcome, however, is not ensured by the structure of the contest itself. A welcoming attitude towards ties can be fostered by a more critical understanding of the purpose of sporting contests. With such knowledge, a tied contest can be appropriately understood as a genuine conclusion of competitive sport; a conclusion that has the beneficial consequence of providing an accurate rendition of athletic merit. Such an enlightened attitude would value excellence and the precise measurement of relative abilities over just a mere designation of winner and loser.

A discussion of practical implementations addresses the important question of what should sport communities do with tied contests. The most important upshot would be to allow for the possibility of ties in sporting contests. The implications tied contests have in determining championships will be considered, particularly for championship contests themselves and the structure of contesting adopted by sport communities. A final concern is what to do with ties in contests that are part of a tournament where the winner advances, such as the later rounds of the World Cup. While determining a winner in such a contest is necessary for the continuation of the tournament, it is critical that the means of determining a winner remains entrenched in the

centrality of the purpose of sport. The difficulty sporting communities have with developing an acceptable method of resolving ties will be discussed in connection with what considerations should inform the development of tie-breaking procedures. These attitudinal and practical applications should help foster sporting communities' ability to celebrate ties as meaningful contest resolutions.

The Hooker: An examination of the analogy between prostitution and sport

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The aim of this paper is to examine and philosophically analyze from a North American perspective, the analogy between prostitution and sport. Martha Nussbaum in Sex and Social Justice, argues that prostitution should be decriminalized. Her claim is that those who are against prostitution are inherently committed to gender hierarchy and domination and control over women and women's sexuality. Based on Nussbaum's account of prostitution, I argue that significant similarities exist between prostitution and sport, and such an analogy is worthy of discussion.

Nussbaum examines the similarities and differences between prostitution and six types of bodily services. They include: plucking feathers from a nearly frozen chick; domestic servant; nightclub singer, philosophical professor; skilled masseuse and colonoscopy artist. I argue that in comparing sport and prostitution, Nussbaum's initial argument is strengthened and provides a closer connection than her already existing analogies.

The position that will be defended throughout this paper is that North American society has tried to control women and women's sexuality through the criminalization of prostitution; however, it is interesting to note that sport and prostitution have close ties making it difficult to refer to one as immoral and the other moral.

WORKSHOPS

Pedagogy in sport ethics. What to teach? How to teach? What is learned?

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The purpose of this paper is to discuss the myriad problems of developing an effective teaching pedagogy, concerning both content and methodology, in undergraduate sport ethics classes.

Specifically, we will address the typical educational philosophic questions that govern all teaching: *A. What should be taught? B. How should it be taught? C. And, finally what is learned?* **For example.**

A. What should be taught? One of the problems that we see is that faculty typically chose objective content, i.e., books or articles that are issue driven, over abstract thinking and reasoning curriculum which demands that a faculty member be grounded in conceptualization of ethical theory. Objective driven faculty assume that students can use objective curricula to make abstract decisions or conceptualizations. Objective driven faculty, who are untrained in sport ethics, choose such curriculum because it is easier to use, easier to justify, and easier to teach - lecture driven.. Objective content or information can be

placed into a typical lecture format with aligned objective based evaluation. Faculty are not stressed to field different views or to be challenged by students who often hold equally morally valid points of view. Specifically we will discuss from our experience of working as consultants and teaching professionals in the area of competitive ethics, the flaws of the preferred curriculum approaches currently used. We will discuss the problems with each and make suggestions on how to improve on these approaches. **B. How should it be taught?** Basically, methodologies are either lecture (by the professor), discussion (between professor and student) or project driven (students working with students), or a combination of all three. We will discuss current research on the success of each of these methods and offer suggestions on improving these approaches, i.e., lecture driven formats and their lack of developing critical thinking. **C. And, finally what is learned?** We will discuss research that we have gathered on student outcomes from different sports ethics teaching methodologies. At present, data suggests that the study of sport ethics can be highly positive in developing critical reasoning or the study of sports ethics can be highly negative and relativistic in developing reasoned thinking about sport ethical issues. This session will be interactive.

The aging athlete

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This paper broaches the topic of aging and athleticism from metaphysical and epistemological perspectives. The ontological and teleological questions of existential meaning and purpose in old age are examined as they relate to epistemological issues of body experience and kinesthetic knowledge.

Folk-lore is replete with examples of denial of the inevitability of aging and death. The Peter Pan syndrome has created an enormously profitable self-enhancement industry of health and beauty products and services. We try to hold back the waves of time, but like King Canute, we ultimately realize the futility of our efforts. In every culture, certain athletes reach mythic status because they seem to cheat time by competing successfully well past their prime. Athletic prowess is associated with youth. When we are young we play, when we grow older we watch others play. But, the spirit of sport springs eternal. We do not lose our passion for participating, our pride in our prowess, our love of competition or our pursuit of the perfect play. We may have them stolen from us by the dictates of society or by the ravages of time, but the transition from standing and competing to sitting and spectating may be delayed, even denied. Whether we acquiesce entirely to cultural norms that deny the possibility of athleticism in old age is determined, in part, by the philosophy that we adopt.

Growing older in western society, we are beset not only with the onset of infirmity, but also the ideological impediments of prevailing philosophies of physiology, culture and mind/body philosophy. However, the negative stereotyping of athleticism in old age is being challenged by emerging physiological and social philosophies that champion the aging athlete. Increasing evidence of the importance of exercise in old age and changes in the social construction of physical activity and aging are changing cultural norms and philosophical expectations. Enmeshed in these physiological and cultural ideologies are philosophies of the body. Although they may not be aware of the ongoing debate, the elderly are an ideological battleground between contending philosophies of mind/body that range from Cartesian extremism, manifested in the body-object, to phenomenological monism, as represented in the concept of body-subject.

The final issue addressed in this paper is whether innovative ideas drawn from play theory, eastern beliefs and practices and the philosophy of integrative health can transform the body experience of the aging athlete from the standard expectation that the elderly will acquiesce to infirmity through sedentary living. One answer to this cultural conundrum is offered through analysis of teleological theories of the internalization of rewards through play, the re-assessment of purpose through the adoption of established eastern concepts and the reinvention of wellbeing through integrative health philosophy.