



33rd Annual Meeting of the
International Association for the Philosophy of
Sport

hosted by

The Faculty of Physical Culture
Palacký University, Olomouc, Czech Republic

September 15 – 18, 2005

Program and Abstracts

Welcome!

On behalf of the Program Committee, it gives me great pleasure to welcome colleagues and students, old and new, to the 33rd Annual Conference of the International Association for the Philosophy of Sport hosted by the Faculty of Physical Culture at Palacky University in Olomouc, Czech Republic. This is a momentous occasion for the IAPS because this is the first time in its history that the annual meeting is being held in a central European country. A special note of thanks is extended to Ivo Jirasek, the Site Convener, and his team who have arranged not only the venue for the scholarly program but also organized an outstanding series of social events, including a pre-conference sightseeing excursion in the beautiful city of Prague.

I want to also extend my appreciation to Jan Boxill, Heather Sheridan and Heather Reid for their invaluable assistance in helping me and the other members of the Program Committee, Claudia Pawlenka and Deb Vossen, prepare the conference program. Drawing from their wealth of experience made our job much easier. We hope we have lived up to the high standards they set in organizing excellent conferences in years past.

As a result of this year's location in the Czech Republic, the conference has attracted several new presenters from a number of different countries. I hope their experience, and that of other new participants, is a stimulating and rewarding one. I would encourage those who are not members of the Association to please consider joining our international family of sport philosophers. As you will find out, we are a dynamic and collegial group with a common interest - our love of sport and philosophy - and that makes us a rather unique academic community.

Once again, we hope you enjoy this year's conference. The venue promises to be historically and culturally rich, and with our scholarly exchanges, meeting new colleagues and catching up with old ones, you leave energized and satisfied. Should you have any questions or require assistance, please contact a member of the Program Committee, or the Site Convener and his team of volunteers.

Danny Rosenberg
Conference Chair

Thursday, 15 th September			
3pm – 5pm	Registration		
5pm – 5:30pm	Welcome (Room NA 401) Prof. Hana Válková, Dean, Faculty of Physical Culture, Palacky University, Czech Republic Jan Boxill, IAPS President		
5:30pm – 6:30pm	Keynote Address (Room NA 401) Jim Parry, Leeds University, UK “Supplements: Food or Dope?” Jan Boxill, Moderator		
6:30pm – 7:30pm	Reception (cash bar), Room NA 401		
7:30 pm -	Dinner and Sightseeing in Olomouc (not organized, on your own)		
8pm -11pm	IAPS Executive Committee Meeting, Room NA 401		
Friday, 16 th September			
8am – 5pm	Registration		
Sessions Moderators:	1A, Room NA 401 Jeffrey Fry	1B, Room NA 409 Koyo Fukasawa	1C, Room NA 309 Danny Rosenberg
8:30am – 10am	Joan Grassbaugh Forry Temple University, USA Somaesthetics and Philosophical Self-Cultivation: An Intersection Between Philosophy and Sport Lesley Wright Brunel University, UK The Aesthetic, the Kinaesthetic and the Power of the Imagination in Sport	Yoshitaka Kondo University of Tsukuba, Japan The Debate Surrounding the Doping Ban and the Application of the Harm Principle Leon Culbertson Edge Hill College, UK Dehumanisation and Performance-Enhancement	Sigmund Loland Norwegian University of Sport and PE, Norway Understandings of Pain in Sport: Epistemological Perspectives Alun Hardman University of Gloucestershire, UK Injury and the Suspension of Play: An Examination of the Moral Terrain
10am – 10:30am	Refreshments		
Sessions Moderators:	2A, Room NA 401 Robert Mertzman	2B, Room NA 409 Carwyn Jones	2C, Room NA 309 Douglas Hochstetler
10:30am 12pm	Masami Sekine Okayama University, Japan Kenji Ishigaki Niigata University, Japan Modern Sport and the Problem of Others Leslie A. Howe	Sara Teetzel University of Western Ontario, Canada Sharing the Blame: Complicity, Conspiracy, and Collective Responsibility in Sport	Ivanenko Artyom Magnitogorsk State University, Russia Philosophy of Extreme Sports Kevin Krein University of Alaska, USA

	University of Saskatchewan, Canada Sport and Identity	Heather Sheridan and Scott Fleming University of Gloucestershire, UK Consent by Proxy in Sport-Related Research: Some Ethical Difficulties	Adventurous Changes: Rethinking “Sport” in the Age of the Extreme
	Friday, 16th September		
12pm – 1:30pm	Lunch (on your own) JPS Editorial Board Meeting, Room NA 401		
Sessions Moderators:	3A, Room NA 401 <i>Paul Gaffney</i>	3B, Room NA 409 <i>Sigmund Loland</i>	3C, Room NA 309 <i>Alun Hardman</i>
1:30pm – 3pm	Cesar Torres SUNY College at Brockport, USA Confusing Messages: Olympism and the Value of Results in Competitive Sport Naofumi Masumoto Tokyo Metropolitan University, Japan Absence of the Children: Philosophical Interpretations of the Opening Ceremony of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games	Danny Rosenberg Brock University, Canada ‘Rabbits’ in Running Races: Pseudo- Competitors in Pseudo- Competitions? John Michael Atherton Seton Hill University, USA Epistemology on the Run	R. Scott Kretchmar Penn State University, USA The Intelligibility of Suits’s Utopia: The View from Anthropological Philosophy Peter Hager SUNY College at Brockport, USA The Devoted Athlete: An Examination of Seriousness in Competitive Sport
3pm – 3:30pm	Refreshments		
Sessions Moderators:	4A, Room NA 401 <i>Andy Miah</i>	4B, Room NA 409 <i>Leslie Howe</i>	4C, NA 309 <i>Heather Sheridan</i>
3:30pm – 5pm	Mark Hamilton Ashland University, USA Elective Enhancement Surgery Mike McNamee University of Wales, Swansea, UK Transhumanism and the Moral Topography of Sports Medicine	Heather L. Reid Morningside College, USA Is the Roman Gladiator an Athlete? Daniel Levski University of Ljubljana, Slovenia Fair Play in the Ancient Olympic Games	Gregg Twietmeyer Penn State University, USA Suffering Play: Can Play and Games be Justified in a Suffering World? Jernez Pisk University of Ljubljana, Slovenija What is Good Sport?: Plato’s View
7pm - late	Casino Night (dinner included), Room NC 518		

	Saturday, 17th September		
8:00am – 12pm	Registration		
Sessions Moderators:	5A, Room NA 401 <i>Jim Parry</i>	5B, Room NA 409 <i>Bill Morgan</i>	5C, Room NA 309 <i>Mike McNamee</i>
8:30am – 10am	<p>Tim Elcombe Penn State University, USA Making a Difference: Pragmatically Restructuring the Sport Philosopher's Task</p> <p>Jerzy Kosiewicz Academy of Physical Education, Poland The Philosophy of Sport or Philosophical Reflections on Sport?</p>	<p>Koyo Fukasawa University of Electro-Communications, Japan Intergenerational Communication and Sport: From Simmel's View</p> <p>Robert Mertzman University of South Florida, USA Habitation in Sport and Sports Training</p>	<p>Douglas McLaughlin California State University-Northridge, USA From Games to the Good Life: The Neglected Significance of <i>The Grasshopper</i></p> <p>Andy Miah University of Paisley, UK Playing Games with Artificial Intelligence</p>
10am – 10:30am	Refreshments		
10:30am-12pm	Business Meeting (open to all members), Room NA 401		
12pm– 1pm	Lunch (on your own)		
Sessions Moderators:	6A, NA 401 <i>Heather Reid</i>	6B, Room NA 409 <i>Milos Bednar</i>	
1pm – 2:30pm	<p>PANEL SESSION</p> <p>Issues in Olympic Philosophy</p> <p>Panel Members: Sigmund Loland, Andy Miah, Jim Parry, Heather Reid (organizer), Cesar Torres</p>	<p>Anna Hogenova Charles University, Czech Republic The Problem of Corporeality and Temporality</p> <p>Astrid Twenebowa Larssen University of Technology, Sydney, Australia Lived Movement: A Phenomenological Exploration of Skill Acquisition</p>	
Sessions Moderators:	7A, Room NA 401 <i>Scott Kretchmar</i>	7B, Room NA 409 <i>Lesley Wright</i>	7C, Room NA 309 <i>Leon Culbertson</i>
2:45pm – 4:15pm	<p>Douglas Hochstetler Penn State University-Berks/Lehigh Valley, USA Narratives in Moral Education</p> <p>Irena Martinkova Charles University, Czech Republic Jan Patocka's Three Movements of Human Life with Respect to Physical Education and</p>	<p>Milan Hosta University of Ljubljana, Slovenia Ethical Pluralism and the Implications of Tolerance in Sport</p> <p>Carwyn Jones University of Gloucestershire, UK Moral Action in Sport: A Plea for Psychological Realism</p>	<p>William J. Morgan Ohio State University, USA Fair is Fair, Or Is It?: A Moral Analysis of the Drug Wars in Sport</p> <p>Jim Nendel Penn State University, USA Big Game Hunt or Staged Massacre: The United States Congress and the Hunt for an Ethical Approach to the Steroid</p>

	Sport Practice		Issue in Baseball
	Saturday, 17th September		
4:15pm – 7:30pm	Recreation (free time) Leisure workshops (ropes course, movement games and other activities)		
7:30pm – late	Conference Banquet, Konvikt (Umilecké centrum UP)		
	Sunday, 18th September		
Sessions Moderators:		8B, Room NA 409 <i>Joan Grassbaugh Forry</i>	8C, Room NA 309 <i>Robert Mertzman</i>
8:15am – 9:45am		Stephen Mumford University of Nottingham, UK Aesthetics and Art in Sport Charlene Weaving University of Western Ontario, Canada <i>She Strips...She Scores!:</i> An Analysis of Women Athletes Posing Nude	Emily Ryall De Montfort University, UK Being on the Bench: Bad Faith or Towards Authenticity Jim Daly University of South Australia, Australia The Ethical Governance of National Sporting Organisations: An Australian Perspective
9:45am – 10:00am	Refreshments		
Sessions Moderators:		9B, Room NA 409 <i>Irena Martinkova</i>	9C, Room NA 309 <i>Greg Twietmeyer</i>
10:00am-11:30am		Jeff Fry Ball State University Coaching Anger: A Deadly Sin in a Lively Profession Milos Bednar Charles University, Czech Republic Movements of Human Existence and Sport	Peter Hopsicker Penn State University, USA To Ride or Not to Ride: Cycling as a Jamesian ‘Genuine Option’ Ming Tsung Shih National Taiwan Normal University, Taiwan The Sacred in the World of Sport
11:30am-11:45am	Conference Close		

Alphabetical List of Presenters and Abstracts

Philosophy of Extreme Sports

Friday, September 16, 10:30 am – 12:00 pm, Room NA309

Ivanenko Artyom (Session 2C with Kevin Krein)

Magnitogorsk State University, Russia

For the last twenty years the phenomena of extreme sports gets growing popularity. There is a large variety of sport actions which can be called extreme: freestyle and freeride snowboarding, moto-freestyle, surfing, vert in-line skating and many others. The number of athletes, practicing extreme sports, becomes larger and larger. Some of them are professionals, which get money for their activities, but some of them just practice these activities as hobbies. In this article some of the points which can make extreme sports interesting not only for the athletes but also for philosophers and psychologists are considered.

There is a large content of the irrational element in the extreme sports. The matter is that an extreme athlete puts his health and sometimes even his life at risk absolutely free. Our rational mind usually teaches us to make our life as secure as possible; people are used to protecting their lives. Taking this fact into account the behavior of an extreme athlete surely seems irrational or even a little bit crazy from the point of view of everyday experience. Practicing of the extreme sports creates a rather critical, ambivalent situation for a person. From one side the athlete has to analyze all the points of the current situation. For example, in freestyle snowboarding an athlete should take into account the relief of the Big Air, the needed speed, the movements he will produce while he is in the air, the condition of his body and many other points. From the other side the athlete's success depends on his ability to refuse this procedure of analysis, and to some extent to forget even about himself. That means he has to be able to go beyond the boundaries of his Ego.

As we already stated the extreme sports create a critical situation in the life of an athlete, and the effectiveness of his passing through this situation depends mainly on his ability to act irrationally, to follow the situation using his intuition. We find a very interesting parallel with this situation in Zen Buddhism. Zen Buddhists practice a special method of koan, which leads human consciousness to breakthrough the boundaries of the rational mind. Koans are paradoxical tasks which a pupil of Zen Buddhism has to solve. But the problem is that koans can not be solved by rational means. While solving koan the pupil's consciousness comes to its boundaries, and it transcends its boundaries. As a result the pupil finds irrational, intuitional solution.

Let's return to the extreme sports. One more peculiar point about the extreme sports is that quite often they are connected with the unusual sorts of environment: high mountains with danger of avalanches, fast and furious rivers, raging seas and oceans and so on. Sometimes extreme athletes arrive at the places which very few people visit. In such condition a man feels and fully realizes the magnificence and power of nature and his own insignificance. But usually these feelings lead a man to quite strong positive experience of unification with nature. There is also another alternative: in case a man opposes himself to nature, tries to fight with its powers he is doomed to failure. So very important point in the extreme sports is to flow with the environment, to feel yourself a part of it.

There is another interesting feature of the extreme sports to be stressed. The thing is that while practicing any kind of these activities an athlete receives himself as an object for himself. That means he gets a possibility to behold his reactions, his actions; he gets a possibility to discover his emotions: fear, joy and to test his body in unusual activities. That surely leads an athlete to deeper understanding of his inner nature.

All the a/m points are only some from the large number of others which make extreme sports attractive for the growing number of people and an exciting object of investigating by philosophers and psychologists.

Epistemology on the Run

Friday, September 16, 1:30 pm – 3:00 pm, Room NA409

John Michael Atherton (Session 3B with Danny Rosenberg)

Seton Hill University, USA

Running aids thought. Running expands epistemological horizons because it builds metaphors and entails what Gerd Gigerenzer calls "Ecological Rationality" and "Adaptive Thinking." The three central elements of Adaptive Thinking are cognitive flexibility, content knowledge, and applications/implications. These three elements are essential to any running context and they allow runners to enlarge their epistemic world. "Running" stands for energetic engagements with the world and represents such physical activities as bicycling, cross-country skiing, tennis, hiking, etc.

Such vigorous physical activities give us self-knowledge, focus our attention outside ourselves, and finally, build a reservoir of robust, adaptable, and useful metaphors we can use to expand our knowledge.

Runners practice Ecological Rationality when they sample from their environment. When runners invest personal energy and seek to conserve time, they must sample the most salient aspects of the environment in order to survive and flourish. Runners sample to succeed. Sampling works well in races and runners learn they can and should transfer the sampling process to non-race contexts.

Runners also practice Adaptive Thinking in that they must evaluate the conditions of the run and apply their evaluation to their actions so as to avoid dangers and grasp opportunities. Such things as weather, road conditions, competitors, and social contexts of the race (i.e. running for money, love, or glory, etc.) all impact runners and force them to adapt or fail. Humans have evolved through the ability to apply such adaptive skills to an ever-wider area of our lives. A race may initiate adaptive conduct, but we soon enough apply it to areas beyond running.

When we take running-based ideas and apply them to our lives or seek their implications in our lives, we expand the experience beyond running. However, physical experience must precede application or implication because the "ideas" we apply or the implications we seek are derived from physical experience. There is, for example, a difference between someone crossing the finish line after having run an entire race, and someone who drove a car and merely ran across the finish line. The runner crosses the line informed with race experience that can be used to build metaphors and applied to life. The cheater lacks the experience with which to build metaphors and remains shackled to imagining what the race might have been like. Runners finish with a replenished reservoir of metaphors that extend their epistemology.

Energetic, personal, and physical engagements with the world allow us to build metaphors that we can transfer to ever-more abstract parts of life. Transfer allows the running-based metaphors to influence knowledge beyond the running context and, in so doing, expands our epistemological horizons.

Movements of Human Existence and Sport

Sunday, September 18, 10:00 am – 11:30 am, Room NA409

Miloš Bednář (Session 9B with Jeff Fry)

Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic

A human being is both a source and a receiver of many movements. Our life is a multilevel movement! But I'd like to look at human life as a whole and to follow the very special movements of human existence. Let the stage of these movements be called a *biodrom*.

"Our life is the movement, the *cast* of which escapes us" (Patočka) - yes, but we are also a *cast project* (see Heidegger's "der geworfene Entwurf"), we must carry and perform our "stay" (Dasein) and we have free will to give proper form or order to this special, concrete and personal project. The real art of life then is to be a good "personal and project manager of myself".

Which factors can have the strongest influence upon our personal biodrom?

- * *Existentials* as categories of human existence (Heidegger, Fink, Jaspers). We must consider things such as death, love, game, work, “leap into authenticity” etc.
- * Important, deep-going *experiences* of various sorts: optimal, limit, deep, plateau or peak ones.
- * *Metanoia* (conversion) with the power to transform the whole of our identity.
- * *Horizons* of external influences – horizons of time, of sense, horizons of social influences etc.
- * *Values* and their hierarchy.

Finally I'd like to assess the most complete view concerning a movement of our existence, given by Czech philosopher Patočka against the background of Heidegger's analyses. He divided this specific movement into three stages:

1. The movement of *self-anchoring*, an instinctive movement of our existence.
2. The movement of *self-prolongation*, the movement of our coming to terms with the reality we are involved with.
3. The movement of *self-gaining*, which can be described as “living in the truth”.

Related questions to be discussed in this context:

Can we consider the optimal “speed” of our lives?

Can Kant's *categorical imperative* (the formula of the end itself) be useful for our personal “project management” in the field of sport?

Can sport activities accelerate movements in our biodrom?

Can sport generally help us to form our personal (existential) project? And how and under what conditions?

Dehumanisation and Performance-Enhancement

Friday, September 16, 8:30 – 10:00 am, Room NA409

Leon Culbertson (Session 1B with Yoshitaka Kondo)

Edge Hill College, UK

This paper focuses on the claim by Schneider and Butcher (2000) that it makes little sense to criticise the use of performance-enhancing drugs as ‘dehumanising’ (as, for example, Hoberman (1992) does) because we are unable to give a satisfactory account of what it is to be human. Schneider and Butcher (2000: 196) put this as follows: ‘The dehumanisation argument is interesting but incomplete. It is incomplete because we do not have an agreed-upon conception of what it is to be human. Without this it is difficult to see why some practices should count as dehumanising.’

The paper begins by considering J. L. Austin's (1962) treatment of the word ‘real’. By transposing ideas from Austin to the terms ‘dehumanise’ and ‘human’ I argue that: (a) In the pair ‘dehumanise’ and ‘human’, the term ‘dehumanise’ is dominant. (b) We cannot understand ‘dehumanise’ and ‘human’ independently of either the context of their use or the contrast that is drawn in their use. (c) Either one of these is sufficient to understand the terms. (d) ‘Dehumanise’, ‘human’ and their cognates are *not* univocal; we can have no recourse to exceptionless accounts of the meaning of such terms.

The importance of context is developed further by consideration of an example from the work of Charles Travis (2005), and the issue of exceptionless accounts of the meaning of words is addressed through an application of Gordon Baker's (2004) characterisation of Wittgenstein's uses of the term ‘metaphysical’ to Miah's (2004) treatment of human-ness. I argue that Miah's conception of human-ness exhibits all the forms of metaphysical use of terms (in this case the term ‘human’) outlined by Baker (2004).

The article attempts to clarify some objections to the use of performance-enhancing drugs and the prospect of genetic modification of athletes by sketching an overview of possible concrete uses of ‘dehumanise’. The focus of the paper, however, is on ‘making sense of what we (are inclined to) say ... [rather than] ...making explicit what *underlies* what we say’ (McFee, 1993/4: p. 115).

References

Austin, J. L. (1962) *Sense and Sensibilia*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Baker, G. P. (2004) ‘Wittgenstein on Metaphysical/Everyday Use’ in Baker, G. P. (2004) *Wittgenstein's Method: Neglected Aspects*, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 92-107.

- Hoberman, J. M. (1992) *Mortal Engines: The Science of Performance and the Dehumanization of Sport*, New York: The Free Press.
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- Miah, A. (2004) *Genetically Modified Athletes: Biomedical Ethics, Gene Doping and Sport*, London: Routledge.
- Schneider, A. J. and Butcher, R. B. (2000) 'A Philosophical Overview of the Arguments on Banning Doping in Sport' In Tännsjö, T. and Tamburrini, C. M. (Eds.) (2000) *Values in Sport: Elitism, Nationalism, Gender Equality and the Scientific Manufacture of Winners*, London: Routledge, pp. 185-199.
- Travis, C. (2005) 'The Face of Perception' in Ben-Menahem, Y. (2005) *Hilary Putnam*, Cambridge.

The Ethical Governance of National Sporting Organisations: An Australian Perspective

Sunday, September 18, 8:15 am – 9:45 am, Room NA 309

Jim Daly (Session 8C with Emily Ryall)

University of South Australia, Australia

Sport is now 'big business' and the recent crackdown on corporate malfeasance sends strong messages to national and international sporting organisations. Research conducted on behalf of the Australian Sports Commission has identified some key ethical governance issues that are being considered as best practice by national sporting organisations in the next 3-5 years.

When considering ethical governance of sporting organisations, various ethical/moral theories were considered ranging from the attractive deontological Kantian categorical imperative approach, contrasting with the more pragmatic teleological or consequential approach based on the obligations and rights are considered. This led to the possibility of a different approach to ethical governance based on virtue ethics as a means of inculcating ethical governance into the leadership of boards and key decision-making bodies at the national level.

A mixed methodological approach was adopted using qualitative and quantitative data within an essentially "grounded theory" strategy, which led to collecting data from the 75 Australian National Sporting Organisations, then verifying various ethical governance issues by using focus groups. Some feedback from colleagues is sought on the methodology and findings from this Australian research.

This methodology focuses on changing the board culture of national sporting organisations to allow for robust discussion and candour in debate without constraints from vested interests. Some other ethical issues identified during the course of the research were; transparency in decision-making including regular financial reporting and honest dealings with members, players/athletes, participants, businesses, sponsors, governments and the public.

Finally, I would like to open up the possibility of placing the Australian ethical governance research findings within a global context by exploring universalism as a possibility of transcending sports nationalism.

Making a Difference: Pragmatically Reconstructing the Sport Philosopher's Task

Saturday, September 17, 8:30 am – 10:00 am, Room NA 401

Tim Elcombe (Session 5A with Jerzy Kosiewicz)

Penn State University, USA

The sociopolitical and ethical dilemmas emerging in sport continue to garner attention that extends beyond the athletic realm. In North America for instance, illicit use of performance enhancing substances by athletes at all levels of competition has become front-page news and worthy of governmental attention; violence in athletic competitions, such as hockey, continues to reverberate in the public consciousness. The dilemmas facing the sport world go deeper than the high profile, sensational issues typically identified, however. Sport officials, participants, and spectators constantly wrestle with culturally engrained notions including morality, success,

democracy, fairness, and justice that impact the web of meanings potentially made available in athletic endeavors.

Yet despite the clear experiential and sociopolitical significance of sport, as well as persuasive arguments that sport is worthy of academic inquiry, sport philosophers seem to stand outside the public's engagement in conversations about athletic issues. Sport philosophers rarely find themselves actively engaged in public and influential evaluations and assessments of twenty-first century sport. Instead, "radical" sport sociologists (in academe) and members of the sports media (in the wider public) play the central role in critiquing and describing the meanings, values, and significance of sport—often with sensationalism, overly simplistic analyses, prejudice, and inconsistency. In addition, the voices of sport administrators, sport psychologists, athletic medical professionals, biomechanists, chemists, and bioengineers more actively participate in dialogue shaping sport's present and future than philosophers of sport.

Sport philosophers must accept part of the blame for this lack of sociopolitical relevance and academic marginalization. Consequently, I will outline in this paper a pragmatic reconstruction of the field of sport philosophy that aims to enhance the field's sociocultural impact. In particular, I will sketch out four Deweyan/pragmatic moves or points of emphasis that can help sport philosophers play a more significant role in the present and future of the sport-world. First, sport philosophy must become "radically" empirical; second, sport philosophy's abstractness must remain practically "grounded;" third, sport philosophy must aim to improve sport; and finally, sport philosophers must become a genuine (yet pluralistic) community of inquirers.

Somaesthetics and Philosophical Self-Cultivation: An Intersection Between Philosophy and Sport

Friday, September 16, 8:30 am – 10:00 am, Room NA 401

Joan Grassbaugh Forry (Session 1A with Lesley Wright)

Temple University, USA

In response to the systematic neglect of the body in Western philosophy, Richard Shusterman proposes a philosophical method, which he names "somaesthetics." This philosophical method is defined as "the critical, meliorative study of the experience and use of one's body as a locus of sensory-aesthetic appreciation (aisthesis) and creative self-fashioning" (267). Somaesthetics not merely the process of bringing the body to philosophy for analysis, but rather, somaesthetics is "devoted to the knowledge, discourses, practices, and bodily disciplines that structure somatic care" (267). Somaesthetics involves both a reconceptualization of the body and philosophy. The body is no longer a mere philosophical subject, but a philosophical agent. Philosophy must now be thought of as a fluid, transformative practice, rather than a distinct foundational discipline.

My purpose in this paper is three-fold. First, I give an account of somaesthetics and its relation to sport. On Shusterman's account, somaesthetics has three dimensions: (1) Analytic somaesthetics, (2) Pragmatic somaesthetics, and, (3) Practical somaesthetics. Analytic somaesthetics is theoretical, involving the description of the body and its socio-political significance. Pragmatic somaesthetics is the normative examination of body practices; body practices may be representational, aimed at producing certain bodily appearances, or experiential, aimed at producing certain bodily experiences. Practical somaesthetics involves the act of doing or performing body practices. I show that body practices employed in sport are relevant to all three dimensions of somaesthetics, not merely on the level of the practical. Second, I use the intersection of somaesthetics and sport to argue for an account of self-cultivation and aesthetic experience in sport practices. I specifically focus on athlete experiences, not spectator experiences in sport, in order to argue for the philosophical import of somaesthetic experience. While other accounts of the aesthetic in sport privilege sight and focus on the aesthetic experience of the spectator, I posit that the bodily experiences of the participant are aesthetic and have specific philosophical relevance.

Third, I address meta-philosophical questions regarding the relationship between philosophy and sport. If we take this account of bodily experiences in sport as philosophically relevant, what are the consequences for both sport and philosophy? Much work in philosophy of

sport has involved the application of philosophical tools to sporting issues; while this work invariable expands the range of philosophy, this methodology does not challenge the foundational nature of the discipline of philosophy. I claim that if philosophy is reconceptualized as process-oriented and transformative, as somaesthetics necessarily calls for, then sport and philosophy are responsible to one another in new ways.

References:

Shusterman, Richard. "Somaesthetics: A Disciplinary Proposal." Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. 262-284.

Coaching Anger: A Deadly Sin in a Lively Profession

Sunday, September 18, 10:00 am – 11:30 am, Room NA 409

Jeffrey Fry (Session 9B with Milos Bednar)

Ball State University, USA

According to Christian tradition, anger comprises one of the seven "deadly sins." In Eastern religious thought anger is sometimes viewed as a poison and an addiction. On the surface, these views seem to suggest that anger is to be avoided at nearly all costs. On the other hand, Aristotle claimed that anger can have an appropriate expression and a positive function. Anger can be linked to concerns about justice and even compassion, and viewed as having important revelatory and motivational features.

For those of us who care about sport, it is important to get clarity about these issues. Anger is frequently vented in sport. Coaches, in particular, often display anger. At various times they seem to be angry at their own players, opposing players, game officials, representatives of the media, fans, and perhaps even themselves. We are now familiar with coaches being remanded to anger management counseling. Given these factors, in this paper I will examine the nature of anger and its role in the coaching profession.

Questions cluster around various topics. First, it is important to consider the nature and etiology of anger. What kind of emotion is anger? Are angry people drawn to the profession of coaching, or does the profession perhaps cultivate anger in coaches? Martha Nussbaum claims that emotions indicate how things are going for us and that they thus have a *eudaimonistic* function. Anger, in particular, indicates passion and caring, but also that something is wrong. What is so wrong that some coaches seem so angry? Does the emotion tell us something important about the world of sport as well as about the inner world of the coach?

Second, as noted, anger is often viewed as a problematic emotion. What concerns have been raised about this supposedly "deadly" sin? How might such concerns inform our assessment of coaches' anger? Do coaches have psychologically and morally perspicuous grounds for their anger? Is there something *distinctive* about coaching, not only descriptively but normatively, with respect to emotions in general, and anger in particular? Are coaches, by their comportment with respect to anger, teaching important moral lessons, and if so, how are we to interpret these lessons? Is anger an effective tool for teaching certain kinds of lessons?

Finally, "coaching anger" refers not merely to the manifestation of anger, but also to practical steps towards effective and appropriate dealing with this complex emotion.

Intergenerational Communication and Sport: From Simmel's View

Saturday, September 17, 8:30 am – 10:30 am, Room NA 409

Koyo Fukasawa (Session 5B with Robert Mertzman)

University of Electro-Communications, Japan

The appearance of modern sport in our society should be inevitable consequence. We can recognize that the sport has played an important role of the model as modern society and it has been created a negative side of modern society in special. The competitive circumstances and individualism it has led are believed to have brought the transformation of community, fragmented local society or the deterioration of morale/normative consciousness.

So the significance of trying to regenerate the intergenerational partnership and to revitalize community has been kept talking about. This is why we need the intergenerational communication. We are expecting sport to take back lost the sense of community by progress of

urbanization or a trend toward the nuclear family, and to restore the social order. For example, organizing community sports club has been proposed setting an example for European countries, especially for Germany, in Japan, but it has been difficult to pragmatize this movement behind the sports activities in school or workplace. In recent years with fewer children continuing to develop and corporation's retreat from the sport sponsorship, however, The Comprehensive Community Sports Clubs are beginning to be formed with heightened expectations for community sports. This club could be hoped to be a playground where whole generations can enjoy sports and through it local revitalization and active intergenerational communication is intended.

The attempts like these, however, might be like wax fruit at present as we have not found any basis for local revitalization or reconstruction of community by intergenerational communication yet. Actually I think that it is difficult to advance normative consciousness or boost morale through building a sense of community in today's high modern society. The trend toward socially differentiating or complexifying, the development of technology could bring blurred sensibility or impaired judgment as human being. So 'modern subjects' face the task that they have to keep the independent-minded intention, judgment and moral sense against the tendency that our society has autonomous mechanism and tries to treat us as a means of itself.

We should need communication to get through these difficulties. In other words, high modernity is the times when needs communication because the sense of consideration to others is increasingly demanded as modernity makes progress and our society reaches maturity as 'advanced information society' or 'consuming society'. In contemporary society as high modernity, the social attributions which offer the frame of reference of 'social standing' or 'community norm' are almost of no use. Then people needs to form close ties with others and gain their approval relying on his communication skills.

From these demands of these days for communication, we should insist on modern sport transforming its aspect. What transformation of sport can we expect if we had a rethink about it from the position of subjective culture which Simmel proposes? That is sport as 'the form of social intercourse'. Social intercourse is the relation to enjoy and relish the relationship with others, supposes an attitude like this. The actors involved in sports, in this situation, do not deal with others instrumentally, but sustain ties in order to have a relationship with each other. Sport will pull its weight as a media which joins the actors. And they will be asked to control their desires or inconsiderate behaviors while they may enter into a connection with others freely without being expected to meet social demands or produce any results.

The sport games which different generations play, in turn, could have any trouble to play by the rule making based on the principle of formal equality, because of the performance gap between those generations. It will be necessary for these games to devise age composition of each team members or introduce handicapping system. Some modes of sporting game like this could be the hope of becoming a model of lifelong sports.

The Devoted Athlete: An Examination of Seriousness in Competitive Sport

Friday, September 16, 1:30 pm – 3:00 pm, Room NA 309

Peter Hager (Session 3C with Scott Kretchmar)

State University of New York College at Brockport, USA

Competitive sports are cultural sites that send mixed messages regarding their own seriousness. On the one hand, athletes are regularly reminded that sports are "only games," and should not be viewed or framed as events of paramount importance. On the other hand, these same athletes are expected to commit body, mind and spirit to the achievement of success in sport, and to willingly sacrifice their wants and needs for the attainment of victory.

Competitive sport has become a serious venture for many who participate in it. At the professional level, athletic contests are often played for high stakes, with monies, endorsements and athletic and celebrity status on the line. Winning is so strongly emphasized at many levels of sport that instances of cheating and poor sportpersonship have become prevalent. Athletes are frequently willing to put their own health and the health of others at risk in order to gain advantage over or keep up with their competitors. Furthermore, when championships, tournament victories or rivalry games are played, they are often framed as "life-or death" contests in which winners "survive", losers "die", and opponents are "enemies".

While many find this view sport objectionable, there are advantages that accompany taking sport seriously. Entering a contest with a sense of urgency can heighten athletes' intensity, motivating them to focus their attention and efforts in the present moment. The serious sport contest is a venue where athletes and teams can test themselves and push one another toward excellence. Such contests can motivate athletes to hone their skills and condition their bodies and minds, making themselves athletically stronger than they may have believed possible.

It seems that taking sport seriously can positively affect athletic performance and athlete satisfaction, but that taking it too seriously can lead to negative consequences and experiences for athletes. This being so, with what level of seriousness should athletes approach sporting contests? Put another way, what is the appropriate mind-set for athletes in regards to seriousness?

This paper will examine the value that one particular mind-set, the mind-set of the devotee, may have for athletes. In this paper, the various aspects of this attitude will be carefully explicated and examined. Examples from Eastern and Western religion and martial arts will be used to demonstrate how an attitude of devotion might help athletes enter into sporting contests with a mind-set that is more appropriate for these unique kinds of activities. Possible objections will also be considered in an effort to conceptually clarify this approach to sport and avoid potential misunderstandings.

Elective Enhancement Surgery

Friday, September 16, 3:30 pm – 5:00 pm, Room NA 401

Mark Hamilton (Session 4A with Mike McNamee)

Ashland University, USA

The history of sport is riddled with attempts by athletes to use any means possible to get an edge. Many of these means have been acceptable to sport while others have been ridiculed, criticized, and rejected. Advances in genetic engineering will be upon us in the next decade which will create major moral complications meanwhile another area closely associated with this has been practiced in one form or another for around a decade with relatively little discussion and with numerous forms of it being advanced rapidly in the future: this is elective performance enhancement surgery.

The most common form of this that has been occurring is eye surgery, especially among professional baseball players. Eye surgeries have shown to be very beneficial for professional baseball players who get this surgery and no longer need to wear glasses or contacts; they no longer need to worry about clean glasses or to find lost contacts. Some have claimed it has made them more effective players. Many professional baseball pitchers (about 85-90%) who have had the Tommy John surgery or UCL (ulnar collateral ligament reconstruction) are returning to pre-injury form. As this procedure has been refined it has also become common knowledge that some are actually increasing their velocity.

In these cases the athletes were motivated to have the surgeries because of injury or because of convenience. But in more recent years there are those who do not need glasses who are having elective surgery to improve performance. Will it be long before someone chooses to electively have the (UCL) surgery to gain a few miles on a fastball to become a better pitcher? Cubs pitcher Kerry Wood has stated that after the surgery "I'm throwing harder consistently." And Chicago White Sox reliever Billy Koch has jokingly said, "It felt so good when I came back, I recommend it to everybody...regardless what your ligament looks like." With the acceptance of this rather benign eye surgery and due to the advances in surgical techniques, especially micro surgeries or scoping, and the lessening of recovery times, it is only a matter of time before this evolves into athletes having elective surgeries to become bigger, stronger, or faster. Will Liposuction become a means of weight loss for wrestlers? How about ligament elbow surgery to increase the distance of the golfer's drive? Or could elective tendon surgery be performed to become faster?

History tells us that elective surgery will be used to enhance performance. What moral issues are raised by this for the athlete in the twenty-first century? What criteria can we use to determine or evaluate the morality of this type of elective surgery? Is Simon Eassom's distinction between aids and enhancers (*Baseball and Philosophy*) a useful distinction in this discussion?

One could argue against steroid usage and for its being banned because of the dangers or possible side-effects, but what about these rather safe surgeries? How is it like or different from the steroid issue or the genetic engineering issue? What criteria can we use to determine the morality of these actions and are the sports organizations ready and able to deal with these practices? This paper will explore the ethical ramifications of elective performance enhancement surgery and attempt to provide some moral guidelines.

Injury and the Suspension of Play: An Examination of the Moral Terrain

Friday, September 16, 8:30 am – 10:00 am, Room NA 309

Alun Hardman (Session 1C with Sigmund Loland)

University of Gloucestershire, UK

The Football Association Cup match between Arsenal and Sheffield United on the 13th of February, 1999 has provided much ammunition for professional pundits and philosophers alike. This was the game where the Sheffield United goalkeeper intentionally kicked the ball out of play to allow a team-mate to receive treatment after a challenge by an Arsenal player. The United players clearly thought the Arsenal players would return possession with the ensuing throw-in according to an "unwritten rule" of the game. Subsequent events show that some of the Arsenal players were unclear as what to do as the restart saw Arsenal regain possession and almost immediately score the game's winning goal while the United players stood impassively. After much rankling, Arsenal's offer to replay the game was deemed an exceptionally generous one.

My interest in morality of this event is twofold. The first has to do with examining the actions that initiated the controversy itself, namely, whether the unwritten rule in football which asserts players must stop the game when a player is injured is either morally commendable or a pre-reflective convention. The second has to do with assessing whether or not a more universal understanding of such cases can be developed in general. By using the unwritten rule in football as my key exemplar therefore, my overall task is to systematically examine the broader moral issues that emerge from the view that sporting contestants are morally obligated to voluntarily stop the game when a player is injured.

The philosophical tools that will be used in the first part of the paper to better understand this particular football example are well established in the literature on fair play. The issue will be examined from three ethical perspectives (a deontological, a utilitarian and a virtue ethics approach) in order to demonstrate the comparative strengths and weaknesses that each particular perspective has to offer.

Thereafter, the second part of the paper will focus on developing a more comprehensive conceptualisation as to how we are to understand and respond to situations where injury (or the potential for injury) is encountered in different sporting environments. It will examine the extent to which it is possible to develop more systematic guidelines to help deliberate on a broad range of sports where actions born out of consideration for the prevention of injury (or potential injury) to participants need to be evaluated in conjunction with how such actions impact other moral and nonmoral goods of sport.

Narratives in Moral Education

Saturday, September 17, 2:45 pm – 4:15 pm, Room NA 401

Douglas Hochstetler (Session 7A with Irena Martinkova)

Penn State University – Berks/Lehigh Valley, USA

Given recent incidents of unethical behavior in elite sport (i.e., allegations of steroid use in Major League Baseball, and a high-profile melee involving both players and fans at a National Basketball Association game), the general perception is that sport lacks, at least on occasion, moral behavior. The behaviors occur at lower levels as well, where parents berate officials and children, coaches treat athletes as means rather than ends, and athletes learn that they may need to take unethical measures in order to compete.

Within the context of sport, and the larger society as well, discussions occur about the place of moral education. How can those within respective sport practices develop an ethos of moral behavior and fair play? What kind of strategies might be best utilized to introduce youth

sport athletes into a positive culture of sport? For the scope of this paper I will focus on the method of moral education, in particular on the use of the narrative as a pedagogical strategy.

The most prevalent approach to moral education is the cognitive development model outlined by Kohlberg. On this model of moral development, people progress through a series of six developmental stages. The Kohlberg model "presents moral development as a process of abstract cognitive development." What the model lacks, however, is recognition of a qualitatively different manner of approaching moral education – that is through the narrative process.

This paper addresses the merits of narratives as an integral approach in moral education. I begin by examining the strength of narratives from both a psychological and educational perspective. Following the rationale for narratives within moral education, I focus on utilizing the narrative within the framework of moral thinking developed by philosopher R.M. Hare. Finally, I demonstrate how narratives hold the possibility of encouraging moral education in sport through their telling by caring coaches and physical educators.

The Problem of Corporeality and Temporality

Saturday, September 17, 1:00 pm – 2:30 pm, Room NA 409

Anna Hogenova (Session 6B Astrid Twenebowa Larssen)

Charles University, Czech Republic

The body as soma, sarx and pexis. Soma and sarx are objective bodies, apparent against the background of spatial areas. Pexis is apparent against the background of the flux of succession in time. Pexis is a non-objective body! Pexis is not only a material body, but also the soul as it pertains to the body in a substantial way. Pexis is a simple, not a dual body, and not a Cartesian body.

The role of temporality from a phenomenological point of view involves impression, retention and protention by the constitution of pexis. The body is in the world as expression and speech.

The intention to the world is founded through our hand (Heidegger). The prolonged hand of our "hand" is the speech from Heideggerian's point of view. "The body is in possession" of our hand and the speech. Both create the substance of intention to the world. This intention is fundamental for human motility.

A phenomenological analysis of time is the basis for understanding of the motion of our hand and "hand" as speech. (Husserl). Sport is symbol as well of our hand, the significance of sport is the symbol of our speech. The education of sport is the background for the whole of human motility, for the whole life. It is very insufficient to estimate phenomenon of sport only as the instrumentality for our biological a physiological life.

To Ride or Not to Ride: Cycling as a Jamesian 'Genuine Option'

Sunday, September 18, 10:00 am – 11:30 am, Room NA 309

Peter Hopsicker (Session 9C with Ming Tsung Shih)

Penn State University, USA

It has long been the goal of Physical Educators to instill in their students the skills and habits necessary for a life-long commitment to physical activity. While the teaching, demonstration, and participation in physical movement continues to be at the core of Physical Education classes, participation in physical activity beyond the classroom setting remains a challenge for a large segment of the population. Upon completion of mandated Physical Education classes, students are faced with a daily dilemma -- to exercise or not to exercise. It is at this decisive point where individuals may face what American philosopher William James called a "genuine option."

In this paper, I will describe human choices, as James understood them, and suggest a possible method of instilling positive and life-long exercise habits in individuals. These methods would allow them to more frequently choose activity over inactivity when confronted with their own daily dilemma. Utilizing the philosophical writings of William James, I will ground this method in personal experience and stress the importance of direct experience in physical activity as a major factor in a decision to exercise.

My analysis will begin with William James' notion of the "genuine option" described in his essay, "The Will to Believe" (1896). Distinct from other types of options, the "genuine option" requires a decision between two live, life-altering, and forced-choice alternatives. First, the option must appeal as a real or "live" possibility to the individual who is making the decision (e.g. the world is round) rather than an inconceivable or "dead" possibility (e.g. the world is flat.) Secondly, the option must be life-altering and momentous (e.g. choice of religious belief) as opposed to typical and mundane (e.g. choice of sock color). Finally, the option must be a forced decision between only two alternatives with no possibility of not choosing (e.g. to save a life or not.) By using my own personal experience, I will show how the daily dilemma, to exercise or not to exercise, can become a Jamesian "genuine option" for each individual and constitute the decisive moment in a decision to exercise.

Once characterizing the daily decision to exercise or not to exercise as a "genuine option," I will then provide arguments for habits as central catalysts in resolving this personal debate in favor of exercise. In his book, *Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals* (1899), James discusses the creation of habits and presents five maxims essential in their development. Not only will automating the willingness to exercise increase the amount of daily activity in one's life, but the habituation of such activities, James argues, frees the mind to perform its "higher functions." However, James provides a caveat to the power of habits in "The Energies of Men" (1907). Here, James notes that the automation and maintenance of habits can also limit human potential, trapping us below the would-be use of our powers of mind and untapped resources of human energy if we do not strive beyond our initial points of fatigue. It is concluded that Physical Educators should strive to create the "genuine option" to exercise or not to exercise in each individual through the creation of positive exercise habits. However, it is further recommended that both teachers and students utilize these habits of exercise as springboards to higher sources of human energy that can be utilized for other purposes beyond physical activity.

Ethical Pluralism and the Implications of Tolerance in Sport

Saturday, September 17, 2:45 pm – 4:15 pm, Room NA 409

Milan Hosta (Session 7B Carwyn Jones)

University of Ljubljana, Slovenia

If sport is manifested in many forms and from different motives we suggest that also the conceptualization of forms manifested should be different; recreation is non-normative by character, the professional sport is guided by the imperative of winning, and by extreme sports we face the intentional, though controllable, risk-exposition of human life etc.

Ethical pluralism is obvious when dealing with certain sport spheres. We will try to explicate the multicultural nature of sport, which brings the issue of tolerance in front. We cannot expect the overall convincing power from any established position, since we refer to ethical pluralism; sport is not a simple phenomenon and this would not be rational. But anyway, we cannot be satisfied with the logic where an activity or constructed reality in the form of institutionalized body is setting the ethical law, that is independent of man's (sportsman's) will. Here we face the question to whom the sportsman is ethically obliged.

The implication of tolerance is divided in two parts. The first one deals with the tolerance in sport which actually turns into debates considering the ethos of sport (un/accepted ethos). The second part is about tolerance of sport. Can we tolerate each sport activity? Can we tolerate every way of doing it? Once again the same question arises – to whom we are ethically obliged?

Sport and Identity

Friday, September 16, 10:30 am – 12:00 pm, Room NA 401

Leslie A. Howe (Session 2A with Masami Sekine and Kenji Ishigata)

University of Saskatchewan, Canada

Sport is highly valuable for self-development; however, it can also place the participant in situations that discourage authentic self-identity. This is most notable in, though not limited to,

team sport, given a perceived need to submerge individual identity in deference to the super-self of the team.

I begin with a philosophical conception of selfhood as a continuing activity of self-construction through interpretation. On this view, we do not simply possess an identity, as a passive or static given; we create and appropriate who we are through our outward engagement in the world and our interpretation of that activity and ourselves in it. The explanation of who we are as individual persons is a complex and evolving self-accounting that pulls all these elements together more or less comprehensively or selectively in a narrative that can be executed well or badly. Defence of this latter evaluative claim requires explication of an appropriate set of criteria. Several of these are put forward (accuracy, technical success, pragmatic value, artistry, and morality) and the first three discussed in some detail. These theoretical considerations are applied to the issue of team-identity in sport. Two overlapping issues are explored: the connection between identity, especially team identity, and choice and the concept of a team interest. Because the team player is expected to commit him or herself to the team as the substantial outcome of identification, we need to consider not only the nature of this commitment but also that to which the player commits.

I argue that the tension of identity that exists between athlete and team is the reverberation of that which already obtains between every individual and the society in which they live and that allows them to become the individual that they do. Self-construction is intersubjective; it is not and could not be performed in individual isolation. However, the pressure, subtle or overt, to adopt a prescribed group (team) identity in substitution of that which one might author for oneself (in effect, to tell one's self-story in one way rather than in a number of possible others) risks the abandonment of individual authenticity, and with it a number of negative consequences that flow from a failure to be the author of one's own self, e.g., responsibility for one's actions. Thus, teams become, perhaps not the cause, but the occasion of and a convenient excuse for inauthentic and even anti-social behaviour.

Moral Action in Sport: A Plea for Psychological Realism

Saturday, September 17, 2:45 pm – 4:15 pm, Room NA 409

Carwyn Jones (Session 7B with Milan Hosta)

University of Gloucestershire, UK

The fairly gloomy conclusions of moral psychological research in sport are by now reasonably familiar. Shields' and Bredemier's early findings in particular painted a pessimistic picture of sport's affect on the moral character of those who play it. There has been much criticism of the attempts to describe empirically the relationship between sport and morality. The focus of the criticism has concentrated on a few key issues. It has been argued that all "scientific" research into morality is wrongheaded and can never achieve scientific objectivity given the inescapably normative nature of the subject under scrutiny. Other criticisms have focused on the normative commitments to deontological ethical theory implicated in the evaluations made. In this paper I aim to focus specifically on the conceptualisation of moral character implicitly and explicitly implicated in the research into sport and morality. Drawing on the valuable insight of Shields and Bredemeier, I will argue that moral character is significantly more complex than is often acknowledged. I will also argue, following Flanagan (1991) that an account of moral character, including a sport specific account, must be realistic and not compromised by operational considerations. I will sketch an alternative, non-reductive, virtue theoretically informed account of moral character and identify the implications for playing sport in a morally appropriate way.

The Debate Surrounding the Doping Ban and the Application of the Harm Principle

Friday, September 16, 8:30 am – 10:00 am, Room NA 409

Yoshitaka Kondo (Session 1B with Leon Culbertson)

University of Tsukuba, Japan

This study is to reconsider the doping ban from the right to self-determination based on the assertions of John Stuart Mill in his work *On Liberty*, namely: (1) an adult with the ability to

make decisions, (2) circumstances surrounding one's own life, person, and property, (3) conduct that inflicts no harm on others, and (4) behaviour considered by others to be folly and, as a result, (5) the ability to make decisions on one's own. In particular, I will give thought to the argument regarding the ban on doping through two reinterpretations of the third condition of harm to others.

I have reinterpreted the 'other' based on this 'self-other' dichotomy and presented a new argument for the prohibition of doping. As my initial interpretation, I hypothesized that the 'future self' becomes 'other' when seen from the perspective of the 'present self.' Thus, even if the present self acknowledged that there would be drug-induced harm to the health, there is the possibility of causing serious damage to the future other, and this is conduct that should be avoided based on the ethical responsibility to future generations. Since the dosages needed for doping to work effectively are far greater than in the case of treatment prescribed by physicians, it is easy to envision an adverse impact in the future. Doping thus falls under the heading of infliction of harm and is conduct that is probably not subject to self-determination.

Second, I replaced the 'self-other' dichotomy with a self-controllable/not self-controllable dichotomy. Uncontrollable conduct is thus deemed to be 'other' and beyond the scope of self-determination. Doping based on the use of illicit drugs results in self's essential control capabilities being taken over by the drugs (a state in which control by the self is not possible). In the case of ordinary training, the athlete would be reduced to a state of exhaustion if a given level is exceeded, rendering continued training itself impossible. If illicit drugs are used, however, it would become possible to exceed the self-controllable limits. Thus, doping conduct, which commits control to an uncontrollable other, corresponds to the infliction of harm and probably is beyond the scope of determination by the self.

The Philosophy of Sport or Philosophical Reflections on Sport?

Saturday, September 17, 8:30 am – 10:00 am, Room NA 401

Jerzy Kosiewicz (Session 5A with Tim Elcombe)

Academy of Physical Education, Poland

The main task of my presentation is to initiate the discussion about contemporary position, formal and merit situation of philosophy of sport. It is interesting to answer for the following question: if we can to say, that actual we have mature, competent and independent scientific discipline or that we have to do with something like philosophical reflections on sport, which will become in the future independent philosophical discipline?

I am on the opinion, that the philosophy of sport has only initiated some process of structuralisation, of posing and solving manifold problems, of forming various viewpoints characteristic for authors of various education and different research preferences. It has also initiated building from the foundations and shaping of the methodological instruments which would be suitable for a new branch of philosophy aspiring for autonomy. The main burden of exploratory projects and realisations lies on shoulders of the philosophers in the strict sense of the word exploring various manifestations and aspects of sport.

The philosophy of sport is making for defining itself and working out its own properties and forms of research. An important opportunity for it is constituted by a co-operation with other branches of philosophy (and not only of philosophy) aimed at utilising of already worked out and tested patterns enabling the philosophy of sport to formulate its own language, coherent code, category of notions and specific detailed methodology in order to describe and explain sources, contents and senses characteristic for practical and theoretical manifestations and properties of sport. However, until this stage of forming of a new discipline is finished, we will face philosophical reflections on sport rather than the philosophy of sport.

Adventurous Changes: Rethinking 'Sport' in the Age of the Extreme

Friday, September 16, 10:30 am – 12:00 pm, Room NA 309

Kevin Krein (Session 2C with Ivanenko Artyom)

University of Alaska, USA

Significant philosophical work has been accomplished concerning the definition and nature of sport. For much of this work, the paradigm examples of sport have been Olympic sports and those that attract large numbers of spectators such as American football, basketball, hockey,

and tennis. However, within the last two decades, there has been an explosion in both the popularity and visibility of so-called extreme or adventure sports such as base jumping, rock and ice climbing, and backcountry skiing and snowboarding. In this paper, I argue that if we reconsider sport from a standpoint that emphasizes extreme or adventure sports we will get a different perspective on widely accepted claims concerning its nature.

For example, Bernard Suits employs a distinction between games and performance activities as a way to understand differences between sports such as basketball and tennis on one hand and diving and figure skating on the other.¹ While this distinction is helpful in thinking of traditional sports, I argue that adventure sports do not fit well into either of these categories. I consider as well the claim that sports are similar in many ways to theatrical performances. In reference to traditional sports, it appears reasonably straightforward for Gunter Gebauer to claim that sport is theatrical because “It occurs as if on stage; it is a dramatically staged performance for which the stadium or sport hall is the theater” (p.102).² The analogy is far less apt, however, in the case of extreme or adventure sports. This is, in part, due to the venues in which such sports occur, but also a result of the often severe consequences of mishaps in adventure sports settings. I argue further that an implication of these differences is that, while it is commonly accepted that traditional sports are removed from, or outside of, ordinary life, the same is not true of adventure sports. Finally, I consider the role of competition in traditional and adventure sports and argue that, while there is competition in each area, there are significant differences in the role of competition in the two types of sport.

The first goal of the paper is to begin to clarify the similarities and differences between traditional and adventure sports. In turn, I argue that the nature of sports may be changing and that because adventure sports are coming to be seen as paradigmatic examples of sport in general, the conception of what sport is will need to be broadened to better reflect their characteristics.

¹ See for example, Bernard Suits, “Tricky Triad: Games Play and Sport,” *The Journal of the Philosophy of Sport*, XV (1988): 1-9.

² Gunter Gebauer, “Sport, Theater, and Ritual: Three Ways of World-Making,” *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport*, 1993-94, XX-XXI, 102-106.

The Intelligibility of Suits’s Utopia: The View from Anthropological Philosophy

Friday, September 16, 1:30 pm – 3:00 pm, Room NA 309

R. Scott Kretchmar (Session 3C with Peter Hager)

Penn State University, USA

Some have argued that utopia is conceptually incoherent. It has been further suggested that this lack of intelligibility compromises a portion of Bernard Suits’ seminal work, *The Grasshopper: Games, Life, and Utopia*. Both claims have an element of truth to them. As Thompson (*JPS*, XXXI, 1, 2004) skillfully argued, the notion of utopia entails values that conflict with one another. He also pointed out that sport includes experiences of strife that are incompatible with the stipulated perfections of utopia. He concluded that Suits should have jettisoned the concept and that others would be well-advised to do likewise.

In this paper, I will suggest that Suits was not interested in the intelligibility of utopia per se but used this extreme (and perhaps indefensible) notion to make a larger point. That larger point had to do with the nature of problems and their role in producing the good life. Suits, of course, was fascinated with a certain species of problems or difficulties that could be invented by us and then crafted specifically to meet our needs and interests. He called them games, described their characteristics, and argued that the Grasshopper’s dedication to these activities, even if currently shortsighted, may still make sense. But these artificial problems, for Suits, always stood in relationship to other difficulties that seemed to be natural, real, inherited, or simply, already there. It was these problems that dominated the world of ants and served to justify their commitment to work.

The underlying issue in *The Grasshopper* then is the identification of the good life in relationship to natural and artificial problems. Would games, Suits asked, play a central role in some future utopian-like existence where all or most of our natural problems had been solved and there was nothing to do? Or even more radically, are we now already in a utopia of sorts and, as

the heavily socialized ants that we are, have we dressed up games to make them look like work? By employing the notion of utopia and a (naturally) problem-free life, Suits encourages us to take the existence of the Grasshopper (and all that he represents) seriously.

Suits' decision to employ utopia as an analytic vehicle can be supported from another perspective as well. In the second half of the paper I adopt an anthropological point of view and argue that utopia, understood in a certain way, enjoys considerable pragmatic utility. I discuss *Homo sapiens* as a problem-solving creature and speculate on our evolutionary history as we became more and more successful. I end up defending a notion of utopia, not as an all-or-nothing place or state, but as an evolutionary pole of human existence characterized by the dissipation of survival problems and an increase in uncommitted time. My anthropologically-derived notion of the good life, as a game-enhanced problem-solving existence, is not far from the one forwarded by the analytically-inclined Suits. Both of us, albeit from different perspectives, believe that an unproblematic utopian world is far more a threat than an ideal destination.

Lived Movement: A Phenomenological Exploration of Skill Acquisition

Saturday, September 17, 1:00 pm – 2:30 pm, Room NA 409

Astrid Twenebowa Larssen (Session 6B with Anna Hogenova)

University of Technology, Sydney, Australia

The kind of world that is open to us depends on the type of body we have and the experiences that this body has had. By providing certain experiences, such as training, for a body to experience, the kind of world available to the body to act in, changes (Merleau-Ponty 1962).

The analysis of motor habit as an extension of existence leads on, then, to an analysis of perceptual habit as the coming into possession of a world. (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 176)

This paper uses phenomenology, informed by Merleau-Ponty, to explore the lived experience of skill acquisition in capoeira, pilates and yoga practitioners. The paper attempts to describe the essential features of the lived experience, the changing capacity to act, through the learning of specific skills. If we take skill to be changed capacity to act and skill acquisition to be a situated, social and collaborative process between practitioner, instructor and props utilised in the process, the phenomenological approach enables us to describe details of habit formation as it is experienced, and it also allows us to extract descriptive categories and practical knowledge about the activities.

The lived experience of skill acquisition is explored in relation to both the proprioceptive awareness and external feedback involved in the acquisition of skills – such as the *armada*, one of the basic spinning kicks in capoeira, *neutral spine* in pilates, and the *downward dog* pose in yoga. Interviews, participant observation and case studies were used to gather empirical data for understanding the transformation of the lived body as skills were acquired. The data revealed the structures of the lived experience as an interplay in which the practitioners engaged in an intimate reciprocal interaction between 'their being', 'their world', other things and other people. The transformation of the body was described by one practitioner as "*coming back to inhabiting my body*." This exploration also revealed the situated nature of skill acquisition; in specific difference and commonalities between individuals and capoeira, pilates and yoga. Through an analysis of the lived experiences of the transformations, skill acquisition in capoeira, pilates and yoga was found to relate to reasons for being active such as controlling weight and improving one's figure as well as the experience of a heightened level of skill.

The paper also aims to contribute to the discussion of what it means for a body to be in movement, and what it means to exercise. We comment on the potential of phenomenological inquiry in developing wider understandings of active practices as social and cultural practices. Applying these understandings to everyday life, we hope to shed some light on the recent popularity of fringe practices such as parkour and skateboarding, activities that for some has become part of everyday living, e.g. skateboarding to work. Finally, we hope that the understandings we develop can inform other disciplines in need of practice-based understandings of human movement.

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Fair Play in the Ancient Olympic Games

Friday, September 16, 3:30 pm – 5:00 pm, Room NA 409

Daniel Levski (Session 4B with Heather Reid)

University of Ljubljana, Slovenia

When Huizinga defines playing as *a voluntary activity or occupation executed within certain fixed limits of time and place, according to rules freely accepted but absolutely binding, having its aim in itself and accompanied by a feeling of tension, joy, and the consciousness that it is different from ordinary life*, then a true culture cannot exist without a certain measure of playing, but if such playing should create or promote culture, it should be **fair**. It must not stem from self-deceit and the rejection of norms, prescribed by reason, humanity or religion. *A true culture always, and in every aspect, demands fair play.*

All plays have their cultural form on the fringe of social mechanisms, but also their institutional form, which is a part of social life. **Agón** plays realize their cultural form through **sport**, and their institutional forms through business competition, market struggles, job competitions, testing, etc.

But sometimes a play can be **infected by the real world**, causing degeneration and corruption. Pleasure becomes a fixation, the retreat becomes an obligation, entertainment turns into an obsession and source of anxiety. So a play under *agón* degenerates into violence, desire for power, cunning, and disobedience of the rules of the play and the judges.

Although **agón** was an essential constitutive element of the Greeks, distinguishing them from the barbarians, it mostly existed from the end of the Doric migrations and the creation of *poleis* to the end of the 6th century - for about three hundred years. Polis was under the control of the aristocracy, which was being replaced by tyranny, the ideal of "*kalokagathia*" still ruled. *Agón* was aimed at the spirit as well as the body, so that *areté* (meant as excellence) appeared, achieved by *paidia*.

But already in the fifth century **the genuine agón** receded and is replaced by pomposity, boasting and aggressiveness. This was also the transition from the Archaic to the Classical period, a time of big changes, a time of *krisis*, marked by the sophistic way of thinking.

The first gap in the genuity of the Olympic agonality showed itself only at the beginning of the 4th century. In 388 the first attempt of cheating was recorded when Eupolos of Thessaly bribed the opponents to win at boxing. It was not until 327, when Troilos from Elis, one of the referees (*hellanodikos*) won two laurels as a winner in *hippikos agón*, that the Eleians passed the law by which referees, as well as team owners, were banned from competing in the games.

With the degeneration of genuine *agón* the need for greater formalisation and "administrative" protection of the rules arose. The rules had lost their sacred meaning, laws, judges and the court of appeal had to make sure that they remained untouchable. *Areté* ceased to be demonstrated any longer. The Gods had stopped socializing with people, and with the truth itself, the truth of the *areté* had been hidden, too. The question *What is the areté?* became the fundamental question of emerging ethics.

Understandings of Pain in Sport: Epistemological Perspectives

Friday, September 16, 8:30 am – 10:00 am, Room NA 309

Sigmund Loland (Session 1C with Alun Hardman)

Norwegian University of Sport and Physical Education, Norway

Pain, or "and unpleasant sensory and emotional experiences associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage,"¹ has a significant but ambiguous status in sport. To a certain extent, the endurance of pain is considered a necessity to succeed. "No pain, no gain", as the slogan goes. Some athletes even talk of "good pain", or of "the pleasure of pain", and of the ability of overcoming pain as a key element in their fascination with sport. In spite of its obvious significance, however, pain is a neglected topic in sport studies. This paper is meant as a contribution in this respect by discussing some epistemological issues that arise in trying to understand pain in sport.

Pain represents a border case between what can be physically located and given a

medical diagnosis, and what belongs the non-physical and experiential and must be interpreted and explored by other means. Studying pain involves challenges to traditional understandings of athletes and their bodies, and, more generally, to traditional understandings of the physical and the natural, of body and mind, and of nature and culture. With the help of practical examples, the aim of the paper is to sketch and discuss critically three ideal-typical approaches to the study of pain in sport.

In a first section, what can be called the classic, medical approach is examined in which the ambition is to describe accurately and explain in clear-cut causal relationships pain as a physical phenomenon. A second section deals with a radically different approach in which pain is conceived of primarily as a product or a construction of the social and cultural context in which we find ourselves. A third perspective is inspired by phenomenology and departs from the immediate and subjective experience of pain; from pain as *qualia*.

Summing up, reflections are presented upon how the three ideal-typical approaches can be combined in a more complete and comprehensive understanding of pain in sport.

¹ As defined by the International Association for the Study of Pain (<http://www.iasp-pain.org/terms-p.html#Pain>)

Jan Patočka's Three Movements of Human Life With Respect to Physical Education and Sport Practice

Saturday, September 17, 2:45 pm – 4:15 pm, Room NA 401

Irena Martínková (Session 7A Douglas Hochstetler)

Charles University, Czech Republic

Jan Patočka (1907-1977) is one of the most famous Czech philosophers. He was a student of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger and further developed the ideas of phenomenology. He also represents an important figure in the anti-communist movement in former Czechoslovakia, being one of the founders of the document Charter 77.

In this contribution I shall interpret Patočka's original conception of three life movements, which overcomes the viewpoint of movement of modern science, as well as Bergson's conception of movement rooted in retentionality (past), where the protentions (future) are missing. In this conception Patočka follows in the philosophy of existence of Heidegger, however is also inspired by Aristotle's concept of *dynamis* (possibility).

First I shall interpret Patočka's ideas regarding three life movements, that is, the movement of acceptance, the movement of defense and the movement of truth. Then I shall connect them to physical education and sports. I shall show differences of the human movement within all the three spheres of Patočka's life movements.

Movement of acceptance is the "rooting" into the world, that is, the process of being accepted as an individual by others and recognizing one's first possibilities. In terms of physical education (in the widest sense) it means learning to manage one's movement and to handle one's body the same as adults do. This happens mostly as copying of the forms of movement of adults, and thus here is a necessity to be responsible for one's own corporeality and movement from the side of adults.

Movement of work and defense is a sphere of preoccupation with work, it is living in different roles. It is described as the movement of self-extension, self-projection into things, or self-objectification and humanization of the world. In this sphere the human being satisfies himself / herself with mere alleged understanding (of the self or anything else), without looking for foundations of his / her "truths". This is also mirrored in human movement. Physical Education and sports offer people to learn and practice certain techniques (pre-given forms of movement) and to develop their skills. Given movement is applied on them, rather than coming out from them. This often happens without deep self-knowledge, thus also without real knowledge what effect the used methods have. The effects are believed to be those that are valued by society (good-looks, health, wealth, fame, self-confidence etc.).

Movement of truth is shaking of all the alleged truths. It is a turn towards the self and an attempt to understand the self and our human situation (especially our finitude), and to accept it. Here, movement represents the source of self-knowledge, self-discovery. Physical education is

then an education towards founded self-knowledge, responsibility for oneself, movement that is based on individuality, and leads towards freedom.

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Absence of the Children: Philosophical Interpretations of the Opening Ceremony of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games

Friday, September 16, 1:30 pm – 3:00 pm, Room NA 401

Naofumi Masumoto (Session 3A with Cesar Torres)

Tokyo Metropolitan University, Japan

Children's performances have been used often for the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games. Recently, the snow children in the 1998 Nagano Games, the small girl Webster's reconciliation performance in the 2000 Sydney Games, and the child of fire in the 2002 Salt Lake Games are some good examples. These performances were not just utilized for the spectacle to celebrate the opening of the global mega-event. Moreover, it can be said that the message, created by the adult generation of organizers, could be sent to the audience and spectators worldwide as a subtle image of the innocence and pure existence of children. Were there the same kinds of messages in the 2004 Athens Games? What kind of meaning was represented in light of the Olympic philosophy that is Olympism by these existence of the children?

Although there were not so many children in the stadium, nine years old boy, Michalis PATSATZIS, played an important role in the opening ceremony of the 2004 Athens Games. This boy rode on the paper boat and was waving a small Greek national flag while smiling at the audience. However it was not easily possible for the spectators to distinguish his performance from the stands. In that sense, it is clear that his performance was designed to convey some messages to the television viewers. While borrowing a child's figure, although this scene can be interpreted as a kind of expression of the praises of Christianity and the Euro-centrism that emphasizes the Greeks as forerunners to, and philosophical origin of, the European and American civilizations, there were no media comments about it. It was a kind of ideological gimmick, which can represent such an adult intention not so frankly, but, rather, softly.

Besides the boy PATSATZIS, there were a few children who put on the carpenter trousers of five colors while holding sprigs of olive branches in their hands at the appearance of the Olympic flag, and boys and girls who joined the choir and sang the Olympic hymn in praise of the Olympics. These children were not so conspicuous and possibly there were not many spectators who noticed them from the stands. In this sense, it can be said that children were absent from the opening ceremony of the 2004 Athens Games as compared to other Games.

In this paper, the meaning of children's appearances in the opening ceremony of the 2004 Athens Games, the cause of the absence of the children, and the after-effects of the absence of children in the ceremony will be discussed from the philosophical hermeneutics and the Olympic philosophical standpoint that is Olympism.

From Games to the Good Life: The Neglected Significance of *The Grasshopper*

Saturday, September 17, 8:30 am – 10:00 am, Room NA 309

Douglas McLaughlin (Session 5C with Andy Miah)

California State University-Northridge, USA

While Bernard Suits' *The Grasshopper: Games, Life, and Utopia* is often treated as merely a treatise on the definition of games, I will elucidate more fundamental concepts central to the text that have broader significance than a definition of games such that *The Grasshopper* should be read as a treatise on the good life.

While the attempt to define games is in part undertaken for intrinsic reasons, its greater import is as "an enterprise which aims at nothing less than the elucidation of Grasshopper logic, an examination of Grasshopper ideals, and an interpretation of Grasshopper dreams" (18). In the preface, Suits asserts that the goal of the book is not just an "attempt to discover and formulate a definition" but also "to follow the implications of that discovery" (ix). It seems that if the grasshopper was not an exemplification of the life most worth living and game-playing was not the fundamental concern of Utopian existence, then Suits would probably not have been so interested in defining games. That is to say that he is only interested in grasshoppers and games because they inform his greater concerns of the life most worth living. And so, a clear articulation of game-playing is necessarily prior to an elucidation of the life most worth living and *The Grasshopper* can then be understood not merely as a book on the definition of games, but as a book devoted to elucidating Utopian living.

While Suits has provided a rather extensive and thorough definition of game-playing, the elucidation of the good life is not always straightforward. Fortunately, Suits has provided plenty of clues as to what role game-playing has in and for Utopian existence. In an effort to make Suits' discoveries about the ideal of existence more explicit, three critical aspects of the book will be analyzed. First, the notion of lusory attitude will be clarified, particularly in how it serves to unify the other elements of a game and proves to be the lynchpin in securing games as the fundamental Utopian activity. Next, sections in which Utopia and the ideal of existence are most seriously rendered by Suits will be elaborated. Finally, "the Dream" and "the Vision" of the Grasshopper will be interpreted with particular focus on how they inform Utopian living.

Such an undertaking is not an effort to rise above mere considerations of games. Rather, it is an effort to show that, as Suits so astutely argued, games are central to the good life. After all, anyone who is involved in game-playing as either a practitioner or theoretician should be aware of the Utopian implications of game-playing. In turn, anyone concerned with the good life must recognize the central role of game-playing. It seems that game-players and practicing-Utopians often fail to recognize that they are indeed cut from the same cloth. Such awareness has important implications that just may "lead us in surprising, and disconcerting, directions" (ix).

Transhumanism and the Moral Topography of Sports Medicine

Friday, September 16, 3:30 pm – 5:00 pm, Room NA 401

Mike McNamee (Session 4A with Mark Hamilton)

University of Wales-Swansea, UK

Miah (2003:html) has suggested that sports offer a "unique environment where transhumanism can gain social credibility and where its ideas become manifested and normalised". In this paper I argue against the desirability of this position.

I first set out an account of moderate and extreme transhumanism. While their advocates range from the reflective (Bostrom, 2004; 2005) to the rather crazed at least certain portions of their values would find general appeal in the public, the (sports) medical profession and the communities of elite and recreative sport. Francis Fukuyama has recently referred to it as "the world's most dangerous idea". To be fair it is better thought of as a 'loosely defined movement' (Bostrom, 2005). Extreme Transhumanism includes the aim of overcoming the limits of human nature in order to become a post-human category (species?). Such limitations include intelligence, appearance, life-span, vulnerability to harm (e.g. susceptibility to disease). Moderate Transhumanism more modestly claims to use technology (genetic modification, nanomedicine) to enhance human characteristics, (e.g. intelligence, beauty, life-span, resistance to disease or

injury). In this less extreme project, there is no necessary aspiration to shed human nature/human genetic constitution, just to augment it with technology where possible and where desired by the individual. It is this latter version that may well attract the resolutely instrumentalist of the elite sports system.

Bostron asserts that human nature is "a work-in-progress, a half-baked beginning"(2005). Likewise, those who advocate limitless autonomy, bolstered by scientific imagination, will find in moderate transhumanism a project for a sports medicine with or without substantive moral moorings. While technologies might be used therapeutically it is impossible to hermetically seal off those technologies to assist injury or illness prevention to those that attempt to alter normal anatomical and biochemical structures and processes to develop super athletes (Cyborg or otherwise).

By contrast I sketch out counter arguments against the adoption of TH ideals: (i) the threat to autonomy by ill-informed parental choice which already fuels much of the harms of children's sport (Brackenridge, 2001; David; 2005); (ii) the use of sportsmedicine to legitimise the production of difference in order to generate heightened inequity and/or create a genetic (sporting) aristocracy ; (iii) the undesirable degeneration of the category sportspersons; and (iv) a more respectful attitude to human nature in spite of its/our shortcomings.

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Habituation in Sport and Sports Training

Saturday, September 17, 8:30 am – 10:00 am, Room NA 409

Robert Mertzman (Session 5B with Koyo Fukasawa)

University of South Florida, USA

Creating habits and rendering new practices habitual is an important part of sports training and sports performance. Practices in sport help develop habits in athletes that make competitive sport performance possible. The purpose of this essay is to explore several examples of habituation in sport and show that habituation has interesting applications to both epistemology and metaphysics.

When we first attempt an activity, such as dancing or basketball, we often must do so slowly and carefully, attending to many aspects of the activity. After skills are habituated through repetition and practice, we may dance or play basketball without the slightest attention to many of the details that once commanded our attention. Previously needed environmental information is no longer necessary to perform what were once thought to be complex activities. We dance without watching our feet or we dribble the basketball without watching our hands and the ball.

The philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) regarded habituation as one of the most important aspects of life. In his attempt to fully explain his concept of habituation, Peirce created a theory of signs, which he named semiotics, to characterize specific epistemic and metaphysical elements in the habituation process. The semiotic concepts of the sign and of syntax, semantics and pragmatics are common-place concepts in logic and linguistic today. Throughout the late 20th century, Thomas Sebeok applied Peirce's work in semiotics to animal communication and animal behavior studies. Recent work in ethology extends Sebeok's work into the human domain where research into habituation in language learning in animals and habituation in language learning in children now overlap.

We will continue the extension of Peirce's theory of signs to habituation in sport and sports training and connect Peirce's work with recent European scholarship in semiotics. We will provide an extensive bibliography of related scholarship.

We will briefly survey recent psychological investigations of habituation. We will see that habituation plays an important role in sports psychology. Recent scientific studies in habituation are compared with Peirce's use of habituation.

Playing Games With Artificial Intelligence

Saturday, September 17, 8:30 am – 10:00 am, Room NA 309

Andy Miah (Session 5C with Douglas McLaughlin)

University of Paisley, UK

This paper seeks to elucidate weaknesses within the philosophy of artificial intelligence (AI) in an attempt to work towards a more holistic understanding about what kind of knowledge satisfies the conditions of intelligence. In so doing, the paper utilizes Suits's notion of gaming playing as a basis for re-defining the criterion of intelligence to which AI is evaluated. The paper begins by articulating the development of AI research, clarifying the implications of the work of Turing (1950) and Searle (1980). From here, a background is given to the development of artificial life (AL), and the notion of game-playing is introduced as a construct for revealing intelligence capabilities. The game of chess is recognised as having been paradigmatic in AI as a measure of machines against humans, with IBM's *Deep Blue* being the critical machine to provoke a sense of machines surpassing humans. When *Deep Blue* beat the Grand Master chess player Garry Kasparov in 1997, questions arose as to whether machines have become too capable. In response, the paper rejects chess-playing as a sufficient indication of intelligence in the strong sense and argues that other kinds of games serve as a greater challenge and a more accurate reflection of human intelligence. From this, Bernard Suits's classic philosophy text, *The Grasshopper*, is used to elaborate on what it entails to play a game. The *Deep Blue Grasshopper* is described as a game-playing AI machine, which responds to a broader notion of game-playing. This notion encompasses the possibility for creativity, spontaneity, and arbitrary choices that lead to successful strategic option. As such, the definition provides a more comprehensive outline of intelligence, which avoids the criticism of speciesism. The paper concludes with a critique of the possibility of there non-linear intelligence that would sustain the main thesis of the paper.

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Fair is Fair, Or Is It?: A Moral Analysis of the Drug Wars in Sport

Saturday, September 17, 2:45 pm – 4:15 pm, Room NA 309

William J. Morgan (Session 7C with Jim Nendel)

The Ohio State University, USA

As moral agents it is important that we have a good idea of what we are doing and why we are doing it. It is equally important, but not always equally appreciated, that we have a good idea as well of what our doings do, that is, of what the consequences (intended or otherwise) of our actions are. And it is in this last sense in particular, I want to argue, that significant issues of fairness regarding the use and regulation of performance-enhancing drugs (p-e) hinge. I want to raise two arguments in this regard. First, I want to challenge the view favored by some that the use of these drugs by athletes does not raise a fairness problem because non-compliance with the rule against it is so widespread that it no longer warrants our moral assent. This claim that, in effect, because "everyone is doing it" doping is a morally permissible practice is embarrassingly weak on its face, and, therefore, deserves our scorn rather than our sanction. But my second argument targets the so-called "new and improved anti-doping strategy" pursued by athletic officials and institutions charged with enforcing the prohibition against p-e drugs. Here I want to argue that the resort of these officials and institutions to building circumstantial criminal cases

against p-e drug offenders, a new tactic in the drug wars intended to catch athletes that successfully get around even the most sophisticated drug testing measures, raises fairness problems of its own that are no less egregious than those raised by p-e drug takers. This latter argument suggests that drug enforcers should cease and desist from employing such tactics to stem the use of these substances in sports and instead redirect their regulatory efforts in ways that get at the moral root-problem that prompts athletes to take these “illicit” substances in the first place: namely, a professional conception of sports that has no use for moral notions like fairness in the first place.

Aesthetics and Art in Sport

Sunday, September 18, 8:15 am – 9:45 am, Room NA 409

Stephen Mumford (Session 8B with Charlene Weaving)

University of Nottingham, UK

Since David Best’s work in the 1970’s (cf. ‘The Aesthetic in Sport’) the orthodoxy has been that sport is not, and can never be, art. I intend to re-open this debate.

In the first place it is agreed that aesthetic value can be found in sport, both in terms of physical movement but also higher-order beauty in strategy and tactics. I agree with Best, however, that aesthetic value is not a sufficient condition for art. Best has a definition of art that he argues does not apply to sport. I say that this definition is either overly restrictive or can indeed apply to sport. A key battleground that remains is the number of disanalogies that Best claims there to be between sport and art.

Sport is likened by some observers to unscripted theatre. Best responds that defeat or injury only happens to the character on the stage, not to the actors, whereas in sport people do suffer real defeats and real injuries. I argue that there is a sense in which sport can involve adopting a role. Team-mates in national sides, for example, can become adversaries in club sides. These players may be perfectly good friends as people but have to adopt an adversarial role for the sport, even to the point where they are prepared to risk injuring their friend in order for the game to be won. After the game the adversarial role can be dropped and the friendship is unaltered. Analogously, a drama may require the actors to be adversaries, even to the point where a physical injury occurs: A may have to give B a real slap across the face for it to look convincing. The actors, like the sportspeople, accept that the injury is not administered to the adversary qua person but to the adversary qua opponent. In both cases, however, extreme acts of violence may be interpreted as acts against the person rather than acts against the role and therefore produce appropriate indignation.

In sport, the aesthetic values are also said to be incidental while they are essential in standard cases of art. This is contentious because it ignores the evident fact that many sports are spectator sports and dependent for their rules and evolution on the responses of the spectators. A sport may undergo rule changes specifically to make it a more pleasing spectacle rather than, for example, to make it more physically demanding. Some of the reasons why a sport is regarded as entertaining can be understood as aesthetic reasons. As there is a link between such aesthetic values and the existence and nature of the sport, sometimes sport can correctly be described as art.

Big Game Hunt or Staged Massacre: The United States Congress and the Hunt for an Ethical Approach to the Steroid Issue in Baseball

Saturday, September 17, 2:45 pm – 4:15 pm, Room NA 309

Jim Nendel (Session 7C with Bill Morgan)

Penn State University, USA

Former Major League baseball player Jose Canseco opened up a Pandora’s box of trouble for Major League baseball when he published a tell-all autobiography. Canseco became a whistleblower on the use and abuse of steroids in Major League baseball. Not only did Canseco admit his use of the illegal substances but he also named names of those he purportedly assisted in the endeavor to gain a performance advantage through chemical assistance.

The publication of the book and the attendant publicity attached to it including a “60 minutes” segment on the Columbia Broadcast System (CBS) brought the attention of the United States Congress. As a result, Members of Congress assembled a special committee to investigate the use of steroids in baseball and subpoenaed various players administrators and medical personnel to testify before them in March, 2005. The committee emphasized that the intent of the special investigation was to stem the use of steroids in order to protect American youth from emulating their professional heroes. This paper will investigate those Congressional hearings from the perspective of the ethical intent of the political gathering. There are numerous ethical issues which can be addressed in this situation including whether or not these athletes should be utilized as role models for young people and the larger issue of whether or not the use of steroids are an ethical breach. However, I will focus on the issue of why Congress is attacking baseball on steroids and whether or not this is truly an ethical crusade for the good of the youth of America.

I will concede that whether or not athletes have an ethical responsibility to be perceived as role models, the reality is that they are viewed in those terms. Athletes live a life that is appealing to those who are impressionable. I also will not attempt to prove or disprove the ethical nature of the use of steroids. I will grant that they enhance performance in athletes who use them and acknowledge that to date no conclusive medical research has been done in regards to the perceived health issues related to the use of steroids.

My inquiry addresses the nature of the investigation. Congressional leaders chose to bring out their big guns in confronting this supposed scandal. They are hunting down the elephant in the room, which no one wishes to address. It appears that this is a big game safari expedition in search of a vicious predator. Or is it? Could it be that Congress’ hunt is nothing more than a shooting gallery with a hampered injured animal, while in reality the true threat to the young people in the village is the tiger, which no one in Congress or baseball wants to confront, tobacco.

If the ethical nature of baseball’s substance abuse policy, or lack thereof, is of such interest to politicians, why have they not addressed the lack of a tobacco policy in Major League Baseball when that substance is a proven killer?

¹ Jose Canseco, *Juiced: Wild Times, Rampant ‘Roids, Smash Hits and How Baseball Got Big*, New York: Regan, 2005.

Supplements: Food or Dope?

Keynote Address, Thursday, September 15, 5:30pm - 6:30 pm, Room NA 401

Jim Parry

University of Leeds, UK

This paper discusses conceptual and ethical aspects of the use of supplements in sport.

‘Foods’ are nutriment – things that nourish us. A food is something taken in order to maintain life, health or growth. Difficulty with this: to maintain life at what level? To assist health or growth to what degree? Can all my needs be met just by foodstuffs? And what are my ‘needs’?

‘Supplement’ is an incomplete term (supplementing what?), and also ambiguous, meaning both:

- (a) Something added to supply a deficiency
- (b) An auxiliary means, an aid

‘Drug’ has a number of general meanings, which often become confused:

- any medicinal substance
- an opiate or narcotic
- a third ‘modern’ sense recognizes the increased use of ‘social’ or ‘recreational’ drugs
- a further use in sport emphasizes the performance-enhancing qualities of the substance.

In the sense of food-supplements, athletes *must* take supplements. They need to supplement a ‘normal’ food intake in order to support their extra activity.

In the case of enhancement-supplements, athletes *should* take supplements. It is their duty to be at their best, and to be as well-prepared as possible for competition.

So what are the issues?

1. Dope or Supplement?

If some supplements perform the same function as some banned substances, why are they not banned, too?

2. Health or Performance?

Some substances are recommended for health reasons, and some entirely for performance enhancement. Is there an ethical difference?

3. Supplement Efficacy

- a. *Efficacy - do they work?*
- b. *Efficacy - how do they work?*
- c. *Efficacy - quality of substance*

4. Placebo effect**5. Contamination**

- a. *Deliberate contamination*
- b. *Accidental contamination*

6. Strict liability rules (and the application of other anti-doping arguments to supplements)**7. Problems:**

- a. *Combined effects*
- b. *Athlete Motivation*
- c. *Quality of Substance: Safety and Athlete Protection*

What is Good Sport?: Plato's View

Friday, September 16, 3:30 pm – 5:00 pm, Room NA 309

Jernej Pisk (Session 4C with Gregg Twietmeyer)

University of Ljubljana, Slovenia

One of the most common Plato's questions found in his dialogues is 'What is something?' By asking this question Plato usually brought his co-speakers to the recognition that in fact they do not have a full comprehension of what is something, although they have a partial comprehension of it. The awareness of one's incomplete cognition is the first step to be made on the philosophic way to truth. As in the ancient times also today Plato ask us – the modern philosophers of sport – 'what is sport?' or more precisely 'what is *good* sport?'. Probably the best Plato's answer to this question can be found in basic concepts of his philosophy regarding his hierarchical division of the state and human soul on three parts. Since the sport is derived from man also the goodness of sport can be divided in three stages. The lowest stage of sport corresponds to the first part of soul – the appetite soul. On this stage sport is based on the gaining of material goods through the prizes on the competitions. In the philosophic view, this is the lowest possible stage of goodness of sport. The second stage of sport corresponds to the second part of the soul – the emotional soul. Sport on this stage is based on the elementary ancient *agon*, which seeks fulfilment in the winning honour and glory. The greatest and the most superior is the third part of the soul – the reasonable soul. According to this, also the sport corresponding to the third part of the soul is the best. For this kind of sport is no longer necessary to compete with other contestant, since it can achieve it's fulfilment in perfect execution of movement or exercise, in which the perfect cooperation between reason (soul) and body is attained. On this stage of sport is the most important to compete and win over self, and this can be achieved by everyone, with no regards to his physical abilities in comparison with others. In Plato's view, the good sport is the sport directed in the fulfilment of self, all the way till the ideal – the Idea itself. And only sport like that can bring true contentment to the human – the reasonable being. With this is sport essentially intervening in the sphere of philosophical cognition. The goodness of sport is no more determined by physical dimensions of space and time, but indeed, as Plato shows, the true good sport goes beyond these borders. In this manner sport goes beyond physical world and is touching everlasting and unchangeable world of ideas. And the world of ideas is for Plato *tópos* where the very truth is revealing. So, sport could be an useful mean for philosophical investigation of the man and the world.

Is the Roman Gladiator an Athlete?

Friday, September 16, 3:30 pm – 5:00 pm, Room NA 409

Heather L. Reid (Session 4B with Daniel Levski)
Morningside College, USA

This paper examines the situation of ancient Roman gladiators using the contemporary philosophical context of Roman Stoicism. To ask whether gladiators were athletes, we must also consider whether gladiatorial combat can be considered a sport. The fact that these contests often (but not always) ended in death seems to challenge that idea, as does the fact that gladiators were often (but not always) slaves, forced to compete by their owners. Specifically, the reality that a gladiator's only choice was to fight or to die seems to undermine the requirement, characteristic of athletes, that they compete of their own free will.

Looked at from the perspective of Roman Stoic philosophy, however, freedom is independent of external circumstances. The fact that a gladiator is "socially dead," stripped of all money, honor, and political power, actually makes him or her a symbol of the freedom from worldly concerns touted by the Stoics. The gladiator's lone asset is virtue, the only thing of intrinsic value from the Stoic point of view. Furthermore, the constant risk of death faced in the arena merely accentuates a reality all mortals must acknowledge.

Using the writings of Seneca, Epictetus, Cicero and others, I will argue that under Stoicism the gladiator *may* be an athlete capable of transcending his or her servile status through the voluntary exercise of virtue. The gladiatorial combat, however, cannot be considered a sport because it purposely undermines the competitors' autonomy and dignity. Although a gladiator's human excellence may shine through his or her predicament, it doesn't justify that predicament.

The Stoic athlete seeks not only to transcend external circumstances through virtue, he or she has a duty to labor for just institutions. In keeping with that spirit, a Stoic critique of athlete autonomy in modern sports concludes the paper. I consider questions of parental interference in youth sport, institutional exploitation of collegiate athletes, and whether professional athletes must "play for the money." Roman Stoicism suggests that an athlete's attitude need not be dictated by forces beyond his or her control, but those in control of sport should work promote athletes' autonomy and dignity.

'Rabbits' in Running Races: Pseudo-Competitors in Pseudo-Competitions?

Friday, September 16, 1:30 pm – 3:00 pm, Room NA 409

Danny Rosenberg (Session 3B with John Michael Atherton)
Brock University, Canada

A year ago marked the 50th anniversary of Roger Bannister as the first person to run a sub-four-minute mile and the event drew international attention. In addition to being a significant athletic achievement, there is controversy, then and now, about Bannister's use of 'rabbits' or pacemakers in running "the perfect mile." In a recent book on Bannister, Bale (2004) examines in part the history of pacemaking and the questionable role pacemaking played in Bannister's athletic career.

Evidence of the use of 'rabbits' in running races can be traced to the late 19th century and was mainly frowned upon by those in the athletics establishment. By the 1920s and 30s, a number of middle-distance world records were set in paced events and planned record attempts were not uncommon. Bale argues convincingly that pacemaking was a key element in Bannister's success as a miler and in other major running events. As the science of running advanced, new training techniques, where precise measurements were recorded and analyzed, made pacemaking almost a necessity to break records. For most of the history of middle-distance running, there has always been ambivalence surrounding the formal and unwritten rules of pacemaking, and whether or not it was and is a fair practice.

What this paper proposes to do is ask and try to answer several philosophical and ethical questions about the 'rabbit' or pacemaker in running races and the nature of paced events. For example, are paced events "genuine" competitions or staged experiments? What counts as pacemaking as opposed to strategic maneuvering? Why might a record be interpreted differently if accomplished through a paced event or a race? What are the presumptions about being a competitor in running races? Is a pacemaker a "genuine" competitor? How are paced running events different from races in other sports where athlete assistance is acceptable? How can a

paced event be detected? Is it fair if some competitors are unaware they are participating in a paced event?

In addressing these and other questions, I will draw on the work of a number of sport philosophers who have discussed the nature of sport competition and the role of contestants in sport. Suits, Fraleigh, Kretchmar and Simon, among others, will form the backdrop to consider the questions posed above. For example, Simon (2004) makes a distinction between striving for improvement and striving for competitive success. Perhaps paced running events set out to achieve the former goal without a serious concern for the latter element. Similarly, if it is presupposed that all sport competitors in a contest must try to win, do pacemakers fulfill this criterion given their designated role?

These are the issues I hope to examine and explore not only to shed light on 'rabbits' in running races, the meaning of records and record-breaking, and fairness in sport, but also to illuminate an overall understanding of the nature of sport competition and the status of competitors.

Being on the Bench: Bad Faith or Towards Authenticity?

Sunday, September 18, 8:15 am – 9:45 am, Room NA 309

Emily Ryall (Session 8C with Jim Daly)

De Montfort University, UK

A recurrent theme running through, what is generally labelled as, existential philosophy is the view that becoming an 'authentic' being is dependent upon an acceptance that one has freedom over one's choices which necessarily entails the acceptance of responsibility for making those choices. However, such a position seems to conflict with our initial impressions on being named a substitute for a sports team. In such a situation, one arguably has no freedom of choice whether one is able to play the match, and whether one will get to play the game at all is wholly in the hands of others. Yet Sartre would indisputably argue that such a protestation is an example of 'bad faith' since this involves a denial of the fact that one is free to choose whether or not to accept this role of substitute. According to Sartre, an aspect of 'bad faith' can be seen when one anticipates the 'I' of the future as being different to the 'I' of the present. In this sense, if we take it as given that one is a member of a sports club in order to play that sport, presumably one only accepts the role of substitute in the anticipation that one will no longer be on the bench in the future. Few would accept that their present role of substitute is one that they have freely chosen but rather, is a position that has been decided by others.

This paper intends to take a closer look at the existential concept of 'authenticity' and whether it is compatible with being on the bench during a match. In particular, it will focus upon Sartre's concept of 'bad faith', Heidegger's notion of 'they', and whether it is really possible to live an 'authentic' life as a member of such a social community and how such a position could be ac

Modern Sport and the Problem of Others

Friday, September 16, 10:30 am – 12:00 pm, Room NA 401

Masami Sekine and Kenji Ishigaki (Session 2A with Leslie Howe)

Okayama University and Niigata University, Japan

Our concern in this study is turned to the modern sport, which spread all over the world after modernization. The spread scale of the modern sport is a scale to the extent that religion is matched in the present age. International Conventions, such as the Olympic Game and the World Cup, are held although there are a lot of differences in cultures or political organizations.

The globalization of sport can be regarded as an opportunity for realizing human beings' solidarity as it is seen in the Olympic Game. While the sport is considered to have universal value for human beings, the ethical crises are increasing. For example, it is a fact that fair play and sportsmanship have lost the meaning in a modern sport.

As a classic example of the ethical crisis in a modern sport, we are able to point out a doping problem. The doping problem shows the weakness of man's universal morality. It is because the doping problem is not solved by the ethical demand based on fairness shown so far.

When we take the reality of game and athletics into consideration, it is a question whether man's universality or nature exists. The reality, which shows the powerlessness of the practical reason developed by I. Kant exists at least in a modern sport. When we face with the reality, should the argument that we ask for human nature is abandoned?

In this study, we consider the problem of others in a sport from a viewpoint, which has a question to human nature (man's universality). The problem of others in a sport is a clarifying the grounds of sport ethics. As precedence research on this problem, S. Eassom's *Sport, Solidarity and the Expanding Circle* is mentioned.

We are going to advance our consideration examining the Eassom's paper. In Eassom's paper, the argument on R. Rorty and P. Singer was taken up. We also put the argument on M. Merleau-Ponty into a view further, and advance our argument. We consider about the problem others in a sport by refer to Merleau-Ponty's concept of perception.

Consent by Proxy in Sport-Related Research: Some Ethical Difficulties

Friday, September 16, 10:30 am – 12:00 pm, Room NA 409

Heather Sheridan and Scott Fleming (Session 2B Sara Teetzel)

University of Gloucestershire, UK

Covert methods in research are contentious (Homan 1991; Sieber 1992). As Hollway and Jefferson (2000) make clear, there are often tensions between voluntary informed consent on the one hand, and socially beneficial research that necessitates some level of deception on the other. They explain that a number of modified forms of consent have been devised to relieve these tensions, one of which is proxy or presumptive consent (getting approval from 'mock subjects'). Proxies are often used when persons are unable to speak for themselves. The role of the proxy is to speak for a person in the same way that the person would have done if they had been able to speak. In the medical or legal professions, for example, a person may be too ill or too young to provide consent. It seems unlikely, however, that one person will be able to speak adequately on behalf of another without 'knowing' her/him first.

In this paper we explore the extent to which consent by proxy is ethically defensible in sports-related research (cf. Brackenridge, 2001; Tomlinson & Fleming, 1997). We explore in particular two difficulties that arise for sports researchers who have adopted and adapted the use of proxies to gain consent. First, where consent by proxy is used, it may be the researcher rather than the subject of research who authorises the proxy to cooperate on behalf of the research subject. Those eventual research subjects will be unaware that they are the subject of research since they have not been consulted. Yet implicit in getting voluntary informed consent is the idea that research participants will have the opportunity to learn from the research experience. Second, consent by proxy is problematic because when acting on behalf of another, the context and outcomes of the action taken are never the same as they would have been for the subject. The difficulties inherent in using proxies are apparent even when a person has nominated a proxy to act on his or her behalf.

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The Sacred in the World of Sport

Sunday, September 18, 10:00 am – 11:30 am, Room NA 309

Ming Tsung Shih (Session with 9C Peter Hopsicker)

National Taiwan Normal University, Taiwan

This thesis argues that people can become transformed and "spiritually enlightened" in the realm of sport and physical activity. While it is commonly thought that religion is sacred and

sport is profane, I examine how these two seemingly separate realms can be united. How can a gymnasium be turned into a “Temple of God”? I identify four main elements which create the conditions for enlightenment: “a sacred time and space”, “the bridge of ritual activity”, “emptying of the ego” and “revealing of the memory of the true self”.

In *Man and the Sacred* (2001), Roger Caillois defines sacred behavior as sacrifice, asceticism, offerings, and related rituals. I demonstrate that these behaviors can be found not only in religion, but also in the world of sport. He also describes the sacred as consisting of specific objects, beings, places and times. In my opinion, these four aspects are insufficient for discussing the phenomenon of the sacred; we must also explain the process of creation. Similarly, Mercea Eliade tells us *what* is sacred in *The Sacred and the Profane* (1987), but he does not address *how*. This paper attempts to answer this question.

Both Caillois and Eliade ignore one important factor: a connection between humans and God, a process which must involve all four of the aspects I describe, and especially what I call “emptying of the ego” and “revealing the memory of the true self”. Unlike Western religions, in Eastern religions the connection between humans and the “Tao”, or Buddha, resides within our own bodies, and it is through awareness of this connection that we can achieve spiritual enlightenment. I expand Caillois’s theory of the ‘sacred’ to include the connection between humans and God in order to more accurately describe the process of attaining spiritual enlightenment within the realm of sport.

Sharing the Blame: Complicity, Conspiracy, and Collective Responsibility in Sport

Friday, September 16, 10:30 am – 12:00 pm, Room NA 409

Sara Teetzel (Session 2B with Heather Sheridan and Scott Fleming)

The University of Western Ontario, Canada

In this paper, I argue that doping in sport is a collective act. While it is difficult to classify an athlete’s participation in sport as solely an individual or a collective action, it is easy to make the case that there are both public and private dimensions to sport. Similarly, one can view the athletes competing in a sporting event from the reductionist perspective that sees them as individuals performing their own distinct roles, or from the collective perspective, which identifies them as a group seeking a common goal. However, an examination of athletes caught using performance-enhancing drugs and procedures banned by the World Anti-Doping Agency shows that with respect to doping in sport, the neater, simpler, and more convenient reductionist position often replaces the collective view and places the blame almost entirely on the individual athlete.

Unquestionably, the athlete makes the final decision to take a banned substance and is therefore causally responsible for failing a doping detection test. However, I will argue, causal responsibility is not an essential component of complicitous responsibility. Only in the rarest of cases could an athlete research what drugs would be most effective, manufacture the performance-enhancing drugs, and make use of them without the assistance of his or her coaches, trainers, sports medicine advisors, therapists, or other support personnel. Hence, the relationships between the athlete who takes the banned substances and the people who make them available to the athlete are important.

I argue that these people together form a collective and are hence socially and morally accountable for the act. Except in the most scandalous doping cases where an athlete’s positive test result grabs the media’s attention and the ensuing public outcry demands that all involved be held accountable, the professionals and ancillary workers who develop, produce, distribute, and condone the use of banned substances are overlooked in favour of blaming the athlete. The collective does not share the responsibility but instead places it entirely on the athlete.

In this paper, I argue that the participatory intentions of the athlete’s support personnel make them complicit to the act and, therefore, partially accountable for the doping offence. Drawing on philosophers Christopher Kutz, Margaret Gilbert, and Michael Bratman’s accounts of shared intentions and collective responsibility, I argue that the group members’ participatory intentions warrant holding the entire group responsible. A possible implication of this view is that doping is a collective act, rather than an individual one, and anti-doping officials should focus more on the complicitous nature of doping.

Confusing Messages: Olympism and the Value of Results in Competitive Sport

Friday, September 16, 1:30 pm – 3:00 pm, Room NA 401

Cesar Torres (Session 3A with Naofumi Masumoto)

State University of New York College at Brockport, USA

Arguably, the lure of the Olympic Games is to be found in the vision inspiring and framing them. Pierre de Coubertin, the *rénovateur* of the modern international Olympic Games, called this vision *Olympism*. Although Coubertin wrote extensively about Olympism, he never articulated a concise and clear definition of it. Nevertheless, when considering Coubertin's writings and the International Olympic Committee's definition, it becomes obvious that the distinguishing feature of Olympism is the explicit pursuit of moral values through the practice of sport.

Although the specific content of Olympism is often debated, values such as holistic human development, excellence, peace, fairness, equality, mutual respect, justice, and non-discrimination among others are repeatedly emphasized. Clearly, under the precepts of Olympism, sport, and, consequently, the Olympic Games, there lies an educational technology; a means to advance and materialize a set of moral values. As a formulation for moral improvement, Olympism seems a worthy philosophy. However, Coubertin's lack of specificity and inconsistencies regarding the moral values propounded by Olympism have made its understanding and implementation a challenging project.

One of Coubertin's inconsistencies relates to the role and significance of the results of Olympic contests. Frequently cited Olympic phraseology seems to be contradictory in this regard. Consider the Olympic creed and the Olympic motto, both of which were adopted by Coubertin. On the one hand, the Olympic creed proposes that in the Olympic Games, "the most important thing is not winning, but taking part." On the other hand, the Olympic motto reads "Citius, altius, fortius" (faster, higher, stronger). Both dictums are supposedly evocative of Olympism. Yet, their connotation regarding Olympic results appears to be contentious. It could be argued that by stressing participation, the Olympic creed primarily emphasizes the process of contesting. More important, it explicitly diminishes the significance of results. Conversely, it could be argued that the Olympic motto highlights the results of contests, specifically records.

Evidently, Coubertin swung back and forth in terms of whether the process of contesting or the outcome of this process should predominate in his Olympism. Given this ambivalence, it is not surprising that the value of results in Olympic competition has been a contested issue. Thus, in this presentation I will investigate the role that results should have in Olympic matters and, more broadly, in sporting life. To do so I will first discuss the nature of competitive sport as well as its central purpose. This is important in order to articulate a view of results centering on the logic and principles underlying the practice at the core of the Olympic Games. I will then evaluate the Olympic creed and Olympic motto approaches to Olympic results. I will argue that they represent Apollonian and Dionysian tendencies and that neither one is sufficient if sport is to be lived to its fullest. I will finish arguing that an approach to results that is worth accepting in the sporting and Olympic worlds is one in which the process of contesting and its ensuing results come together to form a meaningful unity.

Suffering Play: Can Play and Games be Justified in a Suffering World?

Friday, September 16, 3:30 pm – 5:00 pm, Room NA 309

Gregg Twietmeyer (Session 4C with Jernez Pisk)

Penn State University, USA

Does the time and attention we devote to play and games detract from our ability to feed the hungry, comfort the afflicted, and defend the helpless? If games and play are frivolous activities, how can our involvement with them be ethically defended--particularly when there is so much suffering going on in the world? Some have argued that such a defense would be difficult. Suits (*JPS*, IV, 1977), for example, contended that "playtime comes after we save civilization." Given such a claim, can play ever be justified in a *global* community?

When using the word 'play' I am envisioning an attitude, a joyous spirit, built on autotelicity. Games, by way of contrast, are manufactured or artificial problems. Depending on one's attitude games may or may not be 'played'. Play and games, thusly understood, are often

criticized from rationalist and utilitarian perspectives with questions like the ones I've already posed. Sober utility has taken hold with some philosophers to such a degree that they feel guilty even about trivial subjective commitments. Utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer states the case this way, "Almost every Australian child grows up supporting a football team. It is an affliction to which I am not immune, and which I have been unable to shake off, even as I grow older and presumably wiser." (*How are We to Live*, 1995, p.100) If we are to wring our hands over rooting for 'Hawthorne,' how in the world could we ever justify setting aside time for play and games when real harms like starvation and disease are at stake?

When I speak of a utilitarian paradigm, I am envisioning a philosophy that is rationally committed to an equal concern for all as the basis of ethical behavior. In this paper I offer three major critiques of this kind of utilitarian thinking. The first is based on human particularity. Each person is individually situated in the real world in particular relationships with finite responsibilities. Room for play and games is carved out locally, not universally.

The second critique is related to the nature of community and group dynamics. Play and games are communal activities. Human community and human intimacy breed the very compassion that makes the alleviation of suffering an imperative. Play and games then, paradoxically, may have utility value in terms of cultivating our overall moral responsibilities. But that is not why we play. In other words, autotelic motivation has extrinsic byproducts. While play has concrete utility, a move to utilitarian motivation will squelch the very joy that characterizes play.

Lastly, I will argue that play is fundamental to the ontology of humankind. This suggests two things. If we are to be good people, we need to play. Also, play may be a fundamental human mechanism designed to deal with suffering. Building on Skillen's discussion of human vulnerability, Berger's conception of joyful play, and Fort's model of mediating institutions, I will argue that play, given a proper understanding of the human condition, is perfectly ethical in a suffering world.

She Strips...She Scores!: An Analysis of Women Athletes Posing Nude

Sunday, September 18, 8:15 am – 9:45 am, Room NA 409

Charlene Weaving (Session 8B with Stephen Mumford)

The University of Western Ontario, Canada

The old adage that 'sex sells' remains alive in North American culture; however, I would hesitate to agree entirely with the idea of sex selling out women's sport.¹ In this paper, I contend that the images of nude female athletes represent a loss of individual agency and present women as objectified sex objects rather than powerful strong athletes. I maintain that it is morally problematic for women athletes to pose nude for two reasons. First, contrary to what some women athletes suggest, I argue that they do not empower themselves by posing nude. I suggest that they act morally shallow in that they merely participate in a short cut to achieve empowerment. Second, nude photographs of women athletes are harmful to women's sport in general as well as to the individual athlete. Even though some of the photos may vary in their degree of sexual objectification, I argue that they ultimately help perpetuate subordination in women's sport. Furthermore, the tendency to trivialize and sexualize women's participation in sport reinforces patriarchal power and oppression.

As is argued by philosophers Martha Nussbaum and Robert Baker, the identification of a woman with her sexuality becomes oppressive when such identification is consistently extended to every area of her experience and existence. It appears that many women believe that the only way they be taken seriously as athletes, and thus increase their funding, is by ensuring that, at the same time, they are still accessible as sexual objects.

I approach the topic from a North American liberal feminist ethical perspective and maintain that there has been little research done in the sport philosophy field with respect to sexuality, sexualization, and women athletes. Paul Davis (2001) remains as the main contributor to this important area and hence I attempt to build on his work.

¹ I consider "sex selling out women's sport" when women's sport is noted solely for the female athlete's sexual appeal rather than athletic ability, and significant sporting accomplishments.

The Aesthetic, the Kinaesthetic and the Power of the Imagination in Sport

Friday, September 16, 8:30 am – 10:00 am, Room NA 401

Lesley Wright (Session 1A with Joan Grassbaugh Forry)

Brunel University UK

In my paper I argue that while the value of the aesthetic in sport has been widely recognised, our understanding of it has often been too narrowly based. I suggest that hitherto we have been too preoccupied in looking for a connection between efficiency, perfection and performance, when clearly the aesthetic is over and above a purely efficient and functionally perfect performance. It is the aesthetic response which is crucial. Furthermore, aesthetic appreciation is often not recognised for what it is, because it is difficult to identify independently from other aspects of the experience of engagement in sport. We need a wider vision of what constitutes aesthetic values in sport in order to identify them more clearly.

We can consider the aesthetic experience to be characterised in terms of an aesthetic object, namely skilful human movement, with the form of this movement being unique to each sport and distinctive of each one, and where the perceptual qualities which emerge from sporting movement as an aesthetic object are appreciated for their own sake. In this context, the kinaesthetic sense, as a perceptual quality, will play a vital part in our appreciation. This is evident when one considers that many of us prefer to engage in sport as participants in order to gain kinaesthetic enjoyment from that engagement, rather than watching the movements of others, even though the movements of others may be more skilful.

However, even when we do take the role of spectator, the aesthetic experience which is open to us is still highly perceptual, and, is still of a kinaesthetic kind. The most powerful means we can gain aesthetic enjoyment from sport, whilst we are watching, are not, as some have argued, through a special contemplative attitude, or, by distancing ourselves from the practical interest we might have, but through an engagement which is characterised by the power of our imagination. Here, the kinaesthetic sense again plays its part, for aesthetic enjoyment is gained, to a very large extent through an empathetic response to the performers' movements. Through a process of imaginative identification with the movements of the performers we are able to perceive and enjoy, as if we were running with the sprinter, flying with the ski jumper, or, balancing on the beam with the gymnast. Furthermore, our kinaesthetic imagination will also allows us to keep the representation of the movements in our memories after the performance is over and to recollect the best moments later. The aesthetic experience is transient and elusive and this has to be one of the main reasons why we keep going back to encounter sport and to keep the memory of that experience fresh.

PANEL SESSION (6A)

Saturday, September 17, 1:00 pm – 2:30 pm, Room NA 401

Issues in Olympic Philosophy

Heather L. Reid, Organizer

List of Panel Members:

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|---------------------|--|
| (a) Heather Reid: | Ancient philosophy and the ancient Olympic games |
| (b) Cesar Torres: | Modern philosophy and the concept of Olympism |
| (c) Andy Miah: | Ethical issues related to technology and doping |
| (d) Jim Parry: | Modern political philosophy and Olympic ideals |
| (e) Sigmund Loland: | Ethical issues in Olympic sport |