## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bill Morgan &amp; Scott Kretchmar</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Founding of IAPS: Leaders, Key Events, and Challenges</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doug Hochstetler; James Madison University</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocks, scorned facts, and diamonds: Experience, recollection, and sport philosophy scholarship</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jesúsdííñ-Agurruza – Linfield University</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flourishing, Purpose, and Temporality in Sport and Life – Living the Moment</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafal Adametz, The Open University, UK</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of Perceived Exertion - a challenge for the phenomenology of exercise</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth Aggerholm, The Norwegian School of Sport Sciences, Noora Ronkainen, University of Bern</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Digi-appearing Body: Questions Concerning Physical Activity in the Digital Age</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanchita Aidasani</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should the whereabouts system for elite athletes be revised on grounds of athlete privacy?</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred Archer, Tilberg University, Kyle Fruh, Duke Kunshan University, Jake Wojtowicz, Independent Scholar</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complicity and Sportswashing</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephanie Beni, Norwegian School of Sport Sciences</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meaningful physical education: The philosophical underpinnings of personally relevant learning</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Berg, University of North Caroline Greensboro</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans Inclusion in Sport for Justice in Society</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitchell Berman, University of Pennsylvania</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the eligibility of transwomen athletes: lexicality versus balancing</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon Birse Swansea University</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Suits Refute Wittgenstein on Game Definitions? The Debate that Never Was</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulo Augusto Boccati; Marcus Campos; Odilon José Roble, Universidade Estadual de Campinas</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports communities in the virtual age: Covid-19, personal trainers, and MacIntyre</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steffen Borge, Nord University</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinventing the notion of prelusory goal</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcus Campos, KU Leuven</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too much on fairness? On the referees’ role in protecting fairness AND safety in sport</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agostino Cera, Università degli Studi di Ferrara (Italy)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Running with the Zeitgeist (Long-Distance Running and “The Question Concerning Technology”)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Copeland - University of Michigan; Tom Rorke - Penn State University</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athletic Citizenship - Moving Beyond Second Order Debates Over the Athletic Role Model</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claudio D’Amato, Virginia Tech</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness Isn’t Fair: Why the Advantages of Transgender Athletes are not Unjust</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John William Devine, Swansea University</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After Doping: The Preventive Exclusion Alternative to Punishment</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nicholas Dixon, Alma College .................................................................................................................. 29

Immoral Attitudes in Sport ...................................................................................................................... 29

Mark Dyreson, Pennsylvania State University ........................................................................................ 31

Running Phenomenologically Amok: Encounters with the “Foot Runners” and the Modern Quest to Reveal
the Essential Structures of Human Experience ...................................................................................... 31

Colleen English, Penn State Berks ........................................................................................................... 33

Can Sport Really Be Fair? Toward a Justice-Focused Sport .................................................................. 33

Santos Flores, University of North Carolina ............................................................................................ 34

Decolonial questions arising from the situating of Capoeira in the Philosophy of Sports ...................... 34

Erin Flynn, Ohio Wesleyan University .................................................................................................... 35

The Normative Status of Sports Penalties ............................................................................................... 35

John Francis and Leslie Francis, University of Utah ................................................................................. 36

The NCAA, the states, the courts, and a new playing field for athletes: should the Warwick rowers’
calendar be an example? .......................................................................................................................... 36

Sean Foley and Michael Rohlf, The Catholic University of America ...................................................... 38

Suffering and schadenfreude in sport ........................................................................................................ 38

Jacob Fredericks, Pennsylvania State University ...................................................................................... 39

Interpreting Historical Conventions of Justice in American Road Running Communities .................. 39

Jeffrey P. Fry, Ball State University ........................................................................................................ 40

On Free Will and Sport ............................................................................................................................. 40

Paul Gaffney, St. John’s University ........................................................................................................... 41

Unwritten Rules in Sport ............................................................................................................................ 41

Peter F. Hager, SUNY Brockport ............................................................................................................... 42

Sport and the Varieties of Nostalgic Experience ....................................................................................... 42

Alun Hardman, Cardiff Metropolitan University ....................................................................................... 43

Against Collective Punishment in Sport: A Reply to Wojtowicz .............................................................. 43

Aaron Harper, West Liberty University .................................................................................................... 44

Tournaments, Tests, and the Aims of Intercollegiate Athletic Competitions ......................................... 44

Jonas Holst, San Jorge University, Spain ................................................................................................ 46

The illusion of playing: A tricky triad reconsidered .................................................................................. 46

Aldo Houterman, Erasmus University Rotterdam & Amsterdam University Medical Centre .................. 47

The Importance of the Philosophy of Movement for thinking about Sport ............................................. 47

Tien Mei Hu, National Taipei University of Education .............................................................................. 48

Esports is not a sport ............................................................................................................................... 48

Ryutaro Ichihara, California State University, Fullerton ........................................................................ 49

Why Do Some Athletes Stop Being Athletes? A Phenomenological Critique of Sport as Entertainment in
Relation to Western Sport and Japanese Budo .......................................................................................... 49

Kenji Ishigaki and Takayuki Hata, Tokaiakuen University, Japan ........................................................... 51
School physical education as the education for intercorporeality: An investigation into “the corporeal generalized other” and the corporeal “we” ................................................................. 51
Nancy Kane, State University of New York, College at Cortland .................................................. 52
Transgender and Gender Diverse Athletes: Ethics and U.S. Legislative Initiatives .......................... 52
David Kilpatrick, Mercy College Title ......................................................................................... 53
Staging More Meaningful Games: Cosmodern Drama and the Future of Football ....................... 53
Jeong-Hyo Kim, Seoul National University; Yoon-Shin Kang, Pusan National University, South Korea .......................... 54
A Study on the Structure of Spirituality in Martial Arts .............................................................. 54
Shawn E. Klein, Arizona State University ..................................................................................... 55
Gamesmanship as Discovery Process ......................................................................................... 55
Filip Kobiela, University of Physical Education in Krakow, Poland .............................................. 57
What is the relation between e-sport and sport? ......................................................................... 57
Kevin Krein, University of Alaska Southeast ................................................................................ 58
The Glide Experience: A Phenomenological Account ............................................................... 58
Oh-Ryun, Kwon, Pusan National University, Jeong-Hyo, Kim, Seoul National University, South Korea .......................................................... 59
A Comparative Study on the Body Theory between Plato and Confucius ..................................... 59
Signe Højbjerg Larsen, University of Southern Denmark ............................................................. 60
What is the value of urban lifestyle sports? .................................................................................. 60
Sigmund Loland, Norwegian School of Sport Sciences ............................................................... 62
Phenomenology of gliding sports ............................................................................................... 62
Ole Lund and Esben Stilund Volshøj, VIA University College .................................................. 63
Movement freedom and how it may be taught in physical education classes ............................... 63
Cam Mallett, Penn State University .............................................................................................. 64
“Man vs. Beast,” an Ethical Analysis: How Sporting Contests Between Animals and Athletes of Color Portray Both as Inferior ............................................................. 64
Lukáš Mareš, University of South Bohemia .................................................................................. 65
‘Good Sport’: Different Dimensions and their Constitutive Properties ....................................... 65
Mafaldo Maza, Universidad Autonoma Chapingo, Mexico ............................................................ 66
The existential -selfhood- of play. ............................................................................................... 66
Breana McCoy and Irena Martinkova, Charles University .......................................................... 67
Philosophy, Democracy and Sport: Three agonistic social practices ....................................... 67
Douglas McLaughlin, California State University, Northridge .................................................. 68
Conceding Defeat ....................................................................................................................... 68
Sandra Meeuwsen, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Hans Koeleman, The Hague University of Applied Sciences The Feminization of Olympism; Dead End or Modern Sports’ Future? ........................................................ 69
Eduardo Mendieta, Penn State University ................................................................................... 70
On Running: A Philosopher’s Sprint ............................................................................................ 70
Eric Moore, Longwood University ............................................................................................... 71
Title Rules and the Lusory Attitude in Suitsian Formalism ........................................................ 71
Nelson Morales, Western University, Canada ................................................................. 72

Sport, technology, and authenticity ........................................................................ 72

Bill Morgan, Independent Scholar ........................................................................ 74

Sport and Robust Morality .................................................................................. 74

Hiraku Morita, Osaka University of Health and Sport Sciences; Koki Takahashi, Nagasaki University; Takayuki Hata, Tokai Gakuen University ................................................................. 75

How should sport be at present? : War, Covid-19 and Sport .................................. 75

S.P. Morris, Miami University .................................................................................. 76

Hunting, the Duty to Aid, and Wild Animal Ethics .................................................... 76

Jo Morrison, Longwood University, Farmville, VA .................................................. 77

Anti-Doping Policy, Responsibility, and Harm ....................................................... 77

Jo Morrison and Eric Moore, Longwood University, Farmville, VA ....................... 78

Real Performance-Enhancement or Placebo Performance-Enhancement? ............ 78

What do we Object to? ......................................................................................... 78

Arno Müller, Erfurt University, Germany ............................................................... 79

Try not to die – (revisiting) free solo climbing from a philosophical perspective .... 79

Ryan Murtha and Thomas Hunt, The University of Texas at Austin ....................... 80

On the Usefulness of Simon’s Quest for Excellence in Professional Sports .......... 80

Levente Nagy, ELTE University, Budapest .............................................................. 81

On Petrarch’s Mountain Climbing: Starts a Cult of Mountaineering, - a Survey of Interpretations ...... 81

Toğa Ozyurtcu, The University of Texas at Austin .................................................. 82

Faking it and Making It: Reflections on Teaching Sport Philosophy as a Non-Philosopher ................. 82

Constantino Pereira Martins, NOVA University of Lisbon / IEF - Coimbra University ......................... 83

Big waves, big questions: philosophical implications in the surfing experience .... 83

Adam G. Pfleegor, Siena College ........................................................................... 84

Technological Advancements, Tests, Skills, and Excellence: An Examination of Modern Golf ............ 84

Alexander Pho, University of Wisconsin-Madison ................................................. 85

Articulating the Sporting Moral Community: Augmenting Interpretivism with Constructive Ethical Pragmatism ........................................................................................................ 85

Jon Pike, The Open University .............................................................................. 86

Fairness, Sex, Gender, and the Crisis in Sports Ethics ........................................... 86

Taliah L. Powers, Brock University ........................................................................ 87

In Search of a Moral Sense of Self: A Critique of Physical Literacy ....................... 87

Danny Rosenberg Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada .................... 88

Schutz on Social Interaction and Intersubjective Motives: Toward an Understanding of Typifications in Sport ........................................................................................................ 88

John Russell, Langara College .............................................................................. 90

Fallacies in Bernard Suits’ Utopia: Game Playing, Striving, and Idleness as Play .......... 90

Emily Ryall, Rachael Bullingham and Francesca O’Neil, University of Gloucestershire ................................................................. 91
The invisibility of trans men in sport and contested concepts of ‘fairness’, ‘safety’ and ‘inclusion’..........91
Pam Sailors, Missouri State University, and Desiree Melton, Savannah College of Art and Design .................92
Losing the Race: Black Women on the Track ...........................................................................................................92
Takuya Sakamoto, University of Tsukuba and Yo Sato, Meisei University .................................................................93
Rethinking a site of “animality” in the concept of sport ..........................................................................................93
Jenny Schiff, CUNY .........................................................................................................................................................94
A Place for Sport in Aristotle’s Account of Bravery in the Nicomachean Ethics .........................................................94
Jaime Schultz, Pennsylvania State University ............................................................................................................95
Which Came First? On Embodiment and Rules in Women’s Artistic Gymnastics Abstract ........................................95
Angela Schneider, Alan Oldham, and Loughran Butcher, Western University, Canada ...........................................96
Abjection, Embodiment, Women’s sport and Doping .................................................................................................96
Chad Seifried, Louisiana State University ..................................................................................................................97
Environmental Ethics and Deep Ecology: An Examination of Automobile Race Circuits and Their Use Renewable Energy .................................................................................................................................97
Matija Mato Škerbić, University of Zagreb ..................................................................................................................98
Humbleness and Modesty as Virtues in Football and the Way to Realise Mutualism: Case Zlatko Dalić .... 98
Cesar R. Torres, The College at Brockport, State University of New York, and Francisco Javier López Frías, The Pennsylvania State University ........................................................................................................100
The Just Organized Youth Sport Team ...................................................................................................................100
Yunus Tuncel, New York University ..........................................................................................................................101
Cruelty, Violence, and the Death Drive: Sport as a Field of Transfiguration .................................................................101
Gregg Twietmeyer, Mississippi State University ........................................................................................................102
Are Rules All a Compliance Director Has to Work With? ...........................................................................................102
Lucien von Schomberg, University of Greenwich ......................................................................................................104
The Existential Responsibility of Being Creative: The KRC Genk Blueprint ..............................................................104
Deborah Vossen, St. Francis Xavier University ...........................................................................................................105
The Grasshopper: A Case Study of Games in Literature ...........................................................................................105
Charlene Weaving, St. Francis Xavier University ........................................................................................................106
Dear Basketball...a love story turned horror: Contextualizing the case of the Black Mamba ...................................106
Clayton Whalen, Mississippi State University Department of Kinesiology .................................................................107
Aristotle, Intelligence, and Touch: The Relationship Between Embodiment and Knowing ...................................107
Christopher C. Yorke, Langara College // Kwantlen Polytechnic University ............................................................108
‘The Metaphysics of Leisure’: Bernard Suits’ Autotelic Valuation of Gameplay vs Randolf Feezell’s Atelic Challenge ..................................................................................................................................................108
Keynote Abstracts

BILL MORGAN & SCOTT KRETCHMAR

THE FOUNDING OF IAPS: LEADERS, KEY EVENTS, AND CHALLENGES

In this presentation we detail the early history of IAPS, focusing on the leadership of Warren Fraleigh and others who contributed to the founding of our society. We discuss an important conference that predated our founding in 1972, identify the role Brockport played in the development of the philosophy of sport, and detail steps that led to the publishing of the Journal of the Philosophy of Sport. We also identify several challenges faced by our founders including interdisciplinary cooperation between physical education and philosophy as well as roadblocks to the growth, diversification, and internationalization of our organization.

Warren Fraleigh Distinguished Scholars

DOUG HOCHSTETLER, JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY

ROCKS, SCORNED FACTS, AND DIAMONDS: EXPERIENCE, RECOLLECTION, AND SPORT PHILOSOPHY SCHOLARSHIP

In The Inward Morning, Henry Bugbee (1976) recounts his experience as a graduate student: “It was truly peripatetic, engendered not merely while walking, but through walking that was essentially a meditation of the place” (p. 139). My overall contention is perhaps simple even if it generally goes unmentioned; I want to remind us of the importance of sport and physical activity experiences for our scholarly work. In Part One, I outline the nature of experience and why this is crucial for sport philosophers and sport philosophy. In Part Two, I turn to the process of reflecting on experience, exploring how reflection happens and the import of reflection for our lives and writing. Finally, in Part Three, I move to the writing process related to sport experiences. The manner in which we articulate philosophic principles and arguments, even though these points may be written in third-person, may also be informed by and through an experiential lens.

JESÚS ILUNDÁIN-AGURRUZA, LINFIELD UNIVERSITY

FLOURISHING, PURPOSE, AND TEMPORALITY IN SPORT AND LIFE – LIVING THE MOMENT

This address explores flourishing in the contexts of sport and life. It involves a normative evaluation of well-being and the role sport plays where purpose (and related notions, e.g., life’s meaning) and our temporal existence constitute the philosophical trusses.
The inquiry engages a constellation of “concepts-in-tension” that help elucidate pertinent issues. For example, in relation to purpose, telos and purposelessness; in regard to temporality, its existential phenomenology vis-à-vis linear/circular time at various timescales; and concerning flourishing, a thick holistic view of well-being that is evaluatively objective yet subjectively rich and pluralistic (Thomson et al. 2021). Of relevance is Warren Fraleigh’s early work, wherein he laid out foundational values for sport, as with his keen discussion of purpose in sport (1975) and sports education (1990), or his four-fold normative analysis of sporting contests (1983).

East Asian culture and philosophies complement the discussion. For instance, Dōgen’s Being-Time –ujii – (1985) and Takeuchi’s examination of the impermanence of things – mujokan – (2019) as they relate to temporality and purpose. In a concrete fashion, Japanese dō (transformative practices that aim at flourishing), specifically those involving martial arts, afford a truly autotelic alternative to flourishing beyond mainstream notions in the West. This comparative facet does not so much refute as ‘relegate’ Western views: it incorporates as true— but only as part of the whole — contrary stances without rejecting them (Kasulis 2018).

Bibliography


In the last half-century methods of tracking physical parameters of sport performance have significantly developed. A recreational runner is now able to track her heart rate, breathing frequency and power output (to name a few) live, during every training session. Accordingly, the capabilities of a well-equipped scientific laboratory improved to an impressive degree. Unfortunately, we are not observing similar advancements in tracking the mental characteristics of an athlete during exercise.

Despite great developments in the psychology of sport, not enough attention is given to the subjective feelings of athletes. Widely in use, Borg’s Rate of Perceived Exertion (Borg, 1970), albeit ingenious in its simplicity, flattens athlete’s experience of fatigue to a single number. Even though it provides some information, it is far from being a comprehensive description of mental states held by an exercising human agent. It is hard to understand this omission in the light of the well-established importance of different psychological factors (emotional state, level of motivation etc.) for sport performance (McCormick et al., 2015; Noakes, 2012).

One may argue that it is the very nature of subjective feelings that they dodge our attempts to quantify them. However, a more constructive approach would be to ask – how can we include them in the research process? From a philosophical perspective, investigation in the theory of action is very instructive. For example, distinction between “basic” and “non-basic actions” (Danto, 1965) or distinct kinds of “trying” to achieve some sport-goal (Faulkner, 2014) may prove helpful in establishing some models that could reflect athlete’s mental states during exercise or at least help to better understand their dynamics.

I claim that not only psychology but also phenomenology understood as a method of investigation of human first-person experience based on a balanced combination of empirical observation, reflective introspection, and linguistic analysis (Gallagher, 2005), may bring progress in this field. More specifically, phenomenology and conceptual analysis can provide tools for better understanding athlete’s subjective experiences which in turn can enrich the investigation in exercise science and be useful for developing new mental strategies in sport and improving performance.

**Keywords:** rate of perceived exertion, phenomenology, exercise, action theory

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Digital Technology (DigiTech) is a central part of physical activity today. The ever-growing selection of wearable devices, apps and online platforms provide possibilities for quantifying and sharing details of one’s activity patterns, and these tools are often considered useful for motivation, social connectivity and/or performance optimization. Furthermore, exercise science knowledge is predominantly communicated to the public in forms that encourage a quantified and monitored approach to movement practices (e.g., minutes of activity per week needed for health benefits). DigiTech, in short, is omnipresent in contemporary movement cultures.

In our paper, we question how DigiTech changes our revealing of meaning in the world. We discuss this through a focus on bodily awareness. We argue that although classic philosophical conceptions of embodiment and technology (e.g., Ihde, 2002), as well as psychological accounts of DigiTech and physical activity (e.g. Gao, 2017) provide valuable starting points, they do not sufficiently account for the ways that new forms of DigiTech affect our bodily being. Contemporary existence is saturated with digital technologies that shape our lifeworlds in radically new ways (Lagerkvist, 2019). Therefore, there is a need for new ways of capturing what it is like to be a body in sport and physical activity today.

Our exploration takes its starting point from Heidegger’s (1977) insights on the nature of modern technology. We follow his arguments that the essence of modern technology is not its instrumental use. Rather, modern technology is a mode of revealing. More precisely, it enframes our perception and discloses the world as a resource (standing-reserve). Here, however, we depart from Heidegger’s analysis to pose the question: which mode of revealing is involved in DigiTech?

To explore answers to this question, we draw on phenomenological accounts of bodily awareness and apply these perspectives to the case of wearable technology. A prominent account of bodily awareness can be found in Drew Leder’s (1990) book on the absent body. He distinguishes between 1) the Ecstatic Body, 2) the Recessive body and 3) the Dys-appearing Body. In the first two of these, Leder argues, the body is mostly absent from experience. The body only appears to us when our ways of coping or communicating with the world break down, or when we experience pain or disease. This is the dys-appearing body.

Although the body is present in our awareness when it is framed by DigiTech, we argue that the way it appears is not captured by dys-appearance. Therefore, we suggest the term digi-appearance as an extension to Leder’s analysis which helps to capture the body experienced through DigiTech. After clarifying the main features of the digi-appearing body, we discuss how this conception can contribute to better understand the bodily experience of being physically active in the digital age.

Keywords: Digital technology; embodiment; phenomenology; physical activity

Bibliography:


The WADA Code was introduced in 2003, and came into force in 2004. The whereabouts system, a system developed to drug test athletes out-of-competition without prior notice, was first adopted under the 2003 Code. Under the 2003 Code, athletes selected for out-of-competition “no advance notice” testing were required to submit their “whereabouts information”; this included their personal details, home address, contact number, training venues and times, training camps they may attend, travel plans and competition schedules. Over the years, these requirements have become more stringent, and sanctions for failure to provide whereabouts or missed tests harsher. Under the current regime, athletes in registered testing pools can be subjected to an out-of-competition test at any time, on any given day of the week (7 days a week, 365 days a year). More importantly, the whereabouts system has raised serious concerns regarding the right to privacy of elite athletes. Athletes have alleged that the system is highly invasive, interferes with their private lives and has been a permanent source of anxiety and stress. The European Court of Human Rights ruled in 2018 that although the system was violative of athlete privacy, such violation was necessary and proportional to achieve the dual aim (protection of health and well-being of athletes and ensuring clean sport) of anti-doping programmes. The Court balanced athletes’ right to privacy on the one hand and the aims sought to be achieved by anti-doping programmes on the other. I re-evaluate this balancing exercise and discuss the lack of proportionality between the infringement of the right and measures adopted under the whereabouts system. Emphasis is placed on the ineffectiveness of doping control mechanisms through an examination of testing figures and reports released by WADA. Further, as a result of wide-scale data collection in the form of Athlete Biological Passport, athletes are highly vulnerable to a breach of their informational privacy. I suggest the revision of the whereabouts system on the grounds of athlete privacy.

Keywords: the right to privacy, whereabouts system, WADA, proportionality

Bibliography:


When the 2022 FIFA Men’s World Cup was awarded to Qatar, it raised a number of moral concerns, perhaps the most prominent of which was Qatar’s woeful record on human rights in the arena of migrant labour. Given that the World Cup will be hosted in stadia built by migrant labourers, many of whom have died while working to prepare for the event, the decision for Qatar to host seems to make football players, coaches, journalists and fans from across the world potentially complicit in this injustice.

Qatar’s interest in hosting the event is aptly characterized as a case of ‘sportswashing’. The first aim of this paper is to provide an account of the nature of sportswashing, as a practice of using an association with sport, usually through hosting an event or owning a club (such as Paris Saint-Germain, owned by Qatar), to improve a tarnished moral reputation acquired through being a perpetrator of injustice. This may be done through distracting away from wrongdoing, minimizing it, occluding it from widespread attention, or normalizing it (cf. Brannagan and Giulianotti 2018, Kobierecki and Strożek 2021).

Next, we articulate the distinctive wrongs of sportswashing. The gravest moral wrong here is the background injustice which sportswashing threatens to perpetuate. But the distinctive wrongs of sportswashing are twofold. First, it makes participants in sport (athletes, coaches, journalists, fans) complicit in the sportswasher’s wrongdoing. This is a form of structural complicity (Aragon and Jaggar 2018) which extends a moral challenge to millions of people involved with sport, as they are involved in upholding and reinforcing structural injustice in ways that may be difficult for them to identify (Knowles 2021). Second, sportswashing corrupts valuable heritage associated with sporting traditions and institutions.

We follow Knowles (2021) in claiming that those made complicit in injustice by sportswashing ought to be open to ways they may be able to resist, rather than accepting the inevitability of injustice. We therefore conclude by examining how structural complicity instigated by sportswashing ought to be resisted. The appropriate forms of resistance will depend upon different roles people fill (Zheng 2018), in this case the sporting role (eg. athlete, coach, journalist, fan). The basic dichotomy of resistance strategies is to either exit the condition of complicity, for example by refusing to participate in the sporting event, or to modify one’s engagement with the goal of transformation in mind. However, as we argue, it is in the combination of these strategies that there is room for creativity and hope alike.

**Keywords:** Sportswashing, Complicity, Wrongdoing, Fandom

**Bibliography:**


In recent decades, the concept of meaning and its relationship to human movement has become an increasingly studied phenomenon in physical education (PE) and sport research (Beni et al., 2017). Kretchmar has highlighted the importance of emphasizing meaning in PE in that it is “what is closest and most familiar to all of us” (2007, p. 374) and provides an opportunity to “strengthen our pedagogy” in PE and “win more converts to the active lifestyle” (Kretchmar, 2000a, p. 260-261). In particular, scholars have called for the prioritization of meaningful experiences – those which are full of personal significance (Kretchmar, 2007) – for students in PE (e.g. Arnold, 1979; Ennis, 2007; Metheny, 1968). However, in spite of these calls, a focus on identifying effective methods and pedagogies for teaching toward meaningfulness in PE has been largely absent from the literature (Kretchmar, 2000b). In their 2017 review of literature on the meaningfulness of young people’s experiences in PE and youth sport, Beni et al. largely found support for Kretchmar’s (2006) assertion that “the promotion of a personally meaningful physical education experience, more often than not, lies in the direction of social interaction, challenge, increased motor competence, fun, and delight.” In addition, the authors added to this list the concept of ‘personally relevant learning,’ which they have elsewhere articulated as a need for students to understand what they are learning, why it matters, and how it relates to their lives beyond PE (Beni et al., 2021).

Since the publication of this review, scholars have called for a greater focus on the concept of personally relevant learning in PE, both in scholarship and in practice (Thorburn, 2021) – moving beyond the habitual to that which is more personal (Merleau-Ponty, 2012). The purpose of this presentation is to articulate a philosophical underpinning for the concept of personally relevant learning in PE and its relationship to fostering meaningful experiences for students in PE. This argument draws primarily from the work of Dewey (1938) (e.g. continuity of experience; educative and miseducative learning experiences), Metheny (1968) (e.g. denotations and connotations; the personal and subjective nature of meaning), and Kretchmar (2007, 2008) (e.g. distinguishing meaning from meaningfulness, connecting meaning with learning). This presentation provides a philosophical foundation regarding the importance of personally relevant learning in relation to students’ experiences of meaningfulness in PE, along with pragmatic suggestions for how these ideas might inform a pedagogical approach oriented toward meaningfulness in PE.

Keywords: meaning, meaningful, personally relevant learning, physical education

Bibliography:


With rising cultural awareness and acceptance of transgender identities, ethical questions and debates about the inclusion and exclusion of transgender athletes have emerged within sport philosophy literature. Scholars have suggested various values or normative measures to help adjudicate the issue: fairness within competition, safety, and the right to meaningful gender narratives, among others. Notably, disagreements often stem from differences in how philosophers have conceptualized the underlying nature or purpose of sport. In this presentation, however, I argue we ought to put aside discourses about the nature or purpose of sport and instead focus foremost on what social justice in general requires. Indeed, I contend standards of social justice, in general, should dictate how we create the purpose of sport. Prioritizing social justice ought to guide how we decide what sport looks like, what it is for, and thus how we should manage transgender inclusion. After making this case, I will maintain theories of justice, guided by both utilitarian and deontological logic, would have us normalize the inclusion of transgender athletes in sport.

**Keywords:** Transgender; justice; inclusion

**Bibliography**


In just over a decade, philosophers of sport have produced a substantial and rich literature examining whether, or on what terms, transgender athletes should be eligible to compete in women’s classifications at elite levels. In a much-read recent article, Jon Pike has sought to shift philosophers’ attention from substance to methodology, arguing that sport governing bodies should approach the question by arraying the plurality of relevant values in lexical order and not, as prior contributions to the debates had assumed, by “balancing.” While welcoming Pike’s methodological turn, this paper argues that lexical priority is not the right framework for analysis and that balancing is after all—albeit a weighted balancing that can accommodate duties of greater and lesser stringency. It also argues that, despite his protestations to the contrary, the weighted balancing that this paper proposes is the approach that Pike actually employs.

**Keywords:** transgender, lexical ordering, balancing, eligibility, inclusion, fairness

**Bibliography:**


I argue that an oft-rehearsed dispute between Suitsian ‘definitionism’ and Wittgensteinian ‘anti-definitionism’ about games has typically been conducted on the basis of a misleading portrayal of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. In defending his favoured method of conceptual analysis, Suits (2014) misinterprets Wittgenstein’s (1968) challenge. (Johnson and Hudecki (2020) successfully make the negative case that, as a matter of textual record, Wittgenstein does not say what Suits make him out to say about definitions; but uninitiated readers are as likely to be puzzled as edified by these remarks in the absence of the sort of positive exposition, which I aim to provide, of their wider context and implications for philosophical method). Suits construes Wittgenstein as committed to a substantive “Theory of Family Resemblances”. On this reading (whose roots I identify in early interpreters of the Investigations such as Bambrough (1961)), resemblances are intended as a direct replacement for universals in traditional theories of language, as providing a set of conditions which fix the meaning of a term. This reading – also supported, influentially, by McGinn (2012) – shapes Suits’ case against Wittgenstein and has become the default reading in philosophy of sport. I agree that if this had been Wittgenstein’s view it would be easily dismissible along familiar lines. I am convinced, however, that this is a clear misreading of the intended role of family resemblances. Appreciating this, however, demands a deeper engagement which places that notion in the wider context of Wittgenstein’s later ideas and innovations regarding philosophical method. The notion of family resemblances is not intended to refute the ‘possibility of definition’ but to challenge “the conception we form of what knowing about our concepts would be like” (Diamond, 1991, p. 6). Wittgenstein thinks that we come to know about our concepts by being inducted into the forms of social life in which they have their point and purpose and that knowledge of definitions is, in most cases, irrelevant to conceptual mastery thus construed. Our concepts are here portrayed as intersubjectively constituted in the course of human action and open to the vicissitudes thereof; as a result, they are open to being altered and to being used in new and even conflicting ways as the surrounding practices evolve. This approach can be contrasted with a traditional method which severs language from the world and approaches meaning as though it were a fixed and abstract property graspable by analysing words and concepts without reference to their place in our lives. To summarise, I will argue that: (i) Suits’ negative arguments against Wittgenstein’s approach fail to make contact with their intended target; (ii) his famous definition of game-playing fails as a ‘performative refutation’ because it begs the question as far as the relevant methodological issues are concerned; and (iii) Suits’ defence of his own method remains vulnerable to a more thoroughgoing Wittgensteinian challenge. In short, I will argue, against the standard story of this ‘debate’, that the much-advertised confrontation between Suits and Wittgenstein on this terrain has yet to take place.

**Keywords:** Suits; Wittgenstein; definitions; games; family resemblance

**Bibliography**


SPORTS COMMUNITIES IN THE VIRTUAL AGE: COVID-19, PERSONAL TRAINERS, AND MACINTYRE.

After the Covid-19 pandemic beginning it has become common, for personal trainers (or sports instructors) to accompany their student’s online. Sending tasks through websites or apps while getting feedback through photos and videos has become part of these professionals’ daily life. The personal trainer occupation is changing drastically through the constant incorporation of technological resource. Less has been said about the consequences of such changes. By drawing on Alasdair MacIntyre’s philosophy, this work-in-progress aims to ask what implications this phenomenon generates in virtues and excellences.

Sports are understood as social practices in the MacIntyre’s sense, as widely accepted within the philosophy of sport (Lopez Frias, 2015). One of the main reasons for adherence to his work is his notion of internal goods. Internal goods can only be comprehensive within the practice in question, while their identification comes to light only through one’s experience within such practice. Therefore, practices cannot be comprehensive without their history and a community of practitioners.

MacIntyre (1984) also highlights the importance of relationships between people in a community of practitioners. According to Reid (2012), a practice is not only a group of people who share technical skills, but groups of people sharing common values. Communities, therefore, have a primacy position in MacIntyre’s interpretation within the philosophy of sport, since “virtues in sport are cultivated not only by facing the artificial obstacles of the game itself but also by engaging in a community” (Reid, 2012, p. 65). In this sense, Lopez Frias (2018) mentions “excellences are not acquired and exercised in the void, but rather within social practices. These practices, in turn, are connected to wider meaningful frameworks, such as a moral tradition and the individuals’ narrative of life” (169). Following this pattern, Faulkner (2019) argues that training can also be considered a social practice.

MacIntyre (1984) states that virtues are the goods that serve as a reference to define our relationship with other practitioners. However, when one performs the practice outside a community, the individual may be deprived of attaining some internal goods, virtues, and excellences that could only be acquired by participating and engaging in a community of practitioners. Therefore, this study investigates the obstacles present when someone is training alone – or accompanied online by a personal trainer – and whether this dynamic is an obstacle for the individual to achieve the community internal goods.

Fundamentally, in light of MacIntyre’s notion of community and the Covid-19 pandemic, this paper targets the very concept of sports communities in our virtual age. By comprehending these obstacles, in addition, this study also hopes to contribute to the reflection on the personal trainer and related professionals.

Keywords: Social practices Sports communities Personal trainers.

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Bernard Suits suggested that a game or sport activity has a prelusory goal, which he understood as “a specific achievable state of affairs (...) it can be described before, or independently of, any game of which it may be, or come to be, a part of” (Suits 1978: 50-51). With regard to Suits’ idea that “playing a game is the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles” Graham McFee observes with regard to chess that “the idea of ‘unnecessary obstacles’ makes no sense”, since “the ‘obstacles’ here seem explicable independently of the game” (Suits 1978: 55, McFee 2004: 25). The same observation holds for prelusory goals and complex sports like football. One might suggest that the prelusory goal of football is to make the football cross the goal line, between the goalposts, etc. but this description relies on having a pre-existing institution of football already in place. One could argue, as Suits does, that the notion of a prelusory goal of chess, should be about the token chess game and not about the type, since “it is not possible to achieve the prelusory goal of chess (...) aside the institution of chess” (Suits 1978: 58). The same holds for a sport like football. This admission renders the idea of prelusory goals in sport irrelevant to the analysis of sport, since such an analysis is about the type of activity or practice that sport is. Furthermore, even on the token level Suits’ notion is misguided. If your description of the prelusory goal of some footballers wanting to play football is of a specific football pitch, then if the match is moved, say, due the pitch being waterlogged, then that prelusory goal is impossible and no-one would show up. But they will, so this description must be wrong. On the other hand, in this case, if your description of the prelusory goal is that any old pitch would do, then the footballers would be motivated to show up at different grounds as that would make this so-called prelusory goal easier to archive. But they won’t, so this description must be wrong. Instead, we should realize that the correct way of describing the footballers is to say that whatever they want to achieve they want to archive it in a football match. The footballers want to have a match with each other and having a match is their prelusory goal. “Prelusory, we cooperate to have a match: lusorily, we aim at defeating each other” (Borge 2019: 154). These prelusory goals not only guides us before playing, but also while playing and this can explain how various football games at various levels differ with regard to physicality, tactics, and other sport behaviors. In the World Cup final your opponent are not likely to walk away if you put in lots of hard tackles, play ultra defensive, or what have we not, but in a park game they might just do that, and that would destroy your prelusory goal of having a match to play.

**Keywords:** Bernard Suits, prelusory goal, cooperation, football.

**Bibliography**


Fairness and safety are, indisputably, important values for sport. However, within the jurisprudence of sport the former has received much more attention. In the sport philosophy literature, the rules have served mainly two functions: metaphysical and normative. While the former has addressed the underpinning elements of the game theory, the latter has been deeply concerned to its fairness. Not surprisingly, the referees’ role in sports (hereafter understood as games) has most appeared subjected to the value of fairness. Although fairness is located at the core of the philosophical debate around referees’ roles, little has been said on another role referees have in sports: to keep safety. To bring safety to the debate, I first review the literature on rules in sport, with special attention to the so-called categorical paradigm of rules (Carlson & Gleaves, 2011). My intent is to show how philosophers of sport have drawn extensively on rules, but little has been said about their relation to safety. Second, I present the different conceptions of violence in sport and how Simon et al. (2015)’s vulnerability principle (VP) does not help referees to adjudicate violence in the context of the game. Finally, I conclude with the thesis that referees are protectors of the games’ fairness and the athletes’ safety, and why the latter is a special case for importing values external to sport.

Keywords: Safety; protection; referee

Bibliography


My paper aims to highlight the epochal meaning of technology (the fact that it represents the current “subject of history”), by means of an unconventional theoretical tool: the running (i.e. its newest evolution). Concretely, I will compare Albert Borgmann’s 1984 prophecy on running with a recent event, which totally denies it.

In his book Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life: A Philosophical Inquiry (1984), Borgmann – the father of “device paradigm”, a leading figure of the “empirical turn” in philosophy of technology – characterized running as one of the few oasis of “wilderness” for human being before the advance of “Gestell” (Enframing). More precisely, he considered the long-distance running a “meta- technological antidote to the sway of the device paradigm on our lives”. In doing so, he referred to George Sheehan’s bestseller Running & Being: The Total Experience (1978).

Vienna, October 12, 2019. Eliud Kipchoge – two times Olympic marathon champion – becomes the first human being to run the marathon under two hours. In its essence this event represents a total denial of Borgmann’s claim, namely the proof that Gestell has colonized also this enclave of wilderness by converting running from a practice of human resistance into an entirely rationalized activity. The under two hour result was in fact totally planned and this the reason why it could not been homologated as world record. Within this totally planned/rationalized framework everything – i.e. the choice of location, the technological doping (a new generation of shoes), the use of human beings as “hares”... – has been thought for a unique end: the performance itself. The performance as imperative. As a consequence, the subjectivity of this event is no longer human being (the runner), but an impersonal and indefinable entity. Here human being represents a gear of the mechanism. Turned into human tools, the runners become “raw materials” which obey therefore the logic of “challenging-forth” (according to Heidegger’s sense of the words). What has been celebrated as a human enterprise, looks like a radical experience of alienation. An unaware experiment of de-humanization – or post- humanization, if you prefer –, in any case a further step towards the (self-)disenchantment of human being. This event proves once again the planetary extent of technology as epochal phenomenon, its capability to submit to its logic of rationalization as will to power every space of human life. Insofar as technology stands out as a total and potentially totalitarian force, it should be considered the eidos of current Lebenswelt.

Differently from Borgmann, already in the mid of -30s Walter Benjamin spoke about the technicization of sporting gesture and running in particular. He quoted the example of Paavo Nurmi – Finnish legendary long-distance runner – to show that “in the age of mechanical (technological) reproduction of work of art” running turned into a “test performance”.

As a conclusion I will mention two counterexamples with respect to this epochal tendency: Abebe Bikila (the barefoot runner winner of the Olympic marathon in Rome 1960) and Eric Liddell (the “Flying Scotsman” which inspired Hugh Hudson’s movie Chariots of Fire).

Keywords: Running; Marathon; Philosophy of Technology; Marathon; Borgmann (Albert); Heidegger (Martin); Benjamin (Walter).

Bibliography:


The debate over the athletic role model has been a durable issue in sport philosophy. Despite much social and academic attention on the behavior of athletes, consensus over the nature of the athletic role model still eludes us. In 2017 we published an article in Fair Play with the intent of providing a new philosophical understanding of the athletic role model that drew on phenomenological conceptions of becoming and was grounded in expressions of athlete autonomy, which permitted a more informed and negotiated role model relationship. While we remain steadfast in our argument for autonomy’s essential place in the conception of athletic role models, further second order phenomena must be addressed as well.

The second order issues raised by autonomous athletic role models can be captured as tensions involved in various dichotomies such as the utility of individual versus collective action, practicing transparent vulnerability versus stoic strength, exercising rights versus abiding by duties, proactive versus reactive stances, the self and the other, a priori desires and a posteriori assessments of behavior. Some of those dichotomies have a significant bearing on the debate at hand while others are “flavor” differences that are not determinative in relation to the underlying ethical dimensions at play.

Since writing in 2017, after Colin Kaepernick disrupted the landscape of athletic role modeling, there have been a significant number of other cases in which athletes have taken public stances in an attempt to model new behaviors, or remodel old ones, within the highly visible arena of elite competitive sport. Examples include Simone Biles and Naomi Osaka withdrawing from competition due to competition-caused psychological issues, Kyrie Irving’s social activism in response to the murder of George Floyd and his resistance to taking the COVID-19 vaccine, and the collective action of women’s gymnasts in exposing sexual abuse by Larry Nassar. These cases and others continue to stir social and academic debate about exactly how we should understand the athlete as a role model. This paper will seek to establish principles by which we can transcend dichotomous tensions and incrementally resolve the debate around the nature of the athletic role model. To accomplish this we will draw on the central concept of citizenship and complement it with concepts of welfare, dialectic, and time. Such concepts should provide fertile epistemological ground for coming to a fuller philosophical understanding of the athletic role model. In doing so we hope to productively refresh our relationship with the diverse pluralism of athletic behavior, and provide effective analytical frameworks for interpreting role models and the role modeling relationship.

**Keywords:** Role Models, Epistemology, Pluralism, Citizenship

**Bibliography:**


CLAUDIO D’AMATO, VIRGINIA TECH

FAIRNESS ISN’T FAIR: WHY THE ADVANTAGES OF TRANSGENDER ATHLETES ARE NOT UNJUST

Much recent scholarship has analyzed the question of the fairness of allowing transgender athletes to participate in competitive sports on par with cis athletes, focusing especially on women’s sports as a paradigmatic case study. Some analyses also discuss this question in the context of justice, attempting to balance a requirement for competitive fairness with a similarly urgent requirement for inclusivity. This paper offers an account of this dilemma that does not require any such balancing. It argues, first, that since competitive fairness is not a conditio sine qua non of justice, it is possible for a competition that included both cis and trans athletes to be unfair, but still just. Fairness is only a prerequisite of justice in certain deontological theories of justice, such as those proposed by Rawls, Gaus, and (to a lesser extent) Sen; but there is no reason why competitive sports should adopt one such theory to regulate their guiding ethical principles. Second, this paper argues that even if one did endorse a deontological theory of justice in sports ethics, the supposedly conflicting desiderata of inclusivity and fairness are not actually at odds. Inclusivity is a binary property, such that either all women (cis and trans) are included on equal footing or they are not. On the other hand, fairness is a gradual and relational property, such that a large number of factors contribute to a state of affairs being “more fair than” or “less fair than” another—including, most notably, a slew of potentially unfair advantages not related to sex or gender that competitive sports do not screen for and that have never drawn the scholarly attention currently being dedicated to athletes who are transgender. This paper thus recommends that debates over trans athlete inclusion emphasize inclusivity while greatly diminishing their emphasis on competitive fairness; or, at least, that such debates properly account for all factors relevant to fairness, without the arbitrary singling out of (dis)advantages deriving from sex, gender, or the hormonal treatments involved in most transitioning regimens.

Keywords: transgender, fairness, equality, inclusion, deontology

Bibliography


What is the appropriate response to a verified case of doping? Specifically, what should follow for an athlete who has been found to have committed an anti-doping rule violation (ADRV)? The prevailing institutional response to ADRVs rests on the ‘Punishment Thesis’, according to which the appropriate response to ADRVs is punitive. I reject the Punishment Thesis, and in its place, I argue for the ‘preventive exclusion’ of athletes from competition as part of a non-punitive approach to post hoc anti-doping measures. The paper moves in three sections. In section 1, I clarify the concept of ‘meaningful competition’, and I establish that the possibility of meaningful competition rests on the trustworthiness of athletes. In section 2, I argue that the prevailing punitive response to doping offences is inadequate because it fails to protect meaningful competition from untrustworthy athletes and it wrongfully excludes trustworthy athletes from competition. Finally, in section 3, I make the case for the restitutive justice notion of ‘preventive exclusion’ on the grounds that it is superior to punitive approaches in its recognition that meaningful competition hinges on the exclusion of untrustworthy athletes and the inclusion of trustworthy athletes.

Keywords: Anti-doping; Doping; Enhancement; Meaningful Competition; Preventative exclusion; Punishment; Trust

Bibliography:
Few people would defend overt demonstrations of racist attitudes in sport, such as making monkey noises to mock black soccer players (Jackson, 2021) or lewd, sexist comments directed at female athletes. Some philosophers (Dixon, 2018) have criticized trash talking as showing disrespect for opponents, even though it does not eventuate in any physical harm. These are all examples of overt actions that exemplify morally problematic attitudes. Even when an attitude like Schadenfreude (the German word for taking pleasure in other people’s misfortune) does not necessarily result in any overt actions, many regard it as morally suspect (McNamee, 2003).

From a virtue ethics perspective, the attempt to separate our attitudes from our actions is wrongheaded. Aristotle thought that we acquire virtuous character traits by performing virtuous actions. We are creatures of habit, and the mere act of doing good things is self-reinforcing, in that we enjoy having the good character traits that we develop. By the same token, it seems overwhelmingly likely that our traits and attitudes will spill over into our attitudes.

However, a provocative article by Earl Spurgin (2015) challenges the conventional wisdom on Schadenfreude. According to Spurgin, we should refrain from being judgmental about not only Schadenfreude but also other attitudes that are normally regarded as problematic. He makes a sharp distinction between the attitudes themselves and any actions we perform on the basis of those attitudes. He condemns gloating and mocking other people for their misfortunes, because of the distress that this would cause for them. He insists, though, that privately experiencing Schadenfreude, and even thoughts of killing one’s boss, is morally neutral. For him, privately entertained thoughts only become a fit subject for moral evaluation when they result in harmful actions on our part. His defense of Schadenfreude is thus a consequentialist one. Spurgin explains that reflecting on why we have such thoughts can result in greater self-understanding, which can itself help us to improve ourselves. This process would be sabotaged if we regard hostile attitudes as intrinsically immoral, and fear of public shame if their attitudes are revealed may lead people to suppress them, thus denying themselves the benefit of greater self-knowledge.

If Spurgin is right, we need to rethink the widespread condemnation of not only Schadenfreude but also several other attitudes in sport. While racist chanting would still be condemned, no objections would remain to both fans and athletes who privately hold racist attitudes toward opponents. Fans would have moral license to indulge hateful attitudes to rival teams, including wishing for terrible misfortunes to happen to their players. Nor is this entirely speculative. Some athletes claim to gain a competitive edge by nurturing hostile thoughts towards rivals and even to fans and journalists (Cherry, 2019). Sport’s status as a playful, make-believe world (Moore, 2019) may make it an especially fertile ground for Spurgin’s emotional-freedom defense. However, Spurgin’s view has some very counter-intuitive consequences that reduce its plausibility in sport or any other field.

Keywords: immoral attitudes; Schadenfreude; racism

Bibliography


Over the past few decades, a new theory of human evolution has placed endurance running at the center of scientific narratives of the emergence of homo sapiens. “The feature that differentiates hominids from other primates is not large brain size, but the set of characters associated with erect bipedal posture and a striding gait,” argued the anthropologist David Carrier in a 1984 article that provided a foundation for a new evolutionary paradigm that put feet rather than brains as the central phenomenon of humanness.1 Leading evolutionary theorists quickly expanded on Carrier’s thesis, churning out best-sellers that promoted this idea to an eager public that purchased their provocative tomes, from Bernd Heinrich’s Why We Run to Daniel Lieberman’s The Story of the Human Body and Exercised.2 Journalists pounced on endurance running and human “being” bandwagon, delivering their own versions of locomotive wisdom to best-sellers lists, especially Chris McDougall’s Born to Run.3 Even endurance-running champions such as Scott Jurek contributed to the scientific, philosophic, and popular phenomenology linking running and humanness in an inseparable bond.4

Embedded in each of these pop-phenomenological accounts of running and humanness were evocations of a particular human culture that has been historically identified as the primal essence of running as “being”—a culture whose very name (Tarahumara or Rarámuri) at various historical moments has been translated into modern languages as “foot runner.” The Tarahumara have for more than a century been cast as avatars of the primal avatars who signify the fundamental human experience of running.5 The appearance of the “foot runners” in these narratives was no mere historical accident, as the promoters of the running as humanness paradigm drew on modern studies of the tribe to support their new evolutionary paradigms. Nor was the emergence of these theories at the turn-of-the-twenty-first-century at the very same moment in which the Tarahumara began to race in the early 1990s against “modern” ultrarunners in contests freighted with existential meditations on running as humanness. This presentation employs a variety of philosophical and critical theory paradigms to examine the historical phenomenon that emerged from the 1980s to the 2020s in contests between the Tarahumara and “moderns” designed to illumine essential structures of humanness embodied in locomotion and relocate ontological understandings of our species from our “minds” to our “feet”—bare or shod.

Keywords: phenomenology; running; humanness; cross-cultural sporting contests

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Most sport philosophers argue that a key consideration for sport is fairness, at least of fairness within the context of the game itself. In many ways, this makes sense. It ensures uncertainty in victory—that competitors have relatively equitable chances of winning. Additionally, it helps to guide decision-making about rule changes and advancements in technology.

However, as Berg (2018) argues, there are differences between adjudicating “sport-specific differences” and answering calls for justice. For example, sport-specific questions, such as those concerning strategic fouls, are not easily determined by general ethical systems. Thus, broad internalists assert that the internal excellences of the sport can help determine whether or not strategic fouls are a morally acceptable practice in sport. However, Berg contends these appeals to “practice-specific excellences” are insufficient for questions of justice (such as those about gender-equity) and that instead, we ought to focus external systems of morality for those types of questions.

Building from Berg’s analysis, I argue that sport must first prioritize justice before it can determine whether or not it is fair. Justice is important as it applies to a variety of circumstances, in particular those related to inclusive practices within sport. In recent debates, this is most notable in determinations of whether and how to include trans athletes. However, it also applies to other questions: are sport policies inclusive to those with disabilities? Do they support racist practices? Do they exclude potential athletes based on immutable characteristics? These questions cannot, as Berg noted, be sufficiently answered by the internal excellences of sport.

My argument is not only that we ought to prioritize justice, but that we ought to also consider what kind of justice is appropriate for athletic practices. The philosophy of sport literature that addresses justice tends to focus on forms of distributive justice. Despite its prevalence, I follow Young’s (2011) analysis that justice is political and works with social movements (e.g., those for women’s, Black, Indigenous, and disabled rights). Rather than focusing on distribution, justice must understand oppression and domination. I conclude that we not only need to prioritize justice in sport, but that we also ought to consider justice as a political project, coinciding with social movements seeking to eliminate oppression and domination.

**Keywords**: Justice; fairness; social justice

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To develop my case broadly, I draw on both philosophy of sports theories to provide an account of Capoeira Angola’s central concepts and draw on the normative ‘interpretive legal theory’ to explore if certain theories of sports have become reductive and deterministic. Exploring Capoeira Angola’s cultural-historical practices and process fortify arguments made by Richard Gruenau (1983) and John Hargreaves (1986) that suggest that ‘practices and processes’ shape the nature of sporting practices and should emphasize the value of human agency. To build my case, as both an exercise in the philosophy of sports and to discover what Capoeira Angola is, I walk Capoeira Angola through formalism, conventionalism, and Broad internalism in order to see what sticks. Lastly, I explore a particular application of interpretivist theory to Capoeira Angola to tease out a few ideas about a decolonized approach to sports for the Capoeira Angola community. Finally, my thesis, is that Capoeira Angola cannot be reduced to its sport-specific elements (rules, norms, goals, and purpose). Rather, all these need to be viewed through the lens of the particular social context that emerge from with William Morgan’s work on “Deep Conventionalism.”

**Keywords**: Capoeira, Deep Conventionalism, Decoloniality

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One way the debate about strategic fouls has been framed is in terms of whether at least some sports penalties are best understood as prices for rule-violations or as ‘sanctions’ for such violations (see Fraleigh 2003, Simon 2005, Simon et al 2015). Because the debate has concerned the question of whether such fouls are justified, it is natural to infer that if penalties are sanctions, they imply a prima facie judgment of wrongdoing, or unjustified action. Otherwise, it is not clear why maintaining that penalties are sanctions could help the case that strategic fouls are unjustified. However, the treatment of penalties as either prices or sanctions is a false dichotomy and in this paper I will explore an alternate account of the normative status of sports penalties. Using a legal realist perspective (see Frank 1930), I will first consider whether the status of penalties in sport might not be more clearly understood by regarding all of them as prices. While such a view may have virtues, I will follow Hart 1961 in arguing that it misses a necessarily internal dimension of rules, as well as ignoring the fact that sports penalties are imposed for a failure to meet a standard. Yet inclusion of these dimensions in the concept of the sports penalty does not imply that they are sanctions. For as Feinberg 1970 argued, a necessary condition of punishments is expressive condemnation, which I take to be implied by the relevant notion of sanction. Yet for good reason sports penalties do not imply expressive condemnation of the rule violation. Indeed, one thesis that I aim to support in this investigation is that unless a sporting act violates a standard external to sport, the in-contest negative consequences for the violation should be understood to express no condemnation or reprobation. This is why, for instance, sporting bodies must resort to punitive measures beyond in-game penalties when they wish to express such condemnation. Sports penalties are, in the main, penalties rather than punishments or sanctions. They impose a cost on a failure to meet a standard, but without expressing condemnation of the failure. It may also be worth noting that it is neither severity nor intentionality that distinguishes punishments from penalties. People can be merely penalized for intentionally failing to meet a standard and penalties for unintentional violations can be more severe than punishments.

Keywords: penalty; price; sanction; punishment; foul

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In 2009, male rowing team members at the University of Warwick began selling coffee table books, calendars, films, and other materials featuring frontal nudity. Initially a fundraiser for needed boat repairs, the project soon shifted to countering homophobia and furthering inclusion in sports. In 2014, the group founded Sport Allies, a charity to promote inclusion and challenge homophobia in sports (1). A similar calendar produced by the women’s rowing team supports a cancer charity. Participating athletes received modest compensation. In 2019, the university assumed financial support for the rowers; “Worldwide Roar” continued creation of the highly successful materials featuring Warwick student rowers, participants in other sports, and invited guests. In the first ten years, the sales reportedly garnered over $1 million for the team and its charitable efforts.

Possibilities for student athletes to make money have burgeoned in recent years in the U.S. through state statutes (2), court decisions (3), and changes in the NCAA rules. In this presentation, we explore ethical issues raised by the fundraising of the Warwick rowers or its later iteration as the Worldwide Roar. We ask whether their approach could or should be a model for athletes in the U.S. Several features of the Warwick example are particularly noteworthy in this regard. The fundraising was a team rather than an individual effort, although the athletes received modest compensation for their images. For the first few years, the fundraising was identified with the University of Warwick although the two are now decoupled. The less revealing swimsuit issue of Sports Illustrated draws continuing criticism as sexually exploitative and demeaning of the women it features; the athletes pictured in the fundraising materials are all male although women rowers have now opted to engage in similar fundraising for a different cause. Political divisions in the US have generated intense disagreement about the role of politics in sports and political statements by athletes. In the words of Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan, freedom of expression has become “weaponized” in the US, with both strong Court support for commercial speech and opposition to “compelled” viewpoints; participants might argue that they are exercising rights to freedom of expression while other team members might object to messages potentially attributed to them as members of the team (4).

To assess the ethical significance of these factors, we explore three different models of university sports: as structures to support individual athletes, as teams, and as representatives of universities (e.g., (5), (6) (7). We conclude that significant ethical arguments support permitting not only individual athletes but also teams to engage commercially. However, in the US, efforts like those of the rowers are likely to meet with significant objections if they are attributed either to teams or their universities.

Keywords: university athletes; commercialization; free speech; inclusion

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Suffering and Schadenfreude in Sport

Sport is sometimes construed as a test of human capacities in general and the limits of individual competitors’ capacities in particular. Under this rubric, suffering is constitutive of some sports. Suffering is constitutive when it is not merely informative with respect to a capacity being tested by the sport, but when the capacity to endure suffering is itself part of the test. In this case, suffering is not incidental to the sport, such as when an injury affects an athlete’s performance; nor does suffering merely indicate that one is pressing up against some other relevant limit, such as when the pain of muscle fatigue late in a competition signals that one’s ability to move quickly is compromised. Rather, suffering itself presents a challenge that is essential to the sport, and one’s capacity to endure this suffering is part of what makes that sport the test that it is. What are the morally acceptable emotional responses to the suffering of opponents when this suffering is constitutive of the sport? More precisely, is it morally permissible to feel schadenfreude, taking pleasure in the suffering of an opponent? McNamee (2008) has argued that taking pleasure in another’s pain is morally reprehensible in a sporting context because schadenfreude has roots in envy, not in a sense of justice. Schadenfreude indicates “a lack of [sporting] spirit,” or a “failure to connect with [an opponent’s] humanity” (337). Against this view, we argue that schadenfreude is morally permissible in some sporting contexts in which suffering plays a constitutive role. We further complicate the discussion of schadenfreude in the following two ways. First, we distinguish two varieties also recognized by Aristotle: malignant schadenfreude and benign schadenfreude. As Manca (2019) has argued, these are distinguished by Aristotle through their influence on the subject’s capacity to feel pity. While malignant schadenfreude stands in the way of pity and thus reflects or contributes to a failure to connect to another’s humanity, benign schadenfreude does not stunt one’s capacity for pity. We argue that, in a sporting context, when schadenfreude is attached to constitutive suffering, and insofar as it does not prohibit pity for incidental suffering such as an injury, schadenfreude is benign. We also illustrate instances of benign schadenfreude and suggest that it does arise from a sense of justice. Second, we argue that these two varieties of schadenfreude, although they are not widely recognized in scholarship on the emotion, nevertheless track a widely recognized distinction between malignant and benign envy (Van Dijk and Ouwerkerk 2014). We treat benign schadenfreude and benign envy as counterparts of one another. Thus we argue that, just as benign envy of a competitor – not just admiration of a superior athlete, but a desire to best them – is compatible with the sporting spirit, so too is benign schadenfreude.

Keywords: suffering, schadenfreude, envy

Bibliography:


William Morgan (2012, 2020) argues that “deep” and “ethical” conventions of a sporting community determine how athletes act in situations where fairness and equality are contested. Historical norms inform Morgan’s theory of conventionalism. I further engage with his theory through historical interpretations of running media to analyze the ethical norms of American road runners during the 1950s and 1960s. The values of this group of road runners can be interpreted through articles published in the Long Distance Log (1956-1975), the first nationally distributed magazine devoted exclusively to long-distance running in the United States. The nascent long-distance road running community contributed comprehensive coverage of events, performances, and athletes, including women and Black American runners, to the magazine. The magazine celebrated athletes’ dedication to the sport rather than exclusively praising exciting record-breaking performances. Employing Sigmund Loland’s (2007) “thick” interpretation of justice in sport, I argue that the Long Distance Log aligns with his model of “the purist,” which prioritizes the history, traditions, and moral ideals of the sport. In recent years, road runners appear to have transitioned toward Loland’s “consumer” model of justice in sport, which prioritizes excitement over equality. Some leading athletes, including Black American Joseph Gray, a world champion runner, charge that consumer conventions result in a lack of coverage of marginalized groups in popular running media. Scholarship analyzing the media culture of contemporary running magazines agrees with Gray’s analysis and concludes that individuals appearing on the covers of popular running magazines “are almost exclusively young, conventionally attractive, and white,” which reinforces exclusive social norms about who can participate in sport (Seyidoglu et al., 2021, Walton and Butryn 2006). This raises questions about the deep conventions that inform the ethical conceptions of sport. The transition from the purist model of justice to the consumer model of justice in running communities explains how the norms of the road running community changed over time. Using the Long Distance Log, I analyze historical conventions within the sport of long-distance road running to illustrate and further develop philosophical accounts of justice in sport.

**Keywords:** Sport Ethics; Sport Justice; History; Running; Equality

**Bibliography:**


When we are absorbed in playing, coaching, or watching sport, the issue of free will is likely seldom in the forefront of our consciousness. Yet it may be implicitly presupposed as a default position, and help to explain in part disappointment, regret, praise, and blame in the context of sport. But is this assumption of free will warranted, and what of significance hangs in the balance when we consider sport?

This paper explores the relationship between free will (or the lack thereof) and sport, and especially our understanding of sport. A central issue posed by the paper is whether the lack of free will requires a deflationary account of sport.

There is a prodigious amount of philosophical literature on the topic of free will. Hard determinists have denied that we have free will. Challenges to free will have also come from science. Since the now famous work of neuroscientist Benjamin Libet on free will, which focused on activation of the readiness potential in the brain prior to conscious awareness of an intention to perform an action, there has been much discussion on the potential challenges to free will posed by neuroscience. In addition, proponents of the “new unconscious” pose further questions about the viability and scope of free will.

My presentation examines various understandings of what constitutes free will, and a range of challenges to free will. It then considers the relevance of these debates for the world of sport. These challenges to free will have implications for both our understanding and appreciation of sport. I argue that the viability of the notion of free will as a robust phenomenon in athletic performance faces hurdles that it must surmount. It is not clear that a mere conceptually deflationary shift in what constitutes free will can eliminate all of these hurdles.

Among the issues to be discussed are the possibility of degrees of free will, and whether free will is a precondition for warranted praise, blame, and ascriptions of meritocratic achievement in the world of sport. I also examine the issue of weakness of the will as a sport-related phenomenon, the will to win, the opacity of motivation, automaticity, and the nature of athletic agency.

**Keywords:** Free will, determinism, neuroscience, meritoriousness

**Bibliography**


It is familiar to speak of unwritten rules in sport, although it is not always clear precisely what counts as an unwritten rule, or what kind of normative status unwritten rules might have. At least at first glance, the terms ‘unwritten’ and ‘rules’ would appear to be in logical tension with one another, if not directly contradictory. An essential characteristic of rules, according to most philosophers of law, is codification and promulgation. That is, rules—and their sanctions—should be announced in advance so participants know what is expected of them, and what consequences await noncompliance. Presumably unwritten rules somehow parallel the written rules that structure sport: they have some kind of general understanding and acceptance, they are relatively consistent, and they are somehow enforced if ignored by participants. But it is easy to see how conflict can arise. General acceptance is never universal acceptance, even among people of good will. There can be good faith misunderstandings or disagreements about what is be expected in the conduct of sport.

This presentation will consider some classic articles in the philosophy of sport that have advanced our understating of this issue, some of which have made the argument that there is an internal moral core of sport that the codified rules only imperfectly articulate. When unprecedented instances occur during competition, serious difficulties arise and attempts to address them run into familiar problems: Who should make these determinations? When should they be made—during the competition by officials, or later by officials in leagues offices? Should they be one-time only resolutions, or do they have binding power. On this last point I will make a distinction between rules (which form precedents) and rulings, which are one–time only resolutions. Generally speaking, this presentation studies a basic problem in law: what does silence mean? Is anything not explicitly proscribed allowable? Our conversation will reside somewhere between the moral recommendations of strict formalism and broad internalism.

**Keywords:** fair play; precedent; formalism; sport governance; broad internalism

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Seth Bordner. 2015. “Call ‘Em as They Are: What’s Wrong with Blown Calls and What to Do about Them?” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport. 42: 101-120.


During the early weeks of the COVID-19 Pandemic, as professional and amateur sport shut down in the United States and many other parts of the world, participants and fans around the globe were stunned to find themselves without the sports they loved. The American nation of sport spectators found its usually reliable calendar of events disrupted and eventually rearranged, and its bountiful host of escapes strangely absent. Adrift in uncertainty and sport withdraw symptoms, individual and collective yearnings for favorite sports and events grew palpable, and many people found themselves wallowing in re-presentations of glories past or in their own sport memorabilia. American sport nostalgia was both epic & epidemic.

But what exactly is nostalgia, and what experiences arise from this longing for people, places, things, and events past? What emotions accompany nostalgic escapes into the past, and what benefits or consequences may be associated with them? This phenomenon, under-studied in philosophy and sport studies alike, begs further exploration at this time.

In this paper, the author intends to explore the varieties of nostalgic experience and the emotional “travels” upon which they may cajole one into embarking. Once considered a negative condition akin to homesickness, nostalgia’s positive aspects have only more recently begun to be appreciated (Cho et al, 2014; Gammon & Ramshaw, 2021). The author plans to examine both the positive and negative dimensions of nostalgia, recognizing its relationship to the conditions and emotions from which it arises as well as those which may arise from it.

The author will begin the paper by defining nostalgia and nostalgic experiences with the help of resent research in philosophy and sport tourism (Cho et al., 2014; Howard, 2012), and examining the conditions which may produce them. This preliminary work will be followed by a discussion of the various emotional responses that may emanate from nostalgic experiences. The paper will conclude with an examination of sport-related nostalgia that will demonstrate how athletes and spectators can experience both negative consequences that can leave them mired deeply in the past and transformative positive consequences with the power to shape their futures.

**Keywords**: Emotion, Nostalgia, Pandemic, Sport

**Bibliography**:


Against Collective Punishment in Sport: A Reply to Wojtowicz

Wojtowicz (2021) argues that clubs should be punished for the bad behaviour of their fans. Points deductions, competition disqualifications and other penalties such as fines and stadium closures that may undermine the successes of sporting organisations are justified because the nature of sporting clubs and the nature of fandom are sufficiently intertwined such that the moral responsibility for wrongdoing is inseparable. In this paper, I explore this specific argument and the nature and justification for collective punishment in sport more broadly.

I argue that though fans do play a significant part in the collective moral identity and life of their club, in principle, appropriate punishment for wrongdoing must first and foremost, be directed towards those who do a specific wrong. (Hart, 2008) A failure to uphold this jurisprudential tenet fails to respect the integrity and autonomy of persons in ways that undermine individual moral responsibility by treating agents indiscriminately.

I argue that rather than administer collective punishment on a broad sporting community, as clubs have a weak causal responsibility for the behaviour of their fans (Tyler 2021), they should only be punished for such wrongdoing if there is clear evidence that they are in some way negligent, complicit or directly responsible for specific wrongful acts in which their fans are involved. To do otherwise is perpetrate an injustice.

I then examine the utilitarian assessment which contends that punishing the club directly can have a positive influence on those directly responsible for wrongdoing. I consider what arguments and evidence could confirm this claim and whether the punishment of the club, in and of itself, makes such an outcome a contingent matter, where a range of unintended and problematic consequences are also possible.

I then suggest that if there is a place for a collectivist approach to tackle the wrongdoing of fans it should focus on the rehabilitative potential of educational programmes. Such an approach, I argue, both aims to address the root causes of fan wrongdoing, but also casts moral discourse at the heart of what it means to be part of the club. This approach is better aligned to any claims that fans and clubs are part of the same moral community and is better suited to develop trust, shared values and behaviours that the current punishment strategies used by sporting authorities largely undermine (Giulianotti, 2002; Jones, 2003).

Keywords: Collective Punishment, Fan Behaviour, Wojtowicz

Bibliography:


Many hold that the central purpose of any sport contest is a comparative measure of athletic excellence (e.g. Dixon, Kretchmar, Loland). There has been a related discussion in the philosophy of sport literature concerning what organization of sport best fosters the identification of athletic excellence. A common view is that a season-long tournament should be favored over playoffs and tournaments (e.g. Dixon, Torres & Hager). In contrast, others defend championship pluralism, the position that athletic excellence is best recognized through multiple formats including playoffs and tournaments (e.g. Harper, Smead). Noticeably, the conversation in the literature focuses primarily on professional sports, with barely any discussion of how these apply to intercollegiate athletics. Defenders of the season-long tournament generally assume that the logistics of college athletics may preclude an ideal season-long tournament (although Torres & Hager do suggest that many college sports should use their method). Even so, it might seem that college athletics are better suited to championship pluralism rather than the season-long tournament, in part due to these logistical concerns.

However, it’s not clear that any championship system (season-long tournament, playoff system, or Championship Pluralism) is likely to have great success in identifying or measuring athletic excellence in college sports. There are a number of significant challenges to the basic project, which goes deeper than mere logistics. I explore some of the significant obstacles. Examples of these challenges include the number of teams, conference organization, number of games played, different rules across divisions and conferences, geographical and other constraints, commitment and resource discrepancies, professionalization, etc. I don’t deny that there is some comparative excellence measured in any particular contest, but I contend that any organization of college tournaments, leagues, or playoffs should give us little confidence that we have identified or measured athletic excellence overall (although we may have better success in some sports than others).

If college sports cannot be organized in such a way to provide an accurate measure of athletic excellence, how should we think about them? I believe a few responses are available, but my main argument in this presentation borrows from Kretchmar’s well-known distinction between a test and a contest. Given the quality of college sport contests, I propose to treat intercollegiate athletic competitions instead as tests, aiming especially at self-improvement or self-perfection. My argument is pragmatic rather than conceptual in nature. I contend that the contests are relatively uninformative in nature, so we should focus on the testing elements of the sports. And I argue that the notion of sport as test would be more consistent with the aims/missions of universities for student-athletes. In sum, applying the usual playoffs vs. season discussion to college athletics is the wrong conversation. Instead, we should ask what system advances the best test for student-athletes, and use this analysis to inform the organization of college sports.

Keywords: playoffs, tournaments, athletic excellence, contest, college sports

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Aaron Harper, “‘You’re the Best Around’: An Argument for Playoffs and Tournaments,” *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport* 43, no. 2 (2016)

R. Scott Kretchmar, “From Test to Contest: An Analysis of Two Kinds of Counterpoint in Sport,”
*Journal of the Philosophy of Sport* 2, no. 1 (1975)

Although Bernard Suits gave several accounts of the “tricky triad” of play, games, and sport, he has been said to have “published little on play”, as “he was more intrigued by games. (Klein 2016, 5)” Also sport plays only a minor role in his texts, even keeping in mind “The Elements of Sport”, in which games still constitute the underlying framework through which he views and understands sport.

The purpose of the paper is to investigate into two aspects of play which were overlooked by Suits and which may allow us to shed some new light on the ludic dimension of games and sports. In Homo Ludens, Johan Huizinga calls attention to one of these vital aspects of play: Comparing the play-world to a “magic circle”, within which the players find themselves as long as they play, Huizinga recalls the original meaning of illusion, “which means literally ‘in- play’ (Huizinga 1980, 11)”. This meaning of the word in-lusio has been lost in most European languages. Commonly, illusion refers to a false belief or a deceitful appearance of something which is not what it seems to be. In Spanish, the word has kept some of its original “magic” and refers to great expectations which produce a certain joy.

The paper argues that we need to recover the original meaning of illusion in order to tap into what Huizinga calls “the primaeval soil of play”. Doing this will open up the ludic dimension, present in games and sports, which exposes players to the ambiguous state of knowing that they are “only” playing, and, yet, each player “does not know exactly what he ‘knows’ in knowing that”, as Hans-Georg Gadamer has put it (Gadamer 2006, 103). Gadamer stresses that players are so engaged in what they are doing that they are literally drawn into the dynamic play-element.

Interpreting games and sports in the light of the dynamics of play, which is the second important aspect to be analysed in the paper, may solve some of the tricky questions which have been raised over the years: In the same way as players know that they are playing, yet, without knowing exactly what they know when they are involved in play, they are both serious and not wholly serious about what they are doing, they are free, yet, not completely free, as they are drawn into play. In games and sports the play-movement may not always be present, but the paper aims at demonstrating that when it is, it is modified by the practitioners through the opposition which they mobilize while being in play.

**Keywords:** Play, Sport, Suits, Huizinga, Gadamer

**Bibliography:**


The Importance of the Philosophy of Movement for Thinking About Sport

For the last couple of years, the philosopher Thomas Nail has been developing his “Philosophy of Movement” in numerous publications. According to Nail, movement is a widely discussed theme in Western philosophy and science, but almost no philosophy takes movement as a starting point. Building largely on Lucretius, Nail argues that supposedly solid objects, such as images, human bodies, nation states, and the planet Earth are the result of more primary flows, swerves and turbulences (Nail, 2018)(Nail, 2019) (Nail, 2021).

In my paper, I investigate the implications of Nail’s Philosophy of Movement for thinking about sporting bodies. How should we understand the specific movements of athletes when rather all things are continuously moving? How can we think about the perception of the own body and sensory perception, phenomena crucial for athletes, within the context of movement? Is it possible to establish a connection between sporting bodies and global warming from the perspective of a moving planet?

And lastly, what kind of movements can we discern in sports policy and governance as reactions to sportswashing, violation of human rights, and the dominance of fossil-fuel capitalism?

In order to address the above questions properly, I briefly sketch the main contrasts between Nail’s view and the two main conceptions of movement in thinking about sport: the mechanistic and Aristotelean view, in relationship to the tradition of the philosophy of sport.

Keywords: Movement; New Materialism; Ethics; Embodiment

Bibliography:

Is esports a sport? has become a popular academic topic. The various propositions that support and oppose esports as a sport are involved in a great debate over the concept of sports. There are three common arguments about the relationship of esports and physical skill, they are ‘the Fine and Gross’, ‘the Finger and Whole-Body’, and ‘the Virtual and Real’. This article conducts an analysis of the multiplayer online battle arena game-style League of Legends (LoL). The author advances that the ‘thumb and finger movement,’ is a remote manipulation of heroic actions. All heroic actions occur in a virtual environment and do not actually happen to the players. Therefore, LoL is not a sport. The relationship between the somatosensory type of esports and sports should be further discussed.

Keywords: League of Legends; physical skill; gross movement

Bibliography

WHY DO SOME ATHLETES STOP BEING ATHLETES? A PHENOMENOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF SPORT AS ENTERTAINMENT IN RELATION TO WESTERN SPORT AND JAPANESE BUDO

Burnout of young athletes is a severe issue in current sporting society where sport has become a type of entertainment business. Heavy focus on tangible success puts a significant amount of pressure upon young athletes to “make it” and often neglects their autotelic interest in playing sports, which eventually takes their “joy” away and leads them to leave their sport. To expand on this issue, this paper will examine the authenticity of a sportsperson’s experience in entertainment sport as it engages Jirásek, Oborný, and Hurych’s terms, “techné gymnastiké” (sport in relation to art and beauty) and “techné athletiké” (the art of athletics). To introduce a solution to this situation, Japanese Budo (武道—martial arts) is presented as a remedy to the inauthentic mentality behind the Western sporting culture.

The ‘authentic mode of living,’ a coinage developed in Martin Heidegger’s work Being and Time, is where human beings recognize their mortality and subsequently take ownership over their own lives.

On the contrary, when human beings take their mortality for granted and seek public approval, they make irresponsible choices and fall into an inauthentic mode of life. Jirásek et al. bring this idea into sport and explain that techné athletiké and contemporary entertainment sporting culture heavily focus on victory and breaking records. Therefore, both techné athletiké and contemporary entertainment sport are inauthentic because the experience of sport participation is diminished.

On the other hand, Budo (bu—“martial”; do—“way”), a Japanese samurai cultural tenet, includes the practice of set forms (kata) that allow samurai to jointly polish mind and bodily technique, and thereby achieve self-mastery. Accordingly, Budo will highlight the importance of the internal sporting experience such as “facing oneself,” that is, practice polishing one’s character. With the Budo mentality at heart, samurai practiced intense shugyo (修行) training that resulted in a mastery of self-control in deadly situations. The important notion is that samurai’s concern was never an evaluation from their peers.

Although not apparent physically, the intention of shugyo training is clear to oneself: self-mastery. By practitioners emphasizing this inner experience gained through human movement, sport has a potential to escape the realm of entertainment business and, instead, lead to personal flourishing.

**Keywords:** Phenomenology, authenticity, experience, Budo, self-mastery

**Bibliography:**


What will children acquire in doing sports or physical activity both inside and outside of school? According to Mead, they learn and acquire the attitude of other by interacting with individual other. They also acquire the attitude of others by interacting with plural others. This attitude of others is named “the generalized other” by Mead. The generalized other means the attitudes of the community or a social group and may be regarded as its rules or norms. The child who is playing at housekeeping understands what his or her mother feels. The child also who became able to play an organized game like baseball will be capable of discerning the characteristic attitudes of an opposing team from the movements of opponent players such as pitcher, fielders and batters.

The concept of the generalized other by Mead focuses on the attitudes of others in this way. However, in doing sports and physical activity, there are many situations where the corporeal feelings of others will be much more important than the attitudes of the others including their emotion and thinking. In other words, the corporeal feelings are essential rather than the mental feelings of the others in doing sports and physical activity. If so, the children generalize not only the mental feelings of the others, but also the corporeal feelings of the others in doing sports and physical activity. That is, the children understand how others feel who are in the swimming pool or who stand on them hands. It means that they acquire the corporeal generalized other in doing sports with others. They recognize others as the corporeal feelings.

In addition, the children acquire these corporeal generalized other, and at the same time, they acquire the corporeal “us.” For example, at the moment when a child masters the skills of handstand, he or she is able to understand the other’s feeling of the handstand, and at the same time, they will understand the feeling as the feeling of “we.” It is that we can recognize “us” as the corporeal feelings, and it may be said the corporeal feelings of “us” as human beings and as people’s solidarity. The corporeal “we” is made possible by the “intercorporeality” that Merleau-Ponty mentions. If so, school physical education enriches our intercorporeality and will be positioned as the education for intercorporeality. School physical education should be aimed to understand the corporeal feelings of others in the bodily dimension, not just for sports education aimed at victory or health.

Keywords: “the generalized other,” attitude of other, mental feeling, corporeal feeling

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TRANSGENDER AND GENDER DIVERSE ATHLETES: ETHICS AND U.S. LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES

In 2021, nine states had laws against transgender athletic participation. In 2022, three more states passed similar laws, and legislators in 28 more states introduced restrictive legislation (sometimes multiple bills). In addition, 20 states proposed legislation against gender affirming care for trans youth (TransAthlete.com). In other words, in 80% of the states in the U.S., legislators have been or are working to restrict or prevent transgender athletes from participating in sports on teams that match their gender identity. In some cases, participation may be allowed, pending examination of internal and external anatomy, endogenously produced levels of testosterone, and chromosomal/genetic analysis. Furthermore, in many states, proposed legislation provides that anyone who believes they were unfairly harmed by the inclusion of transgender athletes in competition may sue people, schools, school districts, and/or institutions of higher education.

In response to, and anticipating, these bills, the Office for Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Education, the Department of Justice, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Office of the President have issued various orders, memoranda, and documents to announce that they are working toward equity for transgender, gender diverse, and gender nonconforming students. Notably, under the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb), religious institutions would not be forced to accept the new interpretation of Title IX as prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.

In what is sure to become a battle over social issues and states’ rights, ethical questions surrounding the participatory and health rights of transgender athletes will be contrasted with the rights of cisgender girls and women in sport. This session will examine the topic from three bases: ethical egoism, utilitarianism, and Kantian ethics. Consideration of moral obligations of legislators and government entities vis-à-vis the rights of different constituencies will be discussed.

**Keywords**: ethics; gender identity; legislation

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The world governing body for the world’s most popular game, FIFA, recently published a series of proposals for “the Future of Football” or “the football of tomorrow.” A key element of the proposals, as presented by Arsène Wenger, emphasized the need for “more meaningful games,” though this not simply a matter of supply and demand. “We are not looking to increase the number of games, and we are very conscious of that,” Wenger said. “What is most important for me is more meaningful games. We want to give the fans what fans demand today, and that is meaningful games. We want to respond to that expectation.”

What is this demand and how might association football meet this need (beyond cynical base materialism)? “Welche heiligen Spiele werden wir erfinden müssen?” asked Nietzsche’s madman in 1882, unaware international football was already a decade old. Philosophers of sport must play a role in thinking through what it might mean to play more meaningful games, with Kraft’s and Borge’s discussions of sport as drama especially valuable, while keeping in mind Heidegger’s claim: “Nur Dasein kann daher sinnvoll oder sinnlos sein.” Nietzsche’s madman knows we must invent sacred games, staging drama (as hieratic event). Any understanding and interpretation of the meaning we posit in the staging of sporting events must (as Heidegger insists regarding historiological knowledge, because of the ontological presuppositions of sporting knowledge) transcend the more narrow

**Keywords:** Agon aesthetics, cosmodernism, transdisciplinarity.

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Martial arts are made by physical movements that systematize techniques of fight. On the other hand, there is a counterargument that martial arts are different from general violence because its purpose is not to attack, but to defend. However, whether martial arts are incorporated into the category of violence or not, it cannot be free from the paradox of violence. The paradox of violence refers to a phenomenon in which violence is suppressed only by violence. In general, we believe that martial arts are spiritual discipline. If so, what does the spirituality of martial arts have to do with violence? This study will examine the reason why the spirituality of martial arts are not related to violence through the analysis of its structure. When an action does not exist as a means but exists for its own purpose, an autotelic action could be achieved. For example, the Poomsae of Taekwondo can be said to be a system of physical movements designed to learn the skills of attack and defense on their own. However, as a practitioner continues to perform Poomsae, the purpose gradually evolves into the perfection or excellence of motion. This is what we call the autotelic action. The spirituality of martial arts can be said that a spiritual effect or intensity obtained in the process of pursuing the formal completeness of the movement itself. This study will accurately analyze the structure in which the spirituality of martial arts is created through several philosophical perspectives, such as Heidegger’s de-concealment, Simondon’s phase transition, emergence, and transcendence. Through this investigation, we can find out that the spirituality of martial arts is a tremendous event that expands the horizon of existence.

**Keywords:** spirituality of martial arts, emergence, transcendence, horizon of existence

**Bibliography:**


In her classic article, “Gamesmanship,” Leslie Howe argues that gamesmanship is wrong when it “subverts excellence in favor of wining” (216). She also acknowledges that certain forms of gamesmanship are compatible with the ideals of sports and excellence. Subsequent work on gamesmanship has explored what kinds of gamesmanship fit into this latter category.

In this presentation, I argue that a more permissive view of gamesmanship, of even the subversive type, is important for helping to discover essential features of sport. I will do this through an analogy to entrepreneurship.

Entrepreneurship is often described as a process by which individuals discover information about the needs, desires, or plans of market participants. This information is not known to anyone a priori; it has to be discovered. This entrepreneurial discovery process is one of speculative trial and error, daringness, imagination, and alertness. Acting from a place of imperfect and necessarily incomplete information, entrepreneurial discovery is essential for identifying the kind of knowledge needed for market success.

The entrepreneur is not primarily motivated to act in order to create this knowledge. She is first and foremost looking for profit opportunities. But through the discovery process of searching for and acting on such opportunities, this knowledge about our needs and desires and how to better satisfy them is identified.

By analogy, gamesmanship can also be a discovery process. This process is not, of course, about discovering anything about market participants. Instead, the process helps to discover the meaning of the rules and other central elements of our understanding of sport. It is widely recognized that the meaning, extent, and application of the rules of sport are underdetermined. We cannot foresee every possibility or relevant case. We also never have an authoritative or complete understanding of the underlying principles or norms of the sport. Gamesmanship can help to discover and form this vision.

Through trial and error and imagination, gamers, seeking mainly competitive advantage, push the boundaries of rules, discovering loopholes that were not intended or foreseen. This allows us to reflect: do we like what was done by the gamer? In so doing, we discover new things about the underlying vision, norms, and principles of the sport. More than that, this process helps us to form that vision.

For example, Coach Belichick lines up the running back as a receiver but has him declared ineligible. This confuses the defense and the Patriots score a touchdown. Is this a creative or cynic use of the rules? Is this the way we want NFL offenses to operate? Since the NFL later changed its rules, their answer seems to be no. But we didn’t know that until Belichick’s “artful manipulation of the rules” (Howe 213). His gamesmanship allowed us to discover something new about the rules and the underlying vision of the sport. In this presentation, I will argue that permitting such manipulation is valuable for discovering how to understand and evaluate sport.

**Keywords:** Gamesmanship; entrepreneurship; discovery process; rules

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WHAT IS THE RELATION BETWEEN E-SPORT AND SPORT?

From the viewpoint of the philosophy of sport the most fundamental issue related to the phenomenon of electronic sport (e-sport) is its nature and relation to sport in conservative (traditional) meaning. The issue is controversial: the spectrum of relevant position contains both the inclusive view (e-sport is a form of sport) and the exclusive view (e-sport in not a sport). Besides the theoretical aspect the controversy has also practical consequences: recognition of electronic sport as a legitimized category of sport is especially important for e-sport organizations.

The main goal of the paper is to shed light on the controversy concerning the sport status of e-sport by means of philosophical analysis. Because the controversy over e-sport is to some degree parallel to the controversy over mind-sports, I apply conceptual framework elaborated in my earlier paper on the latter topic. But because there are also some important differences between the two debates, the argument provided does not simply echoing the mind-sport analysis, but rather presents new overall conceptualization of the problem.

I start with the analysis of two interrelated group of arguments. The first one concerns essential features of sport, most importantly, but not exclusively, ‘physicality’. The alleged lack of such a feature is a ground of arguments against including e-sport into the domain of sport. The discussion of such arguments ultimately leads to the discussion of essentialism vs non-essentialism controversy. The second one concerns language use – the very name ‘e-sport’ suggests at least resemblance of its referents to ‘standard’ sport disciplines. If this is sufficient to classify e-sport as sport depends, again, on the conclusion of essentialism vs non-essentialism controversy. The debate concerning e-sport might be thus seen from two different perspectives. The non-essentialism seems to offer a relatively quick solution to the status of e-sport, but it raises some serious difficulties as well.

After analysis of the non-essentialist perspective, I proceed to the presentation of essential account of the problem. To this end I offer a map of possible solutions created with use of Venn diagrams for two sets representing the extensions of ‘e-sport’ and ‘sport’. Besides the two above mentioned opposing solutions (inclusive view and exclusive view) the diagrams allow for the representation of other possible options, most notably the solution being a compromise between inclusive and exclusive view.

Keywords: sport; e-sport; mind-sport; physicality; essentialism.

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Parry, J. 2018. E-sports are not sports, Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 13:1, 3-18.

The experience of gliding is central to many sports, particularly alternative and nature sports. This experience accompanies gliding over a surface on wheels as in skateboarding, gliding through snow as in skiing, gliding across the surface of water as in surfing, etc. This paper is part of a larger project that seeks to better understand the experience of gliding. My interest here is not in describing social or cultural aspects of this type of movement or of the sports in which it is incorporated. Instead, I want to better understand the base level sensations associated with gliding. Doing so will help to increase our understanding of these sports. More specifically, a better understanding of the experience of gliding will help us to understand and describe the aesthetic pleasure that is one of the most attractive aspects of the sports in which gliding is central.

My inquiry into the gliding experience begins with a first-person phenomenological account that attempts to more precisely describe the bodily sensations that are felt during gliding activities. In comparing such sensations with those associated with other forms of movement, I work to identify the sensations that are specific to the experience of gliding. I also draw on descriptions of glide experiences in literature and popular culture. I then turn to phenomenological accounts of skiing and snowboarding by Sigmond Loland, work by Gunnar Breivik on conscious experience in sport. Finally, I apply my description of the experience of gliding to discussions of first-person embodied aesthetic experiences by Arnold Berleant. My ultimate goal in this paper is to provide a phenomenological description of the glide experience that can underlie, and help to illuminate, embodied aesthetic accounts of sports in which gliding is central.

**Keywords:** Gliding, Sliding, Skiing, Surfing, Embodied Aesthetics, Phenomenology

**Bibliography:**


The purpose of this study is to compare the Confucianism in East Asia and the philosophy of human body in ancient Greek. There is no doubt that the human body is the physical basis for life, however its socio-cultural meaning varies greatly with the time and space. In the West, the human body has been considered as something that separates from the mind. In Confucianism, on the other hand, the human body is regarded as something that carries out moral acts based on social relationship. These typical examples could be found from the difference between Confucius’ practical ethics and Plato’s philosophy of human body. When Confucius (B.C 551-B. C. 479) taught the importance of decency to his disciples, Plato (B.C 427-B. C. 347) insisted that the mind is a thinking being, and capable of living without the body. More intriguingly, while Confucius emphasized cultivating one’s moral through self-discipline in denial of the afterlife, Plato insisted that the body is the prison of the soul. What does this ontological difference of the human body mean? This study’s attempt to compare the origin of Western and Eastern body perception could provide a different movement principle between martial arts and sports, also would have many implications for the field of sport philosophy that is directly related to human movement.

**Keywords:** Plato, Confucius, body theory, practical ethics, human movement

**Bibliography:**


In 2021 I published a paper on the spatial and temporal experiences in parkour. I argued that parkour can be understood as a way to recapture moments of non-alienated human experience in urban space drawing on Hartmut Rosa’s theory of social acceleration and resonance (2005, 2010) and Edward Casey’s phenomenological study of place and space (1996). In this paper, I want to elaborate and broaden the analysis. I will argue the concept of resonance offers a novel perspective for understanding the value of urban lifestyle sports.

For understanding the value of urban lifestyle sport we first have to answer the question: What is urban lifestyle sport? Urban lifestyle sport has received very little attention within the philosophy of sport while nature sport (Howe 2008, 2019; Klein 2014) adventure sport (Zimmermann & Saura 2017), risk sport (Breivik 2011) as well as dangerous sports (Russell 2005) has been well described. While it could be argued that street sports like parkour, skateboard or trial biking could be understood as examples of risk sport (Breivik 2011) or dangerous sport (Russell 2005), these conceptualizations don’t capture what is the most important aspect of these activities. Dangerous sport entails an overarching common focus on the “dangerous”, but what is common to these activities are not a significant risk, but the setting: the urban environment. The conceptualization as dangerous sport also leaves out sports like streetball and breakdancing. The concepts of nature sport and adventure sport directs our attention to the setting of the sport. Klein (2014) define nature sports as sports that share a fundamental structure in which human beings and features of the natural world are brought together. The natural environment is, however, quite a different setting than the urban environment.

Firstly, we need to distinguish between two kinds of urban lifestyle sports: 1) genuine urban lifestyle sports: those emerging from the urban environment such as parkour, skateboarding, breakdance, and 2) adapted urban lifestyle sports: which are traditional sports adapted to the urban environment such as streetball, street soccer, street handball e.g. While competition is inherent in all adapted street sports, genuine urban lifestyle sports can be competitive. Furthermore, we can distinguish between two kinds of genuine street sports: those who continuously move between different urban spaces and where the practice entails a creative interpretation of urban space (parkour, skateboard, trial biking) and those who don’t (breakdance and other kinds of street dance). Some relate to the landscape of the urban environment, and some use the urban environment as a framing device. In the analysis, I want to further present my conceptualization of urban lifestyle sport and discuss the value of these activities.

**Keywords:** meaning in sport; resonance; urban lifestyle sport

**Bibliography:**


Gliding sports, or what in French is referred to as 'les sports de glisse', have not received much attention in the sport philosophical literature. In this paper, I will explore phenomenologically what I believe are shared experiential qualities of these sports and reflect upon their interpretation and impact on sports culture.

Simply defined, gliding is a movement pattern initiated and produced by the use of force (muscular force, gravitational force) in order to enable phases of effortless movement on a surface and/or through a medium. Examples of gliding sports can be outdoor winter sports such as skating, skiing, and snowboarding, water sports such as sailing and rowing, and aero sports such as parachuting and hang gliding.

A first phenomenological characteristic is an emphasis on experiences of effortless movement. A concentrated phase of dynamic effort and force is followed by the experience of effortlessness while being in a stable, balanced position. After the kick, the skater enjoys the travel over the ice, and in between a rower's strokes, there are relatively long and smooth gliding phases.

Secondly, in gliding sports, the contrast between effort and effortlessness is more articulated than in most other sports. In addition, the phases of effortlessness are cultivated as the main source of meaning and kinaesthetic joy.

The third characteristic of most gliding sports is the sense of speed and risk. Sports such as skating, skiing, or parachuting include moving at higher speeds than in regular everyday movement and in many other sports. Many of these activities can be categorized as risk sports as practitioners face the risk of severe injury and even death.

The fourth characteristic of many gliding sports is a specific auditive quality. Completing a skiing turn, pushing to accelerate in skating, or opening a parachute, gives rise to distinct sound patterns in concentrated moments of force production, followed by relatively long phases of almost silence.

More generally, I will argue that gliding sports provide embodied and holistic experiential qualities of freedom: free play with gravity, freedom from standardized and regulated movement patterns, freedom of speed and risk, and even glimpses of existential freedom. I conclude by reflecting upon the interpretation and impact of the phenomenological qualities of gliding sports in sports culture, in particular the fact that gliding sports seem to be overrepresented among alternative sports cultures that oppose hegemonic sports paradigms.

Keywords: gliding sports; phenomenology; alternative sports culture; freedom

Bibliography:


As part of his proposal for a "more aggressive approach for imbuing physical education (PE) with meaning", Kretchmar (2000, 24) suggests "[a] new appreciation for the value of freedom". He clarifies that PE must provide students the liberty to be “an author rather than a reactor”, because such liberty accompanies many of the most meaningful experiences that human beings have (2000, 24). Student’s movement freedom thus seems to be an important issue if students are to find PE activities personally meaningful.

Therefore, with this study, we are interested in examining methods of teaching toward movement freedom.

In our examination, we draw on Gert Biesta’s concepts of subjectification and world-centered-education (2022). With his concept of subjectification, Biesta suggests that the student’s freedom is an existential matter and about having the possibility of embracing or resisting what the teacher and the teachings are trying to offer the students. Thus, emancipatory teaching is about giving the students a chance at existing as subjects, but also denying them the satisfaction of being mere passive recipients of the teaching content. Furthermore, Biesta suggests that emancipatory teaching should be world-centered rather than student-centered or curriculum-centered. Accordingly, such teachings should take place in what Biesta calls “the difficult middle ground” (Biesta, 2022, p. 49), i.e. the delicate balancing act between pushing for one’s initiatives to come through and at the same time adapting to the initiatives of others and the world. In this perspective, freedom is not only a matter of getting what you want but also about being given the unexpected, being surprised, and being exposed to what the world has to offer (Biesta, 2022, 97).

Biesta suggests that emancipatory teaching is not first and foremost achieved via instructions and explanations, but a matter of pointing (Biesta 2022, 75-82), touching, and sensing (Biesta 2022, 94-95). However, Biesta’s general educational considerations only provide brief descriptions of how emancipatory teaching may be based on the direct sensorial ‘dialogue’ between the participants’ bodies that is prior to their reflection and conscious control. We suggest that further Bibliography to the role of the body subject and intersubjectivity are needed particularly when examining and trying to understand the possibilities for student freedom in connection with PE.

The enactive approach (De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007) to intersubjectivity shows that interactions between humans may be co-regulated at the level of interaction dynamics which therefore takes on an autonomous organization, without the autonomy of the individuals participating in the interaction is destroyed in the process (De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007, p. 493). In this way, a necessary tension between the individual participants on the one hand and the interaction as a process on the other is highlighted. Based on this we would like to discuss how the enactive approach may help develop our understanding of how dialogues of movements in-between PE educators and students may summon students to voluntarily open up to the world of PE.

**Keywords:** Movement freedom; subjectification; meaningful PE; intersubjectivity; enaction

**Bibliography:**


Human-versus-animal footraces have created spectacle for decades, from Jesse Owens’s series of sprints against a horse in the 1930s to the 2009 duel between National Football League wide receiver Dennis Northcutt and an ostrich. Despite the carnival atmosphere of these contests, these events often reinforce notions of inferiority about both the human and non-human participants. Placing animals in contests with rules they cannot understand justifies notions of human superiority and dominion over other species. Such notions also excuse the on-camera abuse of animals for the sake of entertainment. At the same time, these contests also belittle the human participants—many of whom are athletes of color, short stature, or other nontraditional body types. By literally comparing them to animals, these contests invoke longstanding tropes that dismiss the success of athletes of color as only a result of their natural, animal instincts.

This dynamic emerged most viscerally with the 2003 television show “Man vs. Beast.” The series pitched three athletes of color and forty-four people of short stature against elephants, giraffes, and bears in a series of competitions, from tug-of-war to hot-dog-eating contests. Not only did these events place the animals in unfamiliar and potentially harmful situations, but the portrayal of the human participants trafficked in prejudiced tropes.

While much scholarly literature comments on the ethics of contests involving animals, such as horseracing or dog-sledding, there is little to no research on contests against animals (Campbell, 2021; Morgan, Meier, & Schneider, 2001). Although sensational, these human-versus-animal races nonetheless lay bare the value, or lack thereof, humans place on other communities and other species in the name of athletic entertainment.

The result is a sideshow where nobody wins, and the loser becomes less than human. Yet the durable popularity of these contests over the objections of animal rights activists throws into stark relief society’s ethically-condemnable attitudes towards the welfare of other species (Regan, 2004). How humans treat both each other and other species for the sake of entertainment speaks volumes about how much society values both (Andrade, 2022). As a result, these contests illuminate the tendency for athletic events to fall short not only in the duties humans owe to other creatures, but also in the duties humans owe to each other (Weimer, 2012).

Keywords: Animal Welfare, Race, Entertainment, Ethics, Sport

Bibliography:


One of the essential tasks of philosophers is to determine, analyze, and defend what is good and what is not good (i.e., bad, wrong). This task comes with various difficulties and presents one of the most pressing philosophical challenges. The difficulty arises partly from the fact that the word ‘good’, as G. E. Moore claims, is highly ambiguous: it is not only used, but correctly used in a number of different senses. In the presented paper I want to deal with the question ‘What is good sport?’ This question is not new to the field of the philosophy of sport but, to my knowledge, a detailed and systematic treatment of the issue has not been sufficiently provided so far. The presented paper builds primarily (although not exclusively) on the traditional virtue ethics and demonstrates the most relevant properties of a good sport. It aims to enrich the previous discussions by offering a systematic account of a good sport. It starts with the clarification of meaning of the expression ‘good sport’ to make explicit the basis for the upcoming analysis. Good sport here signifies a desirable type of sporting activity with certain structural standards and moral qualities that are present within a sporting context and that also contribute to individual and social flourishing outside sport. It is not conceived as a perfect or ideal (i.e., not yet existing) sport, but as a fulfilment of certain conditions in already existing sports.

I maintain that good sport involves various dimensions that need to be distinguished to analyze the concept properly. These dimensions are good sport as an activity, as an attitude, as an environment/culture, and as fandom. I will focus primarily on the first three dimensions and for the most part I will leave aside good sport as fandom. The reason for this exclusion is not that fans are not important for sport, but because this dimension (unlike the other three) is not always present, i.e., we can imagine sports without fans. Philosophy of sport literature and various authors from the field offer important insights into each of these dimensions. The primary task of this paper is to describe the most relevant properties of a good sport in each dimension, point to their authors/supporters in the philosophy of sport tradition, and offer arguments why these properties are constitutive of a good sport. The final classification of properties is defended against possible objections.

I will draw mainly from the philosophy of sport literature written in English and from key figures in the tradition. The methodology includes textual critical analysis, description, comparison, evaluation, interpretation, and demonstration of relevant thoughts. This paper is part of a one-year grant project from GAJU (University of South Bohemia grant agency) and is still a work in progress.

Keywords: philosophy of sport; ethics of sport; good sport; analytic philosophy

Bibliography:


Reflecting on the game, corporeality, movement, and the way of feeling and expressing emotions, sensations and attitudes in everyday life, presents us with the path of learning to think and act through play, through the experiential experience of corporeality and the playful and agonizing movement.

From a philosophical perspective, the essence of playing -of the game itself- is interpreted regardless of its characteristics or rules, this essence is that it manifests itself as a constant playful activity of that being that knows that it is part of something, incomplete, free, spontaneous, light, but not empty, that is a possibility for all those who play, it allows the being to receive a host of sensations that make him get excited in the game, motivate himself to manifest his being there. And, part of those emotions, is the feeling of playing, of feeling and knowing that you are alive.

This renewal and hope experienced by playing is at the same time a possibility to be and to be, to understand the relevance that playing offers an environment, a playful space for the being to express in all its expression emotions of freedom, fun, satisfaction, of joy, of reinventing oneself since it can also offer to put into practice what has been learned in previous games, mainly in the domain and control of emotions, sensations and of course, also of attitudes tending to virtue.

Keywords: existentiality, selfhood, play, sport, game.

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The three social practices – philosophy, democracy and sport – are more similar than we might initially suspect. They all can be described as ‘agonistic social practices’, that is, they are manifestations of ‘agon’ (contest). Believed to have played a significant role in ancient Greece, agon presents itself in both intellectual and physical forms – in philosophy, democratic politics and sport – suggesting that the relationship between these practices might be deep-rooted and significant. This paper explores the idea that developing our understanding of polemos and agon can enhance our experience of agonistic practices and therefore enable our existence to develop in a more free and enriching way. The possibility to participate in agonistic social practices derives from the human condition, i.e. from the necessity to strive to sustain one’s existence, which requires ongoing attention and decision-making, and which sometimes means going against others. We call this character of human existence by the Greek term ‘polemos’ (struggle), which can be manifested through various types of agon. It is only in a free society that polemos is understood, respected and incorporated within the structures of that society. A shift occurs in the human spirit when individuals are not simply concerned with procuring physiological needs and they have options in life. The struggle associated with polemos is central to our nature and experience as citizens within open societies and participating in agonistic practices is what we do as a result of that struggle. An important feature of agonistic social practices is that they mirror the human condition and channel it for the betterment of human society. If society cherishes agonistic social practices, it enables its citizens to compete to prove themselves and achieve goals (e.g. to push through a persuasive argument, or to win in sport) in a peaceful and productive way. Not all social practices are, or need to be, agonistic, but it is important to do our best to understand and take care of those essentially agonistic social practices, in order to preserve their character. In order to live up to the agonistic potential of sport and other social practices, we have to understand their character and those forces that diminish their potential. The similarities between philosophy, democracy and sport indicate that the three practices are inherently related, and that this relationship may be able to help us the better to understand them. Ultimately, we believe that our polemic nature should be respected and even celebrated through agonistic social practices.

Keywords: Social practice, sport, democracy, philosophy, polemos, agon, struggle, contest

Bibliography


Losing happens.

Competitive sport centrally involves an effort to determine the relative abilities of contestants. Despite some exceptions such as in the case of ties or draws, the results of competition establish winners and losers. Without losing, there is no competitive sports

Despite not wanting to lose, almost every athlete, even the most successful and iconic athletes, loses. And so, what does an athlete do about losing? Part of being a good competitor is learning to deal with lose; learning to concede defeat.

Conceding can happen during, at the conclusion, or even after the contest. But what does it mean to concede defeat? While much focus is on the outward expression of concession, the more integral part is an athlete’s internal recognition and acceptance of losing.

Learning to compete well entails learning to concede defeat. It is a skill in itself that can be developed that has important implications for moving forward after loss. The ability to concede defeat at the end of a competition influences and informs how an athlete engages competition throughout the contest.

Finally, if sport contributes to human culture and well-being, then learning to concede defeat is part and parcel of that contribution. I will conclude by identifying how the skill of conceding defeat applies beyond the realm of competitive sport.

**Keywords:** Competition, Losing, Resilience

**Bibliography:**


'Young people together, at the top of their potential, creating energy. If it were possible to combine all this power and unleash it on something, we could move mountains with it, and change worlds with it. There is no power on earth greater than that.' Koeleman, H. ‘Olympians’, 2016

It seems that today we live in an era of increased ‘feminization’. It is the age of storytelling, a mode of communication that prefers the soft skills of empathy and imagination over harsher fact and figures. Sports brands today prefer a good athlete with a good story and an Instagram following of several millions over a star athlete without a story. Empathy implies inclusion, a traditional Olympic value yearning for new meaning, set against a post-modern world struggling with issues like global inequality and nonbinary diversity. We believe it is no surprise these discussions are held today – in previous years the predominant ‘masculine’ discourse in sport did not allow these issues to be broached. We see inclusion also in the IOC’s stance on issues like Kosovo, a self-declared independent nation, not recognized by the UN, yet allowed to join the Olympic family. As such, the question we’d like to address here is, if this antithetical process of ‘feminization’ may also lead to new normative divisions between ‘good’ and ‘wrong’ in sport, a heightened sensitivity on issues that previously were ignored or not allowed to enter the debate in sport. How to give meaning to the political in the very heart of sport, without disqualifying and excluding the supposed ‘wrong’? As recently expressed by sporting governance bodies, responding to the Ukran war; if you are on the wrong side of the line you’re out. For the first time ever, the IOC made a stance on an issue that resulted in exclusion, Russia in this case: a departure from the Olympic manifesto that proclaims to never discriminate. FIFA and UEFA took over this policy of exclusion with a global football fallout, suspending Russian clubs and teams from the 2022 World Cup and Champions League Final. However, this policy of exclusion needs to be consistent in application: if Russia is out today, others with similar behavior may be banned tomorrow. Otherwise, the lines will be arbitrary and political, close to discrimination. If not applied consistently countries may opt to leave the Olympic family, threatening the unique potential of the Olympic Movement. In our contribution, we will unravel this striking tension: today’s culture of inclusion in sport may in fact lead to a policy of exclusion, if our contingent common senses are extraordinarily triggered. How to overcome this ambiguity, saving the Olympic potential, desperately needed in a highly polarized world? And how to respond to the growing call for an appropriate manifestation of societal responsibility within modern sports?

Keywords: Olympism; inclusion; politics; exclusion; governance

Bibliography:


This paper is a philosophical-anthropological reflection on the relationship between running and philosophy. It offers a synoptic overview of the role of running in life of some well-known philosophers. Then, it offers a physiological-anatomical consideration of the human body in terms of what the author calls its five pivots of articulation: feet, legs, hips, shoulders and neck. In addition, the author considers what he calls the four motors of the body: brain, heart, lungs, and skin, which may be said to contribute to the articulation of the human body. Then, the author turns to a reflection on the ableist assumptions of phenomenological considerations of the running body. In this context the author focuses on the maimed and hurt bodies of veterans and one disabled philosopher in particular, who is also an artist who has been wheelchair bound her entire life (Sunaura Taylor).

**Keywords:** philosophical anthropology, articulation, running, phenomenology, ableist, disability

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Young, Iris Marion (1990) *Throwing Like A Girl and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory.* Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
There are a number of recent interesting objections to Suitsian formalism along with a several proposed reformulations to solve these alleged problems. The objections can be grouped into those purporting to show problems with the rules requirement and those purporting to show problems with the lusory attitude. I argue that objections against the rules requirement generally fail to be persuasive, but that the there are some significant and interesting problems with the lusory attitude. I then look at the proposed reformulations by Kreider, Hurka, and Borge. I argue that a version of Borge’s reformulation of the lusory attitude is more plausible than those suggested by Kreider and Hurka.

Berman argues that sprints are games but fail to satisfy formalism’s requirement that they have a rule that disallows a more efficient means than sprinting. He also suggests that a religious ritual might satisfy formalism’s requirement even though it is not a game. Kreider argues that practice games and pantomimes fulfill formalism’s requirements even though they are not games. He also argues that accidental, uninvited, and massively inept players satisfy the requirements even though they are not genuine players. I argue that none of these putative counterexamples succeed.

I then turn to Kreider’s claim that playing a game is not just a matter of an individual’s intentions, but also of community standards. Kreider turns Suits’ example of the police officer chasing a criminal during a race on its head to argue it shows just the opposite of what Suits claims for it. Hurka also defends a community standards clause to handle the vexed problem of professional athletes who regard playing their sport as a mere job. Hurka shows that this reformulation also handles several other potential objections, though he admits it does so at the expense of complicating and restricting formalism. I show that Borge’s analysis of sport has some interesting applications in this context that might solve these problems without the price of the Kreider/Hurka reliance on community standards. I end by considering whether the lusory attitude is ultimately circular.

Keywords: sport, games, play, Suits, lusory attitude

Bibliography:


Many ethical problems arise in sport from the use of technology because of issues such as the principle of fairness in competition, the human nature of sports, health and safety, among others. This essay does not attempt to analyze the problems that arise from unequal access to sports technology but rather to provide a philosophical response to the authenticity of sports experiences that have been impacted by techno-scientific progress in recent years.

To address this issue, the first section suggests developing an ontic analysis of sport and technology, which explores how different categories of technology can impact the conception of sport based on the features that make it not fake but unique and real. I conclude that technologies that undermine the authenticity of sport should be banned since they subtract the impact of the athlete's natural skills on the outcome of the competition.

The second section seeks to provide an ontological point of view regarding technology in sport, examining whether the use of techno-scientific resources in sport can account for authentic human experience and reveal a conception of technology that tries to transcend instrumental thinking. I maintain that exploring an athlete's experience in interaction with techno-scientific resources offers additional clues about the criteria for its regulation. It requires an understanding of the Self, not as an athlete but as a human being. Understanding technology as an attitude towards the world with revealing effects, as proposed by Heidegger, will allow us to appreciate the risks and potential benefits of techno-scientific resources, according to the nature of each sport.

**Keywords:** Technology in sport; authenticity; human experiences

**Bibliography:**


I argue that aesthetic evaluations of sport are noteworthy because they provide a clear, direct, and robust case for the interaction of aesthetic and ethical values. The view that ethical features are relevant to the aesthetic evaluation of artifacts such as sport and art is called “interactionism.” It holds that ethical flaws (I leave aside for now ethical merits) in sport performances or artworks (always, sometimes) qualify as aesthetic flaws. Critics of interactionism, deny that ethical flaws count as aesthetic flaws, because, they maintain, ethical value and aesthetic value are two separate, independent domains of value. That doesn’t mean sport practices or works of art can’t be criticized for their ethical failings, but only that such ethical criticism has no bearing on their aesthetic value. The main hurdle faced by proponents of interactionism is to show that it is moral features qua moral features that are relevant to aesthetic evaluation, that, in other words, moral features are internal to aesthetic evaluation. Making such a case, however, has proven to be especially difficult in the philosophy of aesthetics literature dealing with traditional works of art. Tragedies are a telling example, because they seem especially congenial to interactionism. That’s because, as Aristotle noted in the Poetics, in order to be gripped by a tragedy the main character must be a morally upstanding type if we are to feel pity for her unfortunate plight. Clearly an historical character like Putin, to take a current example, won’t do, since if he were to suffer some disaster most of us would feel contempt rather than pity for him. But even in this genre things aren’t so rosy for interactionism, for thinking ethical failings double as aesthetic failings. Why? Consider works that feature what Marica Eaton calls “rough heroes” in visual works like Bonnie and Clyde or Tony Soprano in the Sopranos. Interactionists would have us believe that their obvious ethical failings would put their respective audiences off rather than captivate them, would block any feelings of sympathy they might have for them. But it can scarcely be denied that most of their viewers were captivated, rather than disgusted by their antics, and, again contrary to the interactionists take, gave the works they appear in high aesthetic marks notwithstanding their larceny and murderous ways. Obviously, moral features qua moral features are not doing the aesthetic work that interactionists claim they do, at least in our aesthetic appraisal of works that revolve around such immoral characters.

Sport, I claim again, is a notable exception. That’s because the moral properties qua moral properties of sport actions and performances directly affect our aesthetic evaluation of those actions and performances. So, when a receiver in football pushes off a pass defender and makes a beautiful catch, our aesthetic appraisal of that sequence of actions, once we become aware of the relevant infraction, say, by instant replay, is downgraded accordingly. Similarly, when an athlete whose elegant performance earned her a Gold Medal in the Olympics is found to have been guilty of doping, our aesthetic appraisal of her performance is, once again, negatively affected. In these and other relevant sport cases, I argue, moral properties qua moral properties are doing the moral work interactionists claim they are doing by negatively altering our aesthetic judgments of their actions. And it is precisely because such interaction of the ethical and the aesthetic is central to the evaluation of sport that it deserves far more aesthetic attention than it has thus far received.

**Keywords:** Ethical value; aesthetic value; robust moralism; autonomism; immoralism; tragedy

**Bibliography**


At this very moment as we are writing this abstract, Russia's military invasion of Ukraine is continuing. Covid-19 has not subsided, either. In such circumstances, how should sports be? Recently, “Sports and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)” has become a popular topic of discussions. Most of them are approving and conclude that sports can contribute to SDGs. The United Nations highly regard the important roles sports have played in sustainable development, but is it really the case? Critical recognition of the current position of sports is one of the important roles of sports philosophy.

This research has used the theory of Jonas as a basis and suggests the need for derivation of “what should be (Sollen)” after putting human existence as the first principle. However, it is necessary to hold a perspective that this human existence itself is “a threat” as far as the environmental world is concerned. Humans do not fit in the ecological system because they can survive only by exploiting the environment or other living creatures. Furthermore, “sports” that such humans do are also “a threat” for the environmental world. For the environmental world, humans doing sports is undoubtedly more troublesome than humans without sports. For example, jogging, which is supposed to be the least harmful to the environment, causes an increase in CO2 emission compared to non-jogging. What is needed now is while accepting human existence, humans need to become aware that for the environmental world, human existence itself and sports which humans do are basically “nuisances”. Therefore, humans need to build a system which enables them to behave considerably towards “the environment” and “others”. It is not right to simply assert one’s “freedom” and “rights”. Based on the theory of Jonas, this research has tried to apply “priority of [existence (is; Sein)] over [what should be (ought; Sollen)]” and a new concept of responsibility, which is “collective, one-sided, intergenerational and distanced” as opposed to the past concept of responsibility. Liberalism based on modern ego has thought that free behaviors of individuals with rights promote social advancement. However, as Jonas also points out, nowadays it is necessary to be conscious of the fact that freedom destroys rather than advances. The idea of advancement has been destroying the environmental world which is the foundation of the general world. As long as humans exist, there must be a change from wanting to advance to protecting the environment. In order to implement a sustainable society, our “world view” needs to change. This is because we are members of communities called the Earth, nation and family before we claim our own “rights”. Proposals by Jonas are important as regards to SDGs. Furthermore, they may suggest what sports are and how to do them are effective for SDGs.

This really is not the time for sports, but the Beijing Olympics and Paralympics Games were held. We always need to consider the roles of sports.

Keywords: Environmental ethics, neoliberalism, Is or Ought, Good or Right

Bibliography:


Herein I engage with the very difficult question of whether the duty to aid extends so far as to justify harming persons, perhaps even lethally, in order to protect wild animals. I argue that this question is not nearly as settled as our intuitions may suggest and that Shelly Kagan’s arguments on Defending Animals, contained in his book How to Count Animals, More or Less, provide a rich substrate in which to cultivate ideas on this subject (2019, pp. 248 - 279). My intuition is that killing a human, even one “guilty” of trying to kill an animal for sport or leisure, is beyond what a duty to aid can command, though admittedly I find my own intuition somewhat morally dumbfounding (Haidt, 2001). This is a developing and exploratory work and thus I do not yet take a committed position (e.g., a thesis).

Keywords: Hunting, wild animal ethics, duty to aid

Bibliography


The anti-doping policies of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) aim to promote a level playing field and protect the health of the athlete. To this end, WADA policies prohibit research using performance-enhancing substances or methods, and prohibit athlete support personnel, including healthcare providers, from providing advice, assistance, or aid to an athlete or others seeking to use, or using performance-enhancing substances. These restrictions are often not predicated on the health of the athletic population but rather on the “spirit of sport.” However, WADA and medical associations appear to be ignoring the preponderance of empirical evidence that athletes of all levels are using performance-enhancing substances obtained from dubious sources, without medical advice or monitoring, and that this use is resulting in harm. I will consider the use of performance-enhancing substances as a health-related behavior that results in health outcomes in a similar manner to lifestyle diseases. Health-related behaviors are often the product of repeated actions over time and can be influenced by the environment and agents in that environment. I will argue (i) that WADA policies fail to meet the epistemic and control conditions needed to adequately assign individual responsibility and (ii) that transferring responsibility for use of performance-enhancing substances solely to the athlete enables harm. These policies do this by preventing scientific research to inform healthcare providers and by denying healthcare resources to athletes. I will raise the possibility that, given the abundance of evidence of harm from self-medication, and the lack of evidence of performance enhancement for the majority of substances on the prohibited list, WADA is drifting perilously close to the morally impermissible doing of harm to athletes by initiating or sustaining a causal sequence of events that results in harm. These considerations point to a novel argument for a harm reduction approach to anti-doping.

**Keywords:** Placebo effects, expectation, policy, safety net, knowledge, harm reduction

**Bibliography:**


REAL PERFORMANCE-ENHANCEMENT OR PLACEBO PERFORMANCE-ENHANCEMENT: WHAT DO WE OBJECT TO?

The anti-doping policy of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) regulates and punishes the use of substances that are listed on a Prohibited List (PL). The appearance of a substance on the PL is based on meeting two of three criteria: (1) performance-enhancing or potentially performance-enhancing; (2) harmful to health or potentially harmful to health; and (3) a violation of the spirit of sport. The criteria used to ban a substance are not made public. These substances are colloquially known as ‘performance-enhancing substances.’ In this presentation we will focus on the category of actual performance-enhancement as a rationale to ban a substance. We take it that this is in line with the spirit of sport objection that Reid gives against doping, that the spirit of sport is to improve performance through training rather than medical manipulation (Reid, 2012, p. 54). Furthermore, we focus on two substances on the PL that are not harmful to health at the levels that hypothetically enhance performance in endurance sports: EPO, and testosterone for recovery. Thus, the argument from harm that is commonly used against steroids (e.g. Simon et. al, 2015, p. 107) doesn’t apply.

There is very little empirical evidence of performance-enhancement for most of the substances on the PL, and in fact some evidence against the actual performance enhancement of EPO, raising the possibility that the perceived enhancement of performance (or recovery) experienced by an athlete is a placebo effect. A placebo effect is a response to an inert substance that is strongly influenced by psychological and social cues in the surrounding environment. It is our contention that, given the lack of proper empirical testing of the substances on the PL, it is in fact the appearance of a substance on the PL that has the strongest performance-enhancing effect regardless of the biological actions of the substance. This disconnect between science and WADA’s code raises the question of what we really object to: do we object to real performance-enhancement achieved using substances on the PL or do we object to the performance-enhancement that occurs because WADA has told us that the substance will enhance performance by placing it on the PL? Kayser (2020) argues that the placebo effect constitutes a reductio against WADA’s Code.

In the worst-case scenario, empirical testing could show that very few of the substances on the PL actually improve performance more than through the placebo effect. In this case, anti-doping policy would be punishing those who believe the performance-enhancing myth at the heart of the PL thus leading to a deeply flawed policy that creates its own victims.

**Keywords:** Anti-doping; WADA; performance enhancement; placebo

**Bibliography:**


The aim of this paper is to get a better understanding of sporting activities such as free solo climbing. In order to achieve such a broader form of understanding of high-risk sports one might have to take into account the philosophical perspective.

The main focus of my analysis is on the award-winning documentary free solo¹, featuring the free solo climber Alex Honnold, who climbed El Capitan² in June 2017 without the use of ropes or any other kind of safety gear. The movie literally offers insights into the brain of the athlete. For example, one aspect of this (so to speak) inside view discloses that the athlete suffers from a mild form of autism. A further medical investigation into his head is made with the help of a MRI brain scan. That scan seems to indicate that Honnold is less affected by disturbing pictures than the average person.

However, in this movie – as well as in the mainstream scientific literature on high-risk sports – the focus is often on psychological as well as on medical perspectives, e.g. why are people doing these (seemingly) crazy things? Nevertheless, the philosophical perspective is commonly neglected (examples of positive exceptions cf. Breivik 2003, Breivik 2004, Müller 2008, Martinkova and Parry 2018). I try to complement the picture by the use of existentialist philosophers (for example Heidegger and others).

**Keywords:** free solo climbing, existential risk, existential philosophy, high-risk sports, death

**Bibliography:**


¹ The documentary won an Academy Award in 2019 in the category Best Documentary Feature.

² El Capitan is a vertical rock formation in Yosemite National Park, USA.
In his seminal work on the ethics of sport, Fair Play, philosopher Robert Simon puts forward his concept of the ‘mutual quest for excellence,’ in which he argues that sport is best viewed as a collaborative venture between opponents, who agree to act as obstacles for each other in order to achieve the conditions in which athletic excellence can occur. Simon’s mutualist perspective on sport provides a valuable tool through which to examine any number of topics. Yet the hypothetical space in which Simon works is too neat, and the usefulness of the heuristic falls apart when complicated through a labor lens. Throughout his work, Simon flattens the differences between amateur and professional sport, arguing that all athletes have the same ethical obligations regardless of the level at which they compete. He theorizes professional sport as simply the highest, most elite level at which it is played, ignoring the fact that for professional athletes, it is also the way they make a living.

Simon’s model only leaves space for those who play for the love of the game, motivated solely by the intrinsic value of sport. Thus, while mutualism is a useful model for thinking about amateur sports, it is much less useful as a framework for analyzing professional sporting spaces. Here, athletes have more complex motivations. They are economic actors in an industry, workers who might have spouses, children, or parents to care for. They collectively generate billions of dollars for a cadre of owners and organizers. For many of these professional athletes, the goal is not, as Simon supposes, to reach the very best level of performance they can, but rather to simply stay on a roster, or maintain their sponsorships, as long as possible. Thus, when it comes to cheating at sport, we must look deeper to find convincing reasons to not do so.

Simon, to borrow a phrase from philosopher Karin Volkwein-Kaplan, sees sport as residing in a separate realm from the rest of existence, untouched by the political and economic constraints of everyday life. In this article, I will explain the ways in which this hamstrings his mutualist vision of sport. The argument against doping, for example, becomes more complicated when the reasons for doing so change.

Building on the work of philosophers Michael Hemmington and Hugh Upton, who examine cheating in sport in other contexts, I suggest that Simon’s argument against cheating is insufficient. A mutualist framework is not able to fully capture the stakes and the stakeholders of professional sports, and so an ethics derived from such a framework will be lacking.

**Keywords:** Mutualism; cheating; doping; ethics; labor

**Bibliography:**
ON PETRARCH’S MOUNTAIN CLIMBING: STARTS A CULT OF MOUNTAINEERING, A SURVEY OF INTERPRETATIONS

On 26th April, 1336 the great Renaissance poet of Italy, Petrarch, climbed the Mount Ventoux and then he wrote about his experience in the form of a long letter. This act of the poet is thought by some people to have been the first mountain climbing experience, because, when climbing, Petrarch did not have any practical aim on his mind. It might be Petrarch with whom the cult of mountaineering started in Western cultures. He was a true Renaissance man who left the routine of everyday life behind and aimed to reach the mountain top instead.

Kenneth Clark called this experience ‘a new responsiveness of nature’, i.e. a new attitude, a new sensitivity to nature.

Joachim Ritter considered Petrarch an observer and his mountain climbing as a gesture of a man who climbed the mountain only to enjoy what nature had to offer. According to Ritter the text of Petrarch’s letter has three levels. First, it can be read on a physical, material level, which is the description of the climbing itself. The second level has a spiritual turn; in this part of the letter there are parallelisms between the physical level and the poet’s personal life story. The third level, the pure spiritual level, according to analysts represents a failed attempt.

Jacob Burckhardt’s interpretation is built on a different model; he saw the classical confrontation of two lifestyles, i.e. ‘vita activa’ and ‘vita contemplativa’ in it. In Wilhelm Humboldt’s interpretation readers cannot detect any sign of natural feeling in Petrarch’s writing. Furthermore, he says, the Italian poet does not show any enthusiasm for nature in it. What is more, in Humboldt’s opinion Petrarch failed to feel the divinity of nature.

In my presentation I argue that Kenneth Clark’s interpretation, it was not the aim of a pure admiration of nature that made Petrarch climb the mountain. Then I intend to demonstrate that Ritter’s approach, according to which the spiritual aim of climbing failed, is not true. I also intend to complete Burckhardt’s ideas by explaining the allegory of climbing. Ascending the mountain is parallel with the ascension of the soul with the intention of reaching toward the Holy Spirit. At the same time I also offer a critique of Humboldt’s opinion. True, Petrarch’s short, 10-line description of the view described an aesthetic experience, but then this external look would make the observer look inward and become ‘spiritual’.

Eventually in my presentation I also intend to make a distinction between Petrarch’s mountain climbing and contemporary mountaineering. The climbers of our age seek social glory, they are standardized and they consider the mountain top as a goal to overcome. Although they are on the mountain, their thinking is down-to-earth, schematic and technological. Depending on their personality, this type of climber either loses his Self in the act, or, strengthens it.

**Keywords:** Petrarch, Climbing, Mountaineering, Renaissance Man

**Bibliography:**


Jakob Burckhardt: The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy (1860)

Alexander von Humboldt: Kosmos (1845)
FAKING IT AND MAKING IT: REFLECTIONS ON TEACHING SPORT PHILOSOPHY AS A NON-PHILOSOPHER

For the better part of a decade, I have taught undergraduate and graduate courses on philosophy and ethics in sport and physical activity. Looking at my own transcripts, it is fair to say that I lack the adequate (formal) training to do so: there was an undergraduate course in “global wisdom,” some political philosophy, and one graduate course in sport ethics. Upon this foundation, there are some two decades of my personal study of philosophy; something I have engaged in seriously, but not necessarily systematically. This is all to say that while I believe I am qualified as a “teacher of philosophy,” I don’t consider myself a “philosopher.” Yet the classes I teach in this area are successful: by all accounts and observations, my students end the term with a solid grasp of the philosophical ideas they encounter, the philosophers responsible for them, and, more broadly, the role of philosophy in the world of sport and the body.

In this presentation, I will reflect on my journey as a cultural-historian-non-philosopher teacher of philosophy. In analyzing my struggles and successes, my deliberate decisions and fortuitous fits of inspiration, I hope to excavate some lessons of pedagogical value. I will consider the types of readings, lectures, assignments, and assessments that have worked well in my courses, as well as those that haven’t worked so well. I will contextualize these thoughts in terms of the diverse student populations I have taught. What has worked for undergraduate students has not necessarily worked for graduate students; what has worked for students in sport studies has not necessarily worked for the aspiring physical therapist. For my fellow non-philosophers, perhaps I can offer some perspective on how to learn alongside one’s students, stave off impostor syndrome, and serve as a guide to the world of philosophy. For the trained philosopher, my approach to teaching these subjects might offer some insight or inspiration on pedagogical strategies and tactics that can better serve their students.

Keywords: Pedagogy, ethics, kinesiology, teaching

Bibliography

Surf is probably one of the steadiest growing sports in the world. Probably because surfing isn’t just about sports or physical activity. It’s about a culture, a newborn tribe, a collective identity that thrives within the strength of a global outdoor community. This sense of belonging is reinforced by philosophical assumptions besides a political and economic evidence: the ocean is freedom, and the sea is the last free place on the planet. You can go to the beach and the only thing you need is a board. This fact implies, and relies, on other significant determinations regarding phenomenological and spiritual dimensions. Thus, this presentation will follow two main lines of inquiry:

- **surf phenomenology.** We will try to follow the main moments that insufflate surfing with an unsuspected depth. Isolating key questions in the sports process will allow us to highlight philosophical textures that are implicit in the practice. There will be a close analysis of the concepts of momentum, in the zone, mirroring an intimate relationship, in the flow between the surfer and the infinite mass of the ocean. Reminiscing infancy, the surfer’s merry-go-round mimics the childhood park slide, recollecting that free and joyful relation between play and children in the flux of imagination. In synthesis, the surf phenomenon inhabits a certain fluidity that, between mindfulness and adrenaline, exhibits the profound bond between body and nature, and that simultaneously shows that being at the mercy of the primordial elements, it’s not just a material communion;

- **poetics, spiritual and religious dimensions.** Either those spheres are intrinsical or just natural effects, we face different layers that generally could also correspond to the dimensions of the metaphor, performance and symbol. The sublime and specific dimensions of surfing cannot elude the inherent risk and the facing of death that is involved in this sports form. The relation of what we could call heavy-surfing, or big riders, and dying is absolutely present in many personal testimonies and surf experiences. In this manner, it will be given a special attention to the natural event that enfolds every year in Nazaré, Portugal, to zero in some of the concepts at play and that could highlight and demonstrate some of the thesis presented.

**Keywords** Surf; Spirituality; Philosophy; Phenomenology; Transcendence

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Technological advancements in sport have forced sport organizers to constantly adapt to changing play, strategies, and athlete abilities. Within sport philosophy literature, much of the technological debate has centered on the use of performance enhancing drugs (e.g., Loland, 2009) or decision aid technology (e.g., Collins, 2010; Royce, 2012). However, several cases in sports such as swimming and running have been examined for their implementation of advanced equipment. In 2008, Speedo debuted the LZR Racer competitive swimsuit. The technological marvel reduced skin friction drag and promoted increased oxygen flow for athletes. Following its Olympic debut in Beijing 2008, 23 of 25 world records set during the games were done so by swimmers using the suit and 98% of swimming medalists wore the LZR Racer during competition. In late 2009, FINA barred the suit from competition due to a reduction of the test inherent in swimming. In 2019, famed Kenyan runner Eliud Kipchoge partnered with Nike to break the 2-hour marathon barrier. Notably, Kipchoge had several construed, manufactured advantages such as shoe and pacing technology. Due to these technological advantages the time was not ratified as an official record.

Like its sporting counterparts, golf has not been immune to exponential advancements in equipment technology. These advancements with clubs and balls have increased the distance players can hit while simultaneously increasing the moment of inertia (MOI) which is a measurement of forgiveness. The greater the MOI, the less penalty a player will face in terms of distance, trajectory, and direction from mishits and off-center strikes. Manufacturers use military grade materials with AI precision technology to produce thin, springlike faces on drivers and irons while also influencing the dimple patterns on modern golf balls to encourage longer, straighter, and higher ball flight. All these advances led the predominant governing bodies in golf, The United States Golf Association (USGA) and Royal and Ancient (R&A), to release the Distance Insights Report in February 2021. The report expressed concerns with the trajectory of golf technology in regard to the changing test of golf. For example, the overwhelming number of par five holes played on both the PGA Tour and DP World Tour course rota are now reachable to the green in two shots rather than the standard designed three. Noting these concerns, the proposed presentation will examine the effect of technology on modern golf by focusing on two specific questions: 1) Do the technological advancements cheapen or demean the test derived by gamewrights and/or course architects, and 2) Do the technological advancements change the skills necessary to achieve competitive excellence in golf?

**Keywords:** golf; tests; excellence; skills; technology

**Bibliography**


J. S. Russell (1999; 2004; 2011; 2018a; [2007] 2018b), Robert L. Simon (2000; 2004; 2014; 2015) and Nicholas Dixon (2003) have developed a moral realist and perfectionist theory of sport known as both ‘interpretivism’ and ‘broad internalism’. In Sport and Moral Conflict (2020), William J. Morgan advances his most comprehensive critique of interpretivism to date. One of Morgan’s main criticisms of interpretivism, which he also advanced in earlier publications (2004; 2012; 2016), and that I’ll refer to as his ‘normativity critique’, is that interpretivism’s commitment to moral realism renders it unequipped to resolve ‘hard cases’ in sports. This is because interpretivism’s moral realism makes it so that even the most substantive perfectionist principles that it can posit are still so abstract that they lack substantive normative content. The ‘hard cases’ Morgan has in mind are moral conflicts that arise because of clashes between conceptions of the purpose of sport. Morgan claims we ultimately should reject interpretivism in favor of his anti-realist conventionalism, which maintains that a sporting community’s rationally uncriticizable moral bedrock ultimately has relativist grounding in historically contingent conventions regarding sporting excellence. This is because only such conventions provide the substantive content that enables resolving hard cases.

In this paper, I defend interpretivism from the normativity critique in two respects while granting that resolving hard cases sometimes requires relying on contingent conventions. First, I argue that the perfectionist principles posited by interpretivists aren’t normatively effete, as Morgan alleges. Second, I argue that interpretivism can be supplemented so that it can accommodate, in a realist-friendly way, contingent conventions having moral weight. My defense of interpretivism involves developing interpretivism in a novel direction. The version that I develop incorporates elements of Henry S. Richardson’s ‘constructive ethical pragmatism’ (CEP), a view whose current most comprehensive defense is in Richardson’s book Articulating the Moral Community: Toward a Constructive Ethical Pragmatism (2018). I’ll call this view “CEP-interpretivism.” CEP-interpretivism retains a commitment to there being an objective (i.e., non-relativist) realist set of core moral norms that apply to sports generally. However, CEP-interpretivism is compatible with the sporting community being able to establish new moral norms that are both historically contingent and universally objectively authoritative. I argue that CEP-interpretivism both has the resources to address the normativity critique and demotivates conventionalism, because its account of how conventional moral norms become morally weighty is more morally attractive than conventionalism’s.

**Keywords**: interpretivism; conventionalism; constructive ethical pragmatism

**Bibliography**:


It's only a slight exaggeration to say that sport ethics faces an existential crisis. The simple claim that *it is not fair for male-bodied persons to take part in female sport* has been abandoned by the International Olympic Committee and others. This should shame us.

The attempt by the IOC to address the question of inclusion of trans athletes is a philosophical and ethical failure. (International Olympic Committee, 2021) (hereafter the Framework)

It fails on a number of levels.

First, as shown by a group I identify as the ‘nostalgics’ (Pigozzi and al., 2022) because they seek to return to the 2015 consensus (International Olympic Committee, 2015), the Framework fails to address the bioscience and to take a rounded approach to human rights.

Second, the Framework fails to understand – or even mention – the case for sex categorised sport, instead substituting subjective Gender Identity.

Third, in pursuing a ‘human rights’ perspective, the Framework rests on a false premise. There is no human right to play sport that is not reducible to a human right to free movement. (Pike, Hilton and Howe, 2021) The supposed human right to compete in a sex category which accords with one’s gender identity does not get over the elementary hurdle of universalizability. It therefore collapses, for Kantian reasons. (Kant, 1785 (1981)) That is to say, not only can it not work in practice, but it also cannot even be theoretically articulated.

Fourth, the mode of discrimination discussed in the Framework – unjust discrimination on the basis of gender identity – is not present in sport in any meaningful way, and is not involved in the categorisation of sports according to biological sex. This categorisation involves legitimate justifiable and essential discrimination - on the basis of sex - justified by Title IX (US) and the 2010 Equality Act. (UK)

Fifth, in substituting the concept of ‘meaningful competition’ for fairness in sex-based categories, the Framework attempts a piece of conceptual sleight of hand which must raise serious alarm amongst philosophers of sport.

Keywords: Sex, Gender, Fairness, IOC

Bibliography:
Physical literacy is a theoretical concept defined as the ‘motivation, physical competence, knowledge and understanding to value and take responsibility for engaging in physical activities for life’ (Whitehead 2019, 8). This concept emerged out of concern for the seeming disregard of human embodiment, particularly in the education sector, and is firmly rooted in the philosophical concepts of monism, existentialism, and phenomenology. In accordance with existential philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, who argue human beings are fundamentally beings-in-the-world, physical literacy theory purports that physically literate individuals should have a well-established embodied sense of self. They are to develop as proficient movers capable of exemplary self-expression, self-presentation, and interactions with others and so, the kind of self-realization foundational to one’s physical literacy journey is one whereby the ‘mover is acutely aware of the totality of his [sic] embodiment in its reciprocal interaction with the patterns of force and resistance in the world’ (Whitehead 1990, 7). Physically literate individuals recognize this attribute in themselves, as well as in others. But this conception of ‘self’ is incomplete absent the recognition that we are not only beings-in-the-world, but rather socially situated embodied beings whose interactions demand more than a sharp sense of kinesthetic awareness. Herein lies my motivation for this essay. Specifically, the current philosophical foundations of physical literacy are inadequate to account for a conception of self which recognizes humans as both, embodied movers and moral beings.

To support the preceding thesis, this essay will first, introduce the philosophical underpinnings of physical literacy and their role in the development of self as an embodied mover. I will then advance my criticism of physical literacy and argue monism, existentialism, and phenomenology say very little about the moral dimension of life. In response to this theoretical gap, the third section of this essay will introduce a play conception of sport – sport-as-play (Feezell 2010; Hyland 1978, 1984; Kretchmar 1972) – and suggest physical literacy might benefit from the addition of sport-as-play such that it offers an appropriate theoretical foundation to account for the development of a moral embodied sense of self. The paper will conclude by a summation of the argument and thoughts for further study.

Keywords: physical literacy; embodiment; sense of self; sport-as-play; a moral self

Bibliography:


Recently, Allen-Collinson and Evans (2019) provide a short overview and critique of phenomenological research in the areas of sport, physical culture, and exercise. They recount the foundations of phenomenology as introduced and developed by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and describe its offshoots in philosophy and application in the social sciences. While claiming the latter is not merely a qualitative research approach, they argue in favor of phenomenological sociology or empirical phenomenology that has been criticized by Martínková and Parry (2011).

In this proposed paper my primary interest is not with this debate, but with one theorist whose name is frequently invoked as a central figure in phenomenological sociology, Alfred Schutz (1899-1959). As Allen-Collinson and Evans (2019) assert, “Schutz was particularly interested in the later Husserlian notion of the lifeworld (Lebenswelt), the shared world of everyday life, and the meanings that social actors utilise in everyday interaction with others in the lifeworld” (296). This quote is typical of the pithy characterizations of Schutz’s thought in empirical phenomenological studies on sport, physical culture, and exercise resulting in the appropriation of his ideas with little substantive comprehension.

To advance beyond the latter, in this proposed presentation, I will first explicate how Schutz (1962, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1973) conceived of social interaction which in part includes an interplay of intersubjective motives. This will be followed by an explanation of typifications or typical constructs of sport that conform to the contextual structures and conventions of sport. These organizing principles or idealized formulations assign meaning to common experiences of human behavior in sport and can be isolated outside of specific sites of action or interaction. This of course would be questioned by advocates of empirical phenomenology who mostly reject “universal experiences” (Allen-Collinson & Evans, 2019, 297). The third section of the paper will identify and describe various sport typifications that arise through social interaction like the role or function of athletes, personal styles, spatial-temporal dimensions of sport, strategies, and player relations. The paper will conclude by responding to a criticism that typifications could undermine and diminish spontaneity during competition and divert attention from other game possibilities.

**Keywords:** Alfred Schutz, social interaction, intersubjective motives, typifications, sport

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Allen-Collinson, J., & Evans, A. B. (2019). To be or not to be phenomenology: That is the question. *European Journal for Sport and Society*, 16(4), 295-300.


In The Grasshopper: Games, Life, and Utopia, Bernard Suits famously argues that in a utopia where there is no longer any need to work to meet personal needs, humans will have a problem figuring out what to do with their lives. They will face alienation and boredom because they will have “nothing to strive for.” Suits argues that the solution to their predicament is to invent and play magnificent, complex games to occupy themselves with. Thus, utopia is a place where human pursuits will be taken up entirely with game playing.

I am skeptical that Suits’ account of utopia should be taken seriously at all. It falls prey to Thomas Nagel’s critique of utopias by making question-begging assumptions about human motivation. A response might be that there is still something to be learned from ideal conceptions of humans living in ideal societies, but this faces the problem that there are many conflicting ideal conceptions, and Suits’ account is far from being plausible among them. Even more problematically, taken on its own terms Suits’ utopia arguably makes games themselves obsolete. A second equally deep problem is question-begging assumptions about play and striving that overlook the value of idleness as play in human lives. Idleness is a stable, enduring, richly heterogenous source of meaning for humans that is itself a model of refuge from work, boredom, and alienation. Idleness as play and many non-play activities can be main sources of meaning in a Suitsian utopia where work is no longer necessary and “everything has already been achieved.” Both provide opportunities for striving and achievement. Idleness as what Suits’ terms “primitive play” allows for enjoyable diversions and rest from striving, too, and arguably still counts as a type of achievement. Academic discussion of Suits’ utopia is best left for table talk among scholars at a good Dim Sum restaurant where the ideal life of a certain fictional grasshopper can be debated between dishes.

**Keywords:** Games; Play; Utopia; Idleness; Leisure

**Bibliography:**


The issue of transgender participation in sport has become a fervent and febrile topic in recent years as Western societal attitudes towards sex and gender have changed and greater numbers of trans athletes gain prominence. As the number of high profile and contested cases grow, Governing bodies in the typically sex segregated sports arenas are finding that their policies (or absence of policy) on the issue are being more closely scrutinised as they defend their positions against proponents of diametrically opposing arguments.

Most of the popular and academic discussion of transgender participation in sport is focused on trans women. When trans men are mentioned, it is often only as a footnote or addendum. It is this invisibility of trans men in the discussion that can help to shed light on the contested concepts of fairness, safety and inclusion and uncover hidden assumptions and biases.

An example of this can be illustrated by the World Rugby Transgender Guidance (World Rugby 2019) which concluded that allowing trans women to compete in women’s rugby would compromise the safety of the other participating women. Yet the same report also concluded that it would be acceptable for a trans man to participate in men’s rugby if they were willing to accept the risks. Such a conclusion is contradictory if it is based on the premises that, (1) there is such a significant difference in strength and power between biologically born men and women post-puberty, and (2) that the paternalistic principle of protection from harm over-rides that of autonomy of individual choice. The inferred conclusion from the World Rugby guidance is that a single trans woman poses a risk to safety when playing against a team of 15 non-trans women who should be protected from this harm, but a team of 15 non-trans men does not pose an equivalent or greater risk to safety against a single trans man. As such, it suggests that the real issue is not a primary concern for the safety of all individuals. Instead, it plays into the paternalistic discourse that ‘normal’ women need protection from ‘abnormal’ men. Both trans men and trans women as a result are unjustly discriminated against in this underlying discourse.

Similarly, UK Sport (2021) recently suggested, on the basis of fairness and inclusion, that two categories ought to be created for sport: women’s (which does not include trans women) and open (arguably, so as to include trans women without categorising them as ‘men’). Again, this neglects the position of trans men. If the argument is it is unfair for adults born biologically female to compete against those that are born biologically male, then it would not be fair for trans men to participate in an open category if they were competing against biologically born men.

This paper will argue that through a consideration of trans men in sport, a better understanding of the contested concepts of fairness, safety and inclusion can be provided.

Keywords: Transgender, fairness, safety, inclusion, policy

Bibliography:


Wilma Rudolph was born prematurely, the 20th of her father’s 22 children, in Tennessee in 1940. As a child, she contracted pneumonia, scarlet fever, and the poliovirus, leaving her with infantile paralysis. As a result, she was unable to walk without a leg brace from the ages of five to twelve. She progressed from unable to walk unassisted at age twelve, to a member of the 1956 Olympic team at age fifteen, to the first American woman to win three gold medals at a single Olympic Games in 1960. More than this, Rudolph became one of the first African American women athletes to be celebrated by the media and the public, beloved for her beauty, grace, and accomplishments. Rudolph’s story, however, is more complicated, illustrating ideologies surrounding race and gender in sport. To foreground aspects of these systems, I first discuss elements of Charles Mills’s The Racial Contract (1997). The racial contract is: “that set of formal or informal agreements...between the members of one subset of humans, henceforth designated...as ‘white,’ and coextensive (making due allowance for gender differentiation) with the class of full persons, to categorize the remaining subset of humans as ‘nonwhite’ and of a different and inferior moral status, subpersons, so that...the moral and juridical rules normally regulating the behavior of whites in their dealings with one another either do not apply at all in dealings with nonwhites or apply only in a qualified form” (Mills, 11). Subpersons can be objectified, commodified, and controlled. I also incorporate explication of the notion of “black girl magic,” used to congratulate black women’s accomplishments, to celebrate their ability to persevere and endure under oppression, and to motivate continued striving. The phrase is problematic in its suggestion that accomplishments are effortless, due to “natural” ability rather than the result of sacrifice and hard work. Both tropes are damaging when attached to black women athletes, since, whether subhuman or superhuman, these women are not recognized as just humans who work hard to achieve their goals. Instead, the tropes function to deprive athletes of subjectivity and autonomy. While much of the discussion of the paper will be applicable to sports in general, the focus area will be Black women track athletes.

Keywords: Race; Gender; Objectification; Autonomy

Bibliography:


This paper aims to rethink and reconstruct the concept of sport with an exploration of the “animality.” Although this does not refer to existent animal species directly, this could, more fundamentally, look into how animality is involved in the concept of sport by nature. Therefore, this paper also might be a work preparing a philosophical background of the discussions regarding sexual or gender problems in sports from another perspective.

Since sport is a culture that human beings have created historically, in order to continue to exist in the future, the concept always must be taken of the critical scrutiny and defined anew in the social context. Moreover, we have an increased need for this work because today’s technologies, symbolized by esports, have affected the concept of sport in powerful and actual ways.

Parry (2019) said esports is just a game. However, depending on another perspective, esports is also a human-created sport culture as with conventional sports such as football or basketball. Rather, according to the theory of “civilizing=non-violence process” by Elias and Dunning (1986), we could even say that esports is a fruit of our cutting-edge technologized society and, in that sense, an extremely “human” sport. If so, this suggests the following hypothesis: one of the characteristics of conventional sports is its non-humanity such as “animality” in the symbolical meaning.

This hypothesis would a realistic idea. For long, the animality, as Derrida (2008) notes, has been regarded as a lower conception of human reason in the world under the effect of western philosophy originating with Aristotle. According to Derrida, however, the traditional understanding of animality is simply wrong because the manner of understanding depends on a human-centered and unsophisticated reason supremacism. This naive thought lays also the groundwork for many problems concerning animal ethics today.

Critically considering the thought of animal by Heidegger, Derrida discusses the tension between humanity and animality, and interestingly, he finds an intervention by technology in the boundary between them. This precisely suggests that esports shakes our understanding of the concept of (conventional) sport and requires us to rethink the concept by the viewpoint of animality. If we focus on the phenomenon, for example, that we try to be an existence beyond past humans and strongly want to see the existence at the top-level sports competitions, what we find the animality in there seems sequent to understand the real sporting world appropriately. And also, without the concept of animality, sport philosophy could not give reasons why so many people are greatly attracted to and enthralled by all sorts of new world records. Thus to rethink the conception of sport from animality would enable us to reframe the understanding of “human” playing sport.

Keywords: Humanity; reason; esports; technology; culture

Bibliography:


In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle accounts for various moral virtues as part of his ethical theory. One such virtue is bravery, which Aristotle holds to be the “mean about feelings of fear and confidence” (Nicomachean Ethics 1115a2). In this paper, I consider Aristotelian bravery through the lens of sport. Specifically, I argue that sport can be a setting wherein athletes may demonstrate Aristotelian bravery. I also detail why sport can be a training ground for the eventual development of “paradigmatic” Aristotelian bravery, later to be displayed on the battlefield. Rather than present a modified or adapted version of Aristotle’s account of bravery and consider the possible role of sport therein, my goal here is instead to consider the role of sport within the confines of Aristotle’s account of bravery as expressed in the Nicomachean Ethics, at least as best as possible. I contend that there is indeed a place for sport in this account. One challenge of this paper, therefore, is to overcome the oft cited view that Aristotelian bravery can be shown only on the battlefield. After all, if such is the case, it is clear that the playing field cannot be a locus of bravery (although it could theoretically still serve as a training ground for the eventual display of bravery on the battlefield). I aim to cast doubt on this limitation of scope. I caution the reader, however, that my argument is by no means categorical. I do not claim that all athletes are brave, in the Aristotelian sense, or that all athletic competition fosters the eventual development of paradigmatic Aristotelian bravery. Accordingly, one objective of this paper is to detail under what circumstances athletic competition has this power, namely, to be a setting for the demonstration of Aristotelian bravery, and to be a training ground for the eventual demonstration of paradigmatic Aristotelian bravery.

**Keywords:** Aristotle; Nichomachean Ethics; Virtue; Bravery; Habituation; Sport

**Bibliography:**


The median age of women artistic gymnasts at the 2020 Olympic Games in Tokyo was 21 years old. For the first time since 1968, gymnasts above the age of 20 outnumbered their teenaged competitors. I argue that this trend is not a result of increased age eligibility limits, but rather due to changes in the sport’s scoring system. The system, introduced in 2005, encouraged a trend away from the adolescent “pixies” of the past towards a more mature and powerful physique. Or is it the other way around? ‘It’s something of a “chicken or egg” question’, muses Dvora Meyers (2016), author of The End of the Perfect 10: ‘Which came first: the rules or the body that satisfies them?’ (111). By integrating historical and philosophical perspectives, I explore how the rules of women’s artistic gymnastics have shaped gymnasts’ bodies and, at the same time, how bodies shape the sport.

Keywords: body; embodiment; rules; regulations

Bibliography


In this article we explore the relationships amongst embodiment, ‘abjection,’ the protection of women’s sport and anti-doping sciences. There are three distinct parts of the paper. The first part explains the concept of ‘abjection,’ as it is not commonly used or broadly understood, and its similarities to the “Frankenstein Factor” from the bio-ethics literature. A clearer definition of ‘abjection’ is established and then applied to the area of doping in sport by reviewing David Fairchild’s article on the case of Ben Johnson, disgraced Canadian sprinter who had his medal stripped at the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympic Games. The purpose of this second section is to establish the connection between ‘abjection’ (and the ‘Frankenstein Factor’) and responses to it through the development and application of anti-doping sciences. The third part of the paper explores the application of the concept of ‘abjection’ to the protection of women’s sport, and that the concept of abjection can be applied to both examples. The purpose of this third part is to establish the connection between ‘abjection’ and responses to it through the development and application of anti-doping sciences. The conclusion of this article is that anti-doping sciences that have been used to prevent doping, and also used to help to protect and maintain the category of women’s sport, developed, in part, in the context of ‘abjection.’ Our increased understanding of the potential role played by the concept of ‘abjection’ as part of the motivation for these applications of anti-doping sciences, gives us a more comprehensive perspective of this very complex human reaction. The clarity that can be gained from understanding this reasoning can also help to shed light on current policy decision-making on protecting women’s sport.

**Keywords:** abjection; embodiment; women’s sport; doping

**Bibliography:**
Abstract: In recent years, various sports leagues and businesses increasingly took the initiative to engage in more environmentally sustainable practices (e.g., programming, renewable sources of technology, and recycling). Within this point, many organizations participate in sustainability to improve their bottom line, eliminate waste, decrease their impact on the environment and local infrastructure (e.g., water and electricity usage), and to enhance their image as part of corporate social responsibility or strategy programs (Heinze & Soderstrom, 2020; McCullough, 2020; McCullough & Kellison 2018). Of note, the automobile racing industry is one sport entity that has frequently endured criticism for its lack of social consciousness regarding sustainability (Trendafilova et al., 2014). Furthermore, the facilities they call home are more regularly critiqued for their designs and functions as not working enough to reduce their impact on the environment. As some examples, many scholars criticize automobile circuits for their inability to capitalize on renewable sources of energy such as solar, wind, hydro, geothermal, and biomass. The present study aims to study environmental ethics with respect to automobile race circuits/courses in Formula 1 and NASCAR to assess their actions related to sustainability and more specifically to their use of renewable sources of energy. Regarding environmental ethics, the current research discusses designs for intentional sustainable design provided by Stegall’s (2006) recognition of a philosophy of: resources, form and function, purpose, and spirit. Lastly, the current research examines Formula 1 and NASCAR race circuits within the Eco-Centric/Deep Ecology framework developed by philosopher Arne Naess (Breivik, 2019; Loland, 2006).

Keywords: Formula 1, NASCAR, Deep Ecology, Eco-Centric Ethics, Race Circuits

Bibliography:


During the World Cup in Russia 2018, Zlatko Dalić, coach of the Croatian National Football Team, pointed out two virtues as the most important for competitive success – humbleness and modesty. In his media appearances, he was continuously repeating the crucial role of two virtues as a necessary precondition for sporting success, but also as the proper attitude towards their opponents, the sport of football and the event of World Cup (McAuley, 2018; Jack Pitt-Brooke, 2018; Aarons, 2018).

In this paper, I will analyse two virtues from three connected viewpoints – Christian ethics, highly competitive sport, and the ideal of mutualism. Firstly, from the Christian ethics point of the view, I will show the role and importance of two virtues in Holy Bible (Philippians 2, 6-11) and Christianity per se (Benedict, 2008; Aquinas, 1981). Secondly, I will bring them into the context of sport as a highly competitive practice and show their possible significance for and role in sports (McNamee, 2002, 2008; Parry et al, 2007; Austin, 2014; Hurka, 2000). Finally, I will make two claims and provide rationales: 1) that two virtues actually raise the potential for the realization of mutualism, which is a sort of ideal of ethical competition (Kretchmar, 1975; Fraleigh, 1984; Simon, 2015; Lopez Frias, 2018); and 2) that Croatian National Football Team in Russia World Cup 2018 has actually achieved that ideal.

Keywords: Zlatko Dalić, Humbleness, Modesty, Virtues, Football, Mutualism

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Organized youth sport is, in the United States but presumably in other countries too, a prominent activity in contemporary society around which myriad of families structure their daily lives. The extent of participation in youth sport and the earnestness that surrounds it as well as its economy and concomitant effects have led journalists and scholars to declare that the United States is obsessed with youth sport. Rather than extolling its merits, this characterization of youth sport points to the problems besetting it.

One distinctive set of problems, among many, pertains to matters concerning coaches’ approach to managing youth sport, which necessarily refers to the manner in which coaches and athletes relate to and treat each other, and to the manner in which coaches allot goods, opportunities, and rewards. One example of such problems is the distribution of playing time. A recurrent complaint among young athletes, and their parents, is that coaches treat them unfairly by failing to give them as many opportunities to play as they think they deserve based on some indicators of athletic competence. A second example refers to the administration of physical activity as a form of punishment to a whole team for the behavioral infraction of a single, or a small number, of young athletes. Many young athletes, whether they have misbehaved or not, often protest that the administration of physical activity as a form of punishment and/or that collective punishment is unfair and inefficient.

The distinctive set of problems pertaining to matters concerning coaches’ approach to managing youth sport requires the consideration of “the comparative treatment of individuals;” (Frankena, 1973) that is, the conditions of justice. The goal of this presentation is to explore the permanent features of a just youth sport team. To put it differently, our concern here is with the requirements regarding the comparative treatment of young athletes that make a youth sport team a just social arrangement. The presentation begins with a characterization of childhood, youth, and youth sport. The section following the establishment of this framework articulates the permanent features of a just youth sport team. To do so, this section considers not only the particularity of childhood and youth, but also the goods and rewards that the different types of youth sport, with their unique demands and purposes, dispense. What emerges is an account of justice in youth sport that clarifies the different standards that the adults in charge of youth sport should emphasize and implement.

Keywords: justice; organized youth sport; team; ethics

Bibliography:


Much has been said and written on sport and there have been many definitions and theories as scholars in the field. However, not much is said on cruelty in sports. What I would like to explore in this talk is to present sport as a field of channeling or externalizing cruelty, as a field of transfiguration. This is not to reduce sport to this aspect, but rather to add to the phenomenon of sport. I will first establish a framework based on ideas from Nietzsche and psychoanalysis, specifically, Freud and Adler, and then apply their ideas to sport. Nietzsche may be the first thinker in the west to fully acknowledge destruction as an equal force to creation, not only in cosmos, but also in human life (Hinduism and pre-Socratic thought do give an account to the cycle of destruction as well). Ultimately, humans are destructive and cruel beings; the question is how we give an account of this cruelty and what we do with it for a healthy life for ourselves and for others. Nietzsche admired ancient Greeks and their agonism and Olympism, among other things, for this particular reason, namely that they were able to channel destruction, cruelty into something positive, something uplifting. About two decades after Nietzsche’s writings, psychoanalysis also acknowledged this dark, hard to be honest about aspect of human life: Adler addressed it as aggressivity, Freud as the death drive. From a psychoanalytic standpoint, we can sublimate our death drive—libido too is the energy of the death drive, Freud did not invent a different term for the energy of destruction—into different arenas of human experience, such as arts, science, or research as in academia. Or, we can transfigure it into arenas where cruelty plays itself out as cruelty. Transfiguration, Verklärung in Nietzsche’s German, and sublimation are not necessarily the same. Sport does present itself as a unique and a positive field for transfiguration: first, some fields are directly cruel, as in combat sports, second, there are lesser forms of cruelty as in other sports such as American football and ice hockey. Finally, they are positive expressions of cruelty because athletes are more or less equal and they are expected to play fairly; their cruelties are contextual and are often not abusive. They are all in it, ready to take in the cruelty and give it back when they can. I do not suggest that sport is the only form of such transfiguration, but it is a crucial one, a field of transfiguration that should be an example for all to overcome their abusive, one-sided, unjust cruelties.

Keywords: Cruelty, death drive, destruction, sublimation and transfiguration

Bibliography:
In 2019 Saginaw Valley State University (SVSU) was put on NCAA probation for 137 infractions. By all accounts, each of the violations were “clerical in nature” (Bernreuter, 2020, para. 8). No one accused SVSU of malicious intent, or of trying to gain an unfair advantage. Their overwhelmed staff, had, in essence, failed to “dot certain i’s and cross certain T’s”. Nevertheless, the NCAA reaction was swift and extreme (NCAA, 2019). Penalties included probation, fines, vacation of wins, and an outside audit of the school’s compliance department. Juxtaposing such a decisive reaction with the dithering and jurisdictional hand wringing that the NCAA put itself through in not punishing the decades-long academic fraud found at the powerhouse athletics Department at the University of North Carolina would bear significant philosophical fruit (NCAA Media Center, 2017).

Here, however, I want to focus on something different. The SVSU scandal was born of self-report, and was kicked off, at least in part, by a compliance bureaucrat noticing ex post facto that a box (certifying amateurism) on a byzantine NCAA online form had not been checked. No one disputed that the player was, in fact, an amateur, the dispute centered on whether or not a form had been filled out completely. Upon discovering an insignificant clerical error after the fact, is the compliance director obligated to report that error to the NCAA? Why? Failing to do so would not violate any kind of natural law or divine law. Failing to do some would not make the competition any fairer. What then ethnically compels a compliance director to report a regulatory clerical error?

In his landmark 1999 paper Are the Rules all a Umpire Has to Work With? John Russell (1999) argues persuasively, that: “umpires can legitimately use their authority to clarify and resolve ambiguities in rules, to add rules, and even at times to overturn or ignore certain rules, and that the exercise of such discretion is governed by principles underlying the games themselves and by an ideal of the integrity of games” (p. 28).

If Russell is right, if umpires have need of “discretion” (p. 28) to do their jobs well, if umpires must have more than the rules to work with to protect the “point and purposes which underlie the game” (p. 35), then NCAA compliance directors must need that same “discretion”. That is, what holds for the central type of athletic rule enforcement (game rules), certainly holds for a tertiary type of athletic rule enforcement (bureaucratic rules). If umpires have the authority to ignore certain parts of the rulebook when necessary, then certainly the bureaucrat has the same authority, when necessary, to ignore certain regulations. To fail to recognize this is to confuse the cart for the horse, for the point and purposes of intercollegiate sport are not, and never have been, reducible to “bylaw compliance”.


**Keywords**: justice, broad internalism, rules.

**Bibliography**:


The youth academy of professional soccer club KRC Genk is renowned for developing talents that progress to play at the highest level in Europe. During the season of 2020-2021, I led their academy task force to establish an innovative framework which guides staff and players towards the future of soccer. This framework resulted in the "KRC Genk Blueprint" which constitutes a philosophical vision of creativity, potentially contributing to the academic community engaged with the philosophy of sport.

The KRC Genk Blueprint is inspired by the work of Hannah Arendt, one of the most influential political philosophers of the 20th Century. In The Human Condition, Arendt distinguishes between three fundamental human activities: labor, work, and action (Arendt 1998). Labor refers to the activity of survival and satisfies the vital necessities of life. Work refers to the activity of building something artificial and useful. Action is ranked highest in the hierarchy of human activities and refers to the spontaneous initiative of doing something completely new and unexpected. Each of these activities translates into one of the central pillars of the KRC Genk Blueprint. Labor is converted to ‘readiness’ and provides players with the best possible conditions to perform, both physically and mentally. It also includes the values of ‘blue blood’ which correspond to the cultural ethos and identity of the academy. Work is converted to ‘method’ and provides players with specialized development plans, improving their weaknesses and perfecting their strengths. Ultimately, through the pillars of readiness and method, players are provided with both the structure and freedom to take initiative, excel in their unique qualities, and do the unexpected. This constitutes the third pillar and falls under the original category of ‘action’.

The main hypothesis underpinning the KRC Genk Blueprint is that the creative genius of each player resides in the existential capacity to take action, reminding staff not to reduce this capacity to predefined expectations. This is particularly urgent in response to the increasing use of technology and data to predict and preconfigure behavior in soccer (Dellea et al., 2014). This hypothesis in turn draws on a philosophical understanding of responsibility in terms of ‘response-ability’, that is, the exercising ability to respond (Jonas, 1984). In addition, it suggests that because each individual action includes the involvement of others, creativity is fundamentally plural rather than individual. This is reflected in the creativity of an ingenious pass, which synchronizes all players involved.

**Keywords** Soccer; Creativity; Hannah Arendt; Existential Phenomenology; KRC Genk

**Bibliography**


In his paper entitled “The Detective Story: A Case Study of Games in Literature” (1985), Bernard Suits responded to a call for an end to “the increasing volume of ‘loose talk’ about the importance of games or game models in literary criticism” (Suits 1985, 200). Offering some key ‘tight talk’ about games in literature, the purpose of his paper was twofold: first, to analyze the detective story as a game and second, to advance a possible general method for extending the game-concept as a tool of literary analysis to other forms of literature.

Appreciating Suits’ methodological suggestions, the purpose of my essay is to demonstrate the intriguing possibility that Suits’ own literary masterpiece – The Grasshopper: Games, Life, and Utopia (2014) – might be legitimately characterized as an example of “essentially game-structured fiction” (Suits 1985, 212). Emphasizing the elemental possibilities that the game-concept might arise in literature in the form of author as game-player, author as gamewright, reader as game-player, and/or reader as game-viewer, I begin with a summary of Suits’ analysis of the detective story as an exemplar for the game-concept in literature (Suits 1985, 200-212). Next, I offer an overview of Suits’ proposed general methodology for analyzing a literary form in terms of the game-concept. Then I extend Suits’ proposed methodology to The Grasshopper and argue that because the author of The Grasshopper can be conceived of as a player or gamewright and the reader of The Grasshopper can be conceived of as a player or viewer of a game, The Grasshopper is accurately characterized as an example of essentially game-structured fiction. I conclude with a brief exploration of the “analytical mileage” (Suits 1985, 217) that might be gained via the potentialities suggested by my literary analysis of The Grasshopper.

Keywords: The Grasshopper; Bernard Suits; literary analysis; game-structured fiction

Bibliography:

Los Angeles Lakers’ National Basketball Association (NBA) legend Kobe Bryant tragically died on January 26, 2020 in a horrific helicopter accident (along with his daughter and seven others). In May of 2021, NBA superstar, Michael Jordan presented the late Kobe Bryant into the Naismith Memorial Basketball Hall of Fame. In this paper, I argue that Bryant was a phenomenal basketball player, but we should tread lightly in how we eulogize him as a person and as athletic role model. In 2003, Bryant was charged with felony sexual assault. The survivor opted not to proceed to trial. Drawing on the work of Feezel (2005), Mumford (2012), and Reid (2017), I will notions of athletic heroes, moral exemplars, and athletes as role models in connection with Kobe Bryant.

In this presentation, I will also analyse the possibilities of celebrating Bryant’s basketball career as well as contextualizing the rape allegation. Contextualizing Kobe Bryant is complex and is messy. Bryant’s legacy should not be reduced to solely his outstanding basketball skills nor his advocacy for women’s sports (particularly basketball). When celebrating and eulogizing Bryant, in the era of #metoo, we must consider the 2003 rape allegation. At the crux of this case, victim blaming lingered, and some believed Bryant was framed because of his star athlete power. There are multiple layers of racism which also impact interpretations and stereotypes of Black men, Black male bodies, and Black masculinity and sexuality that need to be analysed. The work of bell hooks (2003) is especially helpful in breaking down the entrenched racism, and distrust with Black bodies that emerge from discussions about Kobe Bryant.

**Keywords:** Kobe Bryant, Black masculinity, Black sexuality, and athletes as heroes

**Bibliography:**


In On the Soul, Aristotle examines the nature of living things (particularly human beings). In doing so, he delivers some keen insights into the relationship between body and soul. When examining the nature of the five senses Aristotle (2004) says, “but with respect to touch he [the human being] is precise in a way that greatly surpasses the rest, and this is why he is the most intelligent of the animals” (421a 20-25). After delivering such a profound statement, however, Aristotle doesn’t go much further in explicating precisely what he meant by this. He later says that without touch, “it would be impossible for the animal to preserve itself” (434b16) but fails to tell us why this makes humans the most intelligent of the animals.

The most obvious and immediate interpretation is that our sense of touch is far superior than that of other animals and that this allows us to preserve ourselves more effectively than other species. However, is brute self-preservation really what makes us the most intelligent animals? How exactly is our sense of touch related to our intelligence? If such questions can be answered, what might be the implications for academic subjects like physical education and kinesiology? Perhaps part of what Aristotle was arguing was that it is our embodied nature which is the source of our intelligence and that our tactile, kinesthetic abilities, which rely on that nature, are themselves a powerful form of knowing.

If this is the case, then a richer understanding of both the phenomenology and epistemology of human movement will be required. In doing so, I will rely on two primary sources. In her book, The Primacy of Movement, phenomenologist Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (1999) explores the experiential reality of human movement and argues that without self-motion, consciousness is all but worthless. As a result, Sheets-Johnstone sheds great light on why Aristotle emphasized the relationship between intelligence and touch. Similarly, scientist-turned-philosopher Michael Polanyi’s (1962) theories of tacit knowledge and focal/subsidiary awareness will be of great use in showing that our movement capabilities, from the mundane to the extraordinary, are in and of themselves substantial forms of intelligence.

When we come to understand both the giftedness and the power of our capacities for movement we ought to begin seeing the fields of physical education and kinesiology in a new light. Realizing that without movement we couldn’t know anything and that our movement capabilities are among the most powerful and uniquely human forms of intelligence that we possess should elevate the academic status of physical education and kinesiology. If Aristotle is correct, then we owe much more to our embodied nature than we may realize. As Sheets-Johnstone (1999) puts it, “In the beginning is movement” (p. 138). We are movers before we are thinkers. We are thinkers only because we are movers.

**Keywords:** Embodiment, Touch, Intelligence, Physical Education, Kinesiology

**Bibliography:**


Critics of Bernard Suits’ Utopian thesis that the ‘ideal of existence’ is a life consisting entirely of gameplay, such as Thomas Hurka, hold that competing activities may have equal or greater autotelic value (i.e., they are independently valued; for their own sake) than gameplay in Suit’s Utopia. This threatens the uniqueness of the value of gameplay. If Hurka is correct, then Suits provides insufficient grounds for promoting gameplay to a position of ultimate value—for if an activity is not uniquely valued, it has no claim to being any higher in value than any other. Suits himself concedes as much at the end of The Grasshopper when he contradicts his earlier formulation of utopia, stating that “game playing need not be the sole occupation of Utopia.” (Suits 2014 [1978], p. 194) Nevertheless, although gameplay might not therefore consistently be argued to possess unique value, this mere fact does not ultimately threaten its autotelicity (independent value). Thus Suits can still consistently defend a moderate, but not totalizing, autotelic valuation of gameplay, and this position still holds promising implications for game design practice.

The perfectionist underpinning of Suits’ metaphysics of leisure implies that the games that will be most attractive to humans are those that promise the best exercise of our specific set of capacities as a species, in line with John Rawls’ ‘Aristotelian Principle’. This suggests an implicit Suitsian account of ideal game design practice, girded by his ‘Goldilocks Principle’ (favoring those games that are neither too easy, nor too difficult, to elicit capacities). The products of Suitsian game design would reliably instantiate autotelic gameplay, and a profusion of such well-designed games would constitute a more grounded, pre-utopian expression of his ideal of existence.

Worryingly, however, Randolph Feezell and others raise the challenging possibility that gameplay may be inherently atelic, or pointless, thus threatening the independent valuation of games. For if games are not goods-in-themselves, and if valuation on the grounds of their uniqueness has already been ceded, then any value they have must be purely instrumental—and the Suitsian game design program is a non-starter. Although Feezell ultimately discards this pessimistic position for a more value-positive view of gameplay, the theoretical threat remains, and so warrants a careful response. Accordingly, the question this paper addresses is whether simple acts of will—performances of ludic alchemy—suffice to diffuse Feezell’s existential threat to Suits’ autotelic valuation of gameplay.

Keywords: Bernard Suits; Randolph Feezell; Thomas Hurka; autotelicity; atelicity

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Philosophy of Sport 35: 142-155.


